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
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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON

BY LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK LX.

WATERLOO.

NOTWITHSTANDING all the exertions Napoleon had made during the two months which elapsed from the 25th of March to the 12th of June, the result was not equal either to his efforts, his expectations, or his wants. He had, in the first place, reckoned on having 150,000 men to encounter the English and Prussians on the northern frontier; then after the events of La Vendée he reckoned on 130,000; and in the end he was able to assemble only 124,000 combatants in his last struggle with fortune. Any one either theoretically or practically acquainted with the difficulties of government will consider this a surprising result. Thus, as was seen in the preceding volume, when Napoleon resumed the exercise of the supreme authority on the 20th of March, he found an effective army of 180,000 men, from which, subtracting the inefficient (that is the *gensd'armes*, the veterans, the staffs, &c., &c., amounting to 32,000), there remained 148,000 men, of which latter number there was left when he had supplied the *depôts*, and made the necessary subdivisions in the different parts of the country, not quite 30,000 men whom he could concentrate on any part of the frontier. This is the truth, and will not surprise any one who has held the reins of government in a great State.

Napoleon, in order to remedy this great deficiency as quickly as possible, had recalled 50,000 men, who were on six months' leave of absence, by which he increased his army from 180,000 to 230,000; and immediately after he recalled the old soldiers, who, instead of the 90,000 he had expected, brought him only an increase of 70,000 recruits, and this because a great number of them had entered the national guards. By this last measure

his effective force on the 12th of June did not amount to 300,000, but to 288,000, as 12,000 out of the 70,000 old soldiers were still en route to join the army. There still remained the conscription of 1815, which ought to yield 112,000, of which 46,000 could be called out immediately, and 66,000 when, as we have already explained, the law on this subject should be passed. The precautions needed with everything connected with the conscription prevented any one being yet called out on this claim. The mobilised national guards, who had zealously responded to the call of the State, had already furnished 170,000 men, of whom 138,000 had joined up to the 12th of June, and 32,000 more were ready to follow. Of the 138,000 national guards who had arrived, 50,000, formed into active divisions, composed the principal part of Rapp's corps on the Rhine, of Lecourbe's near B fort, and of Suchet's on the Alps. The remaining 88,000 were in garrison in the fortresses. The army of the line, the only really effective force, was reduced for the moment to 288,000, and by deducting the *gensd'armes*, veterans, &c., whom we have already mentioned, it did not amount to more than 256,000. It was divided as follows: 66,000 constituted the *d p ts* of the regiments, 20,000 were in Rapp's corps, 12,000 in Suchet's, 4,000 in Lecourbe's. (It has been already seen that the remainder of these corps were formed of the mobilised national guards.) Four thousand were in reserve at Avignon, 7,000 or 8,000 at Antibes under Marshal Brune, 4,000 under General Clausel at Bordeaux, and about 17,000 or 18,000 were in La Vend e. There remained 124,000 fighting men, who were to proceed to the northern frontier under the immediate orders of Napoleon, and all these were tried soldiers, all in their ranks, and not liable to those reductions which must be made in estimating the numbers of an army when the exact truth is to be known.

We must add that each succeeding day would add to the strength of these forces. Twelve thousand veteran soldiers were actually on their way to join, and there were besides, 46,000 conscripts from the levy of 1815, and 30,000 or 40,000 of the mobilised national guards, that is to say, about 100,000 men, a reinforcement that would allow of 40,000 or 50,000 recruits being withdrawn from the *d p ts* to strengthen the army of the line, and to add 30,000 to the active divisions of the mobilised national guards. One month would have sufficed to produce such a result, and by allowing two, an additional augmentation of 100,000 men would have been obtained, and the active army would have amounted to 400,000, and the mobilised national guards to 200,000 men. These troops were provided with every requisite. New muskets had been given to the soldiers of the line, repaired ones to the active divisions of the national guards.

The national guards in garrison in the different fortresses were obliged to content themselves with old muskets, which were to be successively repaired. The artillery were provided with every necessary, except that they had not a sufficient number of horses. On the 20th, Napoleon had at once procured 2000 horses, he had got 6000 from the peasantry, and raised 10,000 more, a number of which had been already distributed to the different corps. The northern army had 350 pieces of ordnance drawn by good horses, a sufficient number, allowing about three guns to every thousand men. The cavalry had 40,000 horses, which it was hoped to increase to 50,000. This corps was magnificent, all the men being tried soldiers, and all the horses good. Their uniforms were almost complete, whilst many in the line had but a vest and greatcoat. The national guards complained of the unfitness of their uniforms, a blue blouse with a coloured collar, which exposed them to the risk of being treated by the enemy as revolted peasants, and not as regular soldiers. The prefects, being very much occupied in these first moments of bustle, and often without sufficient funds, were not able to remedy a defect which, as being a source of danger, excited great discontent amongst the national guards, though it did not detract from their patriotic feeling.

Thus had Napoleon, in the space of two months and a half, raised France from a state of prostration; for whilst on the 20th of March she could not assemble an important force on any one point, on the 12th of June 124,000 men provided with every necessary were assembled on the northern frontier, and able, if fortune were not unpropitious, to give an entirely new aspect to affairs. On the Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps, she had the nuclei of armies, which with some additions would enable Napoleon to assemble at once forces sufficient in number to meet the enemy. The fortresses were well garrisoned, and each succeeding month would have added a fresh 100,000 to the defenders of the soil. Some severe critics have asked why 40,000 men had been divided between the corps of Rapp, Lecourbe, and Suchet, where they did not form real armies, whilst joined with Napoleon they would have decided the victory. Such criticisms are altogether groundless. The Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps could not be left undefended; in these places it was necessary that forces should be maintained, which, being quickly reinforced if danger should threaten in that direction, would be able to arrest an invading army. Napoleon had formed them for the most part of mobilised national guards; but these needed some aid, and 20,000 of the line added to Rapp's corps, 4000 to Lecourbe's, and 12,000 to Suchet's, would give them greater consistence, and furnish them besides with artillery, cavalry, and engineers, which

were not to be found amongst the mobilised national guards. Thus Rapp had from 40,000 to 45,000 men, Lecourbe from 12,000 to 15,000, Suchet from 30,000 to 32,000, and if Napoleon, after conquering the Prussians and English, should turn to the Rhine to attack the Austrians and Russians, who were advancing towards the eastern frontier, he would find already assembled there the nucleus of an army which by the addition of 70,000 or 80,000 soldiers that he would bring with him would amount to 120,000 men. Certainly less could not be done for the Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps; and in doing this he had but done what was absolutely indispensable, at the same time that he had sufficient resources to strike a decisive blow in the north. Of all generals, ancient or modern, not one understood so well as Napoleon how to distribute his forces so as to provide for everything without doing more than was indispensable, reserving at the same time a large force for decisive operations. These facts are not by any means weakened by our misfortunes in 1815.

What we have said shows how great would have been the folly of hastening to the Rhine on the morrow of the 20th of March to take advantage of the enthusiasm excited by the miraculous return from Elba. Had Napoleon done so, he would have met forces triple and quadruple the strength of his own; he would, by going so far, have made the reconstruction of our regiments more difficult and almost impossible, and finally, he would have turned against him all those who desired that every means of preserving peace should be tried, and who would not pardon his going to war unless it was absolutely inevitable. But if it were wise to wait until our forces were drawn from the inefficient state in which they were on 20th of March, and until the hostile dispositions of Europe were no longer doubtful, there remained an important question, whether having waited until the middle of June, it would not have been better to wait until the middle of July or August, when our forces would have been completely organised.

In fact, as Blucher and Wellington had determined to remain inactive at the head of the northern columns until the eastern column, under Prince Schwarzenberg, could be brought into action, a month would have been of the greatest importance for the development of our resources. The old soldiers, the conscripts of 1815, the mobilised national guards, would all have joined, by which we should have had an additional 100,000 men, who would have almost all been drafted into the active army, and Napoleon would have had 200,000 instead of 124,000 men under his command. If, whilst thus waiting, he had, as in 1814, allowed the enemy to advance into the heart of our provinces, the two armies of our enemies could not have

been able to reach, the one Langres, the other Laon, before the 1st August. The dépôts in retiring would have added large numbers of men to the different regiments; Rapp, evacuating Alsace, would have joined Napoleon, who would thus have 250,000 men under his immediate command. Meanwhile Paris would have been filled with sailors, federalists, and men from the dépôts, and might have accumulated 100,000 defenders. Lyon, surrounded by solid fortifications, would have been filled with sailors from Toulon, with national guards from Dauphiné, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne; Suchet, with Lecourbe, would have appeared before Lyon with 50,000 men; and then, whilst Suchet at Lyon defended the south, Napoleon at the head of 250,000 men, and Paris well defended in his rear, would have defended the north, and there could be no doubt of the result of the campaign, even though, as it was asserted, that the invaders amounted to 500,000, of whom at least 100,000 would have been detained in the rear. Now, when it is remembered what Napoleon effected in 1814 with 70,000 men, whilst Paris was undefended by a single cannon, general, or soldier, and Lyon abandoned to the incapacity of Augereau, we must repeat that it cannot but be regretted that he had not confined himself to the defensive instead of acting on the offensive. But acting on the defensive, however advantageous it may seem, had very serious drawbacks. The eastern and northern provinces, the fairest, richest, and most devoted of all France, would have been sacrificed without striking a blow, their immense resources abandoned to the enemy, and themselves exposed to a second invasion, after having suffered so much from the first, and this at a time when they had furnished nearly 170,000 mobilised national guards, who would be led into the interior, whilst they left their wives, children, and property exposed to the enemy. This, besides being an immense sacrifice, would have been both cruel and ungrateful, and an acknowledgment of impotency to the people of France, who were tortured with anxiety, and who would be justified in believing that such conduct was an avowal of weakness on the part of the government. The liberal and revolutionary party would have been dejected and dispirited, whilst the royalists would have become more audacious than ever. The Parisians and members of the chambers, already sufficiently anxious, would have become more excited, embittered, and still more disunited. Had Napoleon abandoned Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Champagne to the enemy, after having deprived them of their best defenders, he would have done little less than proclaim his own weakness, encourage his enemies, dispirit his friends, keep the country and himself in a state of painful anxiety for two months, and abandon the chambers to all the vacillations consequent on a state

of terror : all this would have occasioned serious disadvantages ; and even without taking Napoleon's natural impetuosity into account, it is evident that any other plan would have been more agreeable to him.

And there was one of whose expediency he had no doubt, and on which he meditated with all his own peculiar force of thought. The two invading columns were a hundred leagues apart, and besides this, the eastern column would not be ready for action before the middle of July, that is a month later than the northern, so that they would be prevented both by distance and time from assisting each other. Wellington and Blücher were encamped along the northern frontier behind Charleroi, and though near each other, were not so much so but that it would be possible for the accomplishment of some great design to penetrate between them. The one had his base of operations at Brussels, the other at Liège. They had tried to keep up a communication by stationing numerous posts on the left and right of La Sambre, which flowed between them ; but they had done this after the manner of second-rate minds, who have rather glimpses than defined views of things, whilst Napoleon at Paris, with that clear glance which nature had made so prompt and experience so sure, saw where he could penetrate between their badly united camps, attack first the Prussians, drive them back upon the Meuse, and then the English, whom he would force to retire towards the sea, and by this one blow produce an advantageous change of opinion in Europe, operating on the spirit of party that divided the British Parliament at London, and on the apprehensions of the Austrians at Vienna. Having conquered the northern column, he could return to that on the east, and having, between fighting and conquering, passed that month that was to bring him an additional hundred thousand men, he would have made a better impression upon these, and possibly increased their numbers, and then falling with them on Prince Schwarzenberg, he might probably force him back to the Rhine, and then, if he were not too exacting, he might obtain peace from the disconcerted policy of Europe. Supposing even that Napoleon deceived himself, that this daring offensive movement had not the expected success, there was nothing to prevent his return to the defensive, that is, to disputing the French soil foot by foot, as he had done in 1814, and after having exhausted all the chances of the first plan, he could return to the second without compromising his position. Having fought in defence of Alsace, Franche-Comté, Lorraine, Burgundy, and Champagne, these provinces could not complain of his abandoning them, and by thus trying the offensive before having recourse to the defensive, he would not have neglected a single favourable chance for the country or for himself.

There was but one objection to this plan, but that was a serious one. In tempting fortune so boldly in the midst of the English and Prussian forces, he ran the risk of a great defeat, and then all these resources so laboriously accumulated would, together with the government itself, be annihilated. This was Napoleon's reason for objecting to the immediate assembling of the chambers, for a defeat might throw them into a kind of frenzy. But the thing was done, and it was necessary to give a better tone to the chambers, the country, and all, by endeavouring to obtain a decisive success as soon as possible. Napoleon's superior powers of penetration showed him how this decisive success might be achieved, and he now sought it with all that impatience peculiar to generals inspired by genius. Political genius manifests itself in most cases in knowing how to wait for a favourable opportunity; but military inspiration sees at a glance where a blow can be struck, and strikes at once. Thus whilst the greatest politicians have been distinguished for their patience, the greatest generals have signalled themselves by promptness in action. Each order of mind has its own inconveniences, and acts according to the laws of its nature. Napoleon, therefore, influenced by the peculiarities both of his own nature and of the position in which he was placed, determined to attack the English and Prussians with the 124,000 men under his immediate command, and afterwards aided by the reinforcements he expected, to attack the Russians and Austrians. This plan he formed early, and meditated on with incredible profoundness of calculation, and as we shall soon see, it was singularly successful at its commencement.

Whilst the Prussians had their base of operations at Liège, and the English theirs at Brussels, with a line of communication kept up by posts on both sides of the Sambre, Napoleon had his 124,000 men extended in a long line of encampment from Lille to Metz, with his rearguard at Paris. It was necessary to concentrate these forces rapidly, that is, to assemble them within a space of two or three leagues, and this without alarming the carelessness of his enemies, or at least allow them but to half suspect his intentions, and so induce them to confine themselves to half measures. The first corps was at Lille under the command of d'Erlon, the second under Reille at Valenciennes, the third under Vandamme at Mézières, the fourth under Gerard at Metz, and the sixth under Lobau at Paris, so that there were a hundred leagues between d'Erlon to the left and Gerard to the right, and sixty between the van and the rear. To concentrate these forces under such circumstances was no easy matter. Let us see what measures Napoleon took to secure the successful result of this operation.

The movement of the troops through Soissons, Laon, and Maubeuge, in proceeding from Paris to the frontier, could give no intimation of Napoleon's designs, as it was the route by which other regiments had been passing for a month. Besides, a great portion of the enemy's forces being on the northern frontier, it was natural that the French troops should march in that direction, as others had advanced towards Metz, Strasburg, and Lille.

In order to ascertain the truth, it would have been necessary to calculate what number had passed by each of these routes; but the adverse party is never either sufficiently well informed or sufficiently vigilant to make such calculations, or clear-sighted enough to draw from them correct conclusions, excepting when headed by a man of genius. Napoleon had consequently sent off successively the divisions commanded by the Count de Lobau and those of the guard with all the matériel of the artillery, undisturbed by any other apprehension than that the allied generals might divine that an army was being assembled in the north of the kingdom, which could cause no surprise, as it was in that direction that the bulk of the English and Prussian troops was collected. The movement most likely to excite suspicion was that from the left to the right, from Lille to Maubeuge, and that from the right to the left, from Metz to Maubeuge, for these might reveal his design of concentrating his forces in the direction of Maubeuge, and of afterwards marching on Charleroi. Gerard's corps, being the most remote, was the first put into motion; but fortunately the number of the enemy before Metz was very small, consequently little was to be feared from their vigilance or the transmission of intelligence. Napoleon ordered General Gerard to quit Metz on the 7th of June with all possible secrecy, to close the gates, and take special care that no person quitted the fortress. He was to direct his course to Philippeville without allowing any of the officers to know whither he was going. Nobody, with the exception of the war minister, was acquainted with the plan of the campaign, and General Gerard himself, spite of the confidence which he had earned, only knew one fact, that he was advancing on Philippeville. General d'Erlon, the most remote from the centre, next after General Gerard, had orders to put his troops in motion on the 9th, that is to say, two days later than Gerard's corps, and to advance from Lille to Valenciennes, observing in like manner the greatest secrecy. General Reille was to set out from Valenciennes on the 11th of June as d'Erlon approached the town, and advance towards Maubeuge, which Vandamme, who was at Mézières, could reach in a very short time. However, as the movements from Lille to Valenciennes, and from Valenciennes to Maubeuge, might awaken

suspicion, Napoleon conceived an ingenious mode of deceiving the Duke of Wellington, to whom he gave credit for possessing much more penetration than Marshal Blücher. He foresaw very clearly that the British general, having come by sea, and depending on the sea for his reinforcements, would take every precaution that he should not be cut off from this base of operation. He therefore ordered that the mobilised national guards should issue from Lille, from Dunkirk, and the neighbouring fortresses, and make such a movement towards the advanced posts of the enemy as might indicate serious operations. This movement was so arranged that it was distinctly visible and apparently directed towards the coast, so that if intelligence arrived of the departure of the troops from Metz and Mézières, it might be supposed that the general tendency of the French troops was to advance towards Lille, Ghent, and Antwerp. Besides, intelligence of these indications of our march—supposing the enemy to be more vigilant and better served than was the case—would not reach the headquarters at Brussels for two, three, or four days after being received, and moreover, this intelligence would be so contradictory that it would disturb without enlightening, and could not lead to the adoption of any line of conduct before the concentration of the French troops would have been effected. All the French corps were consequently advancing to their destination when Napoleon left Paris on the 12th of June.

Having left the Palace of the Elysée at half-past three in the morning, he stopped for a few moments at Soissons, where he inspected the works erected to defend that place from a *coup de main*, gave, according to custom, a number of orders, and passed the remainder of the day at Laon. The next day, the 13th, he examined the position where he had fought the sanguinary battle the preceding year, gave orders for what would be necessary to secure possession of the place in case of a forced retreat, and on the evening of that day he slept at Avesnes. After inspecting the state of the magazines here, and listening to the report of his spies, who informed him that the enemy was perfectly quiet, he rested on the evening of the 14th at Beaumont, in the centre of a vast forest that bordered the frontier. The accounts of all our *corps d'armée* were excellent. Gérard had marched across Lorraine and the Ardennes without the slightest intimation of his movements having reached the Prussians. Some intelligence of what was going on at Lille and Valenciennes had reached the enemy; but the strong demonstration made before Lille had induced the belief that the French had designs on Ghent, and probably on Antwerp. Napoleon had all his *corps d'armée* around him, within a distance of five or six leagues from each other, masked by a dense forest, and unperceived by the enemy,

judging by their immobility. We shall describe how the corps were located on the evening of the 14th.

Count d'Erlon was stationed on the left, at Solre-sur-Sambre, with the 1st corps, comprising about 20,000 infantry; and on the same line General Reille was encamped at Leers-Fosteau with the 2nd corps, 23,000 strong. These two generals were to form the left wing of the army, which would thus amount to between 43,000 and 44,000 infantry. On the right, but at twice the distance, because he came from Metz, General Gerard had passed the night at Philippeville with the 4th corps, comprising an effective body of from 15,000 to 16,000 combatants. These were intended to form the right wing of the army at a later period, after receiving various reinforcements. Lastly, in the centre, that is to say, at Beaumont, were Vandamme, with the 3rd corps, that had come from Mézières, and which amounted to 17,000 men; the Count de Lobau, with the 6th corps, that had been raised at Paris, and which was reduced to 10,000 men by the detachments sent to Vendée; lastly, the guard, comprising 13,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 2000 artillery, amounting in all to 20,000 fighting men. Napoleon leaving, as was his custom in all his campaigns, to each *corps d'armée* only as much cavalry as was absolutely necessary, had divided the bulk of this branch of the army into four special corps, comprising the light cavalry under Pajol, the dragoons under Exelmans, the cuirassiers under Generals Kellermann and Milhaud, the four corps composing a superb reserve of 13,000 tried cavalry, which he intended to employ as circumstances should require. Having neither Murat, nor Bessières, nor Montbrun, nor Lasalle to command them, some of these generals having succumbed to fortune, others to death, he selected Grouchy, who had a short time before been created marshal. Grouchy was a good cavalry officer, more competent to execute than to plan a military movement, in a word, more proper to obey than to command. To these troops must be added 4000 or 5000 soldiers attached to the artillery parks and trains, completing the effective force assembled round Beaumont. Never had so difficult a military operation been so successfully effected, for 124,000 men and 350 pieces of cannon had been concentrated on the borders of a forest whose density alone separated them from the enemy. And yet this enemy was unaware of their presence.

The moral disposition of the troops, as regarded devotedness to their chief and ardour for battle, exceeded anything ever before witnessed. There was not a man amongst them who had not seen service. The most inexperienced in those ranks had made the campaigns of 1814 and 1813. Two-thirds were veteran soldiers, returned from remote garrisons, or from Russian and English prisons. Authors of the revolution of the 20th of

March, they still burned with the fanaticism of that period.* No sooner did they behold Napoleon than they exclaimed, "Long live the emperor!" with a fervour at once military and patriotic. The recalled half-pay officers shared the sentiments of the soldiers. Unfortunately the regiments had been recast several times, first under the Bourbons, then under Napoleon, and there were to be found in them a number of officers strangers to the regiment, though having seen much service, and who were not sufficiently well known by the men they were appointed to command. This was one of the grounds for the general distrust that prevailed with regard to the officers. It was a common opinion in the ranks that not only the marshals, but the generals and many officers of a lower grade had come to terms with the Bourbons, that Napoleon's return from Elba had been a disagreeable surprise for them, and that consequently their fidelity in the approaching struggle would be at least doubtful. This opinion, which was true in some respects, was false in others, for officers of high rank, though they had beheld Napoleon's return with regret, were for the most part incapable of betraying him, at least before fortune should have declared against him. It cost them a struggle to attach themselves again to his cause; but they felt that their honour and the glory of France were at stake, and they were ready to fight to the last. Nor must we forget that there were amongst the officers many who had contributed to the revolution of the 20th of March, and these were ready to combat, not alone with courage, but with passion. Still the soldiers, fanatically attached to Napoleon, had little confidence in their officers. It was a general belief that some of them held communication with Ghent. All who did not express themselves with as much ardour as the soldiers became immediately objects of suspicion. The bivouacs were become, to all intents and purposes, clubs where the soldiers and officers talked politics and discussed the conduct of their generals, as partisans discuss the proceedings of their political chiefs. These dispositions, though they did not detract from the military ardour of the combatants, acted injuriously as regarded the spirit of subordination, unity, and tranquillity. In a word, this army, though inflamed with military enthusiasm, wanted cohesion; but Napoleon acted as a combining force, and when he appeared the army recognised in him its centre of unity. All were delighted at the prospect of encountering the enemy on the morrow, and of avenging the disasters of 1813 and 1814,

* General Foy, in his military journal, to which his son has been so obliging as to give me access, writes on the 14th of June: "The troops exhibit not patriotism, not enthusiasm, but an *actual mania* for the emperor and against his enemies. No one doubts that victory will declare for France."

and never was beheld more noble and touching victims than these soldiers, all eager to pour forth their blood in the sacred cause of patriotism.

Napoleon was determined to satisfy the ardour of his soldiers, and to lead them that very night into the midst of the English and Prussian bivouacs. As he had foreseen, the two allied generals, though asserting that it was necessary to remain as close as possible to each other, had, however, neglected to guard the connecting space between their encampments, and had not taken the precautions necessary to prevent an adverse entrance. The Duke of Wellington was wholly engrossed with the design of covering the Low Countries, Blucher was equally anxious to defend the route to the Rhenish provinces, and each had taken up a position conformable to the object he had in view. The Sambre, flowing from the French position towards that of the allies, and uniting with the Meuse near Namur, separated the camps of the two allied generals. Blucher, with four *corps d'armée*, each consisting of about 30,000 men, forming a total of 120,000 combatants, occupied the banks of the Sambre and the Meuse. Bulow was at Liège, with the 4th corps; Thielmann, with the 3rd, was stationed between Dinant and Namur; and Pirch, with the 2nd, was at Namur. Ziethen, with the 1st corps, actually touching our frontiers, had two of his divisions at Charleroi, and his outposts beyond the Sambre, skirting the forests of Beaumont which hid us from his observation. The two other divisions were in the rear of Charleroi, communicating by patrols with the English army, stationed so as to protect the Low Countries. A fine paved road led from Namur to Brussels through Sombrefe, Quatre-Bras, Genappe, Mont St. Jean, and Waterloo. This route consequently formed the most important means of communication for the allies, as it was on some point of it that the Prussians and English should unite for mutual assistance. They had actually promised to repair thither should they be threatened on that frontier, for Charleroi was only five or six leagues distant from the great road leading from Namur to Brussels. By turning to the left on leaving Charleroi you reached this route at Quatre-Bras, and thence lay the highroad to Brussels. By turning to the right you reached Sombrefe, whence lay the route to Namur and Liège. It was on this account that the Prussians kept two of Ziethen's divisions at Charleroi, and the others at Fleurus and Sombrefe.

The Duke of Wellington had under his command 100,000 men, English, Hanoverians, Dutch-Belgians, Brunswickers, and subjects of Nassau. The English were old soldiers, tried by twenty years' warfare, and justly proud of their success in Spain. The most brilliant force in the British army, after the English, was the German legion, composed of the wreck of the ancient

Hanoverian army, recruited with Germans, and thoroughly warlike. The Dutch-Belgians, the Hanoverians properly so called, the Brunswickers, and the Nassau corps had been raised in 1813 and 1814 when all Europe rose against us; of these, some were organised as troops of the line, others acted as volunteer militia. The troops of the line were stauncher soldiers than the militia, but both were animated by intense hatred against France, and possessed boundless confidence in their commander. They were judiciously dispersed amongst the English troops, so as to participate in their solid discipline. In this mass, the English amounted to 38,000 men, the soldiers of the German legion to 7000 or 8000, the Hanoverian to 15,000, the Dutch-Belgians to 25,000, the Brunswickers to 6000, and the subjects of Nassau, much attached, as was natural, to the house of Nassau-Orange, to 7000.

The Duke of Wellington, as we have seen in the preceding volume, had endeavoured to persuade Blücher to delay offensive operations until the second invading column, composed of Russians, Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, &c., which was coming from an easterly direction, should have arrived at the same distance from Paris as the column that came from the north. In order to kill time and satisfy the restless ardour of the Prussians, the Duke of Wellington consented to undertake some sieges, and for this purpose some parks of artillery had been prepared. But whilst thus occupied they had taken but slight precautions to defend themselves against a sudden attack of the French. The Duke of Wellington, whose perspicacity was here at fault, had only thought of defending himself against an attack upon the coast, for which, however, there was no grounds of apprehension, for had Napoleon cut him off from Antwerp, he certainly could not have cut him off from Amsterdam, and consequently could not have deprived him of his base of operations; whilst, on the other hand, he had a manifest interest in separating him from Blücher, and of throwing his forces between those of the English and Prussians, and of engaging them one after the other. Of this latter danger, which was certainly the more real, neither the Duke of Wellington nor Blücher had the slightest suspicion. But taught by the lessons they had received from Napoleon, of the necessity of keeping as close as possible to each other, they had promised to meet on the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels in case an attack should be made in the direction of Charleroi. They were to hasten thither as quickly as possible, the one from Brussels, the other from Namur and Liège. The Duke of Wellington had divided his army into three bodies. That forming his right, under the command of the brave and excellent General Hill, extended from Oudenarde to Ath; another, under the brilliant Prince of

Orange, occupied the space between Ath and Nivelles, not far from Charleroi and the Sambre. The third body was kept as a reserve at Brussels. By this arrangement the Duke of Wellington had designed to put himself in a position to concentrate his forces either on the right in case of an attack in the direction of the sea, or on the left in the event of being called to the aid of the Prussians. But for the carrying out this double purpose his corps were too dispersed, for two or three days at least would have been necessary to combine them either on the right or the left. However this might be, in case of an attack in the direction of Charleroi against the English or the Prussians, the rallying-point had been fixed on the highroad between Namur and Brussels, and it was for the defence of this road that the Prussian corps of Ziethen had been stationed as we have described; two divisions at Charleroi on the Sambre, two others in the rear between Fleurus and Sombreffe.

On the evening of the 14th of June the English entertained none, or at least very slight suspicions of the designs of the French. It was merely known that there had been some movement on the frontier, but no one suspected the object or gravity of this movement. It was indeed a great and marvellous operation to have assembled within four or five leagues of the enemy an army of 124,000 men, coming, too, from places so remote as Lille, Metz, and Paris, and all this effected without the English and Prussian generals conceiving the slightest suspicion of the proceeding. The history of military warfare does not, that we are aware, chronicle a like phenomenon. Napoleon was not the man to lose the fruit of a first success by delaying to profit by it. He resolved to commence operations on the night of the 14th-15th, to advance suddenly upon Charleroi and surprise the place, which was probably ill-guarded, to cross the Sambre, and fall suddenly on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, certain that, however closely located to each other the English and Prussians might be, he would find them feebly defended at their point of junction, and would succeed in taking up a position between them with the mass of his forces. He had given minute directions that in the bivouacs everything should be kept as quiet as possible, that the fires should be kept low, and that no traveller or peasant should be allowed to pass, in order to retard as long as possible positive intelligence of our approach. Vague rumours had certainly found circulation; but these, as experience proves, seldom move the threatened enemy to decisive resolutions.

On the evening of the 14th, Napoleon gave the following orders. At three in the morning all our heads of columns were to move forward, so as to reach the Sambre about nine or ten o'clock. On the left, General Reille was to advance from

Leers-Fostean to Marchiennes, seize the bridge of Marchiennes, situate about half a league beyond Charleroi, cross the Sambre at that point, and be in a position to execute the ulterior instructions received from headquarters. Count d'Erlon, with the 1st corps, leaving his post two leagues beyond Solre-sur-Sambre, was to enter Marchiennes two hours after General Reille, and take up a position in his rear. In the centre, General Vandamme, quitting the environs of Beaumont, had positive orders to appear before Charleroi between nine and ten o'clock in the morning. General Rogniat was to march with him, accompanied by the engineers and marines of the guard, in order to break down the bridge and gates of Charleroi. General Pajol had orders to escort Rogniat with the light cavalry belonging to the reserve. Napoleon intended to accompany him at the head of four squadrons of the guard in order to see and direct everything in person. Count de Lobau had orders to set out with the 6th corps one hour after General Vandamme's departure, in order that the latter might have time to defile through the forest. The guard was to leave an hour after the Count de Lobau. The baggage carts were not allowed to accompany the different corps; orders were given that they should not move until all the troops should have defiled. Lastly, General Gerard, who had then only reached Philippeville, was to leave at three in the morning, fall suddenly on the Châtelet, two leagues below Charleroi, cross the Sambre at that point, and take up a position on the left bank, and there wait orders from headquarters. Thus between nine and ten in the morning 124,000 men were to rush from all points on the Sambre, both above and below Charleroi, and it would be strange if, concentrated within a space of two leagues, they did not succeed in piercing the enemy's line, however strong it might be.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 15th of June the entire army, with the exception of Vandamme, who, however, ought to have been the first to set out, was in motion. And yet there was no more skilful or able general than Vandamme, nor more devoted, if not to the cause of the empire, at least to that of the French Revolution. He was quite willing to fight, but he had not corrected his characteristic defects—violence of temper and love of ease. He had been compelled to quit Beaumont, to give place to the corps of Lobau, to the imperial guard and the emperor. After a considerable display of ill-humour, he had taken up a position on the right, and had ensconced himself in a country house closely sheltered from view. Marshal Soult possessed all the qualities that ought to belong to the head of the staff, except precision and experience; he had not, as Berthier would have done, expedited his orders two and three times in succession to make sure of their trans-

mission. The single officer despatched to Vandamme sought him during a long time, broke his leg in the search, and was not able to transfer his mission to another. Vandamme, unaware of what was going on, remained tranquilly sleeping in his bivouac. General Rogniat, having reached his quarters, expressed his astonishment at finding him stationary, and informed him that he ought immediately to advance on Charleroi. Vandamme, offended at General Rogniat's tone, told him sharply that he had not received instructions from headquarters, and that it was not from a junior officer that he was to take orders. However, spite of this reply, Vandamme prepared to march. But it took some time to awaken, assemble, and put 17,000 men in motion, and it was not until between five and six in the morning that the 3rd corps was advancing towards Charleroi. Having to defile by narrow paths through a dense forest and long straggling villages, Vandamme was not able to advance very rapidly, and his three hours' delay retarded in the same proportion the progress of the corps of Lobau and the guard that were to follow on the same route. Fortunately General Rogniat did not wait for the infantry, and finding himself sufficiently strong with Pajol's light cavalry, he advanced rapidly on Charleroi. Napoleon, annoyed at meeting on the road so many troops, all coming late to their destination, pressed forward with all possible expedition at the head of the four squadrons of the guard that accompanied him.

Meanwhile Pajol, scouring the country with his light cavalry, drove back the Prussian outposts, after making two or three hundred prisoners. Rogniat, who followed with some companies of engineers and marines of the guard, suddenly attacked the bridge of Charleroi, and seized it before the enemy had time to destroy it. He blew up the gates of the town and entered, thus opening a passage for Pajol. The latter passed through Charleroi at full gallop, and pursued the Prussians, who were hastily retreating.

Within a short distance of Charleroi the road branches off in two directions. That tending to the left joins at Quatre-Bras, that to the right, at Sombreffe, the highroad from Namur to Brussels, of which we have already spoken. The Prussians, anxious to keep possession of this road, by which Blücher and Wellington could combine their forces, retreated along the two branch roads that led to this highway, that is to say, the roads leading to Brussels and Namur, but the fugitives were most numerous on the latter route. Pajol despatched Colonel Clary with the 1st hussars along the Brussels route, and with the remainder of his cavalry he advanced towards Namur, closely followed by Exelmans' dragoons.

Whilst these events were taking place upon the route between

Beaumont and Charleroi, General Reille, who had left Leers-Fosteau at three in the morning with the 2nd corps, had encountered the Prussians at the entrance of the wood of Montigny-le-Tilleul, had defeated them, and made from three to four hundred prisoners. He immediately advanced on Marchiennes, seized the bridge and crossed the Sambre about eleven in the morning. He afterwards advanced as far as Jumel and Gosselies in the direction of Brussels. Here he paused to give his troops breathing time, and to await orders from headquarters. Count d'Erlon, who had to come from a more remote point with the 1st corps, had not yet reached the Sambre. On the right, General Gerard, having been delayed by one of his divisions, had not left Philippeville until a late hour, and whether on this account, or because of the distance he had to traverse, the day was far advanced when he arrived at the bridge of the Châtelet with the 4th corps. But these diverse delays were unimportant, as the Sambre was crossed at two points—Marchiennes and Charleroi—and Napoleon could in a few hours throw a body of 60,000 men between the English and the Prussians, so as to render their junction impossible.

Napoleon following closely Generals Rogiat and Pajol, passed through Charleroi between eleven and twelve o'clock. He did not stop there, but joined his light cavalry as quickly as possible. He advanced to where the Charleroi road divides into two branches, one leading to Brussels, the other to Namur. Fearing that Colonel Clary might not be sufficiently strong with his regiment of hussars to oppose the Prussians who had retreated in the direction of Brussels, he ordered General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who commanded the light cavalry of the guards, to support Clary with his division of 2500 horse, and he ordered General Duhesme, who commanded the infantry of the young guard, to send off a regiment as soon as it arrived, to support Clary and Lefebvre-Desnoettes. He at the same time despatched orders to his left, where Generals Reille and d'Erlon were placed, ordering them to press forward to Gosselies, and so accumulate large masses in the direction of Brussels, the point from which the English would make their appearance. General Reille, as we have just seen, having crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes, was marching towards Jumel and Gosselies, and could concentrate on this important point 23,000 infantry.

Having taken these precautions with regard to the Brussels route, Napoleon advanced along the Namur road, where he was to encounter the Prussians, and where they might be supposed to be very numerous, their headquarters being at Namur, that is to say, at a distance of seven or eight leagues; whilst the headquarters of the English, established at Brussels, were at a distance of fourteen leagues.

Of the two divisions of the Prussian corps of Ziethen that occupied Charleroi, one, the Steinmetz division, had retired along the Brussels route; the other, the division of Pirch II,* had retreated along the Namur route, passing through Fleurus and Sombrefe. The latter had stopped at the village of Gilly, situate on the Fleurus road, about a mile distant from Charleroi. Pajol had followed with the light cavalry, Exelmans with the dragoons, and Grouchy himself, at the head of the cavalry reserve, had taken the command of this advance guard. General Ziethen had orders, in case of attack, to resist, so as to retard our advance, but not to enter into a serious engagement. Seeing himself pursued by 6000 horse, he evacuated the village of Gilly, and took up a position behind a wide brook that, passing by the Abbey of Soleilmont, falls into the Sambre near the Châtelet. Acting under the orders of Ziethen, General Pirch had barricaded the bridge that crossed this brook; stationed two battalions in the rear, and several others on the left and right of the route in the woods of Trichehève and Soleilmont. He determined to await the French in this position, which enabled him to offer a prolonged resistance. Marshal Grouchy, on his side, though having under his command the divisions of Pajol and Exelmans, thought it better not to advance, for the cavalry was not sufficient to overcome the obstacle he had to contend with, and he would be exposed to an unprofitable loss of a large number of men.

Such was the position in which Napoleon found things on his arrival at Gilly. He quickly decided on a course of action with that correctness of judgment that never deserted him in military affairs. Before him lay a chain of wooded hillocks whose base was washed by the stream of Soleilmont. On the opposite side lay the plain of Fleurus, celebrated by the battle fought there by Generals Jourdan and Kleber, and where an encounter with the Prussians was now very probable, for the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels ran straight through it. Napoleon, who was very anxious for this encounter, in order to beat the Prussians before engaging the English, wished to secure an entrance to the plain of Fleurus; but he had no intention of occupying the plain, for that would have driven away the Prussians, a movement that would have defeated his designs. Up to this point everything had occurred as he had foreseen and wished. He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians, however much it might be their interest to remain in close proximity to each other,

* There were in the Prussian army two generals of the name of Pirch—Pirch I. and Pirch II. : Pirch I. commanded Blücher's 2nd *corps d'armée*; Pirch II. commanded a division under the orders of Ziethen, who was at the head of the 1st corps.

would, notwithstanding, leave between their respective forces a space not very strongly guarded, and he thought that by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point he might become master of the position. This calculation so profound was fully verified. La Sambre, which had been so happily snatched from the enemy, afforded a view of the space that separated the English and the Prussians. The French saw that they had the English on their left, in the direction of Brussels, their advance posts within five or six leagues, and the main body at a distance of twelve or fourteen. The Prussians were on the right, in the direction of Namur, their advance posts within two or three leagues, the main body at a distance of five or six. Napoleon's object in endeavouring to take a position between the English and the Prussians being to encounter them separately, it was necessary to do two things—to attack one of these two armies immediately, and to oppose an obstacle to the advance of the other whilst so engaged. The necessity of accomplishing these two designs was evident; but which of the two armies ought to be attacked first? The Prussians evidently; in the first place, because the Prussians were in closer proximity to us, and secondly, because, if we left them on our right, they would have come up on our rear and attacked us at a disadvantage during our engagement with the English. Besides, owing to the enterprising spirit of their chief, the Prussians would probably be impatient to fight, and would profit by their proximity to come to blows with us; whilst the English, by reason of the distance, and by reason of their natural sluggishness, would give us time to overwhelm their allies before coming to their assistance. But being placed under the necessity of first engaging with the Prussians, it naturally followed that instead of preventing them from taking possession of the plain of Fleurus, it would be more our interest to aid their design, as otherwise they might execute a great retrograde movement, and passing through Wavre, join the English in the rear of Brussels. Now, if the two allied armies operated a junction beyond Brussels, Napoleon's plan would be defeated, and his position rendered most dangerous; for he could not advance into Belgium, as he would have to retrace his steps to face the invading column that was coming from the east, and he could not encounter 220,000 men with 120,000 unless he could find the means of engaging them separately. If he found the two adverse armies combined, he would be obliged to recross the frontier with the consciousness that his plans had been defeated, and his tactics brought into contempt. It would therefore be imprudent to advance further than Fleurus in the direction of Namur; whilst, on the contrary, in the direction of Brussels, it was indispensable to take up a position which would prevent

the English reaching the battlefield on which we should fight the Prussians.

Ziethen's corps having, as we have said, taken up a position behind the bridge of Soleilmont, and in the woods that bordered the road on the right and left, it was absolutely necessary to dislodge them in order to become masters of the débouche of the plain of Fleurus, but not to go one step beyond. Napoleon therefore ordered Grouchy to force the stream, beat the woods, and reconnoitre the country as far, but not farther, than Fleurus. Having given these orders, he retraced his steps at full gallop to take cognisance of what might occur in the direction of Brussels. He sent orders to Vandamme, who had not reached Charleroi until noon, and who had spent two hours in traversing the narrow streets of that city, to hasten—in the first place, to make way for Lobau and the guard, and in the next, that he might come to the support of Grouchy. It was the 15th of June, the heat was suffocating; a portion of the troops had already marched five, the others seven leagues. But their ardour was not diminished, and they continued to advance rapidly in every appointed direction. After having given orders to Vandamme to hasten his march, Napoleon, advancing beyond the point where the Charleroi road bifurcates, advanced a short way upon the branch leading to Brussels. This branch road, as we have already said, joined at Quatre-Bras the highway leading from Namur to Brussels, forming the line of communication between the two allied armies. The possession of Quatre-Bras was therefore a question of vital importance, for it was at the same time the route by which the English army could join the Prussians, and the point where the English general could concentrate his own troops. We have already seen how the Duke of Wellington, having established his reserve at Brussels, had ranged in advance and in a semicircle the main body of his army, so that the troops under General Hill occupied the space between Oudenarde and Ath, and those under the Prince of Orange extended from Ath to Nivelles. Nivelles was consequently the point by which the English could combine their right with their left wing; besides, a paved road led from Nivelles by a very short journey to Quatre-Bras, so called on account of the roads that crossed at that point, and here—at Quatre-Bras—the English would meet their reserve arriving from Brussels, so that this was at the same time the rallying-point of the English with the Prussians, and the point of concentration for the English themselves. No spot, therefore, in this vast theatre of military operations was of equal importance. As it was naturally of as much value to us as to the allies, Napoleon looked upon it as essential to the success of his plan of operations that Quatre-Bras should be

invincibly occupied, in order that the English might not be able, by means of long and tedious detours, either to concentrate their own forces, or join those of the Prussians. It was influenced by these motives that no sooner had Napoleon taken possession of Charleroi than he sent forward in the direction of Quatre-Bras, first, Colonel Clary with a regiment of hussars, then Lefebvre-Desnoettes with the light cavalry of the guard, then one of the infantry regiments of the young guard, and lastly, the corps of Reille and d'Erlon, numbering 40,000 infantry and 3000 horse. All these forces were despatched to keep the English in check whilst Napoleon engaged the Prussians with 80,000 men. Whilst Napoleon was advanced a little beyond the point of bifurcation, urging forward the troops as much as possible, he perceived Marshal Ney coming in all haste, followed by a single aide-de-camp, Colonel Heymès. Napoleon, we must remember, had given him, after the 20th of April, a mission to the frontier, in order to diminish the embarrassment of his position by removing him from Paris, and this mission being accomplished, he had allowed him to remain at his country seat, which the marshal had quitted only for the ceremony of the Champ de Mai. Napoleon, too, we must remember, had exhibited some ill-humour towards the marshal on the day of the ceremony. Wishing, however, to profit by the marshal's great energy, he had sent him word, on leaving Paris, to join him as quickly as possible if he wished to be present at the first battle. Ney received this message so late that he had only time to take with him his aide-de-camp, Heymès, and set out for Maubeuge without any military equipage. Not having even horses, he was obliged to borrow those of Marshal Mortier, who was confined by illness at Maubeuge. The marshal consequently arrived, knowing nothing of the state of affairs, ignorant of what position he was to take, and of what troops he was to command. He was in a state of feverish agitation consequent on the discontent he felt with himself and others, and therefore not possessing all the calmness of mind necessary in difficult positions, though his extraordinary energy was never greater than at that moment. Napoleon having welcomed the marshal, told him that he confided the left wing of the army to him. This wing was composed of the 1st and 2nd corps—those of Generals Reille and d'Erlon—the cavalry divisions attached to these corps, the light cavalry of the guard, which was lent to Ney for the day with a recommendation to spare it. These forces comprised at least 45,000 men of all arms. Napoleon told Ney that with these troops already advanced beyond the Sambre, and a portion arrived at Gosselies, he was to drive back the enemy sword in hand, and take possession of Quatre-Bras, the key of the whole position. "Do you know Quatre-

Bras?" said Napoleon to the marshal. "I should think so," replied Ney; "I fought in this locality in my youth, and I remember that it forms the nucleus of all the roads." "Go, then," replied Napoleon, "and take possession of this post, by which the English might join the Prussians. Send a detachment in the direction of Fleurus to make observations."* Ney set out full of ardour, and apparently disposed not to lose time. It was then about half-past four. Napoleon having despatched Marshal Ney to Quatre-Bras, fell back in the direction of Gilly, where he had left Grouchy, Pajol, and Exelmans, waiting Vandamme's infantry, to attack the Prussian rearguard. His sole object in this direction was, as we have seen, to occupy the débouche of the plain of Fleurus, in order to be in a position to fight the Prussians there on the following day, and he would have carefully avoided going beyond that point, for by driving them on that day from the highway between Namur and Brussels he would have forced them to seek in the rear of Brussels a rallying-point with the English, which would have frustrated all his plans. He only intended to cross the stream of Soleilmont and take up a position on the opposite side of the wooded hills that enclose the plain of Fleurus. Vandamme had at length arrived with his infantry, and had drawn up his men behind Grouchy's cavalry. But neither he, nor Grouchy, nor Pajol, nor Exelmans wished to commence operations until Napoleon should arrive. They were inclined to think that the entire Prussian army lay on the opposite bank of the Soleilmont stream. And indeed, judging from appearances, it was only natural that they should entertain such a belief. General Pirch II., reinforced by some battalions of Jagow's division, had filled the woods on the right and left of the route with troops, barricaded the bridge, and ranged several battalions in serried columns behind. As it was impossible that any eye could penetrate the density of the woods, or see beyond the chain of hills, free scope was left to the imagination, a faculty that plays a conspicuous part in military warfare, and the French generals were at liberty to picture the entire Prussian army drawn up behind the intervening screen. But Napoleon's stern judgment, triumphing over his imagination, showed him, in the scene presented to his view, an enemy taken by surprise, who had not time to concentrate his forces. On the morrow the case would be different; but Napoleon was convinced that at that moment he had only two or three divisions before him, and

* I must here warn the reader that the assertion attributed to Napoleon in this recital is one of those that have been contested in the long and warm discussions of which the campaign of 1815 has been the subject. The truth of this assertion will be found discussed at considerable length in a note, page 26.

he believed that a *coup de main* would dislodge them from their post. He therefore ordered that the Prussians should be immediately attacked and driven from the position which they seemed prepared to defend.

The stream that separated the opposing forces flowed from the Abbey of Soleilmont, which lay on the left of the French, and running in front of them, flowed on towards their right, until it mingled in the Sambre, near the Châtelet. Marshal Grouchy ordered Exelmans' dragoons to march towards the right and ford the stream in order to turn the position of the enemy. At the same time three columns of infantry, one of the young guard, and two of Vandamme's corps prepared to carry the bridge. The Prussians, thus threatened with a front and flank attack, hastily retreated, their instructions being to retard the advance of the French, but at the same time to avoid any serious engagement with them. The French crossed the stream with little difficulty; but Napoleon saw with vexation that the Prussian infantry was about to escape him. In his impatience to overtake these troops he despatched after them the four squadrons of the guard then on service about his person. General Letort rushed upon the Prussians at the head of these four squadrons, overtook them at the moment when they were forming into squares in a clearing in the wood, broke and sabred one of the squares, and fell upon a second, whose ranks he also broke. Rushing upon a third, he unfortunately fell, pierced by the enemy's balls. The Prussians left some hundreds dead and wounded on the field, besides a loss of three or four hundred prisoners. But we paid dearly for this advantage by the loss of General Letort. He was one of our bravest, most intelligent, and most amiable cavalry officers. Napoleon regretted him, and justly, and at St. Helena immortalised his memory by the eulogium he pronounced upon him.

Exelmans' dragoons having completed the detour they were commissioned to execute on the French right, drove back the Prussians under Pirsch and Jagow, and did not pause until they reached the borders of the wood. An advance guard alone went so far as Fleurus.*

This result being obtained, Napoleon returned to Charleroi to learn what had occurred on his left wing and in his rear. He had not heard Ney's cannon, and he was surprised. He soon knew the cause of this inaction.

Ney, upon quitting Napoleon, had met in the neighbourhood of Gosselies, General Reille with four divisions of the 2nd corps,

* Marshal Grouchy, in one of his writings, complains that Vandamme would not advance further on that evening; but Napoleon, in refuting the work of General Rogiat, at St. Helena, gives reasons for stopping at this point, which fully justify General Vandamme.

that after having crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes, had continued to advance in the direction of Quatre-Bras. These four divisions, comprising more than 20,000 infantry, and extending over a league, were preceded by the light cavalry of Piré, which was attached to the 2nd corps, and by that of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, which belonged to the imperial guard. These two cavalry divisions amounted to 4500 men. Ney was consequently at the head of 25,000 men. At the appearance of this formidable mass, the division of Steinmetz, fearing to be cut off from the Prussian army if they persisted in defending the Brussels route, made a detour, by which they reached the Namur road, leaving Quatre-Bras undefended. Ney, who had received orders from Napoleon to advance in the direction of Fleurus, detached the Girard division to observe the division of Steinmetz, and then taking the Bachelu division, comprising 4500 infantry, with the 4500 cavalry of Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, he advanced at the head of these 9000 men. Having in his rear the infantry divisions of Foy and Jerome, amounting to 12,000 men, with the 20,000 of d'Erlon, he certainly had no grounds for apprehension. The distance from Gosselies to Quatre-Bras is about three leagues, which might be traversed in less than two hours and a half at a moderate pace. Reille's soldiers had, it is true, already marched seven leagues; but having set out at three in the morning, they had had fourteen hours to perform the journey, and had rested more than once on the way. They might consequently perform three leagues more that day without exhausting their strength. It was obviously within Ney's power to keep the promise he had made to Napoleon, and seize Quatre-Bras; but suddenly, whilst marching forward, he heard Vandamme's cannon thundering along the banks of the Soleilmont stream. It was about six o'clock, and Ney became very uneasy. He feared that Napoleon was engaged with the Prussians, in which case they must be in his rear. He began to hesitate and deliberate without coming to a determination.

In addition to the anxiety inspired by the cannon he heard, Ney had fresh cause of alarm. In approaching Frasnès, which is not far from Quatre-Bras, he perceived a mass of infantry which he believed to be English, though the men did not wear the English uniform; but Ney grounded his opinion on the circumstance that these troops advanced from the quarter where the English were stationed. He reasoned after the same fashion as Vandamme, Grouchy, Pajol, and Exelmans had just before reasoned at Gilly, when they believed themselves face to face with the entire Prussian army; and Ney thought that he was possibly in front of Lord Wellington's advance guard, which, drawn aside like a curtain, would suddenly disclose the

entire English army. Ney, spite of his constitutional bravery, had become, like most of our generals, vacillating, and was seized with a double fear, apprehending danger both in front and rear. He paused before the undefended road leading to Quatre-Bras, that is to say, he hesitated when the fate of France lay within his grasp, and which by extending his hand he could have decided.

What forces were at that moment opposed to him? Precisely what he saw and no more. In fact, the Duke of Wellington, who was still at Brussels, had during the morning only received vague reports, and had issued no positive commands. But the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who belonged to the Perponcher division—one of those that composed the corps of the Prince of Orange—had compensated for the instructions he had not received, and under the simple dictates of good sense, had advanced from Nivelles to Quatre-Bras with 4000 Nassau soldiers. Marshal Ney had in fact stopped short at the sight of 4000 foot soldiers of no great importance, when he was at the head of 4500 tried infantry, besides 4500 first-rate cavalry. Had he but made one step more in advance, he could have scattered the adverse detachment in the twinkling of an eye.

It certainly was only natural that Ney should believe that he was in presence of more than 4000 men; but then on the arrival of the other divisions under General Reille, he would have at his command a force of 20,000 men; and it was indeed a bad calculation to believe that the English army, taken by surprise at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, could have already received orders for concentration from Brussels, or if such had been received, that they could have been put into execution. In any case, having at his command 4500 cavalry, why did he not ascertain what force lay before him? A cavalry charge under any circumstances would have cleared up the mystery. Ney, who on the morrow and the next day showed himself again the bravest of the brave, was no longer the audacious general who at Jena and Eylau had plunged France into sanguinary combats by being too rashly forward. It is unfortunately no uncommon occurrence to see men become vacillating who had been formerly too daring. Ney did not advance beyond Frasnes, which is situate within a league of Quatre-Bras; he left there the Bachelu division with the Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoettes cavalry, and returned to Charleroi to acquaint the emperor with what had taken place.

Napoleon, who had mounted his horse at three in the morning, and had not alighted until nine in the evening, having been on horseback eighteen hours—though this exercise was painful on account of an indisposition from which he was at that time suffering—had at length taken some minutes' repose,

and was lying on a bed, where he listened to reports, and dictated orders. Again on his feet at midnight, he received Ney, who related what he had done, and explained the reasons why he had hesitated to act. Napoleon sometimes became angry without cause; but he was perfectly gentle in delicate and grave circumstances, not wishing to agitate men whom the position of affairs had already sufficiently disturbed. He did not utter a word of reproach against the marshal, though the inexecution of the orders he had given him was much to be regretted.* Besides, up to this point reparation was easy, and taken as a whole, the day's proceedings had been successful. Napoleon, bringing his army of 124,000 men a distance of one hundred leagues, had come unawares upon the English and Prussians, and had succeeded in taking up a position between

* This is a fitting opportunity to examine the diverse accounts to which the verbal orders addressed to Ney on the afternoon of the 15th have given rise. We shall do this as briefly as possible, for the edification of those who do not shrink from the tedium of a historical critique. In the first place, Colonel Heymès, Marshal Ney's aide-de-camp, has left a document which is certainly sincere, but drawn up for the purpose of proving that the marshal had not committed any error during these deplorable days. He asserts that Napoleon did not testify any displeasure towards the marshal on the evening of the 15th, that he supped with him, and treated him in a very friendly manner. After having consulted several ocular witnesses, we believe this statement to be correct. The error committed by the marshal was at that moment so easy of reparation that Napoleon, who stood greatly in need of his services, would have taken good care not to condemn his conduct except on very serious grounds. Napoleon's disapprobation was much greater on the following day, and openly expressed, as we shall presently see. It is our opinion that in these accounts of the reproaches addressed to Ney, the facts have been transposed, and that what occurred on the morrow has been placed to the date of the previous evening. But a question of far greater importance arises, which is, to ascertain whether Napoleon was justified in reproaching Ney, and whether he had given him positive orders to occupy Quatre-Bras. It has been denied, and it has been asserted, that Napoleon, in giving Ney orders to drive the enemy briskly towards the Brussels route, made no mention of Quatre-Bras. As for me, I firmly believe the contrary, and I shall adduce the reasons upon which I ground this opinion.

There are two bases upon which sound historical criticism rests—testimony and probability. I am about to examine whether these two species of proof can be brought to support the view I have adopted.

As to direct testimony, we have only Napoleon's, and none has been offered in contradiction.

Napoleon has written two accounts of the campaign of 1815—the one brilliant and unpremeditated, written before any discussion had arisen, dictated to General Gourgaud at St. Helena, and published under the name of that general; the other studied, thoughtful, more learned, more strongly coloured, but in my opinion not less veracious; both admirable, and bearing the stamp of immortality, as did everything that emanated from that powerful genius.

In both these works, Napoleon, in relating his colloquy with Ney, affirms, as the most natural thing in the world, that he expressly mentioned Quatre-Bras, ordering Marshal Ney to advance to that point with all possible expedition. In the first work, that which bears the name of Marshal Gourgaud, he gives with such minute detail his own words, and the replies of Marshal Ney, who affirmed that he knew the place, and recognised its importance, that it is in my opinion impossible to suppose that Napoleon has falsified the truth.

them, so that they would be compelled to fight separately. This must inevitably be the case, for he had the Prussians on his right, and in close proximity in the direction of Namur; and on his left, but at a greater distance, he had the English, in the direction of Brussels.

He was consequently convinced that by allowing his troops to rest during the night, he could on the following day attack the Prussians before the English would be able to come to their assistance, and thus fight both armies successively. It certainly would have been better if Ney had previously occupied Quatre-Bras, and thus rendered it absolutely impossible for the English to come to the assistance of the Prussians; but what had not been accomplished on the evening of the 15th might

Suborned witnesses do not lie more barefacedly before a police magistrate than he would have lied to posterity were his assertion false.

I feel no more admiration than others for the heavy yoke that Napoleon imposed upon France; but though loving liberty, I can do justice to a despot. Napoleon, whilst emperor, was often a dissembler, and not unfrequently had recourse to deception for the accomplishment of his designs; but at St. Helena, with history as his sole object, he has been more truthful than any of his contemporaries, because that he excelled them all in power of memory and in pride, and knew that his glory had a better basis than could be found in blaming his lieutenants. I therefore believe that he was faithful to truth on the point in question, which indeed was not even mooted at the time he wrote. When Napoleon was at St. Helena he was aware of Ney's sad fate, and always spoke of his errors with generous forbearance.

Does anybody contradict what he says? Not one. Did Marshal Ney deny it? By no means. It is true that there had been no discussion on this subject at the time when the heroic marshal fell pierced by the bullets of Frenchmen, nor had any other question been raised but that concerning the famous charge of cavalry he had led at Waterloo. There is nothing known concerning the marshal that can be opposed to Napoleon's testimony.

Major-General Marshal Soult was both an ocular and auricular witness of all that occurred. He alone had seen and heard everything, and he alone could give a faithful testimony. He frequently said, during his life, that on the afternoon of the 15th of June he had heard Napoleon order Marshal Ney to proceed to Quatre-Bras. Marshal Ney's son, the Duke of Elchingen, who died during the Crimean campaign, a young general deservedly regretted because of his great talents and honourable principles, undertook to defend his father's memory on every point, a memory in itself too glorious to need any extrinsic aid. But it was both natural and honourable that a son should defend his father with some exaggeration. The Duke d'Elchingen called on Marshal Soult, who, from a feeling that can be easily understood, would not remember, in presence of a son, that Napoleon on 15th of June had ordered Marshal Ney to repair to Quatre-Bras. The Duke d'Elchingen has related his conversation with Marshal Soult in a composition published under the title of "*Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815.*" But we have a witness quite as respectable, and diametrically opposite to him. General Berthézène, commanding one of Vandamme's divisions, relates in his interesting and truthful memoirs (vol. ii. page 359) that Napoleon, in the afternoon of 15th of June, gave precise orders to Ney to occupy Quatre-Bras, and that he was told this by Marshal Soult, an ocular witness of the conversation between Napoleon and Ney. When General Berthézène published this, Marshal Soult was alive, and could have contradicted his assertion.

We have thus one testimony of Marshal Soult contradicting the other; but if I had to choose between the two, I should rather believe that of 1818, an epoch much nearer to the time when the event referred to took place, and

be done on the morning of the 16th whilst Napoleon would be engaged with the Prussians, and might be even effected in time to allow Ney to bring some detachments to Napoleon's assistance, the more especially as they would be fighting in each other's rear. It may therefore be confidently asserted that the plan was completely successful, since, notwithstanding Ney's vacillation, we had interposed an army between the Prussians, whose forces were only half concentrated, and the English, who were completely dispersed. In any case, if there were any failure in the day's arrangement, it was through Ney's fault, for from five to eight o'clock he would have had time to occupy Quatre-Bras with Reille's 20,000 men, supported by the 20,000 of d'Erlon. Besides, Napoleon, satisfied with the general result, and not seeking faults where it would be of no service to find them, spoke in a friendly tone to the marshal, and at two in the morning sent him to Gosselies, impressing on him the importance of Quatre-Bras, and promising to send him precise orders when he should have received and commanded when the presence of a son, solicitous, so to speak, that the memory of his father might be spared, was not thrown into the balance.

Taking no heed therefore of a doubtful testimony, there still remains Napoleon's assertion, given spontaneously, and which bears in the highest degree the impress of simplicity and truth.

But probability still remains, superior in my opinion to all human testimony.

To make it probable that Napoleon at four o'clock on the afternoon of the 15th had not thought of Quatre-Bras, and had sent on Ney without appointing him a definitive position, it should be believed that Napoleon had not consulted the map, or that he was the dullest of men. The reader can judge whether either of these suppositions is founded on probability.

Of all generals whose memory history has preserved, Napoleon is supposed to have been he who studied his charts most. This is known to all who lived with him, or have read his orders and correspondence. It was this constant study of maps that made him the greatest warrior in all that concerned general movements, which he called the sublime part of the art of war. In the present instance he must have studied his position profoundly to have chosen so correctly Charleroi as his basis of operation, from which he could penetrate the encampment of the enemy, and place himself between the two allied armies. He had chosen Charleroi because from this point he could pounce at once on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, and which formed the line of communication by which the enemies could combine their forces. He had there two points to choose between : Sombreffe, if he turned to the right, in the direction of Namur ; Quatre-Bras, if he chose the left, in the direction of Brussels. He could arrest the Prussians at Sombreffe, and the English at Quatre-Bras. He did still more at Quatre-Bras—he prevented that portion of the British army which was stationed at Nivelles in front of Ath from joining the reserve at Brussels. Quatre-Bras was consequently of more importance than Sombreffe, and whilst he intended to advance to Sombreffe by Fleurus, he would not think of reaching Quatre-Bras by Frasnes. But this is not all. At that moment he was not anxious to oppose the progress of the Prussians ; he was rather disposed to allow them to debouch, that he might attack them at once ; whilst that with regard to the English, he was most desirous of restraining them at any risk, in order to prevent them from assisting the Prussians. This he considered of so much importance that he sent on this service the principal forces that had already passed the Sambre, that is, those of Reille, d'Erlon, Piré, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, amounting to 45,000 men, and he would have combined this imposing mass, placed it under the command of the

pared the reports of his lieutenants. He then threw himself on a bed to take two or three hours' rest, whilst he allowed the troops to repose during seven or eight hours, which indeed they needed after the day's march, and as a preparation for the combat of the morrow.

At this moment the French army was stationed as follows: Grouchy, on the right, with Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons, passed the night in the wood of Lambusart, having a simple advance guard at Fleurus; Vandamme, having performed a march of seven or eight leagues under a burning sun, was encamped a little in the rear, but in advance of Gilly. On the extreme right, Gerard, with the 4th corps, had seized the bridge of the Châtelet, but had not arrived until very late, as he had to wait the arrival of one of his divisions at Philippeville, seven leagues from the Châtelet. He was stationed on the Sambre with half his corps on either side.

The foot-guards of the centre had crossed the Sambre; but the horse-guards, the heavy cavalry of reserve, the 6th corps vigorous Ney, merely to send them forward without a definite object! And he would have said to him, "Proceed to Frasnes," a point where nothing could be effected; and he would not have said, "Go to Quatre-Bras," that was within a league of Frasnes, and where it would be possible to prevent the English forces from combining with the Prussians. This would be to suppose too many improbabilities, and all to prove upon one occasion the stupidity of one of the greatest generals that ever lived. On the following morning Napoleon, in a written order, mentioned Quatre-Bras in a manner that showed how much importance he attached to it, an importance of which it is to be supposed he could have been ignorant the day before. Could it be by mere chance that he took up his position at so well-chosen a point as Charleroi, and only that night studied the map of the country to discover the importance of Quatre-Bras. This, I repeat, is heaping impossibility upon impossibility, and adding improbability to improbability. And whilst this ignorant, idle, thoughtless man advanced through the masses of his enemies, without even looking at the map, the Duke of Wellington, who certainly did not study the map like Napoleon—as is proved by his plans—thought of nothing but Quatre-Bras. His lieutenants, even those of least celebrity, advanced thither, as we shall see, in the greatest haste, and that without his orders. Napoleon alone, the blind Napoleon, whose eyes were to be opened on the morrow, took no heed of Quatre-Bras, and in a position so difficult and so delicate confided to Ney two-fifths of the forces under his command, and sent him forward with orders such as he never before had given—vague, ambiguous orders, such orders as incompetent generals give—"Advance," without telling him whither, when Quatre-Bras was but a league distant!

Let who will believe such a supposition. I do not mean to influence the reader, I leave him at liberty, which he would take without my permission, to adopt either version; but the historian is pledged, and here, with my hand on my heart, I declare that I believe an absolute certainty exists in favour of the opinion I uphold. Nobody feels more interest than I in the victim sacrificed in 1815 to the most deplorable passions; but Ney's glory is by no means diminished in my eyes because he erred on some occasions. What I seek now is truth. It is truth—as I have already many times said, and shall incessantly repeat—that must be sought, found, and spoken, let the result be what it may. Truth is sacred, and cannot injure any just cause. Napoleon's military glory cannot redeem his despotism, or make liberty of less value. The decision between Napoleon and his lieutenants must be made in all sincerity. Whatever that decision may be, Napoleon will be no less great, or Ney less heroic.

(Lobau's), the reserve of artillery, the great park, and the baggage had not been able to cross the bridges of Charleroi, which were encumbered with men, horses, and cannon. This was doing a great deal, since they had already marched, some six, and some seven leagues during intense heat, incommoded by vast matériel, and obliged to pass through narrow defiles. Besides, they would require but two or three hours to cross the Sambre on the following day. To the left at Frasnes, on the road to Brussels, Marshal Ney had the Bachelu division of infantry, and the cavalry of Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoettes. In the rear, from Mellet to Gosselies, the remainder of the 2nd corps, one division of which—Girard's—had advanced to Wagnelée; and lastly, he had the Count d'Erlon with the entire of the 1st corps between Gosselies and Marchiennes. As the men of the latter corps had had several hours' repose, they would be ready for action at an early hour next morning. Napoleon being thus placed with Grouchy, Pajol, Exelmans, Vandamme, Gerard, and 38,000 men on his right; Ney, Reille, d'Erlon, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, commanding 45,000 men, on his left; and in the centre, the guards, Lobau, the heavy cavalry, the parks and reserve of artillery, amounting to 40,000, and only two or three hours being required to cross the Sambre, he would next morning be in a position to attack either the Prussians or the English after having separated them; he might, moreover, choose which he pleased to combat during the day.

A sad event had occurred in General Gerard's corps. General de Bourmont, together with Colonel Clouet, his aide-de-camp, formed the resolution, so fatal to his fame, of leaving the army on the morning of the 15th, at the very moment when all our columns were about to advance. Energetic in warfare, mild and sensible in private life, esteemed in the imperial army, where he had served with distinction, sought by his former friends, the royalists, to whom he could have brought a name distinguished in military service, both parties possessed equal attractions for him, he saw the faults of both; he judged and condemned them, but found great difficulty in deciding which he should join. General de Bourmont had at first refused to take service, although his tastes inclined him to the army, and the smallness of his fortune made it a necessity. Having at last yielded to the very natural desire of resuming his professional avocations, and having, through General Gerard, obtained a grade suited to his rank, he soon regretted what he had done when he learned that Vendée had revolted, and that his friends and relatives were treated with the utmost severity. Assailed by the reproaches of the royalists, he determined to leave the army and repair to Ghent. On the evening of the 14th he

sent word to General Hulot, his oldest commander of brigade, that he would be absent next day, but did not say why; he transmitted to him the orders of the commander-in-chief, that he might carry them out, addressed a letter of excuse to his guarantee, General Gerard, and then crossing the enemy's outposts, declared he was going to join King Louis XVIII. This was immediately noised through the 4th corps, where it produced an extraordinary excitement; but far from disheartening the troops, it roused their enthusiasm. But it increased the existing feeling of distrust towards the commanders, who all, with the exception of those long known and loved by the soldiers, became objects of suspicion. General de Bourmont left on the morning of the 15th, but did not reach the Prussian headquarters until noon, when Marshal Blucher was already aware of all that it interested him to know. General de Bourmont's conduct was thus an injury to himself, and neither useful nor honourable to his party, whose triumph was secured by other means, and attributable to more general causes.

The allied commanders had not employed the time as well as Napoleon. Whilst we were assembling at Beaumont on 14th, Marshal Blucher had acquired only vague information of our approach. But towards evening these reports became more certain, and he commanded the 4th corps under Bulow at Liège, and the 3rd under Thielmann stationed between Dinant and Namur, to advance to Namur. He ordered Pirch I. (2nd corps) to proceed to Sombreffe, and Ziethen (1st corps) to concentrate his troops between Charleroi and Fleurus. Ziethen was driven back from Charleroi on the morning of the 15th, and from the bridge of Soleilmont at noon, when he retired to Fleurus. Pirch I. took up his position at Sombreffe, on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels. Thielmann hastened to the same point. Bulow, who did not receive orders until late in the day, quitted Liège to proceed to Namur. The fiery Blucher was determined to accept the challenge to fight on the following day, the 16th, between Fleurus and Sombreffe, without waiting for the British army, though with the hope of seeing a large portion arrive at Quatre-Bras.

The English, owing either to natural disposition, or because of the greater distance they had to traverse, were slow in making their appearance. The Duke of Wellington, anxious to maintain his communication with the sea, was determined not to allow himself to be deceived by false alarms, nor to move until the attack was decidedly directed to one side or the other, by which he ran the risk of deceiving himself, that he might avoid being deceived by Napoleon. Although he had been more than once informed of the approach of the French,

information unfortunately given by some of ourselves, he would not make any movement until he should receive more precise information. He might, however, have formed his divisions, so that he need but give the order to march when the route they were to take should be decided on; but as he commanded men who would more readily forgive him for risking their lives than causing them unnecessary fatigue, he had refrained from issuing any orders. On the 15th he was informed by the Prussian general, Ziethen, of our actual position, and he then ordered his troops to form round the three principal English quarters; at Ath for the right wing, at Braine-le-Comte for the left, and Brussels for the reserve. But this did not prevent his attending a ball given by the Duchess of Richmond at Brussels. It was during the amusements of the evening, amusements at which all the English commanders and diplomatists accredited at the court of Ghent were present, that he received the detailed account of our entrance into Charleroi, and the passage of the Sambre. He immediately left without interrupting the merriment of this coalition festival, and proceeded to issue his orders.

He commanded his reserve to march at once from Brussels to Quatre-Bras. He ordered General Hill and the Prince of Orange to make a movement from the right towards the left, the former from Ath towards Braine-le-Comte, the latter from Braine-le-Comte in the direction of Nivelles; the latter was especially enjoined to send on all his disposable troops to Quatre-Bras. He himself prepared to set out that night, that he might at early dawn meet Marshal Blucher between Quatre-Bras and Sombreffe, and combine his movements with those of the Prussian army.

Whilst the English general was giving these somewhat tardy orders, his lieutenants, stimulated undoubtedly by the danger, made better and prompter arrangements than his. The head of the Prince of Orange's staff having learned that the French were before Charleroi, assembled on the afternoon of the 15th the Perponcher division, one brigade of which, commanded by the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, advanced spontaneously to Quatre-Bras. This same commander of the staff concentrated Chasse's division and Collaert's cavalry in the neighbourhood of Nivelles, so that on arriving at his headquarters the Prince of Orange found that, thanks to the prudence of a subordinate, the most urgent measures had been already prescribed and partly executed.

Thus on the evening of the 15th the English army began to move forward from every point, but had not yet an entire division at Quatre-Bras; whilst the Prussians, owing to their greater proximity, and having received earlier intelligence, were able

to assemble half their effective forces on the plain of Fleurus, and would be able to have three-fourths of them there on the morning of the 16th.

Though Napoleon had not retired to rest until two in the morning, he was up again at five. Notwithstanding that he was suffering from a very disagreeable illness, he had been on horseback for eighteen hours on the 15th, and was prepared to do the same on the next day, a sufficient proof that his activity had not decreased.* He had resolved on the plan of the day's proceedings even before he had received the report of his lieutenants. As the English headquarters were at a distance of fourteen leagues to the left, and the Prussian headquarters at eight leagues to the right, with their different corps concentrated, whilst the English were dispersed between the Schelde and the Sambre, it was evident that during the course of the day he would find the Prussians assembled on the plain of Fleurus, and that he could not encounter the English until the next day at the earliest. A clear view of his position showed that the best thing to be done was to turn to the right and fight the Prussians, and station a strong detachment on his left to arrest the progress of the English. Though this was all but certain, nothing could be absolutely determined, nor definite orders given, until he received the reports of his outposts. Had the entire army passed the Sambre on the previous evening, and had it been possible to commence operations at once, it would undoubtedly have been better to come to a decision immediately, and without loss of time march forward in both directions, proportioning the forces employed to the anticipated danger. But there were still at least 25,000 men, 10,000 of whom were cavalry, together with the great park of artillery, to cross the bridge of Charleroi, and defile through the narrow streets of

* Contemporary testimonies as to Napoleon's health during these four days are very contradictory. His brother, Prince Jerome, and a surgeon attached to his staff, both assured me that Napoleon was suffering at that time from an affection of the bladder. M. Marchand, attached to his personal service, a man whose veracity cannot be doubted, assured me of the contrary. This shows how difficult it is to discover the truth amidst contradictory though sincere testimonies, and I could furnish other proofs no less strange, of how difficult it is to make many witnesses of this period agree, though all were present at the events they relate, and all mean at least to speak the truth. But I shall not do so, lest I should encumber this history with tedious notes. I shall confine myself to saying that whatever may have been the state of Napoleon's health at this period, it did not in any way interfere with his activity, as may be seen from what follows. I have verified the account of his movements by numerous and authentic witnesses, amongst whom the principal was General Gudin, the worthy son of the illustrious Gudin, killed at Valentine, and late commander of the military division at Rouen. General Gudin was at that time seventeen years of age, and as first page brought his horse to the emperor. He did not leave Napoleon for a moment, and the correctness of his memory, as well as the truthfulness of character, justify me in placing implicit confidence in his assertions.

the town. This operation could not be executed in less than three hours, and meanwhile the troops that had already crossed the Sambre were reposing after the fatigues of the previous evening, and Napoleon was occupied in receiving the reports of the light cavalry, which was of the greatest importance, placed as he was between two adverse armies, and the somewhat scared generals believing that they were face to face with the combined armies of England and Prussia. But on the 16th of June there would be seventeen hours' daylight, so that a delay of three hours could not be of much consequence.

Napoleon having visited several points, and heard the reports of the spies and light cavalry, was confirmed in his conjectures of the previous evening. There could be at Quatre-Bras only the troops collected from the neighbourhood, whilst three-fourths of the Prussian army was assembled between Fleurus and Sombreffe. A report of Grouchy's, dated six o'clock, announced that the whole Prussian army was deploying before Fleurus. There were therefore two very good reasons for going to meet the Prussians—in the first place, they alone were within reach, and secondly, they would be left on our flank should we advance without fighting them. Napoleon having again examined his maps, issued his orders at about seven o'clock verbally to the major-general, who was to transmit them in writing to the different commanders. He commenced with the right wing, whose concentration was most important, and ordered that the corps of Vandamme and Gerard (the 3rd and 4th) should advance in front of Fleurus. Vandamme having bivouacked near Gilly, had to march two leagues and a half, and Gerard three, being encamped on the Châtelet. Supposing no delay to be made in the transmission of the orders, these troops could not be on the ground before eleven in the morning. This would be early enough, as they could fight at any time before nine in the evening. Napoleon also ordered the guards, encamped around Charleroi, to advance in the direction of Fleurus. To these he added Milhaud's division of cuirassiers, consisting of 3000 splendid horsemen. We shall now see in what way he intended to employ Valmy's cuirassiers.

These troops, consisting of Pajol's light cavalry, Exelmans' dragoons, Vandamme's and Gerard's corps of infantry, the guard, Milhaud's cuirassiers, and Girard's division which had been detached from Reille's corps the previous evening to make their way towards Fleurus, did not amount to less than from 63,000 to 64,000 first-rate soldiers. This was a sufficient force with which to oppose the Prussians, who, supposing they had assembled three-fourths of their army, could not have more than 90,000 men on the plain of Fleurus. There were still the Count of Lobau's 10,000 men (6th corps), tried soldiers,

who, by raising the numbers on our right to 74,000,* would relieve Napoleon from all apprehension with regard to the Prussians. He had fought them with much inferior numbers in 1814. However, although he was convinced that the English could not have yet combined their forces, he would not run the risk of deceiving himself at such a time, and determined that for some hours he would leave Count Lobau at the junction of the two roads leading to Fleurus and Quatre-Bras, trusting to this general's sagacity to bring up his forces to wherever the danger seemed most pressing. As the position of all parties would be known in three or four hours, Count Lobau would have time to hasten to the point where the enemy should have assembled in the greatest numbers.

As to the Brussels road, and the important position of Quatre-Bras, Napoleon ordered Ney to proceed immediately thither with the corps of Generals Reille and d'Erlon, with the cavalry attached to these corps, and Count de Valmy's cuirassiers. Napoleon confided these brilliant cuirassiers to the marshal, that he might withdraw the light cavalry of the guard which he had lent him the evening before with the recommendation to spare them. However, he gave permission to retain them in an intermediate position if they were already too far advanced to retrograde with ease, and he also desired

* I have taken as much pains to verify the forces as the movements, and the different hours at which they were made, and I believe that the following numbers are the nearest to the truth :—

Under Napo- leon's orders in the direction of Fleurus.	Pajol	2,800 men.	
	Exelmans	3,300	
	Milhaud	3,500	
	Vandamme	17,000	
	Gerard	15,400	
	Guard (infantry) . . .	13,000	
	Guard (heavy cavalry)	2,500	Lefebvre-Desnoettes with Ney.
	Guard (artillery) . . .	2,000	
	Girard (the division de- tached from Reille)	4,000	
		64,000	
Lobau's corps placed between both . .		10,000	
			74,000
Under Ney at Quatre-Bras.	Piré's cavalry	2,000	
	Reille's (without Girard)	17,000	
	D'Erlon	20,000	
	Lefebvre-Desnoettes . .	2,500	
	Valmy	3,500	
		45,000	
			119,000
Parks of artillery, stragglers killed and wounded in the combats of advanced guard on the 15th.		5,000	
			124,000

that Valmy's cuirassiers should be left on the road called des Romains, an old route crossing the country from left to right, that he might be able to recall them to Fleurus if necessary. The troops confided to Ney amounted to about 45,000 men. The following were Napoleon's instructions relative to their disposal during the day. Ney was to take up a strong position at Quatre-Bras, so as to be able to repulse the English, whatever efforts they might make to seize the position. Ney was even ordered to station a division a little beyond, that is to say, at Genappe, and hold himself in readiness to form the head of the French column that was to advance on Brussels, in case the Prussians should avoid encountering us, and endeavour to combine their forces with the English in the rear of that city, or in case they should be defeated and thrown back on Liège.

Napoleon, when rid of these, intended to fall back rapidly on Ney to support him on his march to Brussels. To these orders so profoundly calculated to meet all contingencies, Napoleon added another which, as we shall see, exhibited profound forethought. As Ney was to have 45,000 men under his command, and if he took immediate possession of Quatre-Bras, would not have to encounter a very great English force, Napoleon wished him to send a detachment to Marbais, a little village situate on the highroad between Namur and Brussels. This could easily be done, for as Napoleon and Ney would fight in each other's rear during the approaching combat, the one being at Fleurus, the other at Quatre-Bras, whichever had first completed his task could easily send a detachment, great or small, to the assistance of the other, and which, beside the numerical advantage it would bring, could attack the enemy in the rear. Marbais, situate on the highroad between Namur and Brussels, and not very far from Sombreffe, was admirably well selected for the accomplishment of this object. These arrangements having been decided on at about seven in the morning, ought to have been embodied in writing in the staff style by Marshal Soult, and immediately despatched to the different commanders.

Unfortunately the new major-general, a novice in the exercise of his delicate functions, was not as rapid in composition as Berthier, nor could he, like him, catch at once the true spirit of Napoleon's ideas, nor reproduce them in a few expressive words. Though Napoleon gave his orders at seven o'clock, they were not written and despatched until between eight and nine. This, though a sad waste of time, did not entail any serious consequences, the troops meanwhile crossing the Sambre, and as in any case the day was to be devoted to fighting the Prussians, the latter part of the day would answer that purpose

quite as well as the earlier.* Napoleon having no motive for hastening his personal movements, as he was to perform on horseback the passage that his troops were performing on foot, determined that before leaving for Fleurus he would write a detailed letter to Ney, in which he would explain his intentions with the brevity and precision peculiar to himself. He told the marshal that as his officers would move faster than those attached to the staff, he sent him his definite instructions by one of them. He informed him that he was about to set out for Fleurus, where it appeared that the Prussians were drawn up in line of battle, that he would fight if they offered resistance, but would advance to Brussels if they retreated. He instructed him to make his position good at Quatre-Bras by placing a division in front of that station, and another on the right at Marbais, which latter division would be able to fall back on Sombreffe. He again desired him not to give the light cavalry of the guard too much to do, and to keep back Valmy's cuirassiers, so that both these corps might be able, if necessary,

* Severe critics have blamed Napoleon's tardiness on the morning of the 16th. Some account for it by a diminution of activity; but others, finding this reason incompatible with the march from Cannes to Paris, consider it altogether inexplicable; but neither party has sought the explanation where it might be found, that is to say, in the unprejudiced study of the events of those days as recorded in authentic documents. Napoleon was on horseback from three in the morning on the 15th until nine at night, when he threw himself upon a bed until midnight, when he rose, and remained conversing with Ney until two o'clock, then slept again for three hours, and was on his horse at five on the morning of the 16th. This is not the conduct of a prince enervated by age, or rendered effeminate by luxury. Placed between two opposing armies, when a false movement would be destructive, it was not of so much importance to him to fight two hours earlier on a day seventeen hours long, as to know the exact position of the enemy's forces before ordering his own to the one point or the other. As the most important information, that sent by Grouchy, describing the Prussian movements, had not been despatched until six, and did not consequently arrive until seven, it cannot be said that any time was lost, at least by the commander-in-chief, whose orders were immediately given to the major-general, and despatched by the latter between eight and nine; and we must besides remember that this time was employed by some of the troops in reposing after a march of ten or twelve leagues accomplished on the previous evening, and by others in crossing the Sambre. It will be seen by what follows that the troops were on the ground at noon, that the battle could not commence before half-past two, that it was then a complete victory, which, but for an accident, would have been gained much earlier in the day. The unavoidable delays of the morning of the 16th had therefore no injurious influence on the battle of Ligny, nor even on the combat at Quatre-Bras, which would completely have answered its proposed end had the orders issued been faithfully executed. These delays of the morning arose from the necessity of waiting the arrival of intelligence, and would in any case have attended the passage of the Sambre. As for the delays of the afternoon, which were more to be regretted, these were due either to accident or to the fault, not of the commander-in-chief, but of his lieutenants. We repeat that if we do not object when Napoleon's policy, so often open to criticism, is blamed, we must examine more closely when fault is found with the military operations of a general so accomplished in every department of his art, and who took more than ordinary precautions at a time when the existence of France as well as his own was at stake.

to fall back on Fleurus. He repeated that when the Prussians should have retreated or been beaten, he would immediately turn to the right to support Ney in the movement on Brussels. He then explained his plan for the remainder of the campaign. He wished, he said, to have two wings, one composed of Reille and d'Erlon's corps and some cavalry under Ney, and the other under Grouchy, consisting of Vandamme and Gerard's corps, with a contingent of cavalry, and intended himself, with the guard, Lobau, and the reserve of cavalry, in all, about 40,000 men, to turn sometimes to one, sometimes to the other wing, and thus raise them alternately to the importance of the main body of the army.

These double instructions were entrusted to a confidential officer, Count de Flahault, the emperor's aide-de-camp, and who, being acquainted with the English language and character, might be very useful to Marshal Ney. In passing through Gosselies and the different points on the route to Quatre-Bras, Count de Flahault was to deliver the emperor's orders to the several commanders, that they might proceed to their immediate execution even before the major-general's orders should arrive. M. de Flahault left at nine.*

These different orders being despatched to the right in the direction of Fleurus, and to the left in the direction of Quatre-Bras, arrived at their destinations, some at nine, some at ten o'clock. The French troops were now marching from every point. Vandamme had advanced from Gilly to Fleurus, and taken up his position in front of that little town, covered by Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons. General Gerard had passed the Sambre at the Châtelet, and advanced on the left towards Fleurus. The guard, amounting to 18,000 men, horse and foot (in this number we only include those that fought, the others were with the artillery), had passed Gilly, and were approaching Fleurus. The day was fine, but warm. Already the Prussians were seen deploying before Sombreffe, behind the hills of St. Amand and Ligny, and with the evident intention of giving battle.

Count de Lobau and the heavy cavalry had passed the Sambre at Charleroi. The latter, divided into two corps, had proceeded in two different directions. Milhaud's cuirassiers had gone to join Vandamme, Gerard, and the guard at Fleurus. Valmy's cuirassiers had proceeded to the left towards Gosselies and Quatre-Bras. On this road was d'Erlon with the 1st corps, who having arrived late on the previous evening at Marchiennes, allowed his troops to repose whilst he awaited the orders of

* A letter of General Reille's, dated quarter past ten, mentions M. de Flahault as having already passed. He might therefore have passed through Gosselies between half-past nine and ten o'clock.

Marshal Ney, his superior in command. Had the duties of the staff been executed as in Berthier's time, he would have immediately learned the instructions intended for Ney, so that he would have been able to assist in their execution by immediately giving the order to march. General Reille, with the entire of the 2nd corps, passed the night at Gosselies, where they had arrived the evening before. Foy's and Jerome's divisions were also at Gosselies, Gerard's a little to the right at Wagnelée, and at Frasnes, very near Quatre-Bras, was Bachelu's division, with which Ney, on the previous evening, had held the Prince of Saxe-Weimar in check. Piré's cavalry and Lefebvre-Desnoettes' light cavalry were also there. Ney having passed the night with General Reille at Gosselies, had left for Frasnes to observe the movements of the English, but gave directions to Reille to open the despatches from headquarters, that he might be able to transmit the emperor's orders to the different commanders, and secure their immediate execution. He then advanced to Quatre-Bras, where he was deeply impressed by what he saw.

The Prince of Orange and the Duke of Wellington had just arrived at Quatre-Bras. They had been preceded by General Perponcher, commander of the nearest division, composed of the Saxe-Weimar and Bylandt brigades. We have already mentioned how the Saxe-Weimar brigade had set out of its own accord the evening before. It was soon to be joined by the Bylandt brigade, already on the road. The latter brigade could not arrive at Quatre-Bras before two in the afternoon. The English divisions, some coming from Ath and Nivelles, others from Brussels, could only arrive successively at three, four, and five o'clock. Nevertheless the Prince of Orange had promised the Duke of Wellington to make every effort for the defence of Quatre-Bras, and even to sacrifice both himself and soldiers for the attainment of so important an object. Confiding in this valorous lieutenant, the Duke of Wellington took his way along the highroad from Brussels to Namur in order to consult with Marshal Blücher. He found him ranging his army in order of battle before Sombreffe, and determined to fight with or without support. The Duke of Wellington would have been better pleased had he found him less inclined for action, but promised to give him effectual assistance towards the close of the day by occupying Quatre-Bras, and endeavouring to take up his position on the right of the Prussian army. These arrangements being made, the Duke of Wellington returned by the Brussels road to hasten the march of his own troops.

Such were the arrangements made by the adverse generals on the different parts of this vast battlefield. The French

generals, as valiant but not as confident as ever, looked with apprehension on what was passing around them. Ney, impetuous, but deficient in coolness, feared that he had to encounter the entire English army, while some of his generals asserted that they were about to encounter one hundred thousand English, with only some few thousand French. The almost offensive attitude assumed by the Prince of Orange seemed a confirmation of the truth of this statement, and Ney sometimes felt inclined to rush upon the prince with the four thousand horses he had; sometimes he listened to those who said that the enemy had their forces concealed behind the wood, and how imprudent it would be to attack them until he received the reinforcement of forty-five thousand men promised by Napoleon.

It was the same to the right. General Girard, one of the bravest and most devoted officers in the army, had been sent with his division to Wagnelée to make observations in the direction of Fleurus, and by the emperor's orders he had remained there to serve as a connecting link between the two portions of the French army. From the point where he was he discerned the Prussians distinctly, and saw them deploy before Sombreffe. He reported this to his immediate superior, General Reille, assuring him that the emperor would soon have to encounter the entire Prussian army between Sombreffe and Fleurus. When this report arrived at Gosselies it made a profound impression on General Reille. This general, who had behaved so well at Vittoria, had unfortunately retained an inefaceable remembrance of that day, and was one of those who felt too little confidence in fortune to act with decision and vigour. The position seemed to him most dangerous, with the English in front, and the Prussians in the rear, and this caused by Napoleon's wonted temerity. He was thoroughly imbued with this opinion when General Flahault passed on his way to Marshal Ney. General Flahault gave him the imperial commands, and as Marshal Ney had told him, when he was leaving, to see to the execution of these orders when they would arrive, General Reille should have immediately marched his entire corps towards Frasnés. At the very latest, this corps could have arrived there at noon, time enough to drive back the few battalions of the Prince of Orange. Far from doing this, General Reille, taking advantage of his influence with Marshal Ney, ventured upon his own responsibility to assemble his corps in front of Gosselies and to keep it there until fresh announcements from General Girard should give him more exact information as to the movements of the Prussians. It is always very hazardous for a general to substitute his own views for those of the commander-in-chief; but under such a leader as Napoleon,

whose boundless forethought embraced all possibilities, it was very daring in General Reille to take upon himself either to modify the orders or defer their execution; it was a proceeding that might, as we shall see, have induced the most serious consequences. General Reille informed Marshal Ney of what he had done, and immediately sent the orders from headquarters to Count d'Erlon, in his rear, that this general might set out and join the 2nd corps on the road to Quatre-Bras. Ney, whose apprehensions, increased by those of his lieutenants, had made him hesitate to act, sent an officer of the lancers to Charleroi to inform Napoleon that he was apprehensive of having the English army in front, and the Prussian on his right flank, and that he informed him of his position, not knowing whether he ought to fight with the small body under his command.

Napoleon was about to leave Charleroi for Fleurus when he received Ney's message. He was greatly annoyed when he saw that Ney, usually so resolute, had relapsed into the uncertainty of the previous day, and immediately sent him word that Blücher, being at Namur the evening before, could not consequently be at Quatre-Bras on this day, where there could not be more than a few English troops from Brussels, and those not very numerous; that he should therefore assemble Reille and d'Erlon's infantry, with Valmy's heavy cavalry, and with these drive all before him. Napoleon left to the commander of the staff the task of committing this order to writing, which he did in the clearest and most precise terms. Napoleon immediately set out for Fleurus.

He arrived there about noon. He had been preceded but a very short time by the troops; they were drawn up on the plain of Fleurus. To the left, on the highroad from Charleroi to Namur, was Vandamme's corps, composed of the infantry divisions of Lefol, Berthezène, and Habert, together with General Domon's light cavalry. By Napoleon's orders, Girard's divisions, belonging to Reille's corps, remained still further to the left, at the intermediate position of Wagnelée. To the right was the 4th corps under Gerard, consisting of Vichery, Pecheux, and Hulet's divisions, with Maurin's cavalry. More to the right, and in advance, were Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons. Milhaud's cuirassiers were in the rear. Lastly, in the second line, and as a reserve, were the entire guard, infantry, and cavalry, with magnificent artillery. These fine troops consisted of 64,000 men of all arms, as we have already mentioned. Three leagues in the rear, at the junction of the roads, was Count de Lobau with 10,000 men, waiting for a signal to turn either to Fleurus or Quatre-Bras. The weather, as we have said, was beautiful, but the heat was stifling. The troops were in a state of excitement, and anxious for a decisive battle,

which everything they saw seemed to prognosticate. On the arrival of the 4th corps the entire army had learned General de Bourmont's defection. The intelligence aroused intense indignation. His conduct was qualified as an abominable piece of treachery, and it was even said that many other officers were ready to follow his example. The distrust in those officers who had taken service under the Restoration, or who did not sympathise in the general enthusiasm, had now reached its acme. One soldier left his ranks, and walking directly to Napoleon, said to him, "Sire, do not trust Soult, he will betray you." "Do not be uneasy," replied Napoleon, "I'll answer for him." "Be it so," said the soldier, returning to his ranks, but evidently not convinced. This suspicion, though groundless, for the head of the staff was doing his very best, shows the moral tone that pervaded the army, where the men were devoted even to fanaticism, but totally devoid of self-possession. General Gerard had hastened to Napoleon, and felt at first some embarrassment in speaking of General de Bourmont, whose guarantee he had been. But Napoleon, without showing any displeasure, said, as he pulled his ear, "*You see, my dear Gerard, that the blue are always blue, and the white always white.*" *

As the Prussians deployed before us they seemed every instant more numerous. The indented plain of Fleurus, on which one of the most terrible battles of the age was about to be fought, presented at this moment a most imposing aspect.

The highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, of which we have so often spoken, and on which abutted the two branches of the Charleroi road, the one leading to Quatre-Bras, the other to Sombreffe, ran from our right to our left on a tolerably high embankment, and divided the waters that flowed to the Sambre and the Dyle. The Prussian army was advancing towards this point in vast masses. As the troops arrived at the heights of Sombreffe they made a demi-tour to the left, and taking up a position in front of Fleurus, joined the divisions that had left Charleroi the previous evening. The ground occupied by the Prussians on the flank of the road and in front of us was extremely favourable for defensive operations.

The stream of Ligny, flowing from a turn of the road between Namur and Brussels, and pretty near to Wagnelée, exactly where Girard's division was stationed, ran from our left wing towards our right, almost parallel with the road, and after many sinuous windings passed through three villages called St. Amand-le-Hameau, St. Amand-la-Haye, and Great St. Amand. When this stream reaches Great St. Amand, it turns abruptly, and

* This celebrated saying, so often referred to occasions on which it was not said, was addressed on this day to General Gerard, from whose lips I have learned the occurrence.



On the whole, the response to the program was positive. On the whole, the program was well received and the students were able to learn a great deal from the program. The program was well received and the students were able to learn a great deal from the program.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_1 &= \mathcal{L}_1^{\text{reg}} + \lambda_1 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{W}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{V}\|_F^2 \right) + \lambda_2 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{Z}\|_F^2 \right) \\ &\quad + \lambda_3 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{X}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{Y}\|_F^2 \right) + \lambda_4 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{A}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{B}\|_F^2 \right) \\ &\quad + \lambda_5 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{C}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{D}\|_F^2 \right) + \lambda_6 \left(\frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{E}\|_F^2 + \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{F}\|_F^2 \right) \end{aligned}$$
$$\frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \int_0^t (t-\tau)^{\alpha-1} \frac{d}{d\tau} \left(\frac{1}{\Gamma(\beta)} \int_0^\tau (\tau-\eta)^{\beta-1} \frac{d}{d\eta} f(\eta) d\eta \right) d\tau = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)} \int_0^t (t-\eta)^{\alpha+\beta-1} \frac{d}{d\eta} f(\eta) d\eta$$

(iii) $\mathcal{A} \in \mathcal{A}_n$, $\mathcal{B} \in \mathcal{A}_m$, $\mathcal{C} \in \mathcal{A}_k$ and $\mathcal{D} \in \mathcal{A}_l$ are
 independent of each other, then $\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{B} \times \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{D} \in \mathcal{A}_{n+m+k+l}$.

[illegible]

1. *Chlorophyll *a** was determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a 100- μ l. aliquot of the sample. The absorbance of the sample was measured at 663 nm using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll *a* was calculated using the following equation:

1. The first step is to identify the key components of the system. This includes understanding the hardware, software, and data involved.

$\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{B})$ are $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$ and $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A} \cap \mathcal{B})$ respectively.
 (b) $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A}) \cap \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{B}) = \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A} \cap \mathcal{B})$.
 (c) $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{B}) \subseteq \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$.

$\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{B}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{C}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{D}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{E}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{F}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{G}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{H}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{I}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{J}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{K}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{M}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{N}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{O}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{Q}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{R}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{S}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{U}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{V}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{W}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{X}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{Y}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{Z}) = \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{A})$

1. The first step is to identify the variables involved in the problem. In this case, the variables are the number of hours worked (H) and the number of hours of leisure (L).

Number of Islands, of which
 10 are over 1000 ha.

As a result, in the case of the $U(1)$ restriction, the $U(1)$ symmetry is broken down to the $U(1)$ symmetry of the $U(1)$ gauge field.

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the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

[illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 85 years of age or older is projected to increase from 2 million to 4 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 90 years of age or older is projected to increase from 500,000 to 1 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 95 years of age or older is projected to increase from 100,000 to 200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 100 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10,000 to 20,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

the \mathcal{H}_2 norm of the error signal $\|e\|_2$ is bounded by

$$\|e\|_2 \leq \frac{\gamma}{\sqrt{1 - \gamma^2}} \left(\frac{\|w\|_2}{\sqrt{1 - \gamma^2}} + \frac{\|v\|_2}{\gamma} \right) \quad (10)$$

where $\gamma = \sqrt{\lambda_{\max}(G)}$ and $G = \begin{bmatrix} A & B \\ C & D \end{bmatrix}$ is the system matrix of the closed-loop system. The \mathcal{H}_2 norm of the error signal $\|e\|_2$ is bounded by

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Portrait by G. B. de St. Armand.

Engraved by J. B. de St. Armand.

MARSHAL SOULT

instead of running parallel with the road, flows almost at right angles to it, passing through the village of Ligny to Sombreffe, where, resuming its original direction, it runs along the foot of some tolerably high hills, and falls into a tributary of the Sambre. The Charleroi road, by which we had come, crossed this stream by means of a small bridge, and then joined the road leading from Namur to Brussels at a point quite close to Sombreffe, called Point-du-Jour. This shallow but muddy stream, bordered by willows and lofty poplars, was eminently suited for the battlefield of an enemy seeking to prevent our occupying the important road from Namur to Brussels. The ground beyond its source and beyond the villages through which it ran rose sloping to the side of the road that the Prussians wished to defend, and presented an amphitheatre occupied by 24,000 men. Upon the summit of this high ground the mill of Bry was conspicuous, and behind the mill, in a depression of the ground, stood the village of Bry, whose steeple only was visible.

The Prussians were distributed in the following order on the field of battle. Steinmetz and Henkel's divisions, belonging to Ziethen's corps, that had been driven back on the previous evening from Charleroi, occupied, the former the three villages of St. Amand, the latter the village of Ligny. There were some battalions in the village, and the remainder of the army was disposed in serried masses on the slope behind. Pirch II. and Jagow's divisions were kept as a reserve, the former to the troops defending St. Amand, the second for those defending Ligny. There were about 30,000 men there. The corps of Pirch I., the second of the Prussian army, placed on the highroad to Namur, at a spot called les Trois Burettes, formed with its four divisions, Tippelskirchen, Brauze, Krafft, and Langen, a second line of about 30,000 men, ready to support the first. The third Prussian corps—Thielmann's—just arrived from Namur, had been placed by Blucher on his extreme left, and in advance of Point-du-Jour, exactly at the junction of the Charleroi and Namur roads.

He wished by this means to defend his communication with Namur and Liége by which Bulow's corps and all his matériel were to come. This was a wise precaution, but would have the effect of paralysing the better part of his army. His plan was first to defend effectually the point where the Charleroi road crossed the highroad from Namur to Brussels, that is, Point-du-Jour and Sombreffe; next to protect Ligny and the three St. Amands; and then, as his energy was never unmixed with presumption, to push beyond St. Amand, drive back Napoleon on Charleroi, and even force him into the Sambre should fortune and the English come to his aid. But

he flattered himself with a vain illusion, for this campaign of 1815, which was destined to terminate so advantageously for him, did not commence so favourably, and on this day, the 16th, our reverses were destined to be softened by one more victory!

Although the ground lying between St. Amand and Ligny, being disposed in form of an amphitheatre, ought to be easily visible to us, yet the numerous trees bordering the stream intercepted our view, and it was only through some openings between them that we could get an occasional glimpse of the masses of the Prussian army. A little to our right, in the middle of the plain of Fleurus, was a mill, which the owner, alarmed for his property, had hastened to protect. Cap in hand, and quite overpowered at finding himself in Napoleon's presence, he led him by tottering ladders to the roof of the mill, whence they could examine at leisure the battlefield chosen by the enemy. From this observatory Napoleon saw quite distinctly Ziethen's 30,000 men stationed, some in the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, and some on the slope behind, and above, on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, he discerned the corps of Pirch I., equal in number to Ziethen's, and lastly, Thielmann's troops, which, just coming from Namur, were beginning to occupy the heights opposite to the French extreme right. He calculated that this army amounted to 90,000; a slight mistake, as it had been reduced to 88,000 by the losses of the previous evening. Napoleon saw at once that he had before him the hastily assembled Prussian army, which had not been able to join the English, since the Prussians, though the first to hear of our presence, had only just arrived; consequently the English, who had received the intelligence twelve hours later, could not possibly have reached the spot. He therefore determined to attack immediately, and according to the following plan. He resolved to confine himself on his extreme right, along the hills bordering the stream of Ligny as it approaches the Sambre, to some very evident though really unimportant demonstrations, and so oblige Blücher to leave a portion of his forces at that point by alarming him about his communication with Namur; then with his right wing, composed of Gérard's infantry, he intended to attack Ligny with vigour. With his left, composed of Vandamme and Girard's division, he intended to attack the three St. Amands, and to keep his guard as a reserve to be employed wherever it should be most needed. But in order to make this battle productive of great results, which it would not be were it confined to the valiant seizing of any one position, he determined to employ Ney's forces in such a manner as to give a decisive character to the combat. If we have given a clear description of the configuration of the ground, the reader will

perceive that the battlefield presented a lengthened triangle, whose apex was at Charleroi, and whose sides fell on the high-road from Namur to Brussels, one at Quatre-Bras, the other at Sombrefe (Sombrefe and Point-du-Jour are nearly equivalent). Napoleon and Ney, the one opposed to the Prussians, the other to the English, were each on a side of the triangle, and so to speak, in each other's rear, with an interval of about three leagues. It would therefore have been easy for Ney, who had not yet a numerous enemy to encounter, to detach 12,000 or 15,000 of the 45,000 men under his command, and who, wheeling round, could take Ligny and St. Amand in the rear, and thus surround the greater part of the Prussian army. Had this manœuvre been executed in time, neither Marengo, Austerlitz, or Friedland would have produced greater results than the impending battle, results of which, indeed, we stood much in need !

There was no deficiency of roads for effecting the projected movement, for besides the excellent cross-roads from Frasnès to St. Amand, it would have been very easy, by retrograding on the road to Quatre-Bras, to reach the old road called des Romains, which cuts the triangle we have described, and passing near St. Amand, joins the Namur road at Brussels.

Napoleon having descended from the mill, whence he had formed so correct a view of his position, gave orders for an immediate attack. His generals, as on the evening before, were anxiously considering the aspect presented to their view. Whilst Ney, at Quatre-Bras, thought that the entire English army was drawn up before him, these fancied they should have to fight the united English and Prussians. And yet it was not possible that the English could be both at Quatre-Bras and at St. Amand. Still the error of our generals was very natural, considering that they had not a clear idea of the general state of affairs. They believed that Blücher, already established on the highroad from Namur to Brussels, was in communication with the English, who would join their forces to his; for otherwise, his right wing, at St. Amand, would be without support, and exposed to the greatest danger. Not believing that he could commit so great an error, they supposed that Blücher must have the English army either in his rear or to the right. Napoleon told them that Blücher was brave but rash, and did not consider things so closely; that in the hope of joining the English he had advanced even before he could be supported by them, for which he would in all probability pay dearly, as it would be impossible for the English at that moment to join him at such a distance as St. Amand. He ordered them to prepare for making an immediate attack, but not to open fire until they received a signal to do so. He said to General Gérard, for whom he felt a particular affection, that

if Fortune would only show him a little favour, he hoped that the events of this day would decide the fate of the war. His lieutenants repaired to their appointed posts.

Vandamme, according to his orders, turned, together with his three divisions, to the left of the Charleroi road, by which we had come, and deployed before St. Amand, having Girard's division, which he commanded for the day, on his extreme left, and General Domon's cavalry a little beyond. Gerard, with the 4th corps, taking the highroad directly before him, advanced about half a league, then wheeling to the left, took up his position before the village of Ligny, so as to form almost a right angle with Vandamme. Grouchy, with Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons, galloped after the enemy's sharpshooters as far as the foot of the hills which are bathed by the stream of Ligny as it flows towards the Sambre. And lastly, the entire guard, formed into close columns, was stationed in front of Fleurus, between Vandamme and Gerard. In front of the guard was the reserve of artillery, with the cavalry of the guard on one side, and Milhaud's noble cuirassiers on the other.

This mass of 64,000 men, drawn up in order of battle, remained motionless for more than an hour, expecting to hear the roar of Ney's cannon. Napoleon was desirous that before hostilities should commence on the plain of Fleurus, that the engagement at Quatre-Bras should begin in order that Ney might have time to fall back on the Prussians. At two o'clock he sent him word that the Prussian army before Sombreffe was about to be attacked, and ordered him to bear down all opposition at Quatre-Bras, and then wheeling round, attack the Prussians in the rear. A detachment of 12,000 or 15,000 men, that could be easily spared, considering the small number of the enemy at Quatre-Bras, would produce an immense effect.

Having despatched this order, and having not without anger and astonishment waited until half-past two, Napoleon gave the signal for attack. It was not long before this signal was responded to.

Vandamme ordered Lefol's division, which formed his right, to advance on the Great St. Amand. When the firing was about to commence, General Lefol formed his division into a square, and addressed his men in an animated discourse, to which they replied by enthusiastic cries of *Vive l'Empereur*.

Then dividing them into several columns, he led them directly against the enemy. The ground which these troops had to traverse before reaching St. Amand sloped considerably, and near to the village was studded with hedges, enclosures, and orchards. The houses of the village were strongly built of

stone. Beyond was the bed of the stream marked by a deep border of trees, through the openings of which might be seen the Prussian reserve, provided with a numerous artillery. Our soldiers had scarcely advanced a few paces when terrible ravages were made in their ranks by the chain-shot from the village, and the balls from the batteries above. A single ball killed eight men in one of our columns. But the enthusiasm of our soldiers was too great to allow them to waver. They rushed forward almost without firing, and penetrating into the gardens and orchards, drove thence the Prussians at the point of the bayonet, but not without encountering a brisk resistance. They then entered the village, notwithstanding street opposition and firing from the windows, and soon compelled the enemy to retreat beyond the stream. Emboldened by this success, for which, however, they had paid dear, they would have pursued the fugitives further, but Steinmetz's six battalions of reserve suddenly appearing beyond the stream, discharging a shower of balls and grape-shot, the French troops retired, not so much from the violence of the firing as from the impossibility of conquering masses of infantry drawn up in a semi-circle on the slope which surmounted the mill of Bry.

General Steinmetz wished in his turn to retake the village, and bringing fresh battalions to the assistance of those expelled from Great St. Amand, he made great efforts to attain his object. But though our soldiers had not been able to advance beyond the village, they were not of a temper to allow themselves to be driven out. They firmly awaited the Prussians, received them with a close fire, and forced them to fall back on their reserve. General Steinmetz then returned to the charge with his entire division, sending some battalions to the right to try and turn Great St. Amand.

Vandamme, who was attentively watching every variation of the combat, sent a brigade of Berthezène's division to oppose the troops that had been sent to turn Great St. Amand, and despatched Girard's division to the two villages beyond—St. Amand-la-Haye and St. Amand-le-Hameau. Whilst Lefol's division was pouring its murderous balls on those attempting to cross the stream, Berthezène's brigade held those in check that were trying to turn Great St. Amand, and the brave General Girard, partaking the enthusiasm of his men, advanced on La-Haye, with Villier's brigade on his right, and Piat's on the left. He entered and established himself at La-Haye, spite of a fearful discharge of musketry. We thus got possession of the three St. Amands, without, however, being able to debouch beyond, in presence of the masses of the Prussian army, for behind Steinmetz's division were the remains of Ziethen's corps and the entire of Pirch's—in all, about 50,000 men.

The action at Ligny had commenced a little later, but not less warmly. General Gerard having executed a reconnaissance along the stream of Ligny, during which he was very near being carried off by the enemy, saw that his rear and his right flank were threatened by the Prussian cavalry, and by Thielmann's corps, both stationed at Point-du-Jour. It was therefore necessary to act with great caution. It was possible that whilst he fell back on Ligny, Thielmann's infantry might descend from Point-du-Jour on his flank, and the Prussian cavalry, crossing the Ligny stream, might fall on his rear. Threatened by this double danger, he ranged Bourmont's division, now commanded by General Hulot, in line of battle from Tongrinelle to Balâtre, with orders to defend the banks of the stream to the last extremity. This division, placed *en potence* on his right, and supported by the 4th corps, under General Maurin, and Pajol's and Exelmans' squadrons, was sufficient to defend both his flank and rear. Having taken these precautions, General Gerard advanced, with the Vichery and Pecheux divisions, on the village of Ligny, forming almost, as we have said, a right angle with General Vandamme's line of battle.

He formed his troops into three columns, which were to fall successively on the village of Ligny, that lay on both banks of the stream. Before reaching the village it would be necessary to cross a small plain and seize the orchards and enclosures immediately in front. As Gerard's three columns approached they were received with so terrible a volley that, notwithstanding all their energy, they were obliged to fall back. General Gerard then sent forward a large body of artillery, whose cannon so riddled the village of Ligny that it was impossible for the battalions detached from Henkel's and Jagow's divisions to maintain their position. Profiting by their disorder, he advanced at the head of his three columns, under a fierce fire, and took possession first of the orchards, then of the houses, and reached the main street of the village, running parallel with the stream. Then commenced a series of combats, which an eye-witness has described as exhibiting all the ferocity of civil strife, for the known hatred of the Prussians had excited a species of fury amongst our soldiers, who gave no quarter, nor did they receive any. General Gerard having himself led on his reserve, carried his victory from the main street to the river, and had even got beyond it, when an unexpected return of Jagow's division obliged him to fall back. The main street of the village ran parallel to the river, another street crossed this, passing over the stream by means of a bridge, in front the church, which was built on an elevation. Jagow's division having resumed the offensive, advanced from this cross street, penetrated as far as the church, and compelled us to retire almost to the extremity of the village.

But Gerard, sword in hand, brought his men again to the charge, and remained master of the principal street. To the right, on the elevation on which the church was built, he stationed a numerous artillery, which poured a shower of shot on the Prussians whenever they sought to return by the cross street; and to the left he stationed in a half-ruined castle (there are no remains of it now) a garrison provided with artillery. Thus by prodigies of energy and self-devotion he succeeded in establishing himself in the interior of Ligny. But here, as at St. Amand, the French were obliged to pause. Having conquered the villages which separated them from the Prussians, they could not advance, because of the reserves drawn up in semicircular lines on the slope, topped by the mill of Bry.

This position justified the skilful manœuvre devised by Napoleon; for an attack directed from St. Amand to Ligny, in the rear of the Prussians, could alone put an end to their resistance; and it ought even to do still more, for by placing them between two fires, half their army would have been destroyed.

Napoleon, impatient for the execution of the movement, sent orders to Ney, whose cannon were just beginning to make themselves heard, and who in all probability could not be so much occupied by the English, that it would be impossible for him to detach 10,000 or 12,000 men to attack Blücher's rear. This order, dated quarter past three, drawn up by Marshal Soult, and entrusted to M. de Forbin-Janson, ran thus:—

“MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,—The combat which I announced to you is raging here. The emperor desires me tell you that you must immediately manœuvre so as to envelop the enemy's right, and attack their rear with impetuosity. The Prussian army is lost if you act with vigour. *The fate of France is in your hands.*”

Whilst M. de Forbin-Janson was hastening with this order to Quatre-Bras, the battle continued as furious as ever; but the Prussians had not succeeded in driving us from Ligny, nor had we been able to cross the stream. The old General Friant, who commanded the foot-grenadiers of the guard, and whose eye had been trained through an entire life passed on the battlefield, advanced to Napoleon, and said, as he pointed to the villages, “Sire, we shall never be able to dislodge these lads if you do not take them in the rear with one of your divisions.” “Make your mind easy,” replied Napoleon; “three times have I ordered that movement, and I shall now order it for the fourth time.” He knew that d’Erlon’s corps, the last that had begun to march, could not be further off than Gosselies, and that an officer following at full gallop could easily bring him back to St. Amand. He sent La Bédoyère with a note written in pencil, containing a formal order to

d'Erlon to turn back if he were advanced beyond, or to turn aside if he were only as far as the old Roman road, and by this route fall on the rear of the mill of Bry. This order, of whose execution there did not appear to be any doubt, was intended to produce a result that would have equalled the greatest triumphs of past centuries. But did Fortune will it so?

Meanwhile Blucher, whose patriotism and energy never relaxed, had sent all that remained of Henkel and Jagow's division to Ligny. These fresh battalions, entering the village, advanced for a moment as far as the principal street. But General Gerard's skill and courage seemed to redouble; he brought up his last reserves, and holding firm to the right on the platform near the church, and to the left in the old castle, he did not allow his conquest to be wrested from him; but he sent word to Napoleon that his resources were exhausted, and that it was absolutely necessary for him to have assistance. Four thousand corpses already strewed the village of Ligny.

At St. Amand, Blucher had also made a violent effort by sending the corps of Pirch I. to support Ziethen, that is to say, he brought into action the 60,000 men stationed between Bry and St. Amand. He then sent the division of Pirch II. to the assistance of Steinmetz, with orders to recover St. Amand-la-Haye at any price; he sent Tippleskirchen's division to St. Amand-le-Hameau with equally energetic instructions. To this mass of infantry he had joined all the cavalry of the 1st and 2nd corps under General Jurgas, intending that they should turn Vandamme's left. At the same time he ordered the other three divisions of the 2nd corps commanded by Brauze, Krafft, and Langen to advance and replace on the heights of Bry the troops that were about to enter into action. He ordered General Thielmann to advance on Sombreffe without, however, too much exposing Point-du-Jour, where Bulow (4th corps) was to debouch. He recommended him to excite the alarm of the French for their right wing by making a demonstration on the Charleroi road.

In consequence of these arrangements, Blucher himself advanced at the head of his soldiers, and made a vigorous attempt upon the three St. Amands. The division Pirch II. advanced with the greatest impetuosity on St. Amand-la-Haye, and succeeded in forcing an entrance. General Girard,* at first repulsed, returned with his left brigade under General Piat, and succeeded in maintaining his position. Blucher, at the head of the rallied battalions of Pirch II., reappeared in the avenues of the village now strewn with dead; but Girard, by a last

* The reader will not forget that the General Girard commanding a detached division of the 2nd corps is not General Gerard who commanded the 4th corps, and was at this moment attacking the village of Ligny.

effort, expelled the energetic old man, who was lavishing his inexhaustible courage in the interests of his country. Girard, who had declared that he would not survive if France were vanquished again, was mortally wounded in this desperate struggle. His two brigadier-generals, de Villiers and Piat, were seriously wounded. Each colonel being thus left to act on his own responsibility, the valiant Tiburce Sebastiani, colonel of the 11th light infantry, performing prodigies of valour, and displaying wonderful presence of mind, kept his position at St. Amand-la-Haye. Out of 4500 men, the Girard division had already lost the third part, besides three generals.

More to the left, towards St. Amand-le-Hameau, Habert's division, sent by Vandamme to support Girard, succeeded most happily in arresting the progress of Jurgas' infantry and Tippelskirchen's cavalry, General Habert having ordered a body of sharpshooters to conceal themselves amidst the tall ripe corn, waited there until the Prussian cavalry had arrived within about half the distance of a musket-shot. He then ordered a sudden and well-directed discharge of musketry, which, taking the enemy by surprise, obliged them to retire in great disorder. Thanks to these combined efforts, we remained masters of the three St. Amands, but had not been able to cross the sinuous stream of Ligny. On our right, on the opposite extremity of the battlefield, Thielmann's infantry having descended from Point-du-Jour by the Charleroi road, were driven back to the fatal stream by a vigorous charge of Exelmans' dragoons, and held in check by a continuous fire from the Hulot division, dispersed as sharpshooters. Thus arrested on the banks of the stream, we harassed our enemies, and they us; but the disadvantage was greater to us, as we needed both a prompt and complete victory to enable us to overthrow the two armies opposed to us. But Napoleon, ever on horseback, and ever watchful, suddenly devised a means of making the combat more destructive to the Prussians than the French. We have already said that the stream on which the three disputed villages stood turns abruptly immediately on passing Great St. Amand, so that this village and that of Ligny were almost at right angles to each other. As Napoleon proceeded towards Ligny, that is, along the side of this angle, he discovered, through an opening between the trees bordering the stream, Ziethen and Pirch's corps, the one ranged behind the other, and extending to the mill of Bry. He immediately ordered up some batteries of the guard, then attacking these masses *en écharpe*, soon committed fearful ravages amongst them. Each discharge brought hundreds of men to the ground, overturned gunners and horses, and blew the carriages of the cannon to pieces. Napoleon, contemplating this spectacle with that fearful coolness which the

habit of war develops even in the least sanguinary men, said to Friant, who was constantly beside him, "You see that they will pay dearer than we for the time they make us lose." Still this slaughtering of men by thousands was not sufficient: it was now late, and it was necessary to terminate this combat with the Prussians, in order to be able to meet the English on the morrow. General Friant was in despair, seeing that the movement ordered to be made in the enemy's rear had not been effected. "Do not be uneasy," said Napoleon, "there are more ways of gaining a battle than one," and then with his usual fertility of invention he devised another combination for putting a speedy termination to this fearful struggle.

The effect produced by his artillery firing *en écharpe* suggested to him the idea of advancing still further in the same direction, passing Ligny, and crossing the stream with all the guard, and thus take the sixty thousand men who were attacking the three St. Amands in the rear. Had this movement succeeded, and executed by the guard there could have been no doubt of its success, the Prussian army would have been cut in two, Ziethen and Pirch separated from Thielmann and Bulow, and though the result might not have been so great as if a detachment from Ney had attacked Blucher's rear, still it would have been great, very great, and even sufficient to rid us of the Prussians for the remainder of the campaign.

Having devised this combination, Napoleon ordered Friant to form the guard into columns of attack, to advance as far as the heights of Ligny, and pass behind the village in order to cross higher up the ill-boding stream, whose waters now flowed mingled with human blood.

These orders were about being put into execution when Napoleon's attention was suddenly attracted to Vandamme's position. Blucher, about to make a fresh attempt to recover the three St. Amands, had ordered Ziethen's exhausted divisions to the rear, and replaced them by those of Pirch I. Vandamme had exhausted his resources, and was vehemently demanding aid. It was no longer possible to allow him to wait in expectation of an attack on the enemy's rear, which, though so often ordered, had not yet been executed. Napoleon immediately sent him a detachment of the young guard under General Duhesme, allowing the old guard and heavy cavalry still to advance towards Ligny. Vandamme's troops to the left, and Gerard's to the right, uttered cries of joy as they saw the guard advancing to their assistance. Loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were re-echoed from both sides. Count de Lobau, who had been compelled by the violence of the cannonade to come nearer to Fleurus, took the place of the guard, and formed the reserve.

It was full time that the young guard came to Vandamme's

assistance, for Habert's division, stationed at St. Amand-le-Hameau to support Girard's half-destroyed division, seeing fresh masses of Prussians advancing against it, whilst others were preparing to make an attack in the rear, was preparing to retreat. Vandamme hastened to the spot, and became seriously alarmed, not so much at sight of the masses in front, as by the danger that threatened in the rear. He shuddered as he suddenly thought of Kulm and all its horrors. He perceived deep columns, clad in what seemed to him the Prussian uniform, and which from their movements seemed disposed to surround his forces. Not wishing to be caught between two fires, as he had been in Bohemia, he sent an officer to reconnoitre the troop advancing in the rear of Habert's division. The officer did not approach very near to the supposed enemy, but convinced that they were Prussians, returned at full gallop to make his report to Vandamme. This general ordered Habert's division to take up its position at right angles to his left, so as to protect him from the real enemies in front, and from imaginary foes in the rear. Meantime he sent officer after officer to tell Napoleon of this new occurrence.

Napoleon was amazed at the intelligence. He could not comprehend it, for had a Prussian or English column succeeded in gliding between the French army at Quatre-Bras and that at St. Amand, it must be that the different corps of cavalry stationed to Ney's right and Vandamme's left had been both idle and blind during the entire day; and d'Erlon's division, in Ney's rear, must not have seen this either; all which suppositions were equally inadmissible. But conjectures were of no avail when opposed to an authentic report despatched from the scene of action. Napoleon immediately ordered several aides-de-camp to gallop off at once, and see with their own eyes what was going on between Fleurus and Quatre-Bras, and obtain an explanation of this unexpected apparition of what seemed Prussian troops on his left flank.

Meanwhile he countermanded the orders given to his old guard to advance towards Ligny, for it would not be prudent to deprive himself of his reserve if a large corps were about to attack his rear. But he allowed the young guard to advance to the support of Habert and Girard's exhausted divisions, and ordered the continuation of the fierce cannonade, which, playing on the Prussian flank, was committing such terrible ravages.

During this time Blucher, whom nothing could deter, was making a fresh attack upon St. Amand-le-Hameau and St. Amand-la-Haye with the rallied battalions of Ziethen and Pirch II. Attacked now for the fifth time, Vandamme's line was beginning to give way, when Duhesme at the head of the young guard rushed directly on Le Hameau and La Haye, drove

back the Prussians, and again recovered the line of the stream of Ligny. Just as this was effected, the aides-de-camp who had been sent to reconnoitre returned and dispelled the error into which a giddy-brained officer had led Vandamme. This fancied Prussian corps turned out to be d'Erlon's battalion, which at length, complying with Napoleon's repeated orders, was proceeding towards the mill of Bry, and consequently about to take the enemy in the rear. There was therefore nothing more to be dreaded on this side; there were even very good grounds for hope that the oft-repeated orders should at length be put into execution. Napoleon did repeat these orders, and at the same time proceeded to execute the great manœuvre which had been interrupted by the false report that was now explained. The importance of this movement became every moment more evident, for Blücher, by accumulating his forces in the direction of the three St. Amands, had left a space between himself and Thielmann, and a vigorous effort made above Ligny in the direction of Sombreffe would separate the corps of Ziethen and Pirch I. from those of Thielmann and Bulow, throw them into the greatest disorder, and deliver them as prisoners into d'Erlon's hands should his movement succeed. In any case, this manœuvre was most opportune, for it was that decisive blow so long expected, a blow disastrous to the Prussian army, whether d'Erlon had or had not reached the neighbourhood of Bry, and would in any case terminate the battle to our advantage by removing the obstinate resistance we encountered beyond the stream of Ligny.

Napoleon ordered the old guard to resume its suspended movement, and to defile behind Ligny, as far as the extremity of that fated village. He was not likely to send his chosen battalions into Ligny itself, where they were sure to be incommoded by heaps of ruins and of dead bodies: he led them to a spot a little beyond, where they would only have to pass the stream and the trees on its bank. The sappers under his own directions had cut down the trees and hedges, so as to allow a free passage to a deployed company. To the left he stationed three battalions of the Pecheux division, which, debouching from the village of Ligny at the same time that the guard debouched from the ravine, would greatly aid the movement of the latter. He next placed six battalions of grenadiers in close column, supported by four battalions of chasseurs. A significant silence was observed by these admirable troops, proud of the honour of being chosen to put a termination to the battle. The sun, now sinking behind the mill of Bry, gilded the trees with its declining rays as Napoleon at last gave the impatiently expected signal. Then the column of the six battalions of grenadiers rushed through the ravine, crossed the stream, and ascended

the opposite bank, whilst the three battalions of the Pecheux division debouched from Ligny. This obstacle being overcome, the grenadiers paused to form into line and attack the height on which were stationed the Krafft and Langen divisions, supported by the entire Prussian cavalry. Whilst the French were falling into line the enemy discharged a volley of balls and grape, which they bore unflinchingly. The Prussian cavalry, thinking from their uniform that they were some battalions of the mobilised national guard, advanced and parleyed, trying to induce them to surrender. One of our battalions, suddenly forming into square, slaughtered a number of the enemy's cavalry. The others formed into columns of attack, charged with fixed bayonets, and cut down all that opposed them. The Prussian cavalry returned to the charge; but at the same moment Milhaud's cuirassiers bore down on them at full gallop. A bloody conflict ensued, but soon terminated to our advantage, whilst the Prussian army, divided into two parts, was forced to fall back hastily.

At this moment Blucher having made a last and fruitless attempt to recover the three St. Amands, hastened to the relief of his troops at the mill of Bry. He had come too late, and meeting our cuirassiers, had been unhorsed and trodden down. This heroic old man, lying on the ground near an aide-de-camp, who took good care not to give the slightest indication of who he was, heard the galloping of our men as they cut down his squadrons and completed the defeat of his army. Meantime Vandamme at length debouched from St. Amand, Gerard from Ligny; and General Hulot, advancing by the road leading from Namur to Charleroi, with Bourmont's division, opened that route to Pajol and Exelmans' cavalry. It was now past eight o'clock, and the shades of evening began to envelop the hideous scene, and on the right and left victory had declared in our favour. However, the Prussian army, which had retreated before the victorious imperial guard, did not appear to be harassed in the rear; d'Erlon, so often summoned and so long expected, did not appear, and no greater result could be hoped for than that just obtained. The Prussian army, retreating on every side, left us in possession of the field of battle, that is, of the highroad from Namur to Brussels, the line of communication between the English and Prussians, and left besides on the field 18,000 dead or wounded. We took a few prisoners and some pieces of cannon. These, it is true, were not all the losses the Prussians suffered. Many terrified by the fearful struggle had fled in confusion. Twelve thousand had thus deserted their standards, and this day reduced the Prussian army from 120,000 to 90,000 men. But what was this in comparison to 30,000 or 40,000 prisoners that might have been made had

d'Erlon appeared, by which the ruin of the Prussian army would have been completed, and the English troops left unaided to sustain our attack. Napoleon had had too much experience to be surprised at the accidents by which the most skilful military combinations are often frustrated; but still he could not understand why his orders had not been obeyed, nor could he discover though he sought the cause. According to his calculations, the entire English army could not have been at Quatre-Bras on that day, and he could not comprehend why Marshal Ney had not been able to send him a detachment, nor why d'Erlon had not arrived when he was so near Fleurus. Revolving these thoughts in his mind, he still lingered on the battlefield, now enveloped in profound darkness, and permitted his soldiers, wearied from their long march on that morning and the previous evening, besides fighting all day, to bivouac on the ground where the combat had terminated. Lobau's corps (the 6th) now become the sole reserve, was ordered to advance, and was stationed round the mill of Bry. It might have been possible to send this corps in pursuit of the Prussians had the state of things at Quatre-Bras been known; but not a single officer had come from Ney, and as Lobau's were the only fresh troops that Napoleon had (the entire guard being overcome by fatigue), he thought it better to keep them near him, since if the enemy should again assume an offensive attitude, he had no other troops with which to oppose them. However, he sent one of his detachments, that of Teste, under the intelligent and alert Pajol, to pursue the Prussians, and hasten their retreat. The rest he kept to protect his bivouac.

What he did not yet know, or at most but suspected, may be divined from Marshal Ney's arrangements. It must be remembered that in the morning Ney was in a state of anxiety, fancying that he had before him, not the Prince of Saxe-Weimar's four thousand men, but the entire, or at least the larger portion of the English army. He was confirmed in this opinion upon seeing a reconnaissance made by officers of high rank—a preliminary, he believed, to a great battle. General Reille's strange conduct in retarding, on his own responsibility, the advance of the 2nd corps did but add to the marshal's perplexity, and he passed the entire morning vacillating between a desire to fight and the dread of committing an imprudence. It was under the influence of these different impressions that he sent a lancer officer to inform Napoleon that he feared the forces opposed to him were far superior in number to his; to which Napoleon quickly replied, that the troops assembled at Quatre-Bras could not be very numerous; that at most there could only be those that had hurried from Brussels; that Blucher's headquarters being at Namur, he could not have

sent any force to Quatre-Bras, and that consequently Ney ought to lead on Reille and d'Erlon's corps with Valmy's cavalry, and scatter the slender resistance he might meet. Had Napoleon been at the enemy's headquarters, he could not have formed a more correct judgment, or given more suitable directions. Besides the letter brought by M. de Flahault, Ney had received a formal order from headquarters to attack the enemy, and consequently made every preparation to obey; but unfortunately the 2nd corps had not yet arrived at noon. General Reille, alarmed by General Girard's report of the appearance of the Prussians, had detained this corps before Gosselies. It certainly would have been easy for Ney, with the Bachelu division, and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoettes and de Piré, amounting to 9000 men, to overpower the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, whose forces, with the reinforcement he had received of 2000 men, did not amount to more than 6000 in all. The Prince of Orange had hastened to him, but unaccompanied; and most certainly Ney's 4500 infantry and 4500 excellent cavalry would have destroyed the entire. Still we can understand that when Ney beheld a brilliant staff, he believed himself in presence of an entire army, and would not venture to commence an attack with the forces under his command. Urged at length by the emperor's repeated despatches, he lost patience, and sent orders to Generals Reille and d'Erlon to advance at once. Had General Reille, on the receipt of the orders brought by General de Flahault, marched forward with the Foy and Jerome divisions, he might have arrived at Quatre-Bras at noon, and with these divisions, Ney's forces would have amounted to at least 22,000 men, and with Valmy's cuirassiers, to nearly 26,000. This number would have sufficed to overpower the enemy at noon or even at one o'clock. Unfortunately General Reille did nothing of all this, and contented himself, in compliance with the repeated request of his commanding officer, with coming alone at about two o'clock to Quatre-Bras. Ney testified the desire he felt to attack the forces before him, saying they could not be very numerous, and might be easily overcome. General Reille, full of the remembrance of Spain, as Vandamme was of that of Kulm, far from stimulating Ney's ardour, sought rather to depress it by representing to him that this was not the way to act with the English, that to come to an engagement with them was not a trifling affair, and that it would be better to wait until all his forces should be assembled; that, indeed, they could see but a small force before them, but that in all probability the entire English army was concealed behind the wood, and only waiting the commencement of the combat to make its appearance, and that it would therefore be unwise to

attack, unless with his entire force. This counsel was good in principle, but in the actual circumstances it was fatal, for at Quatre-Bras there was only the Perponcher division, of which three-fourths had arrived at noon, and the remainder at two o'clock, the entire amounting to only 8000 men. Ney therefore determined to wait the arrival of the Foy and Jerome divisions, for though General Reille had come himself, his troops, not having received orders until late, had not yet formed into line. Now the thundering of the cannon at St. Amand and Ligny was heard: it was nearly three o'clock, and Ney* determined to commence the attack, hoping that the report of the cannon would hasten the advancing troops. The Bachelu division had arrived the evening before, that of General Foy had just joined, and he was thus certain of 10,000 infantry. He had also the cavalry of General Piré and General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, which with Valmy's 3500 cuirassiers amounted to

* I take these details from General Foy's military journal, written daily as the events occurred, and therefore more worthy of confidence than accounts written twenty or thirty years after the occurrences they relate. This journal asserts that Ney wished to attack, that General Reille dissuaded him, alleging the peculiar character of English troops, and advised him to await the concentration of the divisions; and the journal further says that this consultation took place at the very time that the firing at Ligny was heard. This firing was heard at half-past two at the earliest. Consequently the attack at Quatre-Bras had not commenced at that hour. Ney wished to commence earlier, but had been prevented either by General Reille's advice, or by the tardy arrival of his divisions. Colonel Heymes' account also proves that the marshal was impatient for the arrival of the divisions of the 2nd corps, and that he began the attack before he had collected all his forces, hoping that the sound of the cannon would hasten the troops on march.

In order to transfer the responsibility of the events at Quatre-Bras from Ney to Napoleon, it has been asserted that the marshal, by commencing the attack at two o'clock, anticipated the order sent from Fleurus at two, and which could not arrive at Frasnes before half-past three. Here is a double error. The firing at Ligny was heard before Ney commenced his attack, which consequently could not have been before half-past two, or probably three. Besides this, Ney had received before eleven o'clock the message brought by M. de Flahault, by which he was ordered to advance even beyond Quatre-Bras, and he had also received the message which Napoleon had sent when about to leave Charleroi for Fleurus, and which, in reply to the information brought by the lancer officer, was meant to appease the marshal's anxiety, and ordered him to summon Reille's and d'Erlon's troops to his aid, and then attack the forces opposed to him. Ney ought to have received at half-past eleven at latest this latter message, which had been despatched from Charleroi before Napoleon's departure. He consequently had not anticipated the imperial orders, some of which he received at half-past ten, and others at half-past eleven, and which enjoined him to pay no regard to his own opinion of the enemy opposed to him, but commence an immediate attack. It is certainly true that he was most anxious to engage from the time he received the second order, but he waited for Reille's troops, which that general, influenced by General Girard's information of the approach of the Prussian army, had kept back. Further on I shall consider the part played by each in these events. But it may be said here that all these things were ruled by a deplorable fatality, and by a lingering remembrance of our late reverses, which, acting on the imagination of our generals, made them, contrary to their natural dispositions, both weak and vacillating.

nearly 1000 horsemen. It is true that he had been told not to overwork Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and to keep Valmy a little in the rear; but these were not positive commands, they were only counsels, and counsels which the necessity of the moment rendered void. He decided, therefore, on commencing the attack. The Jerome division was in sight, it was known that d'Erlon's was on its way, and it was hoped that the sound of the cannon would stimulate its zeal and hasten its arrival.

We shall give a detailed account of the battlefield on which this long-delayed but heroic struggle was to be fought. Ney occupied the highroad leading from Charleroi to Brussels, and passing through Frasnes and Quatre-Bras. He was a little in advance of Frasnes, on the border of a pretty extensive hollow, with Quatre-Bras, consisting of an inn and a few houses, in front. Before him was the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels, passing through the centre of the hollow, then turning towards Quatre-Bras, where on one side it joined the Nivelles route, and on the other, that of Namur; to his left were the wooded hills of Bossu, concealing the Nivelles road, which ran behind; in the centre, on the road itself, was the farm of Gimioncourt; to the right, opening towards the Dyle, were several ravines bordered by trees, and in the extreme distance was the road leading from Namur to Brussels, along which resounded the roar of cannon from Ligny.

The disposition of the enemy's forces in front of Quatre-Bras was distinctly visible; but we could see nothing of those behind, which left Ney in the greatest doubt as to the numerical force with which he was about to engage. The Prince of Orange having nine battalions of the Perponcher division under his command, had stationed four of them to our left, in the wood of Bossu; two in the centre, at the farm of Gimioncourt; one on the road to support his artillery; and two as a reserve, in front of Quatre-Bras.

Ney resolved to overpower the enemy in front, not knowing exactly how many were in his rear, but counting on the arrival of the Jerome division, which was already in sight, and on d'Erlon's, which must soon appear. He stationed Bachelu's division on the right of the highroad, Foy's on the road itself, and Piré's cavalry on the right and left. The enemy's sharpshooters were soon driven back by ours, and Piré's cavalry, charging the Dutch battalions in front of the farm of Gimioncourt, at full gallop, cleared the ground. Our artillery on the road, superior in quality, number, and position to that of the enemy, dismounted several of their cannon, and caused great devastation amongst their infantry. The brilliant Prince of Orange, annoyed by their fire, had the hardihood to attempt to capture our batteries. He endeavoured to communicate his

courage to the battalion protecting his artillery, and lead them against our cannon. Whilst he headed the charge, waving his hat, General Piré sent forward one of his regiments, which, attacking the battalion in flank, drove it back, unhorsed the prince, and very nearly made him prisoner.

It was now our infantry's turn. The Gautier brigade of Foy's division, following the highroad, attacked the farm of Gimioncourt. This brigade, led by General Foy himself, took the farm, and passed the ravine on which it was situate. Jamin's brigade, the second of Foy's division, turning to the left, advanced towards the wood of Bossu, into which it forced Saxe-Weimar's battalions to retire. The Prince of Orange found himself in a critical position, for his two battalions of reserve stationed in front of Quatre-Bras would not be able to arrest the progress of Bachelu and Foy's victorious divisions. Had Ney possessed more confidence and thrown himself on Quatre-Bras, he would certainly have taken that important post, and the English divisions advancing on one side from Nivelles, and on the other from Brussels, would have been obliged to make a long detour before being able to act in conjunction, during which Ney would have been able to render his position at Quatre-Bras impregnable. But still doubtful of what enemy was really opposed to him, and not daring to engage Valmy's cuirassiers or Lefebvre-Desnoettes' cavalry, he prepared, waiting for Jerome's division, the most numerous of the 2nd corps, before pursuing his success further. Jerome's division appeared at last, at about half-past three; but at the same moment the Prince of Orange received a large reinforcement. Picton's division, consisting of eight English and Scotch, and four Hanoverian battalions, arrived from Brussels, and brought him nearly 8000 men; 1100 of Collaert's cavalry debouched by the Nivelles road, a little after the Brunswick troops arrived from Vilvorde; and the Duke of Wellington, having made his several observations, came himself to take the supreme command. The Brunswick troops, at least those that arrived on the ground, brought a reinforcement of 3000 foot and a thousand horse. The Duke of Wellington, with the Perponcher, Picton, and Brunswick divisions, had already 20,000 men under his command, and was therefore very nearly equal in strength to Ney, even after the arrival of Jerome's divisions.*

* Here is an almost exact account of the respective forces at half-past three or quarter to four :—

The Duke of Wellington had—

Perponcher	7500
Collaert	1100
Picton (English and Hanoverians)	8000
Brunswick	4000
— 20,600 men.	

Whilst things were going on thus in the British army, Jerome's division arrived on the edge of the hollow where we were fighting, and brought Ney a reinforcement of 7500 excellent infantry. He had consequently about 19,000 in line. In case of necessity he could have employed Valmy's 3500 cuirassiers, for the last imperial despatch, sent when Napoleon was about to leave Charleroi, in telling him to use Reille, d'Erlon, and Valmy's corps in sweeping away the enemy before him, evidently authorised his employing them. But he had left Valmy in the rear, and did not dare to make use of Desnoettes' troops. He again sent orders to d'Erlon to hasten, and with the aid of Jerome's division resumed the battle, which he was determined should be decisive. He ordered Bachelu's division, which formed his right wing, to take the farm of Gimioncourt as its starting-point, and advance, if possible, as far as the highroad to Namur. On the highroad he assembled Gautier's and Jamin's brigades and Foy's division, supported on their flank by Piré's cavalry, and ordered them to march directly to Quatre-Bras. To the left, along the wood of Bossu, he replaced Jamin's brigade by Jerome's fine and numerous division, in which General Guilleminot was second in command. Ney thus advanced his entire line from left to right, which was not a good arrangement, as he was about to meet serious obstacles on each wing; whilst if he had confined himself to mere demonstrations, on one side towards the farm of Gimioncourt, and on the other towards the wood of Bossu, and concentrated his forces on the highroad, he would in all probability have taken Quatre-Bras, broken the English line, the two divisions of which being thrown back, one on the wood of Bossu, the other on the Namur road, would not have been able to form a recombination. The Duke of Wellington had placed his principal strength in his wings. On his left, opposite our right, along the road to Namur, he had stationed six of Picton's eight English battalions, with the four Hanoverian battalions in the second line. Of Picton's two remaining battalions, he had placed one at the point of junction between the little road of Sart-Dame-Avelines and the highroad of Namur, and one, and only one, at Quatre-Bras. To his left he had placed Perponcher's weary troops in the wood

Ney had drawn up in line—	
Bachelu (including artillery)	4500
Foy	5000
Jerome	7500
Piré	2000
A little in the rear, which he could but did not dare employ, were—	
Lefebvre-Desnoettes (light cavalry)	2500
Valmy (cuirassiers)	3500
— 25,000 men.	

of Bossu, and in Quatre-Bras itself, and he stationed Brunswick's in front with Collaert's cavalry. The centre, that is Quatre-Bras, the most important point, was consequently but badly defended.

Ney, feverishly anxious, saw nothing of this, and marched towards the enemy with all his line equally in advance, his right directed towards the Namur road, his centre towards Quatre-Bras, and his left towards the wood of Bossu. At the moment of the execution of this movement the Prince of Orange, seeing Foy's division advance, sought to arrest its progress with the aid of Collaert's cavalry, composed of Dutch hussars and Belgian dragoons. He first attacked our infantry with the Dutch hussars, keeping the Belgian dragoons as a reserve. But the hussars had scarcely advanced when Colonel de Fandoas flung himself with the 6th chasseurs upon them, drove them back upon the infantry in their rear, and even cut down the gunners of one battery. The Belgian dragoons, coming to the assistance of the Dutch hussars, were repulsed in their turn by our chasseurs, and forced them back upon an English battalion, which, taking them for enemies, fired on them, and completed their confusion.

After this, our entire line, protected by a numerous artillery, entered into action. To the right, Bachelu's division, composed of four regiments of infantry, advanced in open file beyond the farm of Gimioncourt, that we had taken. The men had to pass through several ravines bordered by hedges, which being cut down by the sappers, they marched on resolutely without suffering any great loss, aided as they were by the fire of our cannon. Having crossed the first ravine, they met a second, which they traversed with equal success; but when at this distance, the division could no longer be supported by our artillery, as it happened to fall directly within range of the guns. Nevertheless the men climbed the bank of the second ravine, intending to take possession of a plateau covered with ripe corn, when they were unexpectedly exposed to a terrible fire. It proceeded from Picton's six English battalions hidden amid the corn, which had attained the height of three or four feet. Here they had waited until we were within short range.

Our soldiers fell in great numbers before a close and well-directed fire. Picton, with great presence of mind, ordered his men to charge with fixed bayonets. Our infantry, driven backwards with violence on a sloping ground, could not support the shock, but plunging headlong into the ravine, retired to the other bank. But a happy accident soon gave them an opportunity of rallying. Of the four regiments composing Bachelu's division, only three had advanced to the attack. The fourth—the 108th of the line—was to our left, commanded by Colonel Higonet, an officer as firm as he was intelligent, who had been

kept back by a hedge, which he was having cut down when he saw our three regiments retreating. He immediately turned to the right, deployed his battalions, ordering them to await his signal to fire. As soon as our retreating soldiers had passed, he ordered his men to fire on the English, who were in hot pursuit. The ground was immediately covered with slain. He then charged with fixed bayonets, and caused fearful carnage amongst them. Seeing this, the soldiers of the 72nd, immediately to the right of the 108th, were the first to rally, the others followed their example, and the English were driven back to the point whence they had come. The Foy division, seeing this movement, supported it by advancing along the road, and assisted in driving back the English left wing. The ground was now strewn with as many red as blue uniforms. However, to force the English left wing, it would be necessary to again brave the fearful firing of Picton's battalions, and of the four Hanoverian battalions by which they were supported. Bachelu, appreciating this difficulty, formed the judicious resolution of turning his efforts altogether to the right, towards what was called the Piraumont farm, lying behind the Namur road.

General Foy was advancing slowly with his two brigades along the highroad, not venturing to make a vigorous attack on Quatre-Bras, because of what was taking place in our right wing, and more especially because of the obstacles our left met along the wood of Bossu. The brave Jerome division, which had been ordered to make a movement against this wood, persisted in trying to force a passage; but the Brunswick and Bylandt troops, profiting by the advantage of their position, succeeded in keeping their ground. This division, supported by Foy's movement on the highroad, was about taking possession of the wood so violently disputed, and of advancing on the Nivelles road, when the Duke of Brunswick led on a charge of cavalry. He rushed with his Uhlans on our infantry, but was stopped by their fire; he was soon driven back, and put to flight by Piré's lancers and chasseurs. This brave prince fell pierced by a ball. Our lancers and chasseurs at once pursued Brunswick's Uhlans as far as Picton's infantry, which he was hastily forming into squares. Notwithstanding his efforts, our lancers, led by Colonel Galbois, drove back the 42nd with great slaughter. They forced their way to the 44th, but could not succeed in totally destroying them, being repelled by the fire of the rallied soldiers. The French chasseurs, anxious to imitate the lancers, attacked the 92nd, but could not succeed in breaking their lines, but, however, pushed on to Quatre-Bras, cutting down the fugitives they found on the Namur road, and for one moment seemed on the point of carrying off the Duke of Wellington himself. But unable to sustain their position at such

a distance, both lancers and chasseurs were obliged to retreat and form again behind our infantry.

It is six o'clock, and we are approaching the attainment of our object; for on the left, Jerome's division is on the point of debouching beyond the wood of Bossu in the centre; Foy's division, supported by our artillery, is ascending the steep that abuts on Quatre-Bras; whilst on the right, Bachelu, advancing through the Piraumont farm, has nearly reached the Namur high-road. A decisive blow is needed in the centre to secure victory by the capture of Quatre-Bras. Time presses as reinforcements are flowing from all parts to the Duke of Wellington. First arrived the Nassau contingent under General Von Kruse,* consisting of 3000 men; then came Alten's division, consisting of an English and German brigade, amounting to about 6000 men. The English general would then have 30,000 men to oppose the 19,000 of the French general, already diminished by 3000 since the commencement of the engagement. Ney, though he could not see the reinforcements that reached his adversary, felt, however, that the resistance was increasing, and became miserable at not being able to overcome it. Whilst anxiously expecting d'Erlon's arrival to help him in these straits, he receives a piece of information that throws him into actual despair. General Delcambre, the chief of d'Erlon's staff, arrives at full gallop to say that in obedience to an imperial order, written in pencil, and brought by La Bédoyère, d'Erlon's corps, so often ordered to Quatre-Bras, had been commanded to turn back and advance towards Ligny. On hearing this, Ney declared he had been placed in a fearful position, that it was the hope, nay the certainty of d'Erlon's aid that had induced him to engage the English, whose entire army was now opposed to him, and that he would certainly be destroyed if he did not get the promised help. Agitated, and not reflecting on what he was doing, he exerted the authority given him over d'Erlon, and sent General Delcambre to him with a formal order to return to Quatre-Bras.

At the very moment that Ney gave this hasty order he received the letter that had been written at quarter past three at Fleurus, and brought by de Forbin-Janson, and in which Napoleon ordered him to fall back on the heights of Bry, exciting him to make this movement by telling him that the Prussian army would be annihilated, and that consequently the *safety of France was in his hands*. In a cooler moment the marshal would have perceived what was very plain, that the

* The Nassau contingent was not the same as the Nassau troops of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, that had defended Quatre-Bras on the previous evening. The latter were called Nassau-Orange, because they were in the service of the house of Orange.

principal action was not now at Quatre-Bras, but at Ligny; that the Prussian army once destroyed, the ruin of the English must inevitably follow next day; and that it would consequently be better to obey Napoleon, and that at once, by confining himself to acting on the defensive at Quatre-Bras, which was possible, as he proved an hour later, and send immediate orders to d'Erlon to advance to Flenrus. An officer at full gallop could have delivered this order within half an hour, and an hour later, that is to say, at half-past seven, d'Erlon would have been in the rear of the mill of Bry, and thus enclose the Prussians between two adverse armies. But Ney did not make this very simple calculation. Occupied solely with what was presented to his view, he only thought that he ought to obtain a victory as quickly as possible on the spot where he was, and then fall back on Napoleon. His only thought was, by some desperate effort to overcome the obstacles opposed to him. He had seen the prodigies of valour effected by our cavalry during the day. Inflated with the hope that, with the assistance of the horse, he could bear down all before him, he sent for Count de Valmy, one of whose brigades he had ordered to come closer, and addressing him in Napoleon's words, said: "*General, the fate of France is in your hands.* You must make a great effort against the English centre, and bear down the mass of infantry opposed to you. If you succeed, France is saved. Go, and you shall be supported by Piré's cavalry." General Kellermann, always fond of contradiction, made more than one objection to this plan, but yielded to the marshal's almost spasmodic entreaties, and commenced preparations for the desperate attack that had been confided to his valour.

To accomplish what Ney had commanded would require the Count de Valmy's four brigades, consisting of 3500 cuirassiers and dragoons, together with the light cavalry of the guard, commanded by Lefebvre-Desnoettes in person; and when all had been trodden down by our horse, a mass of infantry would have been required to take definite possession of the conquered ground. Instead of allowing Jerome's fine division to wear out its energy against physical obstacles at the Bossu wood, he should have left but one brigade of infantry to sustain the combat at that spot, and then with the remaining 4000 men of this division, 5000 of Foy's, Valmy's cuirassiers and dragoons, the lancers, and Piré's and Lefebvre-Desnoettes' chasseurs, that is, with 9000 horse and 9000 foot, break the English centre as Massena had done the Austrian centre at Caldiero in 1805. But Ney, actuated at the same time by the impulses of heroic valour, and perplexed by deep anxiety of mind, only thought of making some desperate effort. Unfortunately desperation itself needs some degree of prudence to secure

success. Ney, whilst neglecting Napoleon's most essential directions by summoning d'Erlon to his assistance, was most scrupulous in observing the now unnecessary precaution of leaving Kellermann at the junction of the old Roman road, and the still less important one of not overworking Lefebvre-Desnoettes' troops, and confined himself to employing one of Valmy's brigades, whilst he allowed Jerome's brigade to exhaust itself in the wood of Bossu.

Count de Valmy, notwithstanding the little wisdom of the orders he had received, prepared himself for a vigorous charge, first giving the horses a little time to rest. Piré, at the head of his chasseurs and lancers, hastened to support him. The Count de Valmy proceeded along the highroad, and ascended the acclivity towards Quatre-Bras at a trot, then turning abruptly to the left, in the direction of the Bossu wood, he with his brigade, composed of the 8th and 11th cuirassiers, rushed on the English infantry, commanded by Major Halkett. Balls rained on the cuirasses and helmets of our horsemen, but they did not flinch. The 69th regiment was attacked by our 8th, borne down, a number of the men put to the sword, and the flag carried off by a cuirassier named Lami. This English regiment took refuge in the wood. Kellermann having rallied his squadrons, rushed on the 30th, whose ranks he could not break; but he overpowered and cut down the 33rd and two Brunswick battalions, and thus forced his way to Quatre-Bras. Meanwhile Piré commenced an attack on the right on Picton's infantry. These troops, drawn up in several lines, met every charge of our light cavalry with a sharp and well-directed fire. But the 6th lancers, under Colonel Galbois, and distinguished by their exploits on this day, succeeded in reaching the Namur road, and cutting down a Hanoverian battalion in Picton's rear. The Duke of Wellington had only time to mount a horse and fly.

Our cavalry maintained the position it had attained on the plateau of Quatre-Bras. Had some infantry regiments come to its aid, had Foy's division or a part of Jerome's come and occupied the ground that had been won, or had Valmy's three other brigades been sent to its assistance, its triumph had been complete. But having unfortunately been thrown by an act of desperation amid a host of enemies, the men were left without support, exposed to a terrible fire. The English infantry that had taken refuge in the houses at Quatre-Bras poured an incessant shower of balls on our cuirassiers. Surprised by this fire, and not seeing themselves supported, they began to retreat, at first slowly, but afterwards with the precipitation of terror. The Count de Valmy sought in vain to retain them on the plateau they had lately so victoriously ascended; but their retreat was hastened by the slanting character of the ground, and by their

own confusion. Their general being thrown from his horse, and with his head uncovered, to avoid being left on the field, took hold of the bridles of two cuirassiers, and returned thus suspended between two horses at full gallop. Ney seeing this confusion, ordered the way to be blocked up by Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who rallied by arresting our fugitive cuirassiers, after they had performed prodigies of valour.

Ney, now displaying all that incomparable heroism with which he had been endowed by nature, rallied his troops, and steadily preserved his line of battle. On the highroad he kept Foy's division at the point to which it had advanced, whilst Bachelu's division was about to debouch by the Piramont farm, on the Namur highroad. He next hastens to the left, to Jerome, to carry the wood of Bossu, the ill-chosen terminus of all his efforts. But the enemy's resistance increases every moment. Instead of troops content to defend the wood without leaving its precincts, superb battalions were seen to approach in numbers sufficient to envelop us. In fact, the Duke of Wellington, already at the head of 30,000 men, was reinforced by the English guards under General Cooke, the remainder of the Brunswick corps, and some fresh squadrons of cavalry, giving him 40,000 men, whilst Ney had scarcely 16,000. Ney, at this moment resuming his lion-like nature, dashes forward at the head of Jerome's division against the troops debouching by the wood, and arrests their progress. Recovering his presence of mind in the midst of physical danger, he sees the risk of continuing on the offensive. He determines to confine himself to defensive measures, which he ought to have done earlier, after allowing the morning to pass without attacking the English. In consequence of this wise resolve, he slowly draws his entire line from right to left, remaining himself on horseback in the centre, and encouraging the soldiers by his noble bearing. The advantage of ground was on his side as he ascended the side of the hollow. The English had now to ascend an acclivity under a murderous plunging fire. Ney attacked them with a continuous shower of balls and grape, sometimes arresting their progress at the point of the bayonet, and sometimes by a close fire of musketry, and thus two hours were spent in ascending the side of the hollow extending from Frasnes to Quatre-Bras.

Firm in the midst of the bullets that fell around him, Ney stands an object of terror to the enemy, and of admiration to his soldiers; but he deeply feels the turn affairs have taken, and exclaims with heroic but profound sorrow, "Would that all those bullets were lodged in my body." Alas, the scene before him was a victory compared to what he was doomed to witness two days later!

It was nine o'clock, darkness enveloped these funereal plains, and more than 40,000 corpses strewed the triangle formed by Sombreffe, Quatre-Bras, and Charleroi. At Quatre-Bras Ney had killed or wounded nearly 6000 of the enemy, and had himself lost about 4000 men. At Ligny, as we have already said, 11,000 or 12,000 French and 18,000 Prussians lay weltering in their blood, without counting the numbers that had fled—40,000 valiant men were again sacrificed to the fearful passions of the time!

It will naturally be asked where the Count d'Erlon was all this time, since he had neither appeared at Ligny to complete the victory, nor at Quatre-Bras to force back the English on the Brussels road. The answer is a sad one: he had spent the day in objectless marches, his peerless valour rendered useless by the fatality that then presided over all our affairs.

He had remained at Gosselies all the morning, waiting orders that did not come until eleven o'clock, when General Reille informed him of General de Flahault's message. He immediately advanced towards Frasnes, sending, as he had been ordered, his right division, under General Durutte, to Marbais. When the men of this division saw themselves in the Prussian rear, they clapped their hands, and loudly applauded the foresight of Napoleon, who had placed them in such a position. But they had scarcely advanced a league in that direction when some of Ney's officers, sent when the marshal was about to attack the English, came to order the whole corps to Quatre-Bras. Durutte's division had, like the others, been recalled to Frasnes, amid the murmurs of the soldiers, angered at being turned from a point where they foresaw that they should have accomplished great deeds. At about half-past three General La Bédoyère suddenly arrived with a note from the emperor, renewing the order to march to Bry. The men again rejoiced as they recovered the prospect of triumph. D'Erlon, while obeying the order brought by La Bédoyère, sent, as we have seen, Major Delcambre, the head of his staff, to inform Ney of the reason of his retiring from Quatre-Bras. This general fulfilled his mission to Ney, and returned with a formal and positive order to d'Erlon to retrace his steps and return to Quatre-Bras. Between five and six o'clock General Delcambre overtook the 1st corps on its march to Bry, and brought it back towards Quatre-Bras. General Delcambre was succeeded by several officers, who came to inform Count d'Erlon that Marshal Ney, counting on his assistance, had commenced an engagement with the English with inferior forces, and would be ruined without his aid, by which all Napoleon's plans would be overturned; and that by not returning to Quatre-Bras, Count d'Erlon involved himself in a grave responsibility. These were exaggerations, for, as

the event proved, had he acted on the defensive between Frasnes and Quatre-Bras, he ran no greater risk than that of not accomplishing anything decisive on that day at Quatre-Bras, whilst an immense triumph would have been secured at Ligny. But d'Erlon did not know how affairs stood on either field of battle. In the direction of Ligny he only heard of a victory to be completed; at Quatre-Bras he was told he was needed to prevent a disaster. Ney, his immediate superior, summoned him in consequence of a pressing necessity, and he very naturally obeyed. He did what in point of fact was wrong, as we shall soon see; but he did it in all sincerity, with the very best intentions, and influenced by the terrified countenances of those who came from Quatre-Bras. Thus for the second time on this day he abandoned the road to Bry, and turned towards Frasnes. Though determined to do this, he asked the opinion of General Durutte, a very distinguished officer, commanding his first division, the one most in advance towards Bry, and in accordance with this general's advice, he adopted a middle course. On one hand, Ney seemed to need immediate aid; on the other hand, the victory of Ligny would be decided by the appearance of some troops on the Prussian rear; moreover, there would be a very great risk in leaving the space between Fleurus and Frasnes unoccupied, as it would be leaving an issue open by which the enemy might advance between the two French armies. As to the authority of the commands, d'Erlon was left to decide between Ney, who was his immediate superior, and Napoleon, who was commander-in-chief. Having duly weighed all these different considerations, he determined to advance with three divisions to Quatre-Bras, and allow Durutte's division to proceed alone to Bry. But at the same time he advised General Durutte to act with prudence, an advice he made still more impressive when en route he heard how bad an aspect things had assumed with Ney. D'Erlon then, to the great regret of his men, set out for Quatre-Bras, whilst General Durutte advanced hesitatingly towards Bry, which gave rise to a report that he was disaffected, or even a traitor, a most unjust accusation, for this general was as zealous as prudent, and only acted in obedience to his superior's commands. He arrived between nine and ten o'clock at Bry, hastened the Prussians' retreat, but did not take a single prisoner, and d'Erlon arrived at Frasnes, in Ney's rear, when the firing of the cannon had ceased, and when he could not be of any use.

Such was that sanguinary day, the 16th June 1815, the second of the campaign, on which two battles were fought, one gained at Ligny, the other undecided at Quatre-Bras. It would be impossible to appreciate the events of this day were they only considered with regard to what occurred at Quatre-Bras, or the

false movements by which d'Erlon's corps was rendered useless. In the first place, the ably concocted plan of the campaign had been successful. Napoleon had occupied victoriously the high-road from Namur to Brussels, not indeed at two points, only at one—Sombreffe; but that was sufficient for his object. The Duke of Wellington had certainly remained master of one point on this road—Quatre-Bras; but though he continued to occupy a position so necessary for rallying the English army, he was not the less separated from his ally Blücher, whom he could only rejoin at a very great distance in the rear. The English were therefore so circumstanced that they would be either compelled to fight without the Prussians, or to make a great circuit to rejoin them. The first and most essential result was consequently obtained. In the second place, the army Napoleon had intended to attack first was beaten, thoroughly beaten, since it had been reduced one-fourth, by the number of dead, wounded, and disbanded; its original 120,000 men being reduced to 90,000. The Prussians might certainly have been so completely conquered as not to be able to make their appearance again, by which everything would have been changed; for the English army, compelled to fight next day without assistance, would have been completely ruined in its turn. The decisive result was not obtained, and it was a great misfortune. But the French had succeeded in taking up a position between the two allied armies, and that which they had intended to attack first was beaten. The essential part of the plan had consequently been accomplished; and if the great results that might have been expected, and which would have changed the fate of France, were not obtained, who was to blame? History must inquire, for if it recounts facts, it must also pronounce judgment. Here, therefore, is the conclusion that we think may be drawn from the simple statement of these events.

The chief fault found with this day's proceedings is the time lost on the morning of the 16th. This blame, as may be seen, is not directed to the events at Ligny, but altogether to what occurred at Quatre-Bras. Persons discuss this question as if Napoleon had his entire army assembled on the morning of the 16th, and had nothing to do but order his troops to march at dawn. This was not the case. About 25,000 men had bivouacked during the night to the right of the Sambre, and in the morning had to defile with a vast matériel across the bridge and along the narrow streets of Charleroi. At the Châtelet, General Gérard's troops had not all crossed the Sambre, and were exhausted from fatigue. It therefore required three full hours for the different corps of the French army, not to form into line, but to be in a position to advance towards the line in which they were to fight. Besides, although Napoleon had

scarcely any doubt as to the position of the enemy's forces, still in so serious a position as his—between two armies, each equal in numerical strength to his own—it was natural that he should seek for certainty before taking a decisive step, and that the time occupied by the troops in marching should be spent by him in seeking intelligence of the enemy's movements. Marshal Grouchy, who had been ordered to commence reconnoitring at four in the morning, acknowledges that he did not know and did not report until six o'clock that the Prussians were forming into line before Sombreffe. This information could not have arrived at Charleroi until long after seven. All orders were given before eight, and despatched between eight and nine. Berthier's facility in catching Napoleon's ideas might have saved a half hour; but certainly where so much was to be done, it cannot be said that time was lost. As the troops advancing on foot would require several hours to reach Fleurus, whilst Napoleon on horseback could arrive there in an hour, he could very safely prolong his stay at Charleroi, and receive necessary information, and issue a number of indispensable orders. When, therefore, it is asked how Napoleon was occupied at Charleroi until ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, all these details must be taken into account before it is asserted that the delay was caused by the inactivity of a man who, though in bad health at the time, had been eighteen hours on horseback on the 15th, had slept but three hours during the night, had risen at dawn to commence that fearful and sanguinary day—the 16th—which did not terminate until eleven at night, and during which he was again eighteen hours on horseback.

There is another consideration more conclusive than any of these, which is, that it was not of so much consequence to enter early into action at Fleurus as at Quatre-Bras, where it was of importance to bar the road as quickly as possible against the English, whilst at Fleurus it was necessary to allow the Prussians to debouch, that we might be able to fight them under more favourable circumstances. It certainly would not be wise to commence the battle late in the day if it were intended to be decisive; but it was not of much consequence whether it was fought in the morning or in the afternoon. Besides, the day dawned before four in the morning, and did not close until after nine in the evening. There was therefore sufficient time to fight, and a small portion of the morning passed in collecting information and bringing up the troops was no cause for regret.

The time was equally well spent at Ligny. Napoleon having arrived at Fleurus before noon, found all his generals in a state of anxiety, but did not hesitate himself, and resolved to give battle. But the troops, the right wing (4th corps) especially,

had not arrived, and Napoleon was obliged to wait. At two o'clock he was ready; but having formed the brilliant combination of making a portion of Ney's troops fall back on his, in order to take the Prussians in the rear, he determined to leave this general some advantage of time, and wait until he heard the report of his cannon. Impatient at the useless delay, he sent him message after message, and at last gave the signal to commence about half-past two. Even then there was sufficient time to derive every desirable advantage from the victory, if at half-past five a false alarm had not caused Vandamme to lose some valuable time, and obliged the decisive charge of the imperial guard to be deferred until seven. Had this charge been made at half-past five, there would have been sufficient time to pursue and destroy the Prussians. But there was sufficient time to beat them thoroughly, for a third of their troops actually engaged were killed, wounded, or put to flight.

It cannot be said that the day was as well employed at Quatre-Bras. If in a certain sense time was not all-important at Ligny, on the contrary, every moment lost at Quatre-Bras was a misfortune. Besides the immense importance of getting possession as quickly as possible of the point of junction between the English and Prussians, it was not less desirable to attack the English before their entire forces should be assembled. On the evening of the 15th there were but 4000 of the enemy at Quatre-Bras, and all these were Nassau soldiers. Up to noon on the 16th this number had not increased. It was not until two o'clock that they amounted to 7000, to which number not a soldier was added up to half-past three. Ney, on the other hand, had 9000 under his command on the evening of the 15th, and had them also on the morning of the 16th, when he might have increased the number to 20,000 if he chose. It would be extremely improbable to suppose that the verbal orders given in the afternoon of the 15th did not refer to Quatre-Bras; but even admitting that they did not, the written orders delivered by M. de Flahault at half-past ten on the morning of the 16th, and renewed so often during the forenoon, contained the formal command to attack Quatre-Bras, and take it at any cost. During the five hours which elapsed from half-past ten until half-past three, 20,000 men could certainly have overpowered Perponcher's division, that amounted only to 7000.

It is true that Ney from eleven o'clock, that is, from the time he received Napoleon's written orders, no longer hesitated, and was firmly resolved to attack Quatre-Bras; but as General Reille, misunderstanding General Girard's report, had taken upon him to keep back the troops, the marshal was obliged to wait until nearly three o'clock. Consequently he is not to be blamed for what occurred after eleven o'clock, and when again at two he

wished to make a sudden attack upon the enemy, General Reille, influenced by the remembrance of events in Spain, again restrained him, undoubtedly with the very best intentions, but still he did restrain him. When at length the attack commenced, the English were equal, and soon became superior in numbers.

Thus at Quatre-Bras much precious time was lost from the evening of the 15th to the afternoon of the 16th, and lost when its importance was greatest.

So far as to the manner in which the time had been employed. We shall next turn our attention to the mode of operation. Napoleon's first combination at Ligny was one of the finest in his whole military career. Seeing that the Prussians, heedless of the safety of their right wing and rear, were deploying between Ligny and St. Amand, whilst they had Ney's 45,000 men in their rear, he determined to make some of these 45,000 fall back on them, which manœuvre would have thrown half the Prussian army into our power. General Rogiat, who criticises Napoleon severely after his fall, asserts that Napoleon ought to have preferred another mode, and attacked the extremity of the three St. Amands, that is, that he ought to have brought up our extreme left against the extreme right of the Prussians, in order to throw them back on Sombreffe, and separate them from the English. Napoleon, at St. Helena, refuted these censures with all the haughtiness of offended genius replying to presumptuous and calumniating mediocrity. There was no question, as he very well remarks, of separating the Prussians and English, which had been already done by Ney at Quatre-Bras, but of destroying a portion of the Prussian army, which would have been the result of Ney's movement. Thus when by delays and deplorable misunderstandings this most admirable combination was frustrated, Napoleon, by determining to pierce the enemy's line above Ligny, gave an additional proof of the fertility of his resources in the field.

But at Quatre-Bras the ground was neither so correctly estimated nor so skilfully attacked. Ney was more heroic than ever, but not as cool. He exhausted his strength at the wings, to the right at the Gimioncourt farm, and to the left at the wood of Bossu. The furious charges made by his cavalry, fruitless because unsupported, prove that the enemy's line might have been pierced in the centre. that is, at Quatre-Bras. Had Ney, instead of literally obeying an order that was revoked by a second, as well as by the course of events, sent forward Valmy's four brigades, and Lefebvre-Desnoettes' light cavalry, which latter would with Piré's amount to several thousand horse, and instead of compelling Prince Jerome's fine division of 8000 men to exhaust its strength against the wood of Bossu,

had he left one of General Foy's brigades before this wood, and directed these 7000 horse and 8000 foot against Quatre-Bras, he certainly would have broken the Duke of Wellington's centre, driven part of his troops along the Nivelles road, and the others towards Sombreffe, and thus secured the valuable position of Quatre-Bras.

Although such a victory would be most desirable, as it would have curbed the pride of the English, and destroyed part of their forces, yet it would not have been the most important event of the day. Thanks to Ney's great firmness, what was most essential had been done when the progress of the English was arrested at Quatre-Bras, and all would have been well had d'Erlon not been rendered useless by orders and counter-orders, and so allowed the Prussian army to escape, half of which he certainly could have captured. This was the real misfortune of the day, which prevented the battle of Ligny, all glorious and important as it was, from becoming a decisive victory, and rendered its results so much inferior to what they might have been. It was only part of the fatality that reigned over those days, a fatality that circumvented the best laid plans, and rendered the most extraordinary heroism fruitless. It is confounding to see how often d'Erlon approached the scene of action, and how often he was recalled before attaining it, and that to the despair of his men, more clear-sighted than their commanders.

This, we repeat, was the misfortune of that day. Was this misfortune attributable to the error of any individual, or owing solely to the rigour of fate? We shall inquire. Napoleon, knowing that in the early part of the day Ney would not have many enemies to encounter, could very well ask for 12,000 or 15,000 out of his 45,000 men, for the accomplishment of a decisive object, more decisive even than the taking of Quatre-Bras. Consequently his order to d'Erlon was not an error on his part. When Ney received this order he ought to have resigned himself to do without d'Erlon, and act on the defensive, which he could very well have done with 20,000 men, as he proved two hours later. As to d'Erlon, he ought not to have obeyed his immediate superior, but the emperor, the commander-in-chief. It can still be very easily understood, that excited by the combat, and seeing the number of the enemy increase, Ney should endeavour to conquer on the spot where he was engaged, and then hasten to assist in completing Napoleon's triumph. It was also very natural that d'Erlon, receiving such bad accounts from Quatre-Bras, should think it right to obey Ney's orders, given as they were in such terms of despair; and on the whole, there seems more reason to blame fortune than mortals for these misunderstandings. Indeed,

Napoleon's expressive words, "*The fate of France is in your hands*," words meant to rouse Ney's enthusiasm, were understood by him to refer to the necessity of taking Quatre-Bras, whilst in reality they referred to the victory of Ligny, and though meant to secure the success of Napoleon's plans, only tended to frustrate them, a striking proof of the designs of destiny in our behalf, or rather a proof of how forced and bewildering that position was in which Napoleon was the only person who preserved the free exercise of his faculties, a position Napoleon himself had created by seeking in defiance of Europe, in defiance of France, nay, in defiance of common-sense, to recommence a reign henceforth become impossible! *

* I cannot conclude these already too lengthened reflections without adding a few words in reply to a purely gratuitous supposition, which pretends that if the Count d'Erlon, after his marchings and counter-marchings, went to Quatre-Bras instead of to Bry, it was in obedience to an order from Napoleon himself. In that case, his marchings to and fro, which prevented his being of any service anywhere, could not be laid to Ney's charge, who wished him to come to Quatre-Bras, nor to d'Erlon's own account, who obeyed Ney in preference to Napoleon, but to Napoleon himself, who countermanded his own orders. This hypothesis originated with M. Charras, in his learned, spirited, and extremely well written work on the campaign of 1815.

Hypotheses are admissible in history when they explain what would otherwise be inexplicable, when they accord with probability and the inductions drawn from the general course of events. Here there is nothing of the kind. The supposition of M. Charras renders facts which were before quite simple, inexplicable. Confused by the conflicting orders of Napoleon and Ney, the Count d'Erlon, without failing in respect to his superiors, ventured to do what is always very hazardous in military affairs, that is, he drew his own conclusions, and believing Ney to be in great danger, and that Napoleon was ignorant of that danger, he determined to go to Quatre-Bras. Viewed under this aspect, all is simple and clear; but there is neither clearness nor simplicity in supposing that Napoleon countermanded a movement on which he considered the issue of the war to depend, and that before he had time to learn the state of affairs at Quatre-Bras, or with what difficulties Ney was surrounded. M. Charras' explanation consequently renders what is simple, inexplicable, and far from being probable, is opposed to all probability. Still the hypothesis might be taken into account, if not altogether admitted, did it rest on any authority; but there are only two witnesses to the fact, and these are both in direct contradiction to this supposition. These witnesses are the Count d'Erlon, and General Durutte, who commanded a division of the 1st corps. Certainly, could any testimony be decisive concerning Napoleon's orders to Count d'Erlon, it would be that of Count d'Erlon himself, who received and had to execute these orders. When questioned by the Duke d'Elchingen as to these events, he gave the following reply, related by the Duke d'Elchingen himself in a production entitled *Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815*:—

"I stopped with the generals of the guard beyond Frasnes, where I was joined by General La Bédoyère, who showed me an order written in pencil, which he was taking to Marshal Ney, and which enjoined him to send my corps d'armée to Ligny. General La Bédoyère told me that he had already given the order for this movement by changing the direction of my column; he also told me where I could join it. I set out immediately, first sending General Delcambre, the head of my staff, to inform the marshal of my new destination. He was sent back by Marshal Ney with imperative orders for me to join him at Quatre-Bras, where, counting on the co-operation of my corps d'armée, he had commenced a most serious engagement. I consequently believed that the necessity must be very pressing when the marshal assumed

However much Napoleon might have regretted the incompleteness of his victory, we repeat that he had reason to be satisfied; for up to this time his plan had been crowned with success. He had succeeded in surprising the English and Prussian armies, and taking up his position between them, he had conquered the Prussians, and arrested the progress of the

the responsibility of recalling me though he had received the note I mentioned."

"*I thought the necessity must be very pressing,*" says the Count d'Erlon, "*when the marshal assumed the responsibility of recalling me though he had received the note of which I have spoken.*" . . . Is it not evident, merely from reading this passage, that if Count d'Erlon had received a final order from Napoleon authorising his marching to Quatre-Bras instead of to Bry, that he would have said so simply, since he would thus justify himself with a single word, and needed not to defend himself by the urgency of Ney's position, and by the supposition that Ney was authorised in contradicting Napoleon's orders? He would have said simply that Napoleon had countermanded the order written in pencil shown him by General La Bédoyère, and his justification would have been complete and satisfactory. The necessary conclusion is that he did not receive this last countermanding order, which would have fully exculpated him. This seems to us an absolute and incontestable proof.

Here comes another witness, quite as important, General Durutte. This competent and intelligent general commanded the division of the 1st corps which formed the head of the column. He drew up a note, now in my possession, and of which the Duke d'Elchingen quoted a portion at page 71.

General Durutte having related how the Count d'Erlon, in obedience to an order from Napoleon, had advanced towards Bry to attack the Prussians in the rear, continues as follows: "Whilst he was en marche, orders arrived in haste from Marshal Ney commanding that the 1st corps should be sent on to Quatre-Bras. The officers who brought these orders said that Marshal Ney had encountered superior forces at Quatre-Bras, and had been driven back. This second order embarrassed Count d'Erlon very much, as at the same time he received fresh orders from the right to advance towards Bry. He nevertheless decided on joining Marshal Ney; but as he remarked with General Durutte that the enemy might make a column debouch in the plain between Bry and the wood of Delhutte, by which the emperor's army would be totally cut off from Marshal Ney's, he determined to leave General Durutte on the plain."

This is quite as decisive as the evidence already quoted. This testimony of an ocular witness shows that Count d'Erlon had received contradictory orders, that he hesitated at first, but that he was finally decided by Ney's danger, and by this danger alone, for, as he says, *he received at the same time fresh orders from the right to march towards Bry.* These orders from the right were the reiterated orders of the emperor, and this passage is more than a sufficient proof that they had not been revoked, since, if that were the case, General Durutte, who was present and shared in the perplexity, would not have failed to say that their embarrassment had been terminated by a fresh order from the emperor. From all this it is quite evident that the supposition of a countermanding order from the emperor is not only gratuitous, but in direct contradiction to the conclusive testimony of the only known witnesses. Consequently those movements which rendered d'Erlon's corps useless are attributable to Ney, who did not act on the defensive, and summoned d'Erlon to his aid at any risk. And blame must also attach to d'Erlon, who, embarrassed by opposing orders, allowed himself to be influenced by Ney's despairing message. This error did not proceed directly from Napoleon, or from an obscurely worded command; but it did indirectly, inasmuch as he was the general and superior cause of the moral condition of his lieutenants. It needs no proof to justify us in saying that Napoleon was a bad politician; but to assert that he was a bad general seems to me a most rash assertion, which I could never be induced to admit.

English, and had forced them sufficiently apart to allow him time to fight the Duke of Wellington alone on the morrow or the day following. Blücher having lost the highroad from Namur to Quatre-Bras, could no longer join the Duke of Wellington by this the only direct route, and should be obliged either to separate altogether from the English by advancing by Namur towards the Rhine, or endeavour to join them at Brussels if he wished to continue the campaign conjointly with them. Between the belligerent armies and Brussels was the deep and extensive forest of Soignes, surrounding this town from south-west to north-east, and which, being three or four leagues in depth, and ten or twelve in length, would present great difficulties to the advance of a large army encumbered with considerable matériel. If the Prussians, deprived of their direct communication with the English by the highroad from Namur to Brussels, wished to rejoin them, they could do so by advancing through Gembloux and Wavre to the borders of the forest of Soignes, in the front or rear of which they might have met them. If for greater security they should advance through the forest in order to effect their union beyond it, that is, under the walls of Brussels, they need cause us no uneasiness, as they would arrive too late to assist their allies. If, on the other hand, they wished to join them nearer than the forest of Soignes, the danger might be very serious indeed; but as Napoleon was actually between the Prussians and English, and only five leagues from the forest, it would be impossible that this junction could be effected in advance of the forest, that is, before his eyes, unless he himself allowed it, or that his lieutenants, whose duty it was to prevent them, should allow the enemy to do as they pleased. Being, besides, actually face to face to the English at Quatre-Bras, he was as certain as it was possible to be that he could attack them on the following day, and beat them before the Prussians could come to their assistance. It is therefore incontestable that though he had only conquered, not entirely routed the Prussians, that his plans had been successful up to this time, since he was in a position to encounter his enemies one after the other. If the Prussians were not totally routed, as they ought to have been, they were very well beaten, and an active pursuit might have produced the same result as the intended attack of d'Erlon. They ought not to have been allowed a moment's rest next day, but constantly pursued, so that those who had left their ranks should be entirely cut off, and their army as much reduced by the pursuit as it would have been by the battle itself.

Napoleon returned to Fleurus at about eleven at night, and though he had been actively employed since five in the morning, he did not seek the rest he so much needed until he had given

all necessary orders. He was then told, though not very minutely, that Ney had only succeeded in arresting the progress of the English, though he had been engaged with them all day. He sent him orders to be under arms next morning at dawn in order to advance to Brussels, and that he need feel no fear of the English, who could make no opposition after the battle of Ligny, since by advancing on them by the highroad from Sombreffe to Quatre-Bras they could be taken in the rear if they attempted to resist. He ordered Pajol to take a little rest, and then pursue the Prussians; he sent after him Teste's infantry detached from Lobau, as a reinforcement, in case the Prussian cavalry should turn on them. Napoleon then flung himself on a bed to refresh himself by a few hours' sleep.

He was up again at five ready to continue his operations, as he considered that the moment for attacking the English was come. As there was but little chance of seeing the Prussians for three or four days at least, it was the English that he was to seek and fight, and with such soldiers as his, and under his own immediate command, he could have no doubt of the result. Having adopted the plan of two wings, which he intended to support alternately with his centre, consisting of Lobau's corps, the guards, and the reserve of cavalry, in all, about 40,000 men, he was now about to leave his victorious right wing at Ligny and join the left wing, which had been neither victorious nor conquered at Quatre-Bras. His left wing, consisting of Reille's and d'Erlon's troops, and part of the heavy cavalry, being now reinforced with the troops of the centre, amounted to about 75,000, a sufficient force to oppose to the English. He very naturally formed his right wing of the troops that had fought at Ligny, too fatigued to fight on this day; these were the 4th corps (Gerard's), the 3rd (Vandamme's), Girard's division, Pajol's chasseurs and hussars, and Exelmans' dragoons, which were already placed under Marshal Grouchy's orders.

The part already allotted to this right wing, and which was to be performed whilst Napoleon was engaged with the English, was to watch the Prussians, complete their defeat, or at least aggravate it by pursuing them at the point of the sword, and check them if they showed any intention of falling back on us. It would have been the extreme of negligence, a negligence most unworthy of a great commander, to allow the conquered Prussians to do what they pleased, perhaps join the English in advance of the forest of Soignes, or perhaps, encouraged by our negligence, advance on Charleroi, threaten our rear, interrupt our communications, but in any case, recover from their defeat, and bring the important contingent of their recruited forces to the aid of the English, or perhaps of the Russians or Austrians. It would consequently be an unpardonable oversight to neglect

them, and as the detachment sent in their pursuit need not proceed further than four or five leagues from the others, it could be easily recalled. We must add that this detachment ought to be tolerably large if it were expected to fight, stop, or pursue the Prussians. As Napoleon had but 110,000 men to oppose to 190,000, and perhaps these were reduced by the losses of the preceding days, and as he was obliged to employ 75,000 of them against the Duke of Wellington, he could not give more than 35,000 or 36,000 to Grouchy. But this number, under a skilful and resolute commander, would have been sufficient against a beaten army. On the memorable day of Auerstadt in 1806, Marshal Davout had successfully opposed 26,000 French to 70,000 Prussians. It is true that Grouchy was not Davout, nor the moral condition of the men the same in 1815 as in 1806; but our soldiers were as warlike as ever, besides that they were now animated by the courage of despair.

Napoleon determined to do what both his own plans as well as prudence suggested, which was to advance with his centre towards the left wing and attack the English, leaving his right to observe the Prussians, aggravate their defeat, and keep them at a distance whilst he fought the British army. Having risen at five o'clock, he wished to march at once, in order to overtake the Duke of Wellington in the course of the day; but as he was only at a very short distance from the forest of Soignes, it would be impossible for him to advance quicker than the English general, who need not fight until he chose; for if he wished to advance through the forest to rally the Prussians beyond it, all the haste that would be employed to overtake him would but hasten his retreat, without giving us the least chance of coming up with him. Notwithstanding this, Napoleon, impelled both by his natural impetuosity and his desire to decide the vital point at issue between him and Europe, was anxious to reach the English at once. But it was objected to this that the troops were fatigued by a three days' march, and two days' incessant fighting. He certainly did not intend to employ Gerard's and Vandamme's troops—the 3rd and 4th corps—as weltering in their blood, they still slept surrounded by 30,000 corpses, and could not be refused a few hours to clean their arms, and prepare their soup, in short, to draw breath. He naturally intended to send on Lobau's corps first, as it had not fired a single shot. But it was absolutely necessary that this corps should be supported by the guard, who had fought vigorously the evening before, and notwithstanding all their devotedness, could not do without rest and food. He arranged all the day's proceedings in such a manner that the military operations might be performed with the necessary celerity, at the same time that the troops had sufficient time to

rest. As it would be necessary to traverse Quatre-Bras to reach the English, it was Ney, who was on the spot, who should defile first; and as he had 40,000 men to defile through one passage, there was no doubt but that if the troops arrived at nine or ten, they would be in time to defile after him; and as they could reach the borders of the forest of Soignes in two or three hours, the battle, like that of the day before, could take place in the evening, provided that the English would consent to fight. Napoleon, without hoping too sanguinely for this meeting in advance of the forest of Soignes, a meeting for which he was too anxious to suppose that the English would desire it as much, did everything in his power to force it if possible, and should he not succeed, he determined to enter Brussels in the evening, or on the following morning, which would produce an immense moral effect, and place the English at a great distance from the Prussians. He therefore decided that Lobau's troops should be the first to advance by the Namur road to Quatre-Bras, so as to be able to defile immediately after Ney's. Lobau was to be followed by the guard, and the guard by the heavy cavalry.

By this means he would secure two hours' rest to the guard and heavy cavalry. As to Vandamme's and Gerard's troops, so fatigued from the battle of the previous evening, they could get some repose during the morning, as they could not be sent in pursuit of the Prussians until the cavalry should have discovered what route they had taken. Without such a precaution there was risk of choosing the wrong route, no great inconvenience, indeed, for mounted cavalry, but a very great risk for foot-soldiers depending on their own strength, and already very much fatigued.

Whilst Napoleon was issuing these orders, Count de Flahault, who had been present at the combat of Quatre-Bras, and who had left Ney at night, arrived at headquarters about six in the morning. He told Napoleon, without, however, detracting from Ney's merit, whose heroism was admired even by those who disapproved of his tactics, how mediocre had been the marshal's arrangements at Quatre-Bras, and how the feverish agitation under which he seemed to labour, whilst adding, if possible, to his devotedness, detracted considerably from his military judgment. Napoleon himself had observed something of this since the 20th March, but he saw that he must employ this incomparable hero such as he was, such as he had been made by the circumstances of the time, too powerful to be resisted by individual character. The result of Napoleon's observations was that he thought it wiser to keep him near himself, that he might be able to send him forth as a lion wherever the greatest danger threatened. To these details M. de Flahault added one still more important—that Ney,

distrustful of fortune, still doubted the result of the battle of Ligny, and far from being inclined to advance boldly, was more disposed to act on the defensive at Quatre-Bras. This was disagreeable information for Napoleon, who would have been glad to learn that Ney was at that moment *en marche* with his troops. He immediately ordered Marshal Soult to write to Ney, and assure him that the victory of the evening before had been complete, and to order him to march boldly and speedily to Quatre-Bras, when the English, seeing 40,000 men advancing along the Namur road, would immediately decamp, fearing they might be taken in flank if they offered a prolonged resistance. He was also to advise him to keep his divisions together, and at the same time to reprove him, though in a gentle tone, for the manner in which he had acted on the previous day, when, though great results had been obtained, these results were far inferior to what was needed and might have been expected. At the same time Napoleon sent some officers to reconnoitre on the highroad between Namur and Quatre-Bras, and see whether Ney was advancing, and the Duke of Wellington retreating. Having given these orders at seven in the morning, he got into his carriage and drove to Ligny, where, having arrived, he mounted his horse, visited the field of battle, looked after the wounded, and distributed remedies and rewards to those who had fought the day before, at the same time that the others were marching towards the scene of the new day's strife.

These remedies and recompenses had been well earned by the boundless self-devotion of these men on the preceding day, and in such a case gratitude may indeed be looked on as good policy. Meantime Vandamme and Gerard's soldiers were cleaning their muskets, making their soup, and recruiting themselves after the fearful struggle of the previous day. When they saw Napoleon they rushed to meet him, waving their shakos, brandishing their sabres, and uttering enthusiastic cries of joy. His mere presence delighted them, and was a sufficient recompense for all their dangers and sufferings. The time spent in gratifying and encouraging such sentiments was certainly not lost. Napoleon having saluted the wounded, and waved his hand in acknowledgment of the men's acclamations, rode through the villages of St. Amand and Ligny. Within St. Amand the number of slain was pretty equally divided between the French and Prussians; but all the bodies beyond the stream were clad in the Prussian uniform. These hapless men, by their obstinate efforts to recover St. Amand, had fallen in numbers at all the approaches to the village. The rising ground behind, as far as the mill of Bry, where the artillery of the guard had attacked the Prussian reserve *en écharpe*, was strewn with the bodies of

men and horses, mingled with broken cannon, a spectacle which, however gratifying to the victors, was most painful to humanity. But at Ligny the scene was fearful. There the combat had taken place in the village itself, where men had fought hand to hand with all the animosity of civil strife. The number of the slaughtered Prussians and French was equal, and save their lifeless bodies, no human form was to be seen, all the inhabitants having fled from their homes and concealed themselves in caves. Some wounded soldiers, moaning from pain, were the only living objects in this new necropolis. In leaving Ligny and ascending the ground where the imperial guard had decided the victory, the slain were almost exclusively Prussian, or in making a sad computation, we may say that there were two or three Prussians to one Frenchman. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that if the combat cost us 9000 men, it had cost the Prussians 18,000, without counting deserters. We had no prisoners but wounded, except 2000 or 3000 of the rearguard, picked up by the cavalry. Thirty pieces of ordnance remained in our hands.

Napoleon having ordered the removal of as many of the wounded French as possible, a labour in which the Belgian peasantry zealously assisted, desired that assistance should also be given to some Prussian officers, who had been wounded in a much larger proportion than the common soldiers. These brave men had sacrificed their lives to the violence of their passions. Napoleon addressed them with courtesy and generosity, and told them that though France was hated by the Prussians, she did not reciprocate the feeling; that if she had been severe on them during the late wars, it was the inevitable punishment of their aggressions in 1792, of the Convention of Pilnitz, of the Brunswick Manifesto, and of the war in 1806; that besides, they had had ample vengeance in 1814, that it was time now to put an end to these sanguinary reprisals, which he was determined to do by an immediate peace, and in testimony of his pacific intentions he would commence by having them cared for in the same manner as the officers of his own guard. This address, which was immediately translated into German, was very well received by these unfortunate men, who waved their feeble hands in reply to Napoleon's parting salutation. This scene, published in all the journals, was calculated to calm the German passions should victory continue to smile on us for twenty-four hours longer.

When Napoleon arrived at Bry he dismounted while awaiting the result of the reconnaissance directed towards Quatre-Bras. Apparently content with what had been done during the last two days, and hoping for still better results for the ensuing days, he conversed with his accustomed ease with his generals on various subjects—war, politics, the different parties that

divided France, royalists and Jacobins.* It was during this conversation that he received the first report of the officers sent to reconnoitre between Namur and Quatre-Bras; and he learned that instead of meeting Ney in this direction, they had seen only the English. He was greatly annoyed at hearing this, and sent fresh orders to the marshal to advance without paying any regard to the English, whom he was to attack in flank if they resisted; he next ordered Lobau to hasten his march to Quatre-Bras, and then expedited the departure of the guard. He was preparing to leave himself, in order to direct the movement in person, when he received a report from General Pajol, who had been in pursuit of the Prussians since dawn. This rather strange report told that some fugitives and cannon had been picked up near Namur, and consequently in the direction of Liège. To judge by this first indication, it would seem that the Prussians, leaving the English to depend on the sea as their basis of operation, had resolved to return to the Rhine, and were about to join the Russians and the Austrians. Napoleon could not give credence to this supposition. He concluded, from his knowledge of Blücher, that that general would endeavour to join the English either in advance or in the rear of the forest of Soignes, and that consequently he was to be sought for in the direction of Wavre. But in war as in politics we must not rely implicitly on probabilities, but whilst allowing them due weight, we must hold our judgment free. It was thus that Napoleon acted. Marshal Grouchy was with him at the

* Marshal Grouchy, who sincerely regretted his military errors of 1815, at the same time that he would not acknowledge them, has sought to show that it was on the 17th, and not on the 18th, that time had been lost, and in a very inexact recital, represents Napoleon as losing his time in the fashion of a talkative, idle, and irresolute prince. In this portrait we could scarcely recognise the man who had come from Elba to Paris in twenty days, who in two days had suddenly established himself between the Prussians and English even before they suspected his approach. Nobody will believe that Napoleon, who, when he could have awaited an attack in Champagne, had boldly advanced into Belgium, that he might have an opportunity of surprising and successively combating the armies of his enemies, had suddenly become weak and irresolute. But Marshal Grouchy, like many ocular witnesses, ignorant of the secret intentions of those whose acts are before their eyes, attribute to them the most childish and chimerical motives. Marshal Grouchy, in asserting that Napoleon on the morning of the 17th was as little inclined to action as an Oriental prince, only shows that he did not comprehend the true position of affairs, and that he neither knew nor understood that Napoleon was obliged to wait, first, until Ney should have defiled at Quatre-Bras with 40,000 men; secondly, until Lobau's troops should be en marche towards Quatre-Bras; thirdly, until the guard should have eaten their soup and left their bivouacs; fourthly, until some reports from Pajol's cavalry should inform him of the direction the Prussians had taken. It was but eight in the morning, and it certainly was not too much to allow two or three hours for the accomplishment of all these things. Meanwhile Napoleon conversed on various subjects with a calmness of mind of which few men are capable when engaged in very important undertakings, but which proves that these few men are capable of accomplishing what they have undertaken.

moment. To him he gave his instructions verbally, instructions so completely the result of the situation that they might be divined before uttered. He desired him to pursue the Prussians vigorously, to make their defeat as complete as possible, or at the very least prevent them from soon assuming an offensive attitude; but above all, to keep them carefully in view, and manage so as to remain in constant communication with the main body of the French army, but between it and the Prussians. Marshal Grouchy, to do him justice, was alarmed at seeing himself placed on his own responsibility in so delicate a position, and modestly said so to Napoleon, at the same time declaring his inability to divine what route the Prussians had taken. Napoleon told him that he could keep up a communication with headquarters by means of the highroad to Namur, so that he could at any moment demand or receive orders; that Pajol's report certainly did not give positive information; but that he had only to send some of his cavalry towards Wavre, and some towards Namur, and he would soon know what he ought to do. As Napoleon mounted his horse he repeated aloud and with marked emphasis, "*Above all things, pursue the Prussians briskly, and keep up a communication with me to the left.*"* Grouchy, in obedience to Napoleon's orders, set out immediately, and advanced, in the first instance, along the Namur road, where Pajol had found the fugitives and cannon. Napoleon left him Gerard's corps—the 4th—reduced to 12,000 men; Vandamme's—the 3rd—reduced to 13,000; Pajol's, reduced to 1800; and Exelmans', reduced to 3200. He also left him Teste's division, detached from Lobau's corps, and consisting of about 3000 foot. Here was then a total of 33,000 without counting Girard's division, all whose generals were killed, and whose numbers did not amount to more than 2500 men. This division was to remain in the rear, that the men might recruit themselves, take care of the wounded, and defend Charleroi, an arrangement which relieved Grouchy from the necessity of sending a detachment in that direction. Napoleon, with Ney,

* All these details have been communicated to me by an eye-witness, who has repeated them to me at least one hundred times, having them, as he said, as vividly before his eyes as when they occurred; and this witness is Marshal Gerard, one of the most upright and truthful men I have ever known. These facts have also been confirmed by a number of persons who both saw and heard what passed. Marshal Grouchy has endeavoured to raise doubts as to the nature of the orders he received; but his own assertions, his letters to Napoleon, confirm these essential points: 1st, that he was to go in search of the Prussians; 2nd, that he was to pursue them briskly; 3rd, that he was not to lose sight of them; 4th, that he was to remain in communication with headquarters; 5th, that he was always to endeavour to prevent the Prussians from joining the English. These points being established, it is easy to draw a conclusion in this great historical dispute. In any case, the instructions given to Marshal Grouchy are so consistent with the state of things at the time that one may safely affirm that he could not have received any others.

Lobau—reduced to two divisions—the guard, Milhaud's cuirassiers, and Subervic's division, taken from Pajol, had about 70,000 men. This number, considering the superior quality of his troops, would have been sufficient to defeat the English had not a great error or a great misfortune compelled him to fight two armies. With the 36,000 men he had left Grouchy—including Girard's division—and about 4000 attached to the great park train of artillery, he had about 110,000 soldiers, deducting 14,000 killed or wounded, in the different combats and the two battles. The Prussians and English, who had lost from 30,000 to 40,000 men in dead, wounded, and fugitives, had had certainly more cause to complain, and the campaign up to this time may be considered as entirely in our favour. It needed but one successful day to make it decidedly so.

Napoleon left the heights of Bry at about eleven in the morning,* and advanced at a gallop along the highroad from Namur to Quatre-Bras to make his observations. He found the men of the guard about to quit their bivouacs, and Lobau arrived at Marbais on his way to Quatre-Bras. When Napoleon arrived at Marbais he saw the English sharpshooting on the highroad, apparently not having left Quatre-Bras, which proved that Ney had not made any movement. However, on approaching nearer, the English were seen to retire gradually, as from the heights of Quatre-Bras they discerned our infantry advancing in deep column along the Namur road. Red uniforms were also discernible to our left towards Frasnès, a sight which, though it did not excite alarm, at least awakened great uncertainty. How could it be possible that Ney, having received such repeated orders, and the promise of being supported, had not yet advanced; and how, above all, was it that he was surrounded by English? The mystery was soon cleared up: it was the red lancers of the guard that were mistaken for English soldiers, but who, being observed more closely by our light

* I state these hours on the best authority. Marshal Grouchy mentions others; but, as will be seen hereafter, he makes constant mistakes as to time, and his assertions in this respect are completely erroneous. For example, here are two proofs of Marshal Grouchy's inexactness as to time, a want that cannot be attributed to his temperament, but to the regret he felt for the great fault he had committed, and from which he was naturally anxious to exonerate himself. In relating the events of the morning of the 18th he asserts that he left Gembloux at six o'clock. Now incontestable proofs show that some of the troops did not leave until eight, others at nine, and some even not until ten. He also says that it was near three o'clock on the afternoon of the same day that he got the order to march in the direction whence the roar of the cannon proceeded. It has been asserted by several unanimous witnesses, whose correctness he afterwards admitted, that this order had been given at half-past eleven in the morning. We do not quote these facts in order to attack the marshal's veracity, but to prove that in the agitation caused by the remembrance of that day, his assertion cannot be accepted with confidence, especially in what relates to time, which in military as well as in civil events is always very difficult to be determined.

cavalry, were recognised and treated as French. Still none of Ney's troops had advanced. Count d'Erlon was quite near, and not having fought on the previous day, his men were not fatigued; he had therefore taken the position nearest to Quatre-Bras. Napoleon sent him orders to march thither immediately, as he did himself, pursuing the English, who retired as he advanced. He arrived there soon; but his troops had to defile through a single passage, and certainly three hours was not too long a space of time for 70,000 men to pass the bridge of Genappe on the Brussels road. However, had the weather continued fine, it would not be impossible to reach the entrance of the forest of Soignes at four o'clock, and commence the attack between four and nine o'clock. Unfortunately the sky became covered with clouds, and threatened one of those summer storms which in a few minutes render the roads impassable. However, Napoleon had had little hope of overtaking the English during the day, and had considered a battle in advance of the forest of Soignes as dependent on the freewill of the English themselves, and upon that he did not build any strong hopes. If they were inclined to fight, they would pause, and he could come up with them on the following day, which would be better for his troops. Our light cavalry, who had advanced through the fields to our right, between Marbais and Quatre-Bras, had seen the corn beaten down by the passage of numerous troops, which was a proof that the Prussian corps had taken the Tilly route leading to Wavre, and following the course of the Dyle. This indication of their route destroyed the supposition that the Prussians had advanced towards the Rhine; and as Marshal Soult was not with Napoleon at this moment, he employed Marshal Bertrand to transmit to Marshal Grouchy more positive directions than the verbal ones he had given him two hours before. He ordered him to advance towards Gembloux, on the road to Wavre, and which possessed the advantage of being connected with Namur and Liége by the old Roman road. He impressed on him the importance of knowing the exact state of things on every point, of not losing sight of the Prussians, and of seeing whether they were inclined to leave the English and turn towards the Rhine, or were about to join them and fight a second battle near Brussels; of watching them incessantly to try and discover their real intentions; that in any case he was to keep his divisions united, and station posts of cavalry along the road, so as to be in constant communication with headquarters.

At Quatre-Bras, Napoleon was joined by Ney, who informed him himself of the cause of his indecision during the morning. The marshal, influenced by the events of the previous evening, did not dare to advance, believing that the whole English army

was before him ; nor had he ventured to move until he saw the English retire before the Count de Lobau. He sought to excuse his tardiness ; and Napoleon, not wishing to increase his agitation, contented himself with some not very severe remarks. But the soldiers, who saw that the *brave des braves* had committed some fault, whispered amongst themselves that *Rougeot*, as they called the illustrious marshal, had got a good scolding. Napoleon waited with impatience until the troops had defiled at Quatre-Bras, a movement which was not completed until three o'clock.

About this time the lowering clouds descended in torrents of rain, and deluged the neighbouring country with an extraordinary quantity of water. In a few moments the whole country was changed into one vast marsh, through which neither man nor horse could pass. The troops of the different *corps d'armée* were obliged to assemble on the two paved roads of Namur and Charleroi, which unite and form one at Quatre-Bras. These were soon overcrowded, and soldiers of all arms were mingled in fearful confusion. This painful spectacle put an end to all regret for the morning's delay, for had our troops set out three hours earlier, such an inundation would have interrupted all military operations, and turned both evening and morning to the advantage of the English, who, intending to fall back on the excellent position of Mont St. Jean, would be benefited by everything that increased the difficulty of the attack.

The troops defiled in the following succession : Subervic's light cavalry, Milhaud's cuirassiers with some mounted batteries of artillery, d'Erlon's infantry (1st corps), Lobau's (6th corps), Kellermann's cuirassiers, the guard, and lastly, Reille's corps, which, having fought bravely at Quatre-Bras, had reposed during the morning after the fierce combat of the preceding evening. Napoleon marched with the advance guard which he commanded in person. They had to traverse the large town of Genappe, where they crossed the Thy, which takes the name of Dyle a few leagues further on. The English had placed their cavalry in the rear, in order to retard our march by a few vigorous and well-directed charges whenever the nature of the ground permitted. The ground slopes downwards towards Genappe, but rises again after the passage of the Thy, so that directly in front we had the English rearguard hotly pressed by our vanguard. Napoleon, who under torrents of rain gave directions for all these movements himself, had ordered up twenty-four pieces of cannon, which kept up an unceasing fire on the retreating columns. The English, hastening forward, did not allow themselves time to fire in return, but suffered our balls to do fierce execution amongst their living masses without making any attempt to retreat. As we left Genappe the English hussars

charged our cavalry, but were immediately driven back by our lancers. Lord Uxbridge, in his turn, charged our lancers, at the head of the mounted guards, and drove them back; but the English guards were compelled to yield before our cuirassiers. In a few minutes the road was strewn with dead and wounded, the greater number belonging to our enemies. Our cannon especially had covered the ground with lacerated human bodies most fearful to behold. During these attacks Colonel Sourd, a model hero, covered himself with glory. Though his arm was lacerated with sabre wounds, and half severed from his body, he persisted in remaining on his horse. He only dismounted to have the limb amputated, which operation did not diminish either his zeal or courage, for he mounted his horse immediately, and remained at the head of his regiment until it reached the walls of Paris.

During all these charges Napoleon did not cease for one moment to direct the advance guard himself. Still the march was slow, for both English and French bent before the violence of the storm. Several hours had not sufficed to discharge the clouds of their immense masses of water, and our troops were in a deplorable condition. The paved road no longer sufficed for their numbers, and the infantry, being obliged to give place to the artillery and the cavalry, were forced off the sides of the road, and obliged to walk knee-deep in the slimy Belgian soil. It soon became impossible to preserve the ranks; each advanced as he could or would, following at a distance the column of artillery and cavalry that occupied the highroad. Towards the close of the day their sufferings increased with the continuous rain and darkness. Their minds were depressed, as though the severity of the weather was the forerunner of some misfortune. It would have been a consolation had there been any probability that at the conclusion of this painful march they might hope to come up with the English, and satisfy the long-cherished rancour of both nations in a combat on suitable ground. But it was doubtful whether the English would not disappear in the depths of the forest and join the Prussians behind its leafy curtain.

There was amongst the wounded prisoners an English officer, a relative of Lord Elphinstone. He was presented to Napoleon, who received him with marked politeness, and questioned him very adroitly, hoping to discover the Duke of Wellington's views, which this officer was in a position to know. He replied to all the emperor's questions with dignity and courtesy, but declared that though a prisoner, he would not betray his country to procure kinder treatment for himself. Napoleon, appreciating such sentiments, ordered M. de Flahault to see that this English officer was treated with as much consideration as

though he were a Frenchman high in the imperial favour. But he had learned nothing or almost nothing of the plans of the British army. Still journeying along the Belgian road, which traversed an undulating plain, the French reached towards evening an eminence whence the country around could be distinctly seen. They were at the foot of the celebrated position of Mont St. Jean, beyond which could be seen the sombre verdure of the forest of Soignes.

The English having set out at an early hour, had had time to take up their position behind this point, where the elevation of the ground protected them in a great measure from the hardships we had to endure, and where their commissariat had provided them with abundant provisions, though obtained at a high price. They could scarcely be seen, concealed as they were by the hill of Mont St. Jean. The rain was succeeded by a dense fog, which enveloped the country around, and anticipated by two hours the natural termination of day. Nothing was visible, and Napoleon was left in a painful state of doubt; for if the English had actually entered the forest with the intention of crossing it during the night, they would in all probability join the Prussians behind Brussels, and the plan of fighting them separately, so successfully carried out up to this time, would be frustrated. It would certainly be a serious undertaking to advance beyond Brussels for the purpose of encountering 200,000 brave and exasperated enemies, and that with only 100,000 soldiers, heroically brave indeed, but in numbers only equal to half the opposing force; and in addition to this disadvantage, there was the great column of the Austrians and Russians advancing on our right, and not more than forty leagues distant. Napoleon, desirous of terminating the great anxiety he felt, ordered Milhaud's artillery to fall into line and discharge all their cannon. This order being immediately obeyed, the English replied by firing fifty pieces of ordnance into the hollow between us and them. Napoleon then alighted from his horse, and escorted by only two or three officers, proceeded himself to observe the position that the English seemed to have selected. Every moment balls fell around him in the thick mud, which they splashed in all directions. What he saw and heard relieved his anxiety somewhat, for so prompt and extended a cannonade could not come from a simple rearguard posted on the road to arrest the pursuit of an enemy, but must proceed from an entire army in line, and protected by all its guns. He had now no doubt that the hour of battle was at hand, and his future anxiety could only be concerning the result; and this anxiety was enough for the strongest nerves. But still he had so much confidence in his own genius and the valour of his soldiers, that all he asked of Providence

was an opportunity to fight, depending on himself to secure a victory.

Napoleon having ascertained that the English were actually before him, ordered General Milhaud to recall his cuirassiers, that they might enjoy the repose they so much needed to prepare them for the fearful struggle of the morrow. Having left his staff in the rear, he advanced on foot along the height occupied by the English. Accompanied by the grand-marshal, Bertrand, and his first page, Gudin, he moved about there for a long time, seeking to ascertain the peculiarities of a position so soon to be bedewed by human blood. At every step he sunk into the mud, from which he extricated himself sometimes by help of the grand-marshal's arm, and sometimes by Gudin's, and then continued his observations with his pocket glass. Though he paid no attention to the bullets that were raining around, he was drawn from his abstraction by the sight of his page, a lad of seventeen, whose father he had loved, and who had fallen at Valoutina. "My child," he said, "this is the first time you have been present at such a festival. It is a rough commencement, but your education will be the more quickly finished." The boy, a son worthy of his father, thought, as well as Bertrand, only of his master; but nobody would dare to express a fear in Napoleon's presence even for him, and they continued their reconnoitring until ten o'clock at night, bullets still whistling around, and their feet continually sinking deep in the mud. Napoleon, who never spent time uselessly, had continued this investigation only that he might see with his own eyes the English bivouac. The horizon blazed in a short time with the light of a thousand fires, fed with wood from the forest of Soignes. The English, as drenched as we, passed the evening in drying their clothes and cooking their provisions. "*The horizon*," as Napoleon poetically expressed it, "*seemed one vast conflagration*," and those flames, which at that moment seemed to him a presage of victory, filled him with joy—a joy, alas! destined to be of short duration.

Napoleon remounted his horse and returned to his headquarters at the Caillou farm. He announced a decisive battle for the following day—a battle which, he said, would decide the fate of France. He ordered his generals to make the necessary preparations. Of all the orders expedited, the most urged was that addressed by Napoleon to Grouchy, for it was of vital importance that his movements should not be left to chance under existing circumstances; and as the marshal was at a distance of four or five leagues, these orders should be sent to him immediately, that he might receive them in proper time. At about ten o'clock Napoleon sent him instructions suitable to every aspect that the position of things could assume.

Grouchy was ordered to follow the Prussians, in order to complete their defeat, to watch their proceedings, and whatever they might do, to keep himself as an impenetrable wall between them and the English. What many possibilities might not be speculated on in such a situation? The Prussians could, as had been conjectured when the fugitives and cannon had been found on the Namur road, either advance to Liège, to join the other allies on the Rhine, or march through Gembloux and Wavre by the road which crosses the eastern extremity of the forest of Soignes, by which they could join the English beyond Brussels. They might also stop at Wavre, near the Dyle, before advancing through the forest to join the English at the other side of it. None of these probabilities were alarming, not even the last, provided that Grouchy did not lose his presence of mind, which up to this time he had never lost. Napoleon, as he ever did, gave instructions suitable to the existing state of things, and traced them with the greatest precision. "If the Prussians," he said in his orders to Grouchy, "have turned to the Rhine, you need not trouble yourself about them, but only leave 1000 horse to follow them and make sure that they do not fall back on us. If they have taken the road to Brussels by Wavre, it will be sufficient to send 1000 horse after them; and then, as in the former case, do you return to us and assist in beating the English. But if the Prussians have stopped in advance of the forest of Soignes, at Wavre, or elsewhere, do you take up your position between them and us, engage them, keep them in check, and send a detachment of 7000 men to attack the right wing of the English in the rear. Had Napoleon's military genius been less great or less correct than it was, he could not have dictated any other directions than these. These instructions, to leave some troops to watch the Prussians, whether they took the direction of the Rhine or Brussels, and in either case to join Napoleon with the entire of the right; or if they had stopped at Wavre, to engage and keep them aloof from the terrible struggle that was about to commence between the French and English armies, whilst he sent 7000 men to attack the English right wing in the rear; these, we repeat, were instructions suited to what was known of the position of affairs. Could the orders be delivered and put into execution in time, there could be no question as to the result. It was ten o'clock; even admitting that the officer who was to transmit the orders did not leave until eleven, he might arrive at the very latest at two in the morning at Gembloux, where it was natural to suppose that Grouchy was to be found. From the farm of Caillou to Gembloux, following the paved road to Namur, and turning off at Sombreffe to the Wavre road, the distance could

not be more than seven or eight leagues, whilst it was scarcely five in a direct line. A mounted horseman could certainly traverse this distance in less than three hours. Marshal Grouchy, receiving his orders at two in the morning, could leave Gembloux at four, and be quite near Napoleon at the commencement of the battle, for whether he allowed the Prussians to pursue the route to the Rhine or to Brussels, or had to follow them to Wavre, sending only a detachment to Mont St. Jean, he and his *corps d'armée* would not have more than five or six leagues to traverse.* Having despatched these orders, Napoleon retired to snatch a few moments' repose in the middle of the night, as was his custom when engaged in any great undertaking. He slept soundly on the eve of that day, the most terrible of his life, the saddest that ever broke on France.

As to the rest, the enemy's generals had made almost the very arrangements that Napoleon himself would have desired when he asked Providence to allow him the chance of one more battle. On the previous evening the Duke of Wellington, after the battle of Quatre-Bras, had stopped at Genappe, and taken up his quarters there. Not having heard from Marshal Blücher, who was either displeased at not having been more effectually succoured, or disabled by his terrible fall from attending to his duties, the British general took it for granted that the Prussians had been beaten, especially as he saw French videttes both at Quatre-Bras and on the Namur road. The French would indeed have been obliged to retreat if a

* That this order was given has been disputed. Marshal Grouchy said that he did not receive it, which we believe, both because he has said it, and because that it is only too probable, as officers travelling by night amidst patrols of the enemy might be arrested, as unfortunately happened during this campaign, and give the despatches meant for French generals either to Prussians or English. But if we believe Grouchy, to whose word some suspicion may be attached, as he had a great error to justify, we do not see why we should not also believe Napoleon, who in two documents written at St. Helena has stated positively that he sent these orders, and even mentions their most minute details. We do not say that because the assertion comes from St. Helena it is necessarily true; but neither do we admit that it must necessarily be false. We believe Marshal Grouchy's assertion, for though we have seen that he gave facts a certain colouring in order to justify himself, still we do not believe that he was capable of telling a direct falsehood, or denying an order he had received. Besides, we have a regard for probabilities. Had Marshal Grouchy received the order, he would certainly have put it into execution, for acting otherwise would have proved him a traitor or a madman, neither of which he was. But if we, judging him by the laws of morality and probability, and notwithstanding the many alterations he has made in his accounts of these events, either from defect of memory, or a desire to excuse himself, we admit that he would not deny an order he had received, if we admit the probability that he would have obeyed this order had he received it, there can be no reason why we should not judge Napoleon by the same rules. He affirmed most positively at St. Helena that he sent these orders, and even gave the most minute details of their contents, and we find it impossible to believe that on this occasion he spoke falsely. And then as to the probability of his having sent them. It would be utterly impossible that Napoleon, who

victory had not permitted them to occupy so advanced a position. The Duke of Wellington therefore determined to fall back on Mont St. Jean, on the borders of the forest of Soignes, resolved to fight in that position, which he had long studied, foreseeing the possibility of a defensive battle being fought under the walls of Brussels for the preservation of the kingdom of the Low Countries. However good his position might be, he would not fight unless sure of being supported by the Prussians. He therefore sent an officer to Blücher to know if he might count on his assistance.

Whilst the English were making these arrangements, inflexible old Blücher, notwithstanding his discomfiture at Ligny, had no idea of thinking himself beaten, but was determined to renew the combat on the next day or the following, when he should find a position favourable to his operations. Far from thinking of retreating to the Rhine, he was determined to remain, and not advance further than the forest of Soignes, where, either with or without the English, he would fight a fresh battle, and not in the rear of Brussels. He had consequently retired in two columns to Wavre, whither he summoned Bülow's (the 4th Prussian) corps, which had been on the march during the battle of Ligny. Ziethen and Pirch I., who had fought between Ligny and St. Amand, and were the most in advance on the road from Namur to Quatre-Bras, had during the night of the 16th-17th retreated along the right bank of the Dyle, through Tilly and Mont St. Guibert. Thielmann, who had

was vigilance itself, could, on the eve of the most decisive battle of his life, have neglected to send orders to his right wing, which was to play so important a part in the coming struggle. Such negligence could scarcely be attributed to the most effeminate or dullest of eastern princes. How could the most vigilant, the most active of captains be suspected of such carelessness? We can furnish another moral proof, if possible, still more conclusive. Had Napoleon at St. Helena invented the story of this order, to excuse what would have been his absolutely incredible negligence, he certainly would have arranged the account differently. Instead of saying that he was ignorant of the position of the Prussians on the evening of the 17th, or that he had only asked Grouchy for 7000 men, he would have rested his false orders on events that had become known since then, and boasted that he had desired Grouchy to pass the Dyle with all his forces, and take up a position between the Prussians and English. Napoleon's modest assertion, that he had despatched an order framed in accordance with his doubts as to the enemy's position, and which would have been insufficient had he not been ignorant of that position, is in our opinion an irrefragable proof that he spoke the truth at St. Helena, and asserted nothing but the simple truth. We cannot admit the supposition that he did not send any orders to Grouchy on that night; and supposing he did send, those he mentioned, founded on the slight knowledge he possessed, seem to us the most probable; and we believe that had he wished to invent a falsehood, he could have invented one that would tell more to his advantage. We therefore believe both him and Marshal Grouchy in their contradictory statements, which are easily reconcilable by the admission of an order. Sane criticism does not certainly consist in believing that the actors in any scene always speak truth; neither is judicious criticism prompt to suppose that all they say is false.

not passed Sombrefe, had fallen back on the Gembloux road, and joined Bulow at Liège. All had arrived successively at Wavre during the afternoon of the 17th, and taken up their position on both sides of the Dyle. The remainder of the day was passed by Blucher in allowing the troops a little rest, procuring provisions and fresh ammunition, and in sending his horse to collect the fugitives, which our cavalry, had it been better directed, would have taken prisoners in thousands. When informed of the Duke of Wellington's plans he sent him word that he would be at Mont St. Jean on the 18th, hoping that if the French did not attack on that day, they would on the following. What noble and energetic patriotism in an old man of seventy-three!

The English and Prussian generals had thus decided on fighting in front of the forest of Soignes on the 18th, provided the French would allow them.

It was Marshal Grouchy's duty to prevent this junction. A glance at the chart will show that nothing could be easier than to effect this, although the marshal's forces amounted to only 34,000, whilst the Prussians were 88,000. Napoleon having by a rapid movement made himself master of the highroad from Namur to Quatre-Bras, the route by which the English and Prussians had intended to combine their forces, both armies had been compelled to fall back, the former by the Mont St. Jean road, the latter by that of Wavre. Both these roads pass through the extensive forest of Soignes, and meet at Brussels. The forest, as we have already said, surrounds Brussels from south-west to north-east. Wellington, pursued to Mont St. Jean by Napoleon, and Blucher retreating to Wavre before Grouchy, were separated by a distance of four leagues, measured in a straight line. Grouchy was as near to Napoleon as Blucher was to the Duke of Wellington. Now, when Grouchy was parting from Napoleon he had been ordered to keep in constant communication with him; and had he not lost all traces of the Prussians he might have accomplished one or other of two things—he might have placed himself between Napoleon and Blucher, and prevented the latter's advance until the English had been beaten; or had he not been able to prevent his advance, he might have attacked him in flank as he sought to join the British army. That Grouchy did not encounter the Prussians, or even see them, within so small a space, is almost a miracle, a miracle of incomprehensible misfortune! Grouchy's most important mission, that of interposing his troops between the English and Prussians, would have been favoured by the locality itself. Napoleon was separated from Grouchy, and Wellington from Blucher, by the Dyle, an insignificant little river flowing from Genappe to Wavre, and whose approaches could be very

easily defended. Had Grouchy, in obedience to his instructions, kept up a constant communication with headquarters on his left, he could have advanced to the Dyle, crossed it, and having thus interposed the stream between himself and the Prussians, he might dispute the passage with them, and perhaps prevent their advance to Mont St. Jean. Or had they passed the river earlier than he, he could have surprised them in their flank movement, and brought them to a full stop before they could reach the Duke of Wellington. The inequality in numbers would have been compensated by the impression left on the minds of the Prussians by the battle of Ligny, and by the flank attack, and Grouchy would have been able, if not to conquer, at least to give occupation to the Prussians, and delay their arrival at Waterloo until their presence would have been useless.

That he might not lose time, and that his pursuit of the Prussians might be attended with success, it was indeed necessary that Grouchy should know, or at least suspect, what route they had taken. But there were so few probabilities to choose between, and these could be so easily verified by Grouchy's thirteen regiments of cavalry, and the space to be traversed was so very circumscribed, that any time lost in seeking the enemy could easily be recovered. If the Prussians, beaten at Ligny, had retired by Liège to the Rhine, nothing was required but to send a detachment of cavalry after them, and think no more of the affair; if they advanced towards Wavre, in order to fight either in advance or in rear of the forest of Soignes, they had only two roads to choose between—one by Tilly and Mont St. Guibert, the other by Sombrefe and Gembloux, both terminating at Wavre. Three detachments of cavalry, one sent to Namur, and two to Wavre, could have discovered the truth in a few hours, and Grouchy, having left Napoleon at eleven, might have known at three or four in the afternoon which route the Prussians had taken: he might have reached Wavre at nine if he determined to go there, or the left bank of the Dyle if, as would have been better, he crossed that river to put himself in closer communication with Napoleon.

Marshal Grouchy did nothing of all this. Though both clear-sighted and vigorous when in action, he had no discernment in the direction of general operations, nor any of the sagacity essential to an officer commanding an advance guard sent in search of an enemy. He had not sent a reconnoitring party to the left from Tilly to Mont St. Guibert, the route taken by Ziethen and Pirch I.; nor had he sent one to the right, in the direction of Gembloux; and in parting from Napoleon at Sombrefe he thoughtlessly hastened to Namur, where, as he was told, Pajol had found both fugitives and cannon. Whilst galloping along in this direction, without a destination,

he learned that the cavalry sent to reconnoitre during the morning had seen great numbers of Prussians near Gembloux, and apparently advancing towards Wavre. At the same time Napoleon's despatch, sent from Marbais by the grand-marshal, gave him the like information. He immediately set out for Gembloux, giving orders to his infantry to follow. It was near three or four o'clock in the afternoon when this infantry, composed of Vandamme's and Gerard's corps, set out. This delay certainly allowed the men some time to recover from the fatigues of the previous evening; but it would have been better to have left at noon for Gembloux, which was so situate as to afford the troops the advantage of profiting by every possibility, for at Gembloux they would be on the direct road to Wavre, and in communication with Liège by the old Roman causeway. They would have had the advantage of arriving at Gembloux before the commencement of the storm which swept over all the low-lying lands of Belgium at two o'clock, and having rested three or four hours, could have advanced on Wavre, were that definitively found to be the most advantageous direction.

The information collected from the peasantry about Gembloux pointed out Wavre as the point to which the Prussians had retreated; and there certainly was sufficient connection in these reports to influence a less vacillating mind than Grouchy's. But as Bulow had passed by the Liège road, and as there was consequently matériel on that route, Grouchy's perplexity increased, and he did not know on which supposition to act. A variety of reports, in war as in politics, will cause perplexity by their very number, excepting to a man whose reason is at once sufficiently discriminating and stern to compare and decide. What seemed most probable was that the Prussians were advancing to join the English at the forest of Soignes, or, as was less probable, that they were retreating towards the Rhine; but there was not the least probability that their forces were divided between these two directions. And yet this was what Grouchy believed, influenced by the traces found both on the Wavre and Liège roads, indications very easily explained since, as the Prussians were advancing towards Wavre, and their rear still near Liège, which they had just left, it was natural that they should leave traces of their passage in both places. There was another important reason which should have decided the marshal's choice. If he erred in advancing on Wavre, the evil was not great, for though he allowed the Prussians to advance unmolested towards the Rhine, he brought a strong reinforcement to Napoleon against the English. If, on the other hand, he erred in marching towards Liège, an imminent danger would be the result—that of allowing the Prussians to advance unmolested to Wavre, where they would find themselves close to

the English, and consequently in a position to overwhelm Napoleon with their combined forces. This reflection would not allow a clear-sighted man to hesitate for a moment as to what resolution he was to come to. Unfortunately Grouchy was not such a man, and he seemed totally to forget that his most important mission, as was evident both from the circumstances themselves and from Napoleon's verbal instructions, was to keep in the track of the Prussians, and prevent their falling on us before we had beaten the English.

Towards the close of the day more numerous and consistent reports left no doubt that the Prussians had advanced along the road to Wavre; in consequence of which Marshal Grouchy contented himself with leaving some cavalry on the Liège road as a last precaution against a possibility which he never ceased to fear; but he took care to station the larger portion of his cavalry on the Wavre road, in advance of Sauvenière. He allowed his entire infantry to remain at Gembloux, where, in consequence of the weather, it had not arrived until late; but he wished that the men should refresh themselves, and be in condition to march early on the following day. It was certainly very annoying that whilst the Prussians ought to have been hotly pursued, our troops had advanced but two and a half leagues during the day; but if they set out at four in the morning of the 18th, all might still be remedied, for Marshal Grouchy was only four leagues from Wavre and six from Napoleon, a distance that could be traversed by a pedestrian in three-quarters of an hour. There was still time enough to accomplish what had not been done on the 17th. At ten at night, at the very time that Napoleon was writing to him, Grouchy wrote to inform Napoleon of the resolution he had taken, which, as he said, left him still the choice of advancing either to Wavre or Liège; at the same time he announced his determination to march next morning with all his forces to Wavre, should it be positively ascertained that the enemy had chosen that route, and he added that he did this *in order to separate the Prussians from the Duke of Wellington*. This last expression showed that the marshal seemed at last to understand the true nature of his mission, and also proved that Napoleon had expressed himself clearly when he gave him his verbal instructions in the morning.

In this manner did the 17th June close on this theatre of war, which did not altogether comprise a space of more than five or six leagues, and on which 300,000 men met to terminate twenty-two years of desperate strife by mutual slaughter.

Whilst all were sleeping in the camps of the four armies, Napoleon, after a short repose, rose at two in the morning, still fearing that the English would retire to join the Prussians in

the rear of Brussels. All European generals were indeed so convinced of the danger of meeting him in a pitched battle—a danger so evident for the English in their actual position, stationed as they were with a great forest in their rear, through which it would be most difficult to retreat—that he could not comprehend why they did not retreat and join the Prussians behind the forest of Soignes, which they could easily accomplish.

But in reasoning thus, he did not take into account the hatred of the Prussian general, or the ambition of the British commander. The former was willing to lay down his life, provided he could accomplish the ruin of France; the latter aspired to the honour of terminating alone the quarrel that existed between France and Europe. Napoleon, however, was still in doubt, and notwithstanding the rain, which was again falling in torrents, he recommenced, accompanied by two or three officers, the reconnaissance to which he had before devoted so many hours. The ground was wetter and the mud deeper than it had been even on the previous evening. Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, which would render an attack on an army in position so difficult, he felt real pleasure in seeing the fires of the British encampment. These fires gleaming along the whole length of the battlefield attested the presence of the English army. For a moment Napoleon was alarmed by hearing the rolling of a carriage to his left in the direction of Mont St. Jean; but the sound soon ceased, and the reports of his scouts returning from the enemy's camp removed all uncertainty as to the Duke of Wellington's intention of fighting. Napoleon was both surprised and pleased, and day now beginning to dawn, left not a trace of doubt, for had the English general intended to retreat, he would not have awaited the daylight, with such an adversary in his rear, to enter the long and dangerous defile of the forest of Soignes.

Whilst Napoleon was making this reconnaissance, he received the despatch which Grouchy had sent from Gembloux at ten o'clock in the evening, and in which he informed him of the position he had taken between the roads leading to Liége and Wavre, and of his inclination to advance towards Wavre, in order to separate the Prussians from the English. Though Napoleon thought meanly of the manner of proceeding adopted by the marshal, who, pursuing the enemy during an entire day, had only advanced two leagues and a half, still he consoled himself in seeing that Grouchy was advancing towards Wavre, and seemed to understand the essential point in his instructions, which was to keep the Prussians and English asunder. His anxiety was allayed by the reflection that provided Grouchy set out at four or five in the morning, he could join him at ten, and thus

execute the instructions despatched the previous evening from headquarters, which commanded him to pursue the Prussians to Wavre, and send 7000 men to Napoleon. As the state of the ground, drenched by twelve hours' continuous rain, rendered it impossible that the battle could commence before ten in the morning, Grouchy's appearance at that hour or even later with the entire or part of his forces on the left of the English would be sufficient to produce most important results. At three in the morning Napoleon, as an additional precaution, sent the marshal a duplicate copy of the order already sent at ten on the previous evening. Berthier always sent several copies of the same order by different officers, thus increasing the probability that one would arrive at its destination; but Soult, a novice in his new duties, had not taken this precaution. But two despatches having been sent, one at ten in the evening, the other at three in the morning, might have seemed sufficient, especially on a road that was apparently safe, since an officer bringing a report dated ten at night had arrived at two in the morning.

Reassured, though not quite satisfied, Napoleon's sole remaining wish was that the weather would improve to allow free scope for the operations of the artillery. He passed the entire night in making reconnaissances, returning occasionally to the farm of Caillon and drying himself before a large fire. Day broke about four, and the weather became somewhat clearer. The sun soon burst through the heavy curtain of clouds, and lighted up the horizon, and hope, deceitful hope, filled Napoleon's agitated heart! He flattered himself that the clouds would be dissipated by the sun's rays, that the rain would cease, and that in a few hours the ground would be sufficiently soaked to allow the movements of the artillery. Druot and the other officers whom he consulted assured him that, thanks to the season, the ground, though not perfectly firm, would be sufficiently so to allow the heaviest pieces of ordnance to be put in position. The sky continued to become clearer, and Napoleon waited patiently, little thinking that he was allowing time not only for the operations of the sun, but also for those of the Prussians.

About eight o'clock, there being no longer any apparent danger of rain, Napoleon invited his generals to share his frugal morning meal, and discussed the plan of the coming battle with them. From the summit of a mound he had got a complete view of the ground and of the position of the enemy's forces, and had already mentally arranged his plan of attack, and seemed quite confident of the result of his combinations. General Reille, who had often fought against the English, had retained a profound impression of their firmness, an impression that had acted injuriously on the operations at Quatre-Bras; but on the present

occasion he had the merit of communicating several useful truths to Napoleon. He told him that though the English were very inferior in attack, they were superior to any other European forces when acting on the defensive, and that it would be better to seek to conquer them by skilful manœuvring than by a direct assault. "I know," replied Napoleon, "that it is difficult to beat the English when in position; *but I intend to manœuvre.*" He intended, in fact, to combine stratagem with direct warfare, and did not believe that it would be possible for the English to resist his system of operation. "We have," he said, "ninety chances to a hundred;" but Ney, who entered as he spoke these words, said that he might possibly be right if the English would only wait his coming, but that at the moment they were beating a retreat. Napoleon did not give the least credence to this, as he said, if the English wished to retreat, they would have done so before dawn. This argument was unanswerable. Napoleon, however, mounted his horse and went himself to see how matters stood, and finding that the English had not moved, he dictated his plan of attack, which was transcribed by several officers, and transmitted to the different commanders.

The time is now come to describe this battlefield, the fatal scene of one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the century, the most disastrous though the most heroic in the history of France. The English had taken up their position on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, which extended right and left to a distance of about two leagues, and sloping gently towards the direction in which we were placed, formed a small valley between the two armies. The forest of Soignes spread its sombre verdure for several leagues behind. The English, to protect themselves from our artillery, had taken up a position on the opposite slope of the height, and had left on the summit only some well-horsed and well-guarded batteries. Running along the plateau was a cross-road, passing from the village of Ohain on our right to Merbe-Braine on our left, bounded by a quick-set hedge in some parts, and deeply sunk in others, forming a kind of fosse, covering so completely the entire English position that one might be tempted to believe it expressly fashioned for the occasion. The valley between the two armies passed below the farms of Papelotte and La Haye, and then running along the foot of the village of Ohain, became the bed of a tributary of the Dyle, and took its way towards the small town of Wavre, which with the aid of a glass might be seen at about three leagues and a half to our right. This valley, declining to our left, wound round the position of the enemy, and poured its waters into the little river Senne. This partition of its waters between the Senne and Dyle was caused by an embankment, which, running from us to the English, supported the great

causeway from Charleroi to Brussels. This causeway, after clearing the plateau of Mont St. Jean, joined the Nivelles road, which, bordered with trees, lay on our left, so that Mont St. Jean was the point at which the two principal causeways met. It was by these two roads that the different portions of the British army, those that had arrived at Quatre-Bras, and those that had not had time to advance beyond Nivelles, had joined, and formed the great mass which was to dispute Brussels with us. A little beyond Mont St. Jean, at the entrance of the forest of Soignes, was the village of Waterloo, which has given its name to the battle, because it was thence that the English general dated his despatches.

The English were stationed on the opposite slope on both sides of the Brussels road. The Duke of Wellington had commenced the campaign with about 98,000 men, of whom he had lost nearly 6000 in the different rencontres of the preceding days. He had sent a detachment of at least 15,000 to Hal, fearing to be attacked on the right, that is, towards the sea, a fear that never left his mind, and which was quite unworthy of his military discernment. He had at Mont St. Jean, subtracting a few detachments, 75,000 men, consisting of English, Belgians, Dutch, Hanoverians, Nassauviens, and Brunswickers. On his right, in advance of Merbe-Braine, between the Nivelles and Charleroi roads, he stationed the English guards, with Alten's division, composed of English and Germans. Clinton's division, formed into a deep and serried column, was stationed as a reserve in the rear. The extreme right was occupied by Mitchell's English brigade, detached from Colville's division. This wing having to guard the Nivelles and Charleroi roads, was made stronger than the other, besides being supported by the Brunswick corps and the greater part of the allied cavalry. As a last and unnecessary precaution, the Duke of Wellington had placed Chassé's English-Dutch division at a distance of three-quarters of a league, at Braine-l'Alleud, to protect his right wing from the chimerical danger of an attack in the direction of the sea. At his centre, that is to say, upon the highroad from Charleroi to Brussels, he had executed an abattis at the spot where the road debouched on the plateau. He placed very few troops on the road itself, as those on either side would be sufficient to defend it. He had merely stationed Lambert's English brigade as a reserve a little in the rear, in the direction of Mont St. Jean. Picton's division, composed of Kempt and Pack's English brigades, and of Best and Vincke's Hanoverians, was stationed to the left, opposite to our right, part placed in ambush in the Ohain cross-road, and the rest in a mass in the rear. And lastly, his extreme left was formed of Perponcher's division, and kept up a communication with the village of Ohain by

means of the Nassau troops. This wing had been left weakest, as the Duke of Wellington expected it to be reinforced by the Prussian army. The great masses of cavalry were stationed on slopes in the rear, almost entirely out of our view.

The Duke of Wellington had also occupied some detached posts in front of his position. To his right, opposite our left, where the plateau of Mont St. Jean begins to make a sweep to the rear, was the chateau of Goumont, consisting of several buildings, an orchard, and a wood descending almost to the bottom of the ravine. Here the Duke of Wellington had stationed a garrison of 1800 of his best troops. In the centre, on the Brussels road, was the farm of La Haye Sainte, consisting of one large building and an orchard. The defence of this place had been entrusted by the duke to 1000 men. To his left, towards the base of the plateau, he had stationed some detachments of the Nassau brigade in the farms of La Haye and Papelotte.

We shall here describe the position and distribution of the English army. In front were three detached and strongly occupied works; higher up, on the little road that ran along the plateau, half way up the eminence, were numerous battalions in ambuscade; and on the opposite side of the plateau, on the left and right of the Brussels road, were masses of cavalry and infantry, some deployed and some in serried columns. From this description it is evident that the English army, both from the position it occupied, as well as from the number and quality of its soldiers, presented a formidable obstacle to French valour.

Having examined the position, Napoleon immediately decided on his plan of attack. He resolved to draw up his army at the foot of the plateau, and first seize the three advanced posts, the chateau de Goumont on the left, the Haye Sainte farm in the centre, and the Papelotte and La Haye farms on the right, then to send his right wing supported by his entire reserve to attack the English left, weak both in position and numbers, force it on the centre, which occupied the Brussels road, take possession of this road, the only passage through the forest of Soignes, and thus compel the British army to enter the wood, through which there were at that time but few roads, and which, if it did not entirely prevent, would greatly retard the retreat of a routed army. Napoleon, in thus bringing his right wing to operate on the English left, had the advantage of directing his greatest effort against the weakest point of the enemy, of seizing the principal road through the forest, and so cutting off the English from the Prussians, who in all probability, if not certainly, were at Wavre. This plan, the last proof of Napoleon's promptness of determination and clearness of judgment, was undoubtedly the best, considering the configuration of the ground and the

distribution of the enemy's forces. This plan being decided on, Napoleon stationed his troops conformable to their appointed duties. As the rain had ceased some hours before, the ground was tolerably firm, and the men fell into line with wonderful quickness and order. To our left, between the Nivelles and Charleroi roads, and opposite the chateau de Goumont, General Reille's corps (the 2nd) was drawn up on the side of the valley that separated us from the enemy, each of its divisions being formed into two lines, Piré's light cavalry being at the extreme left, in order to be in a position to reconnoitre as far as the extreme right of the English. On the right wing, that is to say, on either side of the Brussels road, Count d'Erlon's corps, that had not yet been engaged, was stationed with 19,000 infantry opposite to the English left, his four divisions being placed one behind the other, and each drawn up in double file. General Jacquinot with his light cavalry was stationed *en vidette* on our extreme right, and making his reconnaissance in the direction of Wavre. The artillery of these different corps formed in front an extensive battery of eighty pieces of ordnance.

Behind this first line Count de Lobau's corps, distributed equally on both sides of the Brussels road, formed the centre reserve. On his left, and consequently in General Reille's rear, Kellermann's magnificent cuirassiers were drawn up, whilst Milhaud's equally good cuirassiers were stationed in General d'Erlon's rear. Such was our second line, a little less extended but deeper than the first, and dazzling as the cuirasses of our heavy cavalry reflected the sun's beams. The splendid infantry of the guards, with Lefebvre-Desnoettes' chasseurs and lancers on their right, and Guyot's mounted grenadiers on their left, were stationed on each side of the Brussels road, where they formed our third and last line, still deeper and less extended than the second, so that the French army had somewhat the form of a great fan gleaming, as the bayonets, sabres, and cuirasses of our men flashed back the sunlight. In less than an hour all these fine troops had taken their appointed position, and altogether produced a most imposing effect. They inspired Napoleon with a pride and confidence which he manifested both by look and word. Desirous, if it were possible, of exciting still stronger enthusiasm in his men, he again traversed the field of battle, passing from left to right in front of the troops. The moment he appeared the infantry placed their shakos on their bayonets, the horse their helmets on their sabres, and waved them in the air, whilst loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard on every side, and continued long after Napoleon had passed from their sight. Thus he presented himself to all his troops, whom he left exultant with joy and hope, notwithstanding the dreadful night they had passed, encumbered with mud, without fire, and

almost without food; whilst the English army, having arrived some hours earlier than we, and being abundantly supplied with provisions, suffered but very little. Our men, however, had had time to prepare their soup in the morning, and were besides in a state of enthusiasm that made them insensible to every physical suffering, to every physical danger.

Napoleon having adopted Druot's advice, of delaying operations until the ground should become somewhat firm, had now no motive for hastening the battle, especially as he saw that the English did not mean to avoid the encounter. There were two advantages to be gained by delay—the ground would become firmer, which would facilitate the attack, and Grouchy would have time to arrive. Everything indeed seemed to promise the speedy arrival of the lieutenant to whom he had entrusted his right wing. At ten in the evening, as we have seen, Grouchy had sent word that he was at Gembloux, ready to advance on Liège or Wavre, but more inclined for the latter, which showed that he was beginning to comprehend that his principal mission was to separate the Prussians from the English. At two in the morning he wrote to announce his definite intention of going to Wavre at daybreak. Napoleon having sent his directions at ten, and having repeated them in a fresh order sent at three, expected that if Grouchy could not come with his entire *corps d'armée*, he would at least send a detachment of 7000 men, which would leave him 26,000 with which to arrest the progress of the Prussians, or fall back fighting on the right of Mont St. Jean. Napoleon therefore reckoned on a detachment from his right wing, or the entire of it. But notwithstanding the orders sent in the evening, and repeated during the night, he determined to send another officer to Grouchy, to inform him of the actual position of things, and to explain once more what was expected from him. He sent for Zenowicz, a Polish officer, appointed to bear his message, and leading him to a height from which they could see the country round, he said, turning to the right, "I expect Grouchy on this side, I await his arrival impatiently; go to him, bring him with you, and do not leave him until his *corps d'armée* debouches on our line of battle." Napoleon ordered this officer to march as quickly as possible, first getting from Marshal Soult a written order, which would give more in detail the orders he had just issued verbally. This being done, Napoleon, who had passed the night wading through the mud whilst making his reconnaissances, and who had slept but three hours since he had left Ligny at five o'clock on the morning of the previous day, now flung himself upon his camp bed. His brother Jerome was with him at the time. "It is ten o'clock," he said, "and I will sleep until eleven; I shall certainly wake, but in any case rouse

me yourself, for these," he added, pointing to the officers, "would not dare venture to disturb me." Having said this, he laid his head on his slight pillow, and was soon sound asleep.

Meantime all was commotion around him, each hastening to occupy his appointed station. The English, who had had plenty of rest and food, were methodically taking their places on the ground where they were about to display their wonted inflexibility. The French hurried through a scanty breakfast, and though having had but little rest and little food, were impatiently waiting for the signal to fight, which they were accustomed to receive from the batteries of the guard. Several divisions had only just fallen into line, General Durutte's especially, which, through the fault of the head of the staff, was late in setting out, and was now hastening to its proper station, whilst the men had scarcely time to eat their soup. But our soldiers were inflamed with an ardour that made them look with indifference on all suffering, whether resulting from circumstances or the errors of their commanders.

The operations of the different armies, however distant, all tended to the same object—the decisive action that was about to take place on the plateau of Mont St. Jean. Blucher having assembled his four corps at Wavre on the evening before, and having rallied some of the fugitives, which our ill-commanded cavalry had not picked up, was preparing to fulfil the promise he had made the Duke of Wellington, of bringing him all or part of his forces. He still had 88,000 men, exhausted and wounded since the 16th, but all, thanks to his patriotic example, ready to fight to the last extremity. The 4th corps (Bulow's), not having yet fired a shot, was the first that Blucher ordered to march to Mont St. Jean. He had given orders that this corps should cross the Dyle at dawn; but having been stopped by a conflagration at Wavre, the men had not been able to set out until after seven in the morning. They were ordered to advance towards the St. Lambert chapel, on the flank of the position where the French and English were about to fight. They might arrive about one in the afternoon. Blucher's plan was to have Bulow supported by Pirch I. (2nd corps), and to send Ziethen (1st corps) by the Ohain road along the forest of Soignes, so that they might be able to debouch nearer the left wing of the English. These two corps (Pirch I. and Ziethen's), reduced to 15,000 each, would with Bulow's, which was still entire, amount to 60,000 men, which was the aid the Prussians were about to bring the English. Blucher had finally determined to leave Thielmann's (3rd corps), which had not suffered much at Ligny, as a rearguard, with directions to check Grouchy at Wavre, and not allow him to pass the Dyle.

The possibility of 60,000 Prussians arriving on his right

flank was certainly a very serious consideration for Napoleon. But there were 34,000 Frenchmen, who, having conquered at Ligny, were full of confidence in themselves, and devotion to their cause, and who were so placed that they could hurl back on the Prussians the blow aimed at themselves. If they arrived at Mont St. Jean before Blucher, they would render Napoleon invulnerable for one day at least; and if they arrived later, they would place Blucher between two fires, which would certainly overpower him. The only question was whether they would come; but indeed it was difficult to doubt it.

We have seen how Marshal Grouchy, having lost half the preceding day in fruitless searches, had at length discovered that the Prussians had advanced to Wavre, and had himself proceeded to Gembloux. It was late when he arrived; but as his troops had only marched two leagues and a half during the day, they could, by leaving at four on the morning of the 18th, reach in the forenoon the more remote points of the scene of action.

Unfortunately, although Grouchy at the close of the preceding day no longer entertained a doubt as to the route taken by the Prussians, he had not given Vandamme orders to march until six in the morning, nor to Gerard until seven, and as arrangements had not been previously made for the distribution of rations, Vandamme's men were not ready to leave until eight, nor Gerard's until nine.* Still nothing was lost or even compromised by these delays, as the distance to be traversed was only four leagues in a straight line, and not more than five by cross-roads. The cannon, which was soon to make the country around re-echo with its thunders, ought to have been the most unmistakable of all orders, and supposing that five hours would be needed to join Napoleon (which would be too much to allow, as we shall see), there would be still sufficient time to bring up a force powerful enough to turn the balance in our favour. And if Blucher were advancing towards Mont St. Jean, Grouchy in all probability was doing the same, and at eleven in the morning, whether the details we have given were known or not, there was as much to be hoped as feared for the fortunes of France. What do we say, as much to be hoped as feared? There was no room for any other sentiment than hope, if the cannon that was about to vibrate on the ears of these 34,000 Frenchmen should at the same time produce an awakening influence on their mind. Alas! it would awaken the minds of all, with but one exception, him who commanded them.

The Polish officer Zenowicz, whom Napoleon despatched with

* Some of the troops did not leave Gembloux until ten. These details are attested by letters in my possession, written by inhabitants of the town.

his last orders to the marshal, had lost an hour waiting for Marshal Soult's written despatch. This ambiguous despatch was not worth the time it cost. It announced that a great battle was about to be fought with the English. Grouchy was to advance to Wavre, in order to keep up a close communication with the army, and *combine his operations with those of the main body*. Vague as was his language, still compared with the orders sent on the previous evening, and with the actual state of things, it showed clearly enough that Grouchy ought to hasten forward, and either place himself between the English and Prussians, or attack the latter, no matter how, so that he prevented them from coming to the aid of the English.

Eleven o'clock struck, and Napoleon, without having given his brother the trouble of awaking him, was already up. He had left the Caillou farm, and repaired to La Belle Alliance farm, whence he could command a view of the entire hollow in which his last battle was to be fought. He ascended a small mound, his horses standing saddled at the foot, with his maps spread on a table, and his officers around him. Both armies awaited motionless the signal to begin. The English were calm, confident in their courage, their position, their commander, and in the approaching Prussian reinforcement. The French—we mean the soldiers and inferior officers—in the most exalted state of enthusiasm, thought neither of the Prussians, nor of Grouchy, but only of the English that they saw arrayed before them, and all they asked was to be allowed to attack the enemy, trusting for victory to themselves, and the fertile genius of him who commanded them, a genius that had hitherto been equal to any emergency.

At half-past eleven Napoleon gave the signal to fire, and 120 French cannon responded. In accordance with the plan he had laid down of throwing the left wing of the English on their centre, in order to deprive them of the Brussels road, the principal attack was to be made by the right wing, and here Napoleon had concentrated a great quantity of artillery. He had brought up to this point not alone the batteries of Count d'Erlon, whose duty it was to execute the operation, but also the batteries of General Reille, which were to attack on the left, the batteries of Lobau, formed into a reserve, and some of the artillery of the guard. These formed a battery of twenty-four guns, which, firing across the small valley that lay between the two armies, sent their balls to the opposite side of the plateau. The English left wing inclining somewhat backward in obedience to the nature of the ground, our right wing accommodated itself to this position, and formed an angle with the line of battle, so that many of our balls fired in an oblique direction fell in the centre of the British army.

On our left, General Reille had collected the batteries of his own divisions and of Piré's cavalry, and kept up a fire on the wood and chateau of Goumont. Napoleon, to sustain the fire of this wing, had ordered Kellermann's mounted artillery to join and fall in behind Reille's corps, so that from this side forty pieces of ordnance at least poured their projectiles on the Duke of Wellington's right. Many balls fell harmless, but many also carried death into the thickest masses of the enemy, making terrible gaps, notwithstanding the precaution that had been taken to station them on the opposite side of the plateau.

This violent cannonade having continued for half an hour, Napoleon ordered an attack on the wood and chateau of Goumont. There were two reasons for commencing the attack with our left—first, because the Goumont post, being the most advanced, was nearest; and secondly, because by drawing the enemy's attention to their right, it would be averted from the left, where our principal attack was to be made.

The 2nd corps, composed of Foy, Jerome, and Bachelu's divisions, descended into the valley, and forming round the wood of Goumont, enclosed it in a kind of semicircle. Foy's division, forming our extreme left, and flanked by Piré's cavalry, was to advance a little further to join that part of the English line which made a circuit to the rear; but this division was not the first that was to engage. The Jerome division rushed on the wood of Goumont, which intercepted its progress, whilst on its right, Bachelu's division filled the space between Goumont and the Brussels road. Our sharpshooters repelled those of the enemy; then Bauduin's brigade, composed of the 1st light infantry and the 3rd of the line, rushed on the wood, which consisted of lofty but not closely planted trees interspersed with thick brushwood. It was occupied by a Nassau battalion and several Hanoverian companies. Four companies of the English guards defended the buildings beyond the wood, completing a garrison consisting, as we have already said, of 1800 men.

Bauduin's brigade stood a murderous fire directed from the brushwood growing between the trees. It was difficult to return the fire of a concealed enemy. Therefore our men forced their way into the wood, killing with their bayonets those who had fired on them at a short range. The brave General Bauduin lost his life in this attack. The Nassau soldiers, aided by the configuration of the locality, defended themselves with obstinacy; but Prince Jerome, turning the wood on the right with Foy's brigade, forced them to retire. We had scarcely taken the wood when a still more serious obstacle presented itself. Beyond was an orchard surrounded by a hedge of large closely planted trees, from which, as from an impenetrable wall, the

enemy poured their balls. The first who sought to force this hedge fell beneath the fire. But no obstacle could deter the French infantry. They cut their way with the axe through this hedge, and killed with their bayonets all those who had not time to fly. This second obstacle was succeeded by a third. Beyond the hedge rose the out-buildings of the chateau, which on the right consisted of a strongly embattled wall, and to our left of a strongly built farm. Six hundred of the English guards defended the place.

As this was not the important point of attack, it would not be worth while to lose thousands of men for the sake of removing so trifling an obstacle; and the conquest of the wood was quite sufficient to prevent the enemy from making an attempt on our right, without sacrificing for a merely secondary object the excellent cavalry of the 2nd corps, the third part of the entire infantry. This was General Reille's opinion, and he ordered that the desperate efforts made to take these buildings should cease, but did not look himself to the execution of his orders; and the generals of the brigades and divisions, carried away by their own ardour and that of their men, resolved to conquer both farm and chateau. The Duke of Wellington, seeing the obstinacy of our attack, sent a Brunswick battalion and some fresh detachments of the guards to support the defenders. The struggle at this point was become most violent.

Whilst our left was thus engaged, Napoleon, obliged to leave the details to his lieutenants, was carefully watching the general progress of the battle, and was preparing to make his principal attack on the enemy's left and centre. This attack was to be made under his own eyes by Marshal Ney, and its object was, as we have said, to deprive the enemy of the command of the Brussels road, the only practicable one through the forest of Soignes. The troops of the 1st corps, displeased at not having fought on the 16th, were anxiously waiting for the signal to commence the attack. Napoleon, telescope in hand, was trying to discover whether the enemy had made any new arrangements in consequence of the attack on the chateau of Goumont. All he could see was that some troops were advancing from Braine-l'Alleud. This was the Chassé division, which the Duke of Wellington had unnecessarily left on his extreme right, in order to keep up a communication with the troops he had left still more uselessly at Hal. Whilst the English general ordered up this division to reinforce his right, he left his centre and left inactive, merely closing the ranks thinned by our balls.

Napoleon, constantly watching his extreme right, the point from which he expected Grouchy, saw in the direction of the chapel of St. Lambert an indistinct cloud on the horizon, whose

exact character he could not immediately define. If the reader remembers the description we have given of the field of battle, he will remember that the valley between the two armies, stretching on towards Wavre, passed successively at the foot of the farms of Papelotte and La Haye, then traversed thick woods, next joined the valley which served as a bed to the stream of Lasne, near the chapel of St. Lambert, and still further on lost itself in the valley of the Dyle. It was on these distant heights of the chapel of St. Lambert that Napoleon perceived the indistinct cloud. It advanced, from which he supposed it must be troops. Napoleon handed his glass to Marshal Soult, and he, after making his observations, passed it to the other generals of the staff: each gave his opinion. Some thought it the summit of a wood, others said it was an object in motion. Napoleon delayed giving orders for the attack until he should ascertain the exact nature of this disturbing apparition. His experienced eye soon cleared up the mystery: what he saw were troops *en marche*. Was it a detachment sent by Grouchy, or Grouchy himself? Was it the Prussians? At the distance at which he was placed Napoleon could not distinguish whether they were French or Prussian troops, as the uniform of both was blue. Napoleon sent for General Domon, who commanded a division of light cavalry, and desired him to ascend the hillock where he himself stood, pointed out the troops that were discernible on the horizon, and bid him reconnoitre. If they were French, he was to hasten their march; if they were enemies, he was to arrest their progress; in any case, he was to report immediately who they were. For the accomplishment of this commission, he added to his division, Subervic's, consisting of 1200 or 1300 light horse. Both divisions amounted to 2400 men, sufficient not only to observe but also to delay the march of the advancing troops should they be enemies.

Napoleon did not feel uneasy yet. Had Grouchy allowed some lateral columns of the Prussian army to escape, he must be pursuing them, and would appear almost as soon as they, and the accident, far from being disadvantageous, would be a gain, for these columns thus placed between two fires would be inevitably destroyed. But the mystery was soon cleared up. A sub-officer of hussars was taken prisoner by our light cavalry. He was the bearer of a letter to the Duke of Wellington from General Bulow, announcing the approach of the Prussians, and demanding instructions. This officer was a very intelligent man. He declared that the approaching troops were Bulow's corps, consisting of 30,000 men, and advancing to join the left wing of the English army. This was a serious but still not very alarming piece of information. If Bulow, who had come from Liége by Gembloux, was so near, Grouchy, whose eyes

must have been closed if he had not seen him pass, could not be far off. His entire corps, or the detachment that had been asked for, must arrive almost at the same time as Bulow's, so that this accident might still turn to our advantage. If our right was formed into a right angle by the addition of a strong detachment sent to oppose Bulow, the latter would be placed between two fires by the arrival of Grouchy's 7000 men, or of his 34,000 led by himself. Napoleon sent for Count de Lobau, and ordered him to choose a position on the declivity of the heights looking towards the Dyle, where, with his two divisions of infantry, and Domon's and Subervic's cavalry, he could make an obstinate resistance. These troops would altogether form a mass of 10,000 men, that, commanded by the Count de Lobau, would be equal to a much larger number, and could very well hold their ground until the arrival of the 7000 that at the very worst might be expected from Grouchy, or until Grouchy himself should come with all his forces. Bulow's 17,000 would thus be opposed by 30,000, so stationed that some would be in his front and some in his rear. There was therefore no cause for alarm. At the worst it was only a diminution by 10,000 men of the force with which Napoleon had intended to attack the English left wing and force it on their centre, and thus deprive them of the command of the Brussels road. But the guard, that was not spared in these desperate engagements, was to be employed as a reserve, and should victory be more expensive it would not be less decisive. Napoleon was not in the least anxious. His 68,000 men were about to be opposed to 105,000 instead of 68,000: the chances of success were indeed less, but still very great.

It was certainly in his power to retreat and decline fighting; but it would be a very serious thing to retreat from a battle already commenced, and that in presence of both English and Prussians. Such conduct would be a renunciation of the ascendancy gained by the victory of Ligny, it would be consenting to recross as a fugitive the frontier which two days before he had passed as a conqueror, and all this with the conviction of having to meet within a fortnight 250,000 additional enemies, when the Austrians, Russians, and Bavarians would have arrived. It was certainly better to fight a battle out which, if gained, would definitively maintain things in the position in which we wished to place them, than, by retreating, allow the two invading columns from the north and east to unite and overpower us with their combined forces. In the actual state of things there was no choice but to conquer or die. Napoleon was convinced of this, and as the events of the day assumed a more serious aspect, they taught him nothing that he had not previously known. Still to imagine that the Prussians could come without Grouchy

would be taking a very gloomy view, and supposing that fortune had assumed a far more rigorous aspect than she had worn at any time during twenty years of warfare. He therefore confined himself to taking fresh precautions to secure Grouchy's arrival in line. He ordered Marshal Soult to send an officer with a despatch, dated one o'clock, announcing the appearance of the Prussians on our right, and giving the formal command to advance immediately and assist in beating them. An officer at a gallop could reach Grouchy in less than two hours, and bring him within reach of the two armies in less than three. Grouchy would thus arrive before six, far too early an hour to have the battle decided. Up to that hour de Lobau would be able to hold his ground on our right, aided by the nature of the ground, and sustained by his native energy.

There was now an additional reason for hastening the attack on the left wing of the English, for besides the advantage of being able to fall back on Bulow if we should conquer the English, we should separate the English from the Prussians, and so cut them off from their assistance. Napoleon consequently gave Ney the signal of attack.

This important operation was to commence by a vigorous onset on the centre, directed against the farm of La Haye Sainte, situated on the highroad to Brussels. Our right wing deployed, was then to mount the plateau, seize the little Ohain road running midway along the heights, rush on the enemy's left, try to force it on their centre, and so obtain possession of Mont St. Jean, at the junction of the Nivelles and Brussels roads. Quot's brigade from the Alix division—d'Erlon's first—placed as a column of attack on the right of the highroad, and supported by a brigade of Milhaud's cuirassiers, had orders to seize the farm of La Haye Sainte. The Bourgeois brigade—Alix's second—placed on the right of the highroad, was to form the first echelon in the attack on the plateau. The Donzelot division was to form the second, the Marcognet division the third, and the Durutte division the fourth. Both Ney and d'Erlon had, of course, with the intention of giving more consistence to their infantry, adopted on this day a very strange arrangement, the disadvantages of which were soon felt. It was customary in the French army for the attacking column to advance with a battalion deployed in front to fire on the enemy, and the battalions on each flank formed into serried columns in order to resist the charges of the cavalry. On this occasion, however, both Ney and d'Erlon had drawn up the eight battalions of each division in file, ranging them with a space of five paces between each line, so that there was barely room for the officers between the battalions, and rendering it impossible for them to form into square to resist the cavalry. These four

divisions, formed into four dense columns, advanced abreast, at a distance of three hundred feet from each other. D'Erlon, on horseback, led on his own four echelons. Ney headed Quiot's brigade, that advanced to attack La Haye Sainte.

General Picton commanded the English left. His first line was composed of the 95th battalion of Kempt's English brigade, placed in ambush along the Ohain road; and in the same line was Bylandt's brigade of Perponcher's division. His second line, on the edge of the plateau, consisted of the remainder of Kempt's brigade, Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Vincke and Best Hanoverian brigades. The Saxe-Weimar brigade (Perponcher's division) occupied the Papelotte and La Haye farms. Vivian and Vandeleur's light cavalry flanked on the extreme left, waiting the arrival of the Prussians. This portion of the enemy's army was protected by twenty pieces of artillery.

At about half-past one Ney attacked La Haye Sainte with Quiot's brigade, and d'Erlon with his four divisions ascended into the little vale that lay between the two armies. The simplest mode would have been to demolish La Haye Sainte by a brisk cannonade, by which much blood would have been spared there, as well as at the chateau de Goumont; but the excitement of the troops was so great that obstacles were little heeded. Quiot's soldiers, led by Ney, rushed first on the orchard, surrounded by a quick-set hedge in front of the buildings of the farm. They forced an entrance under a shower of balls, and drove out the German legion. Having seized the orchard, they next attacked the buildings; but a murderous fire from the embattled walls soon decimated their ranks. A brave officer—Vieux—commandant of engineers, and who was afterwards killed under the walls of Constantine, advancing axe in hand to beat down the door of the farmhouse, was struck by a ball, but did not yield until the number of his wounds rendered it impossible for him to stand. The door still resisted, and the balls rained from the walls.

The Prince of Orange, seeing the danger to which the German battalion defending La Haye Sainte was exposed, sent Luneburg's Hanoverian battalion to its assistance. Ney allowed the Hanoverians to approach, and then attacked them with one of his two regiments of cuirassiers. This regiment rushed on Luneburg's troops, drove them back, trod them down, bore off their standard, and having sabred some, pursued the others as far as the edge of the plateau. Somerset's horse guards now charged our scattered cuirassiers, who, taken by surprise, were forced back; but a smart fire from one of Quiot's brigades, led by Ney, soon stopped the mounted guards. During this protracted combat at La Haye Sainte, of which the orchard alone had been taken, d'Erlon, protected by our great battery of eighty guns, led

on his four divisions, crossed the valley, and began to mount the opposite ascent. The ground being soft and wet, the infantry took some time to cross the space that lay between them and the enemy. They were soon too far advanced up the height for our cannon to fire over their heads; but still though unprotected, they continued to mount with wonderful firmness. As our first echelon, formed of the second brigade of Alix's division, approached the summit, it was attacked by a murderous fire from the 95th regiment, lying in ambuscade on the Ohain road. (As we have seen, Alix's first brigade was attacking La Haye Sainte.) The Alix division drew a little now to the right, to get out of the range of the balls, and thus narrowed the distance between it and the second echelon (Donzelot division). Both advanced along the Ohain road, forced their way through the hedge, and having stood a murderous fire, rushed on the 95th and the deployed battalions of the Bylandt brigade. They killed a great number of the 95th, and drove back Kempt and Bylandt's battalions at the point of the bayonet. To their right, our third echelon (Marcognet division), having mounted the height under a shower of grape-shot, crossed the Ohain road, overpowered the Hanoverians, and succeeded in ascending the plateau at a short distance from the Alix and Donzelot divisions. The position was apparently taken, and the victory ours, when at a signal from General Picton, Pack's Scots rose unexpectedly from amongst the corn, and poured a close fire on our two front columns. Surprised by this fire at the very moment of debouching on the plateau, they pause. General Picton orders Kempt and Pack's combined battalions to charge them at the point of the bayonet. This general falls dead, struck by a ball in the forehead; but the charge continues as vigorous as ever, and our two columns begin to waver. They still continue to resist, and are mingling with the English infantry, when a sudden storm bursts on them. The Duke of Wellington having hastened to the spot, attacks them with Ponsonby's 1200 Scotch dragoons, called the Scots Greys, from the colour of their horses. These dragoons, formed into two columns, charge with the customary energy of English cavalry, penetrate between the Alix and Donzelot divisions on one side, and the Donzelot and Marcognet on the other. Attacking in flank the dense masses of our infantry, too dense to be able to fall into square, they penetrate without breaking their lines, but they succeed in throwing them somewhat into confusion. Yielding to the shock of the cavalry, and impelled by the sloping ground, our columns descend *pêle-mêle* with the dragoons to the bottom of the valley they had crossed. The Scots Greys carried off on one side the flag of the 105th (Alix division), and on the other that of the 45th (Marcognet division). These were not their only exploits.

Two batteries that formed part of the great battery of eighty guns had been ordered to advance to the support of our infantry. The dragoons dispersed the gunners, killed the brave Colonel Chandon, sank the cannon in the mire, and destroyed the horses which they could not bring away.

These achievements happily soon came to an end. Napoleon had seen this confusion from the height where he was stationed. He sprang on his horse and galloped across the battlefield to where Milhaud's heavy cavalry were stationed, and ordered the Travers' brigade, consisting of the 7th and 12th cuirassiers, to attack the Scotch dragoons. One regiment attacked them in front, another on one flank, whilst the lancers, under General Jacquinot, attacked them on the other. The Scotch dragoons, surprised in all the confusion of pursuit, and attacked on every side, were at once cut to pieces. Our cuirassiers, inflamed with the desire of avenging the infantry, rushed on them with their long sabres and hewed them down. The 4th lancers, headed by Colonel Bro, dealt with them as unsparingly. A quartermaster of the lancers, named Urban, rushed into the thickest of the fight and took the brave Ponsonby, commander of the dragoons, prisoner. The Scotch seek to free their general, but Urban lays him dead at his feet; then attacked by several dragoons, he rides directly to him that holds the standard of the 45th, unhorses him with a blow of his lance, kills him with a second, seizes the colours, kills another of the Scotch who is pursuing him close, and then, covered with blood, returns to his colonel with the trophy which he had so gloriously redeemed. The Scotch, in doleful plight, fall back on Kempt and Pack's infantry, leaving, dead or wounded, 700 or 800 of the 1200 that originally composed their brigade.

On d'Erlon's extreme right Durutte's division, comprising the fourth echelon, had met with nearly the same fate as the three others. This division had advanced in the order prescribed to all four, that is, with its battalions in line, and ranged one behind the other, with five paces between. But as Vandeleur's cavalry was about to charge, the 85th regiment, in square, was left behind as a reserve. When this division was attacked by Vandeleur's light dragoons its ranks were not broken, though its first line yielded for a moment to the shock of the cavalry. Returning the attack by a brisk fire of musketry, and supported by the 3rd chasseurs, the division fell back in good order on the square of the 85th, which had not yielded a step.

Such was the result of this attack on the left wing of the English, from which Napoleon had expected such great advantages. An error in tactics, of which both Ney and d'Erlon had been guilty, had left our four fine columns of infantry at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, and cost them 3000 men in dead,

wounded, and prisoners. The English had lost part of their dragoons, part of Kempt and Pack's cavalry, and Generals Picton and Ponsonby, all amounting to about the same number we had lost. But they had maintained their position, and the whole operation was now to be recommenced under the disadvantage of having failed in the first attempt. We were still masters of part of the La Haye Sainte farm, and our men, notwithstanding disheartened, were rallying again on the side of the valley that lay between us and the English. Napoleon joined them, and walked in front of their ranks midst bullets rebounding from one line to another, and howitzers resounding in the air. The valiant General Desvaux, commander of the artillery of the guard, was killed at his side.

Though much distressed by this event, Napoleon continued calm and firm, and ordered that the soldiers should be told that the arrangements would be different this time, and that they would certainly conquer the British obstinacy. But his attention was now attracted by another object. General Domon, who had been sent to meet the troops seen on the summit of the St. Lambert Chapelle, sent word that these were Prussians, that he was actually engaged with them, having charged their advance guard several times, and that he wanted infantry to arrest their progress. Already were the Prussian bullets falling in the rear of our right flank on the Charleroi road. At the same time one of Marshal Grouchy's officers, who had succeeded in reaching us, announced that Grouchy, instead of leaving Gembloux at four in the morning, had not left until nine, and had then advanced towards Wavre. Had the marshal advanced directly on Mont St. Jean, he would have joined the main body before that hour; it was then about three o'clock. But Napoleon saw clearly that Grouchy did not understand either the nature of the ground or his orders, and began to give up all hope of seeing him. He would now have two armies to encounter. It was too late to retreat, as he would be assailed in flank and rear by 130,000 men, justified in regarding themselves as victors; whilst he, having lost 8000 in the late engagement, could meet them with but 60,000, who would consider themselves defeated if they were ordered to retreat. Napoleon therefore determined to face the storm and meet all difficulties with the brave men still under his command, and whose courage seemed to rise as the danger became more pressing.

The Count de Lobau had gone to the right to seek a proper spot on which to act on the defensive. Napoleon ordered him to go with his corps, which, since Teste's division had left, amounted to only 7500 bayonets. He also gave him some batteries of the guards to replace his battery of twelve-pounders, which was one of those dispersed by the Scotch

dragoons. Count de Lobau left immediately, and his corps, leaving the centre, traversed the battlefield with imposing slowness. He was to take his position on the right, parallel to the Charleroi road, and at a right angle to our line of battle.

The ground which the Count de Lobau was about to occupy was extremely well adapted to a small number of troops about to oppose superior forces. As we have already said, the little valley that lay between the two armies became, as it stretched further on, the bed of the Smohain stream, and further still, formed a junction with the little stream of Lasne. Between these streams there rose a kind of promontory, wooded on its sloping sides. The Count de Lobau took up his position across this promontory, his right at the Hanotelet farm, his left at the chateau de Fricherfont, joining Durutte's division towards the Papelotte farm, and thus closing the entire space between the two streams, whilst in front he had a battery of thirty pieces of ordnance, whose gunners awaited the enemy match in hand.

Bulow's corps had descended from the St. Lambert Chapelle by a most difficult path into the bed of the Lasne stream, marching sometimes through shifting sand, sometimes over slippery clay, the artillery following with great difficulty. Having crossed these treacherous soils, he had to traverse a thick wood, where a few well-posted troops could arrest the progress of an entire army. Unfortunately, so confident were the French that none but Grouchy could arrive on this side, that no precautions had been taken there, which when Blücher, who had been joined by Bulow, perceived, he was filled with delight. At about three o'clock Bulow's two first divisions, preceded by their cavalry, advanced towards de Lobau's position, Lottin's division advancing towards the Smohain stream, and Hiller's towards the Lasne. Domon and Subervie's squadrons met them with drawn swords, and delayed their approach as long as possible. Lobau awaited them on the edge of the slope, ready to receive them with a shower of grape.

Though Napoleon as yet felt no alarm for this side, he had somewhat modified his plans. Acting on the offensive against the English, it depended on himself whether he would suspend the action, and not resume it definitely until he could appreciate the importance of the Prussian attack. His plan now was to meet the Prussians with so much determination that they should be kept in check for an hour or two at least, then return to the English, and advance with d'Erlon's corps, the guards, and the heavy cavalry along the Brussels road to Mont St. Jean, and then with all his forces fall on the Duke of Wellington's centre, and put an end to the contest by one desperate effort,

the offspring of despair. To secure the success of this effort, it would be necessary at the centre to get possession of La Haye Sainte, in order to check the English whilst temporising with them, and to be able afterwards to debouch on the plateau when the last blow was to be struck. On the left it would be necessary to have possession of the entire or a part of the chateau de Goumont, to be able to sustain our position. Napoleon therefore ordered Ney to take La Haye Sainte at any price, station himself there, and await the signal for the general and definitive attack on the British army. As General Reille had not had his heavy cavalry at the attack on the chateau de Goumont, his battery of twelve-pounders having been added to the great battery on the right, Napoleon sent him with some howitzers, with which to set fire to the farm and chateau.

During this time the combat in the centre and to the left had not slackened in the least. The Jerome division was vigorously attacking the orchards and buildings of the chateau de Goumont, and had lost almost as many men as the enemy. These soldiers had succeeded in getting through the thick hedge at the end of the wood, but had not been able to force the embattled walls of the garden; they had turned to the left to seize the buildings on the farm, whilst Foy's division, taking their place, answered the fire of the English along the orchard. Colonel Cubières, commanding the 1st light infantry, and who had distinguished himself two days before in the attack on the wood of Bossu, had turned the buildings under a fearful fire from the plateau. Seeing a back door leading into the yard of the chateau, he was determined to force it. Sub-lieutenant Legros, a brave man, formerly a sub-officer of engineers, and whom his comrades called *l'enfonceur*, seizing a hatchet, forced the door, and entered the yard at the head of a few brave fellows. The post was ours, and we should have kept it but that Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonnel, dashing forward at the head of the English guards, succeeded in repelling our men and closing the door, and so saved the chateau de Goumont. The brave Legros was left dead on the field. Colonel Cubières, who had been wounded the previous evening at Quatre-Bras, was at this moment struck by several shots, and fell under his horse; he was about being killed by the English, but touched by his valour and age, they spared his life, and bore him bleeding from the field. The French were therefore compelled to return to the border of the wood without having conquered this fatal mass of buildings. But the battery of howitzers having arrived, it was stationed on the right side of the valley, whence it poured a hail of balls that soon set the farm and chateau in flames. Though surrounded by the conflagration, the English, continually reinforced, persisted in

holding a position which they considered most important to the defence of the plateau. This combat had already cost the French three thousand men, and the English two thousand, a slaughter from which we obtained no other advantage than the taking of the wood of Goumont. The Jerome and Foy divisions had thronged round this wood, where they were somewhat sheltered; and Bachelu's division, reduced to three thousand men at Quatre-Bras, had also sought shelter there from the fire of the British artillery, reserving themselves for some occasion where their courage could be better employed. Thus the space between the chateau de Goumont and the Brussels road, where Ney was attacking La Haye Sainte, remained almost unoccupied.

Ney was making desperate efforts at La Haye Sainte to seize a post which Napoleon would need in his decisive attack on the English centre. Quiot's brigade had remained in the orchard, whence it continued to fire on the outhouses of the farm; d'Erlon's divisions had again formed on the side of the valley; and Ney had brought them closer to his position, in order to throw them on the plateau by the Brussels road when the opportunity should arrive. This illustrious marshal certainly needed no stimulus, for his peerless bravery seemed on this day to surpass the capabilities of mere man. Knowing that Napoleon wished to get La Haye Sainte at any cost, he summoned two battalions of Donzelot's division, the first that had rallied, and leading them up to La Haye Sainte, commenced an impetuous attack. Excited by his example, the soldiers forced the door of the farmhouse, entered under a fearful fusilade, and massacred the battalion of German light infantry that was defending it. Of five hundred men only forty with five officers escaped, pursued at the point of the sword by our cuirassiers, of whom not one brigade had ceased to take part in the combat.

The German legion, stationed on the Ohain road, seeing this hapless remnant of one of its battalions returning, prepared to come to their assistance. Two battalions belonging to the German legion went down as far as La Haye Sainte to try to recover the farm. The moment he saw them Ney sent the brigade of cuirassiers to attack them. The two German battalions immediately formed into square; but our cuirassiers, charging furiously down, cut them to pieces and captured their standard. The other having had time to form, resisted two consecutive charges, but would have been beaten in turn had not Somerset's mounted guards come to its assistance. Our cuirassiers retreated, forced to allow one battalion to escape, but with the cruel satisfaction of having almost totally destroyed the other.

Ney, master of La Haye Sainte, thought he could debouch victoriously by the Brussels road on the plateau, and asked for some additional troops, thinking the moment was come for making a decisive attack on the English army. Having summoned d'Erlon's divisions from La Haye Sainte, he led them forward, and succeeded in occupying that part of the Ohain road nearest to his right, and which Kempt's and Pack's half-ruined troops could not defend. He wished to join his left to Reille's troops, stationed in different detachments round the wood of Goumont, leaving an empty space between that wood and La Haye Sainte. He sent several times to Napoleon to ask for troops to fill up this space, and his countenance glowing with heroic ardour, he repeatedly said to General Druot that could he get some additional troops, he would secure a brilliant victory, and totally repulse the British army.

It was now half-past four, and our right wing, formed *en potence*, was exposed to a severe attack from Bulow. The Prussian troops, issuing from the wooded depths between the Smohain and the Lasne streams, were mounting the slope, having Losthin's division on their right, and Hiller's on their left. The brave Lobau awaited them with imperturbable coolness, and received them with a fusilade which, though it did great mischief in their ranks, did not arrest their advance. These returned the fire to the best of their ability, and their projectiles, falling behind us into the midst of our parks and baggage, caused some confusion on the Charleroi road. Lobau's practised eye saw that they were not supported, and seizing the opportunity, sent forward his first line, and a charge with fixed bayonets drove the assailants back into the thickets they had left. This success, however, which was due to the vigour and promptness of the commander of the 6th corps, only gained time, for other Prussian columns were now seen coming to the assistance of the first, and some making a wide detour on our right flank were preparing to surround us. Napoleon, who had the twenty-four battalions of the guard at his disposal, had had no expectation of such an attempt; but he was determined to meet and overcome it before making the attack on the English army, with which he flattered himself to put an end to the battle. He therefore ordered General Duhesme to lead the eight battalions of the young guards, which he commanded, to the right of the 6th corps, giving him twenty-four guns to thin the Prussian ranks with chain-shot.

Napoleon remained in the centre with fifteen battalions of the *moyenne* and old guards,* intending, when the attack on the Prussians would be terminated, to fall like a thunderbolt on the English with these fifteen battalions, the cavalry of the guard,

* Two of these battalions were formed into one after the battle of Ligny.

and the entire reserve of heavy cavalry. Besides, Grouchy, who had been so long expected, might at length arrive. It was five o'clock, and if we only held firm, without hurrying events, he would have time to arrive and take part in a victory that could not fail to be brilliant, if he attacked the Prussians in the rear whilst they were at the same time attacked in front. With these views, Napoleon sent word to Ney that it would be impossible to send any infantry, but that he would send him Milhaud's cuirassiers provisionally, to occupy the space between La Haye Sainte and the wood of Goumont, and desired him to await his orders before commencing the attack that was to decide the fate of the day.*

In obedience to Napoleon's orders, Milhaud's cuirassiers, who were behind d'Erlon, advanced at a trot, traversed the field of battle from right to left, crossed the Brussels road, and took up their position behind their first brigade, which Ney had so often led against the enemy. They took up a position between La Haye Sainte and the wood of Goumont, where they occupied the space left vacant by Reille's divisions, which, as we have said, were crowded around the wood. The advance of eight regiments and four brigades of these formidable horsemen created a great sensation. All thought they were going to charge, and that the final moment was come. They were received with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, which they enthusiastically re-echoed. As General Milhaud passed before Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who commanded the light cavalry of the guard, he clasped his hand and said, "I am going to charge, support me." Lefebvre-Desnoettes, whose valour needed no fresh incitement, believed that it was by order of the emperor he was desired to support the cuirassiers, and following their movement, he took up a position behind them. Serious inconveniences had resulted at Wagram and Fuentes d'Onoro from the institution of *commandants-en-chef* of the imperial guards, where it had paralysed the efforts of these troops; but here we had to regret the decay of that institution owing to Mortier's illness, as there was no one to check unreasonable enthusiasm; and to add to the disaster, Napoleon had been obliged to leave his post in the centre and betake himself to the right, to direct the action against the Prussians, who thus deprived us not only of our reserves, but of Napoleon's presence.

When Ney saw such a body of noble cavalry at his disposal, his confidence and daring redoubled, and he became more than ever impatient to justify what he had said to Druot, that were he allowed to act, he would unaided put an end to the English army. The changes made in our order of battle induced the Duke of Wellington to make some in his. Alten's division,

* The reader will find further on a discussion on this assertion of Napoleon.

stationed in the centre and to the right, had suffered severely. This he reinforced with Brunswick's corps and Mitchell's and Lambert's brigades. He ordered General Chassé, who was posted at Braine-l'Alleud, to come to the support of the right wing. He also ordered Clinton's division, hitherto left in the rear of the English, to move forward; and recalled Vincke's Hanoverian brigade from the left, which he no longer considered in danger since d'Erlon's fruitless attempt and the appearance of the Prussians. As his troops had already suffered a great deal from our artillery, and were likely to suffer more since we had got possession of La Haye Sainte, he took care, when concentrating them towards the right, to make them fall back a little; and on horseback, in the midst, he prepared them for a fierce assault, which might be easily augured from the brilliant helmets of our cuirassiers and the lances of our light cavalry.

The English artillery was left alone on the edge of the plateau, in consequence of the retrograde movement of the infantry, as well as in compliance with the usual English tactics. It was customary in the British army, whenever the artillery was in danger of an attack from mounted troops, to draw off the gunners and horses into the squares, and leave the cannon, which the enemy could not remove without horses, and when the storm had passed, the gunners returned to their posts, and turned the guns against the retreating foe. There were now sixty ill-defended pieces of ordnance in front of the English line, offering a strong temptation to a daring enemy.

Ney, still elated by the combat of La Haye Sainte, and trusting in his four lines of excellent cavalry, consisting of 5000 men, was not a man likely to bear patiently the fire of the English artillery. Seeing that this artillery had no support, and that the English infantry had made a retrograde movement, he determined to seize the line of guns before him, and putting himself at the head of Delort's division of four regiments of cuirassiers, and ordering Wathier's division to support him, he advanced at a trot, notwithstanding the bad state of the ground. Not being able to debouch by the Brussels road, in consequence of the obstructions, and inconvenienced by the embankments of the Ohain road, he turned a little to the left, crossed the ridge of the plateau with his four regiments, and fell with the rapidity of lightning on the badly defended cannon. Having passed the line of guns, and seeing Alten's infantry apparently in retreat, he sent his cuirassiers after them. These brave horsemen, heedless of the balls raining around, galloped after Alten's division, broke the squares, and commenced a furious slaughter. Some of these squares, however, broken at first by the weight of both men and horses,

rallied quickly, and again fell into order. Others that had not been penetrated continued to discharge a murderous fire. Ney, seeing this resistance, moved forward his second division—Wathier's—and Alten's division was forced back on the second line of the English infantry by the violent charge of these four fresh regiments. Several battalions of the German and Hanoverian legions were overpowered, trodden under foot, put to the sword, and deprived of their standards. Our cuirassiers, the oldest soldiers of the army, glutted their rage by a merciless massacre of the English.

Immovable during this violent attack, the Duke of Wellington ordered Somerset's mounted guards, Trip's Dutch carabineers, and Dornberg's dragoons to advance between the intervals of the infantry. These English and German squadrons, profiting by the inevitable confusion of our cavalry, had at first some advantage over them, and succeeded in driving them back. But Ney, hastening towards Lefebvre-Desnoettes, made a signal to advance, and precipitated him on the Duke of Wellington's English and German cavalry. Our brave lancers rush on the mounted guards, and making good use of their lances, drive them back in their turn. This charge having allowed the cuirassiers time to form again, they with the chasseurs and lancers fall again upon the English cavalry. All are intermingled, a thousand hand-to-hand fights commence with swords and lances by the horsemen of both nations. Ours had the advantage, and a portion of the English cavalry strewed the ground. Those who escaped took refuge behind the squares of the English infantry, and our horsemen were again stopped in their onward course, to the great detriment of the light cavalry of the guard, who, being unprovided with cuirasses, lost a number of men and horses.

Ney had two horses killed under him during this outburst of furious human passion. His coat and hat were riddled with balls; but still invulnerable, the bravest of the brave was determined to keep his oath, and break the British lines. When he looked upon what he had accomplished, he flattered himself that he would be able to fulfil his vow, and seeing on the other side of the plateau 3000 cuirassiers and 2000 mounted grenadiers of the guard that had not been yet engaged, he asked that they should be given him to complete the victory. He rallies the troops that had just fought, ranges them on the ridge of the plateau to afford them time to breathe, and gallops off to recall the others to the combat.

The entire army saw this formidable melee from a distance, and from the movement of the helmets and lances advancing and retreating, but never leaving the position, had formed a favourable augury of the result. The simplest soldier felt instinctively

that such an enterprise, once begun, ought to be continued; and the men were right, for if it was unwise to begin, it would be still more unwise not to go on with the undertaking.

Napoleon, whose attention was attracted by the fearful tumult caused by the cavalry, saw what Ney's impatience had led him to attempt. All who surrounded him applauded; but this consummate captain, who had fought more than fifty pitched battles, exclaimed, "He has begun an hour too soon." "This man," added Marshal Soult, speaking of Ney, "this man is always the same! He will compromise everything as he did at Jena and Eylau!" Still Napoleon thought it better to support him in what he had commenced, and sent orders to Kellermann to support Milhaud's cuirassiers. Kellermann's 3000 cuirassiers were stationed in front of the heavy cavalry of the guard, consisting of 2000 mounted grenadiers and dragoons, all eager for action; the cavalry being quite as zealous as the infantry on this most fatal day.

Kellermann, who had had some experience at Quatre-Bras of what he called Ney's foolish zeal, condemned the desperate use which at this moment was made of the cavalry. Distrusting the result, he kept back one of his brigades, the carabineers, and most unwillingly sent the remainder to Ney. The latter hastened to meet them, excited them both by word and gesture, and at their head mounted the plateau, on whose ridge the cavalry which had been just engaged had paused for a moment's breathing space. The Duke of Wellington calmly awaited this fresh attack. Behind Alten's almost ruined division he placed Brunswick's corps, Maitland's guards, and Mitchell's division, and in the third line, Chassé's and Clinton's divisions. It would be a difficult task to overpower three such opposing forces; one may be vanquished, or two, but there was very little hope of succeeding against three. Still the daring Ney debouched on the plateau with his iron-clad squadrons, and at a given signal these gallant horsemen galloped forward brandishing their swords and crying *Vive l'Empereur!* Never, as an eye-witness declares, did the annals of war record so fearful a spectacle.*

These twenty squadrons, led on by their generals and officers, advanced at full gallop, and though they were received by a terrible fusilade, attacked and broke the enemy's first line. Alten's unfortunate division, already so ill-treated, was now entirely cut to pieces, together with the 69th English regiment. The few that remained of this division fled in disorder along the Brussels route. Ney rallied his squadrons, and advanced on the second line. This attack was vigorous as the former, but

* General Foy, especially, in his military journal. He, an eye-witness, declares that during his long military career he had never been present at such a scene.

it was met by an invincible resistance. Several squares were broken, but the greater number held their ground, and some of our horsemen, who had penetrated to the third line, fell by the English bayonets, or succeeded in galloping back to renew the charge. The Duke of Wellington then decided to sacrifice the remainder of his cavalry. He moved them forward into the midst of the melee, where they were soon cut down, for though the bayonets of the English infantry could arrest the progress of our cuirassiers, no cavalry could sustain their formidable shock. In this extremity he determined on employing Cumberland's 1000 hussars, who had not been yet engaged; but at sight of this scene of slaughter the hussars fell back in disorder, carrying with them along the Brussels road the equipages, the wounded, and the fugitives, who were already hastening thither in crowds. Notwithstanding the desperate resistance that Ney met, he still hoped to destroy the English army at the point of the sword. He unexpectedly received a fresh reinforcement. Whilst this titanic combat was going on, the heavy cavalry of the guard hastened forward, though nobody knew why. These had been stationed in a slight hollow somewhat in the rear, when some officers having advanced to assist Ney in this gigantic conflict, believing that he had conquered, brandished their sabres, and cried victory. At this cry other officers rushed forward, and the nearest squadron, regarding this as the signal to charge, advanced at a trot. The entire mass followed, and yielding to a species of mechanical impulse, the 2000 dragoons and mounted grenadiers ascended the plateau, trampling through wet and muddy ground. Bertrand, being sent by Napoleon to keep them back, hastened to do so, but could not overtake them. Ney profited by this unexpected reinforcement, and directed it against the brazen wall he was endeavouring to batter down. The heavy cavalry of the guard did wonders, breaking the squares; but many of them not having cuirasses, sank beneath the fire of the enemy. Ney, whom nothing could daunt, sent forward Milhaud's cavalry, who had got a few moments' rest, and he thus kept up a kind of continual charge, each squadron after attacking the enemy falling back to form, and then return to the attack. Some of them even turned the wood of Goumont to return to their ranks and renew the combat. Meantime Ney, seeing Kellermann's carabineers in reserve, hastened to where they were, asked what they were doing, and then, despite of Kellermann's resistance, led them against the enemy. These made fresh breaches in the second line of the British infantry, broke several squares, cut the men in pieces, even under the fire of the third line, and destroyed three-fourths of that second human wall, without being able to reach or touch the third. Ney still persisted, and for the eleventh time led on his 10,000 horse to the attack, killing as they went, but still

unable to subdue the firmness of the infantry, that though shaken for a moment, again closed their ranks, fell into line, and continued to fire. Ney, foaming with excitement, and bare-headed, his fourth horse shot under him, his coat pierced with bullets, covered with contusions, but fortunately not seriously injured, said to Colonel Heymès, that if he could get the infantry of the guard, he would destroy the exhausted English infantry, whose strength was nearly spent. He sent him to ask Napoleon for this reinforcement.

Hoping for this assistance, and knowing that he could not put a finish to the combat with cavalry alone, and that the bayonets of the infantry would be needed, he drew back his horse to the edge of the plateau, where they made a firm stand, their courage sustained by his determined bearing. He passed along the ranks encouraging them, telling them to keep their post despite the firing of the artillery, and that if they could maintain their position on the plateau, they would soon be rid of the English army. "It is here," he said, "my friends, that the fate of our country is about to be decided; it is here that we must conquer in order to secure our independence." Leaving the cavalry for a moment, he hastened to the right to d'Erlon, whose infantry had succeeded in seizing the Ohain road, and were still firing on the almost exhausted battalions of Kempt and Pack. "Keep firm, friend," he said to him, "for if you and I do not fall here beneath the bullets of the English, we shall certainly fall beneath those of the emigrants." Sad and bitter prophecy! This peerless hero, going from his infantry to his cavalry, sustained their courage under the enemy's fire, whilst he himself seemed invulnerable midst the balls that rained around. Four thousand of his cavalry strewed the ground; but in return, on the other side, 10,000 English, horse and foot, had paid for their obstinate resistance with their lives. Nearly all the English generals were more or less seriously wounded. A number of fugitives, under pretence of removing the wounded, had hurried with the servants, sutlers, and baggage conductors along the Brussels road, crying that all was over, that the battle was lost. On the other hand, the soldiers in line remained immovable in their ranks. The Duke of Wellington, who was as firm as Ney was brave, told them that the Prussians were approaching, and would be with them immediately, but that in any case they could only die. He looked at his watch and prayed that Blücher or night might come to his rescue. He had still 36,000 men on the plateau that Ney was attacking so violently, and he did not yet despair. Neither did Ney lose hope, and these two great hearts held the destinies of two nations in the balance. A strange phenomenon of exhaustion was then exhibited; for nearly an hour the weary combatants ceased from strife. The English occasionally dis-

charged some of their remaining guns, our cavalry remaining immovable in front of the sixty cannon and six flags they had captured, whilst the ground before them was strewn with thousands of dead bodies.

During this unprecedented combat, the suitable and terrific termination of a sanguinary century, Colonel Heymès hastened to Napoleon to ask for the infantry of which the marshal was in need. "Infantry," cried Napoleon, with an irritation he could no longer restrain, "where does he suppose I can get them? Does he expect me to make them? You see the task before me, and you see what troops I have." Indeed, the state of things on the French right had become most serious. Bulow's corps of 30,000 men, which Napoleon was trying to keep at bay with de Lobau's 10,000, was now about to be reinforced by dense columns which were already visible, emerging from the wooded depths from which the Prussian army had advanced. It was evident that the French would have to encounter Blücher's entire force of 80,000 men, and could only oppose them with 13,000 infantry of the guards, the horse guards, the entire reserve, dragoons and cuirassiers, having been employed and exhausted by Ney in a premature attempt.* Napoleon had now given up all

* Napoleon's assertions on this subject have been much contested; some have even gone so far as to say that he had ordered the cavalry movement which Ney had executed so prematurely. I shall repeat, in the first place, that if every assertion emanating from St. Helena is not necessarily true, neither is it necessarily false. Napoleon says in the "Relation" written in General Gourgaud's name, and repeats in that which bears his own, that he had ordered Ney to take up his position at La Haye Sainte, and wait there for fresh instructions; that he regretted the cavalry charge that Ney had made, but that once made, he decided on sustaining it. This assertion has so much appearance of probability that I, at least, feel inclined to credit it. There are, besides, many, to me, apparently convincing proofs of its correctness. In the first place, Napoleon was so preoccupied with the attack of the Prussians that he suspended every other action but that directed against them; for example, he would not otherwise employ a single battalion of the guards until Bulow's progress had been arrested. How then can we admit that whilst unwilling to withdraw any part of his reserve of infantry from his right, he would allow his heavy cavalry to charge unsupported by infantry? How could we admit that so experienced a general would commit the error of ordering his cavalry to charge when he could not detach any portion of his infantry to their support? It is too much to accuse him of giving an order which the most incompetent of his generals would not have ventured to do. It may be said that Ney did so. But Ney was not Napoleon. Ney was on the spot, was excited, beside himself; he was not the commander-in-chief, nor did he know, as Napoleon did, that at this moment he could get no infantry. An error that might be very natural on the part of Ney would be by no means so in Napoleon. We have even still more conclusive proofs.

Ney's warmest defender, Colonel Heymès, speaking of this cavalry charge, at which he was present, does not venture to say that it was made by Napoleon's command. Had such been the case, he would certainly have mentioned it. He merely says that Ney wished to get possession of the position and artillery which the Duke of Wellington had apparently abandoned when he made his retrograde movement. It is evident that could such an excuse be made for Ney's conduct, it would not have been passed over in silence by those who have even given a false colouring to many facts, in order to justify

hope of Grouchy's coming, as our right wing had heard nothing of him, nor could the most practised eye or ear catch on the wide extent of the horizon either shade or sound that could indicate his presence or approach. The infantry of the guard which had just been demanded was Napoleon's only resource against a fearful catastrophe. Certainly, had he himself seen the state of the British army described by Ney, and had not the danger on his right increased, Lobau's corps alone would have sufficed to keep Bulow in check, and Napoleon might have led the infantry of the guard against the English and completed their destruction, and then return to oppose the Prussians with what indeed would be only the remnant of his troops, but troops flushed with victory. But he distrusted Ney's judgment, he could not forgive his precipitation, and he could see the entire Prussian army emerging from that yawning abyss which was continually pouring forth fresh masses of enemies. He therefore determined to check the Prussians by a serious engagement before going to seek a doubtful contest in the centre, during which a fatal and ruinous one might be fought on his right. However, when his momentary irritation had subsided, he sent Ney a less severe and

the marshal. Here is another proof quite as convincing, in my opinion. Napoleon, in the detailed bulletin of the battle, which he wrote at Laon in presence of Ney, said that the cavalry, yielding to *the impulses of a reckless valour*, had charged without his orders; an assertion which Ney might have contradicted, and which he did when two days later he attacked the bulletin in the Chamber of Peers. I have heard from trustworthy persons who were present when this bulletin was drawn up, that Napoleon said, "I could accuse Ney of the greatest fault committed on that day, but I will not." This was the reason why, without mentioning Ney, he attributed the fault of prematurely expending all our cavalry force to the reckless valour of the cavalry—an assertion that was perfectly correct. He certainly would not have made such an assertion in presence of Druot and so many other ocular witnesses if he himself had ordered the charge in question. Nor did Ney, when two days later, in the Chamber of Peers, he broke into violent invectives against the general direction of that day's operations—invectives pointed against Napoleon—venture to assert that Napoleon had commanded the premature charge of cavalry; an excuse, could he have made it, that would have silenced the reproaches universally uttered against him. The scene recorded in Gourgaud's narrative, page 97, where Marshal Soult says, "This man will compromise everything as he did at Jena," was well known in the army, and has been described to me more than once by ocular witnesses of the occurrence.

For me the most irrefragable proofs are, that Napoleon, having suspended every attack but that against the Prussians, could not at the same time have ordered a general charge of the cavalry; that whilst Ney was present to contradict him, he had not hesitated to say, in the bulletin of the battle, that this charge was owing to the *reckless valour* of the cavalry; and that when Ney two days later blamed Napoleon violently, he did not bring forward the very simple and complete excuse that this outbreak of *reckless valour* originated with Napoleon himself, and had been sanctioned by his orders. I therefore hold that Ney was carried away by the impulses of his own bravery, and that the movement being commenced, Napoleon determined to sustain it, not indeed being able to do otherwise. It was the second order, which had become an inevitable necessity, that has been confounded with the first. I am not an apologist, but an historian, seeking neither more nor less than the truth.

more hopeful reply than that he had before made to Colonel Heymès. He desired the latter to tell the marshal that if he were in a difficult position at Mont St. Jean, he was himself in still greater difficulties on the banks of the Lasne, where he was opposed by the entire Prussian army, but that when he would have repelled or even checked them, he, with the guard, would hasten to complete the conquest of the English; that until then the plateau was to be held at any cost, as Ney had been so eager to mount it, but could he only maintain his position for an hour, he might reckon on efficient aid.

Whilst Colonel Heymès was bearing to the marshal an answer so different to what he had expected, the combat with the Prussians was becoming quite as fierce as that with the English. Blucher having ascended the heights that border the Lasne, could see distinctly what was going forward at Mont St. Jean, and although he had no objection to let the English suffer something in punishment of what he considered the tardy aid they had given him at Ligny, he still would not injure the common cause by the indulgence of any feeling of mean resentment. Seeing the formidable assaults of our cuirassiers, he ordered Bulow to attack the French right wing, and ordered Pirch to assist him with his 15,000 men, whilst Ziethen, with about an equal number, was to support the English left on the Ohain road, giving directions to all to advance as quickly as possible, so that the war might be terminated on this memorable day.

Blucher had infused some of his own ardour into the minds of all, and the Prussians, inflamed with patriotism and hatred, made unheard-of efforts to get possession of a kind of promontory that rises between the Smohain and Lasne streams. Whilst Losthin's division was endeavouring to take the chateau de Frichermont, and Hiller's the Hanotelet farm, they had left a space between them, which Bulow filled with Prince William's cavalry. The valiant Count de Lobau was on horseback in the midst of his men, where his lofty stature made him conspicuous above them all, and now with imperturbable calmness he retired as leisurely as if he were only manœuvring at a review, sometimes sending Subervic's and Domon's cavalry against Prince William's squadrons, and sometimes with fixed bayonets arresting the progress of Losthin's infantry on his right, or of Hiller's on his left. It was six o'clock, and he had lost 2500 of his 7500 foot, so that he had now but 5000 men to oppose to 30,000. His greatest danger was on the right, where the Prussians were making every effort to turn our position. The village of Planchenois was situated in the rear of La Belle Alliance, near the source of the Lasne stream, that is, on our right and rear. If the enemy advancing along the ravine should enter the village which lay at its extremity, our position would be turned, and we should

lose the Charleroi road, our only line of retreat. Bulow having ordered Ryssel's division to support Hiller's, had got both along the ravine as far as Planchenois, whilst he sent Haaken's division to support Losthin's, in the direction of Frichermont. It was in consequence of this serious danger that Napoleon, who had gone to the spot himself, had sent all his disposable troops to the Count de Lobau. On the left, he had drawn off Durutte's division from d'Erlon's corps, and sent it towards the La Haye and Papelotte farms, so as to form a solid turning-point at the apex of the angle formed by our line of battle. On the right, he had sent General Duhesme with the young guard and twenty-four cannon of the reserve to Planchenois, to defend a point that may well be called the Thermopylæ of France. General Duhesme, an accomplished officer, with eight battalions of the young guard, amounting to nearly 4000 men, under his command, had at this moment occupied both sides of the ravine at whose extremity lay the village of Planchenois. Whilst he made a shower of bullets and chain-shot rain on the Prussians, his youthful infantry, some from amongst the trees and bushes, others from the houses in the village, defended themselves with a murderous charge of musketry, and showed no inclination to abandon their position, though assailed by more than 20,000 men.

About half-past six, Blucher having given orders to seize Planchenois, Hiller formed six battalions into column, and having nearly demolished the village with a fire of musketry and howitzers, sought to force it at the point of the bayonet. Our men stationed at the windows of the houses poured a terrible fire, then Duhesme advancing at the head of one of his battalions, drove back the Prussians at the point of the bayonet, and forced them into the ravine, where our artillery poured upon them a volley of grape. They were driven back horribly mutilated in their unsuccessful attempt. Blucher then repeated his absolute order to his lieutenants to take Planchenois, and Hiller, in presence of his commander, rallied his battalions, having given them a few moments to rest, and adding eight more, he, with the entire fourteen battalions, returned to the charge, determined to carry a post so vigorously disputed. These fourteen battalions descended into the ravine, which was lined on each side by the French, and advanced into the midst of an actual fiery gulf. Hundreds fell; but the survivors closed their ranks, marched over the dead bodies of their comrades, and urging each other forward, succeeded at length in entering Planchenois and reaching the termination of the ravine. Another step and they would be on the Charleroi road. The young guards fell back, quite discomfited by the violence to which they had been exposed. But Napoleon suddenly appears amongst them. It is the privilege of the old guard to repair

every disaster. This invincible troop will not suffer us to lose our line of retreat, the last resource of our army. Napoleon summoned General Morand, and giving him a battalion of the 2nd grenadiers and another of the 2nd chasseurs, ordered him to repel this alarming attack on our rear. He rode along in front of these battalions. "My friends," he said, "the decisive moment is come; it will not do to fire, you must come hand to hand with the enemy, and drive them back at the point of the bayonet into that ravine whence they have issued to threaten the army, the empire, and France." "*Vive l'Empereur!*" was the sole reply of this heroic troop. The two appointed battalions, leaving their post, formed into column, and advanced, one on the right, the other on the left of the ravine, whence the Prussians were already issuing in great numbers. They advanced on their assailants with such firmness of step and such strength of arm that all yielded at their approach. Enraged against an enemy that had sought to turn the position, they overturn or slaughter all that oppose them, and soon put those battalions to flight that had beaten the young guard. Sometimes with the bayonet, sometimes with the butt-end of the musket, they stab or strike, and such was the fury that animated them that a drummer of one of the battalions pursued the fugitives with his drumstick. Carried away by the torrent of confusion they had themselves produced, the two battalions of the old guard rushed into the ravine and pursued the Prussians up the opposite height as far as the village of Maransart, opposite to Planchenois. Here they were received with a volley of grape, and compelled to retreat; but they remained masters of Planchenois and the Charleroi road; and to avenge the defeat of the young guard, two battalions of the old guard had sufficed. The victims of this fearful charge may be estimated at 2000.

To judge by appearances, the Prussians' serious attack on our flank had been repelled. No fresh incident could now be expected but the approach of the long-expected Grouchy, who must come at last, and whose presence would be a serious misfortune for the Prussians, as it would place them between two fires. A cannonade was heard in the direction of Wavre, which showed that our right wing was there; but the detachment which had been so formally demanded from Grouchy must be on the road, and its mere appearance on Bulow's rear would produce most important results. Dürutte still held his position at Papelotte, the angle of our line of battle; at the centre and on the left our cavalry kept possession of Mont St. Jean; and the six flags taken from the English infantry by our cavalry were laid at the feet of Napoleon. The aspect of affairs, so gloomy in the early part of the day, was beginning to brighten. Napoleon, whose spirit had been clouded for a

moment, now felt cheered; he might hope for a fresh victory by bringing up his now disengaged old guard to the rear of his cavalry, to complete the defeat of the English. Up to this time 68,000 French had successfully opposed about 140,000 English, Prussians, Dutch, and Germans, and had wrested a great part of the battle-ground from them.

Promptly seizing the decisive moment, when the attack of the Prussians had been repelled, Napoleon ordered the old guard to form again and advance to the centre of his line of battle, that is, to the plateau of Mont St. Jean, and making them pass through the ranks of our cuirassiers, precipitated them on the exhausted British infantry. Although worn out, our own cavalry would not fail to feel their courage revive when they should see the old guard engaged; they would make a last charge, and put an end to this terrible struggle. It is true that there would no longer be a reserve to repel any unexpected accident, but the great gambler was reduced to that extremity when despair becomes prudence!

Of the twenty-four battalions of the guard, reduced to twenty three at Ligny, Napoleon had thirteen that had not been engaged. Eight battalions of the young guard had been engaged at Planchenois, and were still needed there. Of the remaining thirteen, one was drawn up in square at the junction of the Planchenois and Charleroi roads, little enough assuredly to protect our line of communication. Even though the last resources should be called into action, two battalions should at least be left at headquarters to meet any accidental occurrence, such as a new attempt of the Prussians on Planchenois. Napoleon therefore left the two battalions of the 1st grenadiers at Rossomme, a little in the rear of the farm of Belle Alliance, and led forward himself the ten others, consisting of 6000 foot. These included the battalions of the *moyenne* and old guards, all well tried and more or less experienced soldiers, resolved to conquer or die, and equal to forcing the lines of any infantry whatever.

Napoleon was engaged in ranging them in columns of attack on the side of the valley that lay between us and the English, when he heard a discharge of musketry in the direction of Papelotte, that is, at the angle of his line of battle. His heart almost stood still. It might be Grouchy, it might be a fresh influx of Prussians, and in his anxiety he would rather be disappointed of the former than that it should be the latter. His fears increased when he saw some of Durutte's troops abandon the Papelotte farm—at the cry of *saute qui peut*, uttered either by traitors or by those who dreaded treachery. Napoleon rode to meet the fugitives, spoke to them, led them back to their post, and then returned to La Haye Sainte, when looking

towards the plateau he perceived some movement amongst the cavalry that had hitherto been quite immovable. A dark presentiment filled his mind, and he began to fear that from their elevated position the cavalry could perceive the arrival of a fresh reinforcement of Prussian troops. But banishing thought and plunging into action, he immediately ordered La Bédoyère to gallop from right to left along the ranks and say that it was Grouchy's musketry that had been heard, and that great things would soon be done if they would only keep firm a few moments longer. Having sent La Bédoyère to disseminate this useful falsehood, he determined to make the ten battalions of the guard that he had brought with him advance on the plateau of Mont St. Jean. He confided four to the valiant Friant, who was to make a furious attack with them in concert with Reille, who was to rally what remained of his corps for this last effort; and he arranged the six others diagonally from La Haye Sainte to Planchenois, so as to connect his centre and right, and to provide against the coming events which he dreaded. His plan was, supposing things were not as bad as he feared, to lead himself these six battalions after the other four, and force the English line at any price, and thus terminate the day.

As he was leading the four battalions destined for the first attack along the Charleroi road, he met Ney in a state of distraction, who declared that the cavalry would give way if a large reinforcement of infantry did not immediately arrive. Napoleon gave him the four battalions he was bringing up, and promised to send six more, but did not say, which unfortunately was quite unnecessary, that the fate of France depended on the approaching charge. Ney led off the four battalions, and mounted the plateau at their head, at the same time that Reille's shattered corps was about to emerge from the wood of Goumont.

Whilst Ney and Friant were preparing to charge with their infantry, the Duke of Wellington, seeing the hairy caps of the guards, felt that the decisive moment was come, and that his own glory and that of his country depended on the last effort. He had seen fresh Prussian columns approaching, and hoping for their aid, he was determined to hold out to the last, although in his rear the Brussels road was crowded with fugitives. He endeavoured to inspire his companions with his own courage. Picton, who had been killed a little while before, had been succeeded in command of the left wing by Kempt, who, having but 2000 or 3000 men, sent to the Duke of Wellington for a reinforcement. "Let them all die," he replied, "I have no reinforcement to send." General Hill, who was second in command, said to him, "You may be killed here, what orders do you

leave me?" "To hold out to the very last man, so as to give the Prussians time to approach." Having uttered these noble words, the Duke of Wellington closed his line, drew it up in form of a gently arched bow, so as to place the new assailants between two fires, then ordering Maitland's guards to lie flat on the ground, he undauntedly awaited the approach of the imperial guard.

Ney and Friant led forward their four battalions, and made them debouch on the plateau *en échelons*, that on the left advancing first, and the others successively, each a little to the right and in the rear of the preceding. When the men of the first battalion appeared advancing with a firm step, they were received with a charge of chain-shot, that broke the line in a hundred places. The line of hairy caps wavered but did not yield, and continued to advance with heroic firmness. The other battalions mounted in their turn, met the same reception, and showed equal firmness. They paused to level their muskets, and repaid with a terrible fusillade the injury that had been inflicted on them. At the same moment Foy's and Bachelu's divisions of Reille's corps advanced on the left and attracted a portion of the enemy's fire. Having discharged their muskets, the battalions of the guard were about fixing their bayonets, in order to come to close combat with the British infantry, when at a signal from the Duke of Wellington, Maitland's guards rose from the ground, and poured on them a close and fearful discharge of musketry. This unexpected shock did not make our soldiers yield, but closing their ranks, they still continued to advance. The aged Friant, the model of the old army, though seriously wounded, descended the plateau, all covered with blood, to declare that victory was certain if the other battalions came to support the first. He met Napoleon, who having placed one battalion of the guard in square half-way up the acclivity, in order to check the enemy's cavalry, was now advancing with the five remaining battalions to attack the English line. Whilst listening to Friant's report, his eye, ever turned to the right, discovered about 3000 horse dashing down the declivity. These were Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, who seeing that they were about to be aided by Ziethen's corps, which was advancing by the Ohain road, were now hurrying to charge. In fact, whilst Pirch's corps was gone to support Bulow, Ziethen's had advanced, skirting the forest of Soignes, to support the Duke of Wellington's left. It was eight o'clock, and this reinforcement would decide everything. In a moment Vandeleur's and Vivian's cavalry were in the centre of the scene of action. Napoleon having left one of his battalions in square in the centre of the valley, hastened now to form the others into square, to prevent his line being pierced between La

Haye Sainte and Planchenois. If the cavalry of the guard remained intact, he could easily get rid of Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, and the ground being cleared, he could summon his left and centre, engaged on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, retire in good order to his right, and collecting what troops were left, pass the night on the field of battle. But of the entire cavalry of the guards he has but 400 chasseurs to oppose to 3000 of the enemy. He made them advance, however, and these 400 valiant men rushed on Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, drove back those nearest them, but were themselves soon beaten back by the ever-increasing stream of the enemy's cavalry. In a moment the field was filled with a multitude of English and Prussian cavalry. The battalions of the guard, formed into immovable citadels, receive them with a continuous fire, but cannot prevent them from advancing in every direction. To complete our distress, Ziethen's infantry, which had arrived after the Prussian cavalry, had attacked Durutte's half-ruined division, drove these troops out of the La Haye and Papelotte farms, and thus deprived us of the pivot on which our line of battle rested, and which was formed *en potence*, because of our being obliged to meet two armies at once. All now was tumult and confusion. Our heavy cavalry, which had been kept on the plateau of Mont St. Jean by Ney's indomitable firmness, retired now, that they might not be cut off from the centre of the army. This retrograde movement on a sloping ground was soon changed into an impetuously descending torrent of men and horses. The remains of d'Erlon's corps followed the cavalry. Intoxicated with joy, the English general, who up to this time had confined himself to acting on the defensive, now attacked in his turn, and led on his line against the battalions of the guard, now reduced to half their original number. From left to right the English and Prussian armies advanced against us, preceded by their artillery, pouring forth a destructive fire. Though Napoleon saw clearly the real state of things, he endeavoured to rally the fugitives around the battalions of the guard that still continued in square. With a calm demeanour but despairing mind, he stood firm under a shower of balls, endeavouring to rally his infantry, and oppose an obstacle to the rush of the two victorious armies. He now mounted an ill-trained grey horse, that plunged as the balls and bullets rattled around. He bade his page, Gudin, bring him another, and he mounted in a mood that would have led him to bless the blow that would have laid him low for ever.

The English and Prussian infantry continuing to approach, the squares of the guards which had at first resisted the cavalry were now obliged to retrograde, impelled by the enemy, and hurried along by the crowd of fugitives. Our army, which had

shown superhuman courage during the day, fell now into that dejection that succeeds violent emotions. Distrusting their commanders, feeling no confidence in any one but Napoleon, whom the darkness unfortunately prevented them from seeing, our men called on their emperor, sought him, and not finding him, fancied he was dead, and abandoned themselves to despair. "He is wounded," said some; "He is dead," cried others; and giving way to their imaginations, they fled in all directions, asserting that they were betrayed, and that since Napoleon was dead, nothing more was to be hoped for in the world. Had one corps remained entire that could have rallied them, told them how matters stood, or shown them Napoleon alive, they would have stopped, still ready to fight and die. But all were taking flight, and four or five squares of guards, amidst those 150,000 victorious enemies, were no more than a few rocks, whose tops, rising above the sea, are dashed by its angry waters. These squares, hidden by the masses of the enemy, are not perceived by the main body of the army that fled along the Charleroi road. There they found the artillery leading their empty waggons, all their ammunition being consumed. The confusion increased, and the Charleroi road soon became a chaos of tumult and terror. The historian has now but a few sublime acts of despair to relate, which he will record to the eternal honour of those martyrs to their country's glory, and to the shame of those who so causelessly lavished such torrents of human blood.

The débris of the battalions of the guards were driven *pellemêle* into the valley, where they still fought without yielding. Now were heard those words that shall live for ages, and which some attribute to General Cambronne, and others to Colonel Michel—"The guard dies, but yields not." Cambronne fell almost mortally wounded, and remained lying on the ground, for he would not allow his men to leave their ranks to bear him away. The second battalion of the 3rd grenadiers, reduced from five to three hundred men, remained in the valley with their comrades lying lifeless beneath their feet, and hundreds of slaughtered horsemen dead before them; but they still continue the combat, and refuse to surrender. Closing their ranks as they are thinned, they await a last attack; and now assailed on four sides at once, they discharge a fearful volley that brings down hundreds of cavalry. The enemy, exasperated, brought up their artillery, and discharged volley after volley in rapid succession on the four angles of the square. The angles of this living citadel were beaten down, the square became more compressed, presenting an irregular but firmly resisting outline. The square extended its lines, in order to occupy more space and protect the wounded who have taken refuge in the centre.

These brave men stood another charge firmly, bringing down the enemy in their turn. Too few now to remain in square, they took advantage of a short respite to form into a triangle turned towards the enemy, so that in retrograding they could save those who had taken refuge behind their bayonets. They are again attacked. "*We will not yield,*" cried these valiant men, now reduced to one hundred and fifty. Then discharging their muskets for the last time, they all rushed on the cavalry that were pursuing them so fiercely, and with their bayonets killed both men and horses, until they sank in this last sublime outburst of heroism. Admirable devotedness, unsurpassed in the records of history.

Ney put a worthy termination to this day, which God had granted him to expiate his faults by a display of unexampled heroism. He was the last that descended from the plateau of Mont St. Jean, and on his route he met what were left of Durutte's division beating a retreat. The noble remnant of this division, consisting of some hundreds of men of the 95th, under Rulhière, the commander of the battalion, was now retreating under arms. General Durutte had advanced some steps to seek a road, when Ney, bareheaded, his broken sword in his hand, and his clothes torn, seeing a handful of armed men, ran forward to lead them against the enemy. "Come, my friends," he said, "come and see how a marshal of France can die." These brave men, excited by his very appearance, wheeled round and rushed in despair on the Prussian column that was pursuing them. They slaughtered numbers, but were soon overpowered, and scarcely two hundred escaped death. Rulhière, who commanded the battalion, broke the flag-staff, hid the eagle beneath his coat, and followed Ney, who was now unhorsed for the fifth time, but still unwounded. The illustrious marshal retired on foot until a subaltern cavalry officer gave him his horse, and then proceeded to join the main body of the army, sheltered by the darkness, which at length hung like a funeral pall over the battlefield on which 60,000 French, English, and Prussians were lying dead or wounded.

In the midst of this horrid scene our soldiers fled in confusion, seeking the man they still idolised, though he was the principal cause of their misfortunes; but they continued to call for Napoleon, till believing him dead, they hurried along the faster. It was wonderful that he had not fallen; but Providence had reserved for him, as for Ney, an end more fruitful in admonition for others! After having braved a thousand deaths, he retired within the square of the first regiment of grenadiers, commanded by Martenot. He marched in this way *pêle-mêle* with a number of wounded, in the midst of his old grenadiers, who were proud of the charge confided

to their loyalty, and determined not to allow him to be torn from them; even on that day of woe they did not despair of the fate of their country as long as their old commander lived.

As for him, he had lost all hope. With sombre but calm countenance, he rode in the centre of the square, his far-seeing glance probing futurity, and seeing that more than a battle had been lost that day! He only interrupted these gloomy meditations to inquire for his lieutenants, some of whom were amongst the wounded near him. Nobody knew what had become of Ney. It was known that Friant, Cambronne, Lobau, Duhesme, and Durutte were wounded, and great anxiety was felt for them, as the Prussians were accustomed to kill all who fell into their hands. Though the English did not behave during this war with all the humanity that should be practised by civilised nations, still, to do them justice, they alone showed any respect for the wounded. They had succoured and respected Cambronne when he was grievously wounded. But the square in whose centre Napoleon had sought refuge was so stupefied that the men advanced almost without speaking. Napoleon alone sometimes addressed a few words to the major-general, or to his brother Jerome, who was still beside him. Sometimes when much annoyed by the Prussian squadrons, the square halted, and the side that was attacked fired, then the sad and silent march was resumed, disturbed occasionally by the torrent of fugitives that swept by, or by the cavalry of the enemy. They thus arrived at Genappe about eleven at night. The bridge of this little town was so encumbered by the waggons of the artillery that the passage was completely blocked. It was fortunately not difficult to ford the Thy, which flowed past Genappe, and all stepping into the stream, crossed to the opposite bank. This was an advantage for our fugitives, who could easily cross the little stream singly, which the enemy, marching *en corps d'armée*, could not do.

At Genappe, Napoleon left the square of the guard where he had taken refuge. The other squares, being encumbered by wounded and fugitives, had been broken up. From the time of their arrival at Genappe each sought his own safety as best he could. The artillery, not being able to preserve their guns, cut the traces and led off the horses, which were of more importance. Two hundred pieces of cannon were thus left to the enemy, but not one of them had been taken during the battle. It was very strange that we lost but one standard, Urban, sub-officer of lancers, having recovered that of the 45th, one of the two taken from d'Erlon's corps. The wounded alone were made prisoners.

This fatal day cost us more than 20,000 men, counting the

5000 or 6000 wounded who fell into the hands of the English. The loss of the English was pretty nearly the same as ours. The Prussians lost from 8000 to 10,000 men. The allies had thus lost more than 30,000 men; but they had not lost the victory as we had. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher met between La Belle Alliance and Planchenois, where, as they embraced, they congratulated each other on the immense success they had achieved. And they had reason to do so, for the one by his indomitable firmness, and the other by his ardour in recommencing the struggle, had assured the triumph of Europe over France, and made full reparation for the error committed in fighting in advance of the forest of Soignes. Having allowed a little time for the expression of a very natural exultation, Blücher, whose army had not suffered as much as the English, and whose cavalry was intact, undertook the pursuit, which was well suited to the rage the Prussians felt against us. On this night they committed outrages disgraceful to their nation, and if local traditions may be believed, they assassinated General Duhesme, who fell wounded into their hands.

If the Prussian cavalry had not suffered from the moral fatigue of the combat, they had from the physical weariness of the march, and were obliged to stop at Dyle. Our soldiers were consequently able to reach the Sambre, and cross it either at Châtelet, Charleroi, or Marchiennes-au-Pont. Our wounded and fugitives were everywhere received by the Belgians as fellow-countrymen. The year 1814 had inspired them with deep hatred against the Prussians, and awakened all their French sympathies. They participated in the grief of our defeat, and sheltered all the French soldiers who sought an asylum in their country.

The obstruction was very great at Charleroi, but less than at Genappe; the Girard division commanded by Colonel Matis, and which had been left in the rear, protected the passage. Napoleon stopped a few moments at Charleroi with the major-general and his brother Jerome to despatch some orders. He sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy to inform him verbally of the sad events of the 18th, and to order him to retire to Namur. He gave the command of the army to his brother Jerome, leaving him Marshal Soult as major-general, and recommended both to collect our scattered forces as quickly as possible and lead them to Laon. He preceded them thither himself, to collect all the resources that were possible after so great a catastrophe. He first went to Philippeville accompanied by about twenty officers belonging to the different corps of the army.

In beholding so fearful a disaster succeeding the brilliant victory achieved two days before, it will naturally be demanded, what had become of Marshal Grouchy and of the 34,000 men entrusted to him by Napoleon? We have seen how this marshal

Napoleon on the morning of the 17th, when he told him to pursue the Prussians, but to keep in communication with him, so that he might not allow the Prussians to join the English. These directions were so necessary a consequence of the situation, that had they not been given, either verbally or in writing, they might have been very easily divined, since it would be difficult to suppose that our right wing could be separated from us for any other purpose than to watch the Prussians, and take up a position between them and the English. When the roar of Napoleon's cannon was heard, the safest course would have been to advance towards him as a support, and prevent the Prussians from interfering with his operations against the English army.

Marshal Grouchy was as brave of heart and as polished in manner as an ancient *gentilhomme* of France, but he was susceptible and narrow-minded, and concealed a more than ordinary obstinacy beneath a courtly manner. He was offended at the tone assumed by his lieutenants, and said rather sharply that their advice was probably very good, but not in accordance with his instructions, which enjoined him to pursue the Prussians, not to look after the English; that in all probability the Prussians were at Wavre, whither they should be followed without any reference to what was going on at Mont St. Jean; and that in any case Napoleon was a commander who would not bear dictation nor suggestion. General Gerard replied that there was no question of dictation or suggestion with regard to Napoleon's orders, but merely of understanding them; that when he sent his right wing to pursue the Prussians, and ordered that it should keep in constant communication with him, it was evident that he wished to keep the Prussians at a distance and his right wing near, so as to be able to summon it to his aid if necessary; that at this moment they could not be certain of where the Prussians were, but that they must be either advancing by Wavre to Brussels, or skirting the forest of Soignes to join the English, and in either case it would be better to advance to the scene of action; for if the Prussians were at Brussels, Grouchy could aid Napoleon in destroying the unsupported British army; or if the Prussians had joined the English, he would only be carrying out Napoleon's instructions. This argument was unanswerable, and is a proof of General Gerard's great military sagacity. But unfortunately Marshal Grouchy did not profit by the sage but too strongly expressed counsel that was given him. He only replied by enumerating the difficulties that would prevent its execution. What was the distance, he asked, from where they were to Mont St. Jean, or to the chapel of St. Lambert, or to Planchenois? How much time would it take to get there? Would they be able to take the artillery with them? These were the objections he made to going to the

scene of action. The owner of the chateau where Grouchy was breakfasting said that the battlefield was at about a distance of between three and four leagues, and that they could reach it in less than four hours. A guide, who had been long in the French service, promised to lead the army to Mont St. Jean in three hours and a half, or perhaps less. General Baltus, who alone sided with Grouchy, expressed some anxiety about the removal of the artillery. General Valazé, commanding the engineers, assured him that the sappers would remove every obstacle. General Gerard said it would be sufficient if they could bring a few pieces of cannon and some waggons of ammunition, the rest would be done by the cartouches and bayonets of his infantry; that the very appearance of the troops, even at a distance, would suffice to draw off a portion of the Prussian forces, and extricate the emperor if he were in difficulty, or, if not, assist in completing his victory. Meantime the roar of the cannon became louder, the discussion waxed warmer, and even the private soldiers caught up the tone, but with this difference, that amongst them there was no difference of opinion. All asked why they were not led to the battlefield, why their courage was left unemployed, when perhaps their comrades needed their aid either to resist or pursue the enemy. Every detonation excited their enthusiasm, and evoked fresh cries of impatience from these intelligent and heroic men. The enthusiasm of the soldiery should no doubt be regarded with a certain amount of distrust, and Napoleon himself has said that the voice of the soldiery, when listened to, has made generals commit as many errors as governments have done when they yielded to the impulses of the multitude. This assertion is equivalent to saying that all kinds of enthusiasm should excite distrust. But in the case under consideration the dictates of reason were in accordance with the instinct of the masses. It was now half-past eleven, and had Grouchy's troops set out at noon at the latest, they would have arrived, as our sad recital has shown, quite early enough to be of service. Vandamme's corps, the most in advance, was at Nil St. Vincent, a short league from Sart-à-Valhain, which Gerard's troops had reached. Exelmans' dragoons had got as far as the Dyle. From Nil St. Vincent the troops could advance to the bridge of Moustier, which, through an oversight favourable to us, the enemy had left unguarded; which indeed was very natural, for seeing themselves pursued in the direction of Wavre, they only thought of occupying the bridges in the immediate vicinity of Wavre itself. The bridge of Moustier being passed, the noise of the cannon alone would have sufficed to guide them to Maransart, opposite to Planchenois, and situated on the side of the ravine through which the Lasne flowed, and where Lobau was at the moment

engaged with Bulow. The fresh arrivals would have then been placed in the rear of the Prussians, whom they would infallibly have driven into the ravine and destroyed, for there was no means of extricating themselves but by repassing the wood through which they had advanced with so much difficulty. The distance from Nil St. Vincent is not more than five leagues.

Soldiers eager to engage would certainly have marched this distance in four or five hours, and the proof is that Vandamme's corps accomplished the distance between Gembloux and La Baraque—about the same space as from Nil St. Vincent to Maransart—between the hours of eight in the morning and two in the afternoon, spite of many halts, especially one more than an hour long at Nil St. Vincent, which is to say that Vandamme made the march in less than five hours. We must add that the roads from Gembloux to Baraque had been broken up by the passage of the Prussian troops, whilst the cross-roads to Maransart were indeed in excellent condition. The inhabitants of the locality said it would require three hours and a half, or four at the utmost, to accomplish this march. Let us allow five, which is a great deal for such enthusiastic troops, and supposing they set out at noon, they would arrive at five in the afternoon. Gerard's corps would arrive an hour later, that is, at six; but the very sight of Vandamme's corps would have produced the desired effect, which Gerard's would only have to complete. Up to five o'clock, as we have seen, Bulow's corps had only exchanged a few thrusts with Domon's and Subervic's cavalry. It was half-past five before he was seriously engaged with Lobau. At six he was engaged with the young guard; at seven, with the old. Nothing was decided at half-past seven. There were therefore from six to seven hours during which the arrival of these expected troops might have been of use. We may even add, that had they arrived on the scene of action at six o'clock, they would have produced a greater effect than had they arrived at five, as they would have found Bulow engaged, and would have destroyed him by forcing his troops into the current of the Lasne stream. What an effect this spectacle would have produced on our soldiers, what an effect on the English, and what an advantage might not have been derived from the twenty-three battalions of the guards, thus rendered disposable, and that might have simultaneously attacked the exhausted British army?

In truth Marshal Grouchy could not divine all the good he might have effected on this occasion, for he had been too remiss in his surveillance of the Prussians to discover their plans. But the Gerard dilemma still existed: either the Prussians had advanced towards Napoleon, in which case his orders to pursue them and keep in communication with the emperor would be

carried out by advancing to the right; or the Prussians had gone to Brussels, and neglecting them would have been of no consequence, as the main object—the destruction of the British army—would have been attained.

But the wretched marshal would not listen to any arguments, and despite the displeasure of his lieutenants, and the anger of General Gerard, he continued to advance to Wavre.

Vandamme's and Gerard's corps, preceded by Exelmans' cavalry, pursued their march, and Vandamme's arrived at a place called *La Baraque* before two o'clock. Greater certainty was gained as they advanced; through the openings of the woods they could see what was going on on the other side of the Dyle, and Prussian troops were perceived advancing towards *Mont St. Jean*. General *Berthezène*, who commanded one of Vandamme's divisions, reported this to *Grouchy*, but without inducing him to change his plans. He might now have adopted a mode of conduct indicated by the circumstances themselves, and which would have had the happiest results, though not so great as would have been obtained by marching directly to *Maransart*. It was evident that by continuing to advance towards *Wavre* they would find the Prussians firmly established behind the Dyle, and to reach them it would be necessary to force this river at *Wavre*, where the passage was most difficult, and where it would cost lives that it was most important should be spared. It would therefore be better to cross the Dyle in the vicinity where they were, by the badly defended bridges of *Limal* or *Limelette*, which could easily be seized. Thus freed from all obstacles, they would have found themselves within sight of the Prussians, and free to follow them in any direction. It would certainly have been better to have effected this passage in the morning, as *Grouchy* would thus have fulfilled the orders he had received, to follow the Prussians and keep in communication with headquarters; and even at two o'clock this movement would have produced the desired effect. The Prussians would have been surprised en marche, *Grouchy* could have fallen perpendicularly on their left flank, which would have compensated for his inferiority in numbers, and at the very least he might have arrested *Pirch I.* and *Ziethen's* corps, which, as we have seen, caused the greater part of our disaster. Marshal *Grouchy* was not in the least influenced by these considerations, and though he was told that Prussian troops were advancing in the direction whence the cannonade proceeded, he still continued to march towards *Wavre*, where he arrived at four o'clock. The aspect of things at this spot was not calculated to afford much satisfaction to a military man of sound judgment. *Thielmann's* corps, of 27,000 or 28,000 men, was firmly established at *Wavre*, where it could keep an army of double or treble the number in

check for an entire day. In such a case what was to be done? To attack Wavre would be to run the risk of uselessly sacrificing a number of lives, and that without a certainty of success, and meanwhile 60,000 Prussians would have had time to advance to Mont St. Jean. Did Grouchy make no movement, he would only appear as a spectator at a decisive action, without having obeyed any of the instructions he had received. The best thing that could be done then was to turn back and seize the bridges of Limal and Limelette, which he had neglected to do in passing, and which would offer less resistance than that at Wavre. General Gerard represented this to Marshal Grouchy, who persisted in his blindness, and having the Prussians now before him at Wavre, concluded that as he had been ordered to pursue them, it was his duty to attack when he found them. History probably does not furnish another instance of such mental blindness.

At this moment arrived the Polish officer Zenovicz, who should have left La Belle Alliance at half-past ten, but had been detained an hour longer through Marshal Soult's fault, and who, to avoid being captured, had retrograded to Quatre-Bras, whence he had proceeded to Sombrefe, from Sombrefe to Gembloux, and from Gembloux to Wavre, where, in consequence of Marshal Soult's dilatoriness, he had not arrived until four o'clock. He brought the despatch of which we have already spoken, and which unfortunately was most ambiguous.

Having announced that the Prussians had appeared in the direction of Wavre, the major-general added: "The emperor bids me inform you that he is about to attack the British army, which has taken up its position at Waterloo, near the forest of Soignes; and his majesty desires you to advance to Wavre, *in order to be near us, support our operations, and keep up a communication with us*; driving before you the corps of the Prussian army which have taken that direction, and must have stopped at Wavre, whither you are to hasten as quickly as possible. You will send a few corps of light troops to follow the enemy's columns on your right, observe their movements, and pick up the stragglers. Inform me immediately of your arrangements and your march, as also of any information you may have got concerning the enemy, and *do not neglect to keep up communications with us*. The emperor wishes to hear from you constantly."

This deplorably ambiguous despatch, interpreted in its true sense, and according to the position of affairs, could only mean that instead of following the Liége road, where the Prussians had been sought for a short time, Grouchy should turn towards Brussels, it being known with certainty that the enemy had taken that direction which the despatch mentioned under the

general name of Wavre. It did not certainly mean that Wavre was to be the terminus of the march, since these words, "*in order to be near us to support our operations,*" accompanied with the express recommendation, repeated twice, of keeping up a communication with headquarters, clearly showed the design of making Grouchy's corps assist in the principal action. In any case, the officer Zenovicz's verbal commentary would remove all doubt. Napoleon, as we have seen, pointing to the horizon and turning to the right, had said to him, "*Grouchy is marching in that direction; it is from that quarter he is to come; hasten to him, and do not leave him till he shall be ready to debouch on our line of battle.*"

The man must certainly be mentally blind who could not understand such orders. It was evident that Wavre was only a general expression, signifying the direction of Brussels in opposition to that of Liège, and the real point to which Grouchy was to tend was indicated by existing circumstances, by Napoleon's words and gestures, and the embassy of the officer Zenovicz. Grouchy could only see, in the written and verbal order, that he was to advance to Wavre itself. "*I was right,*" he said to his lieutenants, "*in coming to Wavre.*" General Gerard's excitement knew no bounds, and was manifested both in words and gesture. "*I told you,*" he said to Grouchy, "*that if we were ruined, we should have to thank you for it.*" This was followed by most irritating remarks, and Adjutant Zenovicz retired, that by his presence he might not make matters worse. Marshal Grouchy persisted in his opinion, and as if to carry out his instructions still more rigidly, he ordered a vigorous attack to be made on Wavre.

Vandamme's corps was ordered to commence the attack, an order that was immediately obeyed. But the Prussians had taken up their position, so that all our efforts were vain. Habert's division rushed on the Wavre bridge, covered it with the dead bodies of his soldiers, but could not succeed in disturbing the enemy's position. The 4th corps was a little in the rear of Vandamme's. When it arrived, its commander, General Gerard, feeling a presentiment that at that moment the French army was being defeated for want of assistance, rushed in despair on the mill of Bierges, where there was a bridge a little higher up than that at Wavre. The illustrious general, whose advice would have saved France had it been followed, sought death, and nearly found it. A ball passed through his body, he fell, but the bridge was not carried.

Louder and louder pealed the cannon from Waterloo, and all felt the conviction that they were uselessly sacrificing valuable lives before a position that it was both useless and impossible to force; whilst had they passed by the Limal and the Limelette

bridges, they could have crossed the river with ease four hours earlier, and brought decisive aid to the main body of the army. Three times during that day might Grouchy have saved France; first, by leaving Gembloux at four in the morning and crossing the Dyle, when he should of necessity have seen and followed the Prussian movements; next, by deciding at noon to advance from Sart-à-Valhain to Maransart, by which he should have come up at five, or at the least at six, on Bulow's rear; and again, by crossing the Limal and Limelette bridges at two o'clock, when Prussian columns were seen proceeding to Mont St. Jean, by which he could at least have kept back Pirch and Ziethen; but on each occasion the commander of the right wing closed his eyes to what was so evident! It is plain that Providence had condemned us, and that Grouchy was the instrument chosen for our punishment! But the wretched man, for so we must always call him, acted in perfect good faith! His greatest fault was that he was more inclined to estimate the advice of his lieutenants by the manner in which it was given than by its essential value.

About six in the evening his eyes were unsealed. The officer who had left at one o'clock, after Bulow's letter had been intercepted, brought a fresh despatch explanatory of the former, proving that Wavre was not a particular but a general designation, that the position of the main body of the French army was the point to be kept in view, with which Grouchy was to keep in communication, and advance on the rear of the Prussians, who would thus be destroyed between two fires.

The major-general had at length succeeded in expressing himself clearly, and in making Grouchy, spite of his obtuseness, perceive his meaning. The marshal doubted no longer, but the time when he could be of use was past. Napoleon had been overcome, and Gerard, with numbers of valiant men, had fallen before Wavre without any advantage to the army or to France.

Marshal Grouchy gave immediate orders to seize on the Limal and Limelette bridges. Pajol's light cavalry and Teste's divisions were in the rear, having been sent in pursuit of the Prussians in the direction of Liége, and had now returned, having marched nearly twelve leagues during the day, a proof that five or six might have been accomplished in half that time. The marshal ordered them to seize the Limal bridge, which was easily done, as it was held only by a few of the Prussian rear-guard. But at the time that this bridge was taken the sound of the cannon had ceased, and the stillness of death reigned over the surrounding country. Grouchy consoled himself by supposing that the battle of Waterloo had been gained, and he said so to his lieutenants. He had need of such consolation, as

may easily be believed; but it was a sentiment that did more honour to his heart than to his head!

But he was alone in thinking thus; General Gerard, apparently mortally wounded, and resigned to die, had now but one thought more painful than his wound, and that was that France had been obliged to yield. It was a sad night. From Wavre to Limal all were up at dawn on the following morning, anxious to hear what had occurred on the previous day, for an ominous silence reigned over all the plain, especially in the direction of Mont St. Jean. At last the officer who had been sent from Charleroi at eleven the night before, arrived, announced the loss of the battle, and ordered the marshal to retreat to Namur. Grouchy, whose countenance expressed the consternation of an honest man who had made a mistake, and sought to justify himself, said to his lieutenants, who were too sad to be angry, "Gentlemen, when you will have learned my instructions you will see that I was justified in acting as I did." They did not reply, it was no time to dispute. The point to be considered was how to extricate themselves from their perilous position, separated as they were from the wreck of the French army by two victorious adverse armies. The commander of our right wing, with the forces under his command, immediately advanced by the Mont St. Guibert and Namur road, ordering Vandamme's and Gerard's corps to march to the same point by Gembloux. But what would be the consequence if these 34,000 men should meet the whole or a part of Blücher's and Wellington's 150,000 victorious soldiers?

Such were the events on both scenes of action on that fatal day, June 18, 1815—events which the English call the battle of Waterloo, because their bulletin was dated from that village; the Prussians, the battle of La Belle Alliance, because it was there that they fought; Napoleon, the battle of Mont St. Jean, because it was on this plateau that the French army performed such prodigies of valour, and which the historian calls the battle of Waterloo, as custom, from whose decision there is no appeal, has named it so. The faults and merits of this day can be easily appreciated by any one who, freeing his mind from prejudice, knows how to profit by the assistance of common-sense.

We have seen the motives which induced Napoleon to assume the offensive against recombined Europe, and it cannot be denied that his reasons were weighty. The column invading the east, under Prince Schwarzenberg, and that approaching the north, under the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, were more than one hundred leagues asunder, and the latter was a month in advance of the other. Nothing could be simpler than to take advantage of their separation both in time and space; for to wait their arrival, and allow them to unite, would

be to permit them to invade the fairest provinces of France, after having deprived these provinces of their bravest men, who were drafted into the mobilised national guards. There was also the danger of encountering the immense mass of 500,000 men; and though Napoleon would leave Paris well defended in his rear with 250,000 active troops, still it would be running a very great risk to allow these formidable forces to combine when they might be encountered separately. Besides, assuming the offensive at first did not exclude the possibility of recurring to the defensive afterwards. By making an attempt to repel the invasion, even if unsuccessful, the provinces would be deprived of the right to complain, even if they were afterwards abandoned to the enemy; and had not the campaign opened with so fearful a disaster, a transition could easily have been made from the offensive to the defensive, as is daily done by generals far inferior to Napoleon.

It was consequently a very wise plan, one that posterity could not blame, to seek to profit by the distance both in time and place of the two invading armies—endeavouring to defeat that on the north before the arrival of the other coming from the east. Future ages will certainly be more inclined to admire than blame that profound sagacity which saw that though it was the interest of the Prussians and the English to combine their forces, still as they advanced from different points, the one coming from Brussels, the other from Liège, there would be some spot where the connection would be weak, and where it would be possible to interpose an army between them, that, after separating, could encounter them singly. Napoleon, endowed with the twofold sagacity of genius and unequalled experience, saw this, and deceiving the enemy by the most skilful manœuvres, succeeded in concentrating his *corps d'armée* in five or six days, some coming from Metz, some from Paris and Lille, so that on the evening of the 14th June 124,000 men and 300 pieces of cannon had reached the forest of Beaumont without the knowledge of the Prussians, whose advanced posts were only two leagues distant. On the morning of the 15th, Napoleon had crossed the wooded ground that concealed him from the enemy, seized Charleroi within view of both English and Prussians, and on the evening of the same day had taken up his position between the allied armies, surprised and confounded at his sudden appearance. In the whole annals of warfare we find no record of a manœuvre executed with so much security, precision, and success.

There is but one thing to be regretted with regard to this day—that Ney, the daring Ney, was wanting in boldness at Quatre-Bras, and did not seize this position, by which the English and Prussians would have been effectually separated.

But they were in point of fact sufficiently separated, as the Prussians, attacked by Napoleon, would be obliged to fight unaided by the English, and Quatre-Bras could have been seized on the morrow, though it had not been on the eve.

Up to this time the result was equal to the skill with which the arrangements had been made. The first thing to be done on the 16th was to fight the Prussians, who were within reach, and when they were beaten, to fall on the English. Was it absolutely necessary that this should be done in the morning rather than in the afternoon? In politics one should never hurry; but in war we cannot act with too much expedition, as the sooner the result is obtained the sooner are we secured against the caprices of fortune. But in war, more than under any other circumstances, there are material necessities which must be obeyed. And in the present instance there was a necessity which could not be evaded—and that was the arrival of the army in line. Notwithstanding the rapidity of the march on the previous day, the 6th corps, the guards, the cuirassiers, and the parks had not yet crossed the Sambre, Gerard had only reached it, and d'Erlon had advanced but one league beyond. Time would also be required to transport the troops to the scene of action at Fleurus, and during their march Napoleon would have time to collect the reports of his vanguards, and be assured of what his genius had divined. In accordance with these peremptory reasons, he fought the battle of Ligny in the afternoon rather than in the morning, and its success was as advantageous at one part of the day as it would have been at the other; and as in June the day does not close until nine o'clock, the opposing armies would have abundant time between three and nine to slaughter each other and decide a great victory.

As for the battle itself, nobody could dispute that its plan and execution were worthy of a consummate general. The Prussians having taken up their position at the villages of St. Amand and at Ligny, in order to protect the highroad from Namur to Brussels—their line of communication with the English—and their rear being thus turned to the French stationed at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon attacked them vigorously in front, at Ligny and St. Amand, ordering Ney to seize Quatre-Bras as quickly as possible, and then send one of his corps to attack the Prussian rear. Half of Blucher's army would have been made prisoners had this order been executed; but Ney, who, like all our generals, had begun to fear, not the enemy, but fortune, and disturbed by Reille's advice, spent the day in doubt, lost the morning during which he could have taken Quatre-Bras from the few thousand men that occupied it, attacked the position vigorously when the propitious time was

past, that is, when the adverse forces were quadrupled; and then, wishing to repair his error, he summoned d'Erlon, whom Napoleon had already sent for, by which this general was rendered unable to aid either, and without conquering the English, prevented Napoleon from completing the overthrow of the Prussians. Napoleon, thus deprived of the corps with which he had hoped to attack the enemy's rear, was not, however, disconcerted; but devising a new manoeuvre on the ground itself, he cut the Prussian line, which he had not been able to attack in the rear, with his guard, above Ligny, and gained a brilliant and important victory. If the Prussians, thanks to d'Erlon's marchings and counter-marchings, were only defeated instead of being utterly destroyed, still they were so discomfited that a strong detachment could have kept them in check whilst a decisive engagement was being fought with the English. Though it was through Ney's fault that the opportunity of repulsing the English was lost, he nevertheless displayed a heroic tenacity in opposing their efforts to communicate with the Prussians, and prevented them from taking up their position on the highroad between Namur and Brussels; he arrested their progress, and compelled them to retreat on the following day. Napoleon's plan, notwithstanding the accidents incidental to war, the more frequent at this time because of the general excitement, had been as successful on the 16th as on the 15th, since the Prussians had been beaten in a great battle, and the English checked in a furious engagement, were obliged to retreat in opposite directions, leaving the entire French army still between them, and were on the point of being compelled to accept battle, apart from their allies, on the morrow or next day.

It would not be possible to advance at dawn on the morning of the 17th with troops that had been engaged with the enemy until nine on the previous evening, and who, without supping, had bivouacked amidst 30,000 lifeless bodies. Napoleon certainly lost as little time as possible: he sent forward Lobau, whose men had not been engaged; the guard, of which only a part had fought; and the cuirassiers, who had not drawn a sword; he left Vandamme and Gerard, the fatigued victors of the Prussians, to watch the conquered enemy, and advanced himself, with his centre, towards Marshal Ney, that they might together combat the British army. But in order that these troops should defile, it was indispensable that Ney, who now formed the head of the column, should have defiled at Quatre-Bras; but Ney, as apprehensive on the 17th as he had been on the 16th, had not stirred, thinking he had the whole English army before him. His anxiety did not cease until he was joined by Napoleon and Lobau, with the guards and cuirassiers, and it

was only then, at half-past eleven, that he set out. Thus the morning was lost, partly because of the weariness of the troops, and partly because of Ney's tardiness, and in the afternoon because of a fearful storm that paralysed both armies; for when nature puts forth her power she annihilates that of man, however great it may be. But was time the most important consideration on this day? Certainly not. Having beaten the Prussians, it was necessary to beat the English, and that as quickly as possible. But they could not be beaten without being met, which depended on the Duke of Wellington, and not on Napoleon. We were only separated by half a day's march from the English; but we could not expect to outstrip them in speed. If they wished to fight, we should find them, without hurrying ourselves, in advance of the forest of Soignes; and if they did not, they would place the forest between them and us, which would render a battle impossible. Would they fight? Napoleon most ardently desired it, as it would be impossible for him to follow them to Brussels when his presence would be so necessary in Champagne, and to leave them unconquered would overturn all his plans. But whatever might be his wishes, he could not anticipate the arrival of the English at the entrance of the forest of Soignes, and thus compel them to fight. His hopes consequently rested solely on Blücher's impetuosity, and the Duke of Wellington's ambition—and not on a rapid march, rendered more laborious by the weariness of his troops, by Ney's hesitation, and by the violence of the storm, whilst the proximity of the forest of Soignes would have rendered it fruitless.

Time consequently was not the most important consideration on the 17th. But if no fault had been committed in the employment of time, had none been made in the disposition of the troops? The reader can judge from what has been stated. What could be more natural than that Napoleon, having conquered the Prussians, should send after them a detachment sufficiently strong to watch them, keep them in check, and prevent their joining the English, whilst he should be engaged with the latter? Would any man of common-sense say that the Prussians ought to have been allowed to follow what course they pleased, pursued only by a few cavalry, who would have been merely spectators of what they might please to do, without being able to offer any opposition. Ah! indeed, if we could suppose in the commander of our right wing a blindness unequalled in the annals of history, a blindness so great as to allow 80,000 Prussians to do just as they chose before his eyes, and not even interfere to prevent their overpowering Napoleon, the man who had before conquered them, we would be justified in condemning the use made of the right wing. But in giving

Grouchy credit for no more than the instinct manifested by the private soldiers, the service on which the right wing was despatched was not only in accordance with the rules of military warfare, but a matter of necessity, and by no means calculated to deprive Napoleon of the aid of these troops, for all the contending parties being enclosed within a space of four or five leagues, within which each could hear the cannon of the other, it was not reasonable to suppose that Grouchy's 34,000 men would have strayed uselessly about, and not made their appearance on the scene of action until after a great catastrophe had occurred.

Thus the ordinary rules of warfare, the circumstances of the case, and the simplest common-sense show that it was necessary to detach Grouchy's corps from the main body. There may be some disputes as to the signification of the instructions he received; but there is one order that cannot be contested, one that even the soldiers would have given, that the Prussians should not be lost sight of, and that he should manœuvre in such a way as to prevent their joining the English, for everybody knew that the arranged plan was that each army should be fought separately. No matter what hypotheses may be adopted, it is evident that it was not Napoleon's will, but the state of things itself, that dictated this order, and we know that whether clearly or obscurely expressed—and it was not Napoleon's custom to express his orders obscurely—it was comprehended by Grouchy, since when writing to Napoleon on the evening of the 17th, he said, "I am in pursuit of the Prussians, and shall endeavour to keep them at a distance from the English." There could therefore be no doubt that the commander of the right wing understood his instructions.

But from the very commencement Marshal Grouchy mistook the direction the Prussians had taken, and thought they were advancing to Wavre. This error was excusable, and would not have any serious consequence, had he acted as he ought, and sent his light cavalry to explore in the three possible directions, that is, the routes leading to Mont St. Guibert, Gembloux, and Namur; and his infantry along the Gembloux road which lay between. The corn-fields, trampled by the Prussians, would soon have enlightened him, and shown him that they had not advanced towards the Rhine, but towards Wavre, that is, towards the English army. Though he perceived this at last, he still had a suspicion that they had gone to Namur, and it was not until very late on the first day that he directed his infantry towards Gembloux. The 17th had been passed by Napoleon on the Mont St. Jean road, in the manner that circumstances rendered necessary; but it had

been altogether lost by Marshal Grouchy on the road to Wavre.

But all might have been repaired had Grouchy set out at four o'clock on the morning of the 18th, when he would have had seventeen hours at his disposal, to advance whither he pleased, and he was not more than four or five leagues distant from the main army. But unfortunately he did not issue his orders until between six and seven in the morning, and not having made previous arrangements for the distribution of provisions, the troops did not leave until eight, nine, and ten. Still all was not lost, as five hours would have sufficed to advance to the most distant point of this theatre of action, had he followed the sound of the cannon.

Whilst the right wing was thus conducted with so little activity and decision, Napoleon was preparing to fight, with the centre and left wing, that second battle which was to decide his fate and ours. Blucher's burning patriotism and Wellington's ambition were about to give him the opportunity he so much desired, and desired so justly, since it was necessary that he should beat the English after having beaten the Prussians, that he might then hasten to meet the Austrians and Russians. The result has certainly justified the two opposing commanders; but posterity, as Napoleon said, with his wonted grandeur of expression, posterity will be less indulgent, for if fortune had not wrought in their favour that real miracle of blindness on the part of Grouchy, they would have been overwhelmed on the borders of the closely wooded forest of Soignes, so difficult to traverse for a retreating army; whilst had they placed that forest between them and Napoleon, they would have frustrated all his calculations, and compelled him to retreat in confusion, and meet the great column coming from the east. They would thus have played a sure instead of a rash and perilous game.

Be this as it may, the battle that Napoleon so much desired was certain—a proof that genius itself often errs in the prayers it addresses to Providence. Was it necessary to fight in the early part of the day? At Waterloo, as at Ligny, should he have endeavoured to give battle in the morning rather than in the afternoon? Ah! yes, undoubtedly he would have done so had he known that, not Grouchy, who was so near, but 60,000 Prussians would thus have had time to arrive, and to arrive without being seen by Grouchy, though all advanced openly in the face of nature—men, horses, and artillery! But nobody could have anticipated such an event, and besides, the ground being impracticable for the artillery on account of the heavy rains, Napoleon was obliged to wait four or five hours to allow it to become somewhat firm. Druot, the best and wisest of men, could never forgive himself for having advised that the

battle should be deferred for some hours; * but he blamed himself without cause, for at such a season the battle of Waterloo might have commenced at eleven, when the battle of Ligny had been gained though it did not commence until three in the afternoon. It was undoubtedly of vast importance to Napoleon to prevent his cavalry and artillery—his two best arms—from being imbedded in the mud. It was true that the result—that iron idol adored of men—has condemned the vanquished; but Druot's advice was decisive, and posterity will not blame Napoleon for being influenced by it.

The hour being decided on, there was still the plan to be considered. It certainly was a most excellent idea, that of rushing on the weakly posted left wing of the English, drive it on their centre, and thus deprive them of the Brussels road, the only practicable one through the forest of Soignes; whilst this operation, besides all its other advantages, would effectually separate the Prussians from the English. There were errors unfortunately committed in the execution. The chateau de Goumont, on our left, ought to have been attacked certainly, but

* I have found the following passage in some very curious and interesting notes, written a long while since by Colonel Combes-Brassard, head of the staff of the 6th corps (Lobau's), and I quote it here, as an evidence of the exalted feeling of one of the most virtuous men of modern times. "General Druot," writes General Combes-Brassard, "remained but a few days in Paris after his trial. I saw him frequently. We often spoke of the battle of Mont St. Jean. One day he said to me, with the air of one who wished to relieve an oppressed mind: 'The more I think of that battle, the more I consider myself as one of the causes of its being lost.' 'You, general! When did the generous devotion of a noble friendship for one's master go further than yours?' 'I shall explain, colonel. I do not mean to accuse myself of faults I have not committed, but I shall avow what I have done at my own risk and peril.

" 'The emperor,' he continued, 'was aware of the disposition of the enemy's forces at the break of day; his plan was decided on; he intended to commence the battle at eight or nine in the morning at the latest. I observed to him that the ground was so broken up by the rain that the movements of the artillery would be very slow, an inconvenience that would be done away with by a delay of two or three hours. The emperor consented to make this fatal delay. Had he disregarded my advice, Wellington would have been attacked at seven, beaten at ten, the victory would have been completed at noon, and Blucher, not arriving until five, would have fallen into the hands of a victorious army. We did not commence the attack until noon, and left all the chance of success to the enemy.'"

I thought this passage deserved to be reproduced. Whilst those who had committed the most serious errors rejected the responsibility attached to their actions, Druot, who had not committed any error during the fatal battle of Waterloo—for it was not an error, on a day eighteen hours long, to wait two or three until the ground should become firm—accused himself of having contributed to the loss of the battle, because he had advised that it should be deferred. The event proved that this delay was a great loss; but it was not an error in judgment, for the firmness of the ground was an important condition to acting effectually on the offensive. It is only a fresh proof that in military operations a great deal is due to chance, and shows how careful one should be in judging operations where counsels of the greatest wisdom often tend to produce the most deplorable results.

it ought to have been beaten down by cannon, not attacked by men, an attempt which weakened the left wing of our army. These details were concealed from Napoleon by the wood of Goumont; and it was greatly to be regretted that General Reille did not keep sufficiently near the scene of action to prevent this useless expenditure of human life. It is evident that after the conquest of the wood the attack ought to have ceased, and Jerome's, Foy's, Ney's, and Bachelu's brave divisions reserved for the attack on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, the principal scene of operation.

Another error in tactics was the attack on La Haye Sainte at the centre, and on the English left along the Ohain road, an attack executed by masses too unwieldy to manœuvre before the cavalry. It seems almost incomprehensible that so skilful a tactician as Ney could have fallen into such an error, but he must have been too much impressed with an idea of the English stolidity; and Napoleon had not time to alter the disposition of the troops, for they were already in motion when he perceived what was going on, and it was then too late to change the plan of attack. This was an error much to be regretted, for it rendered an attempt fruitless that might have been decisive, and from the very commencement created in the minds of the combatants an impression favourable to the English, and unfavourable to us.

Yet nothing was compromised, and Napoleon with his cavalry charge amply avenged us on the Scots Greys. But that fearful spectacle, the Prussian army, had already appeared on the funereal plain. Napoleon saw all the danger that this apparition threatened, and immediately made Lobau advance to the right. Could he have done anything else or better to neutralise this new attack? Certainly not. If he abandoned an engagement that was now so far advanced, he should renounce those plans which could alone compensate for the inferiority of his forces, and would declare himself vanquished at a time that he hoped to conquer, for the road was as free for Grouchy as for Bulow, and if one traversed it, why should not the other? Napoleon continued the battle, but at the same time relaxed his efforts somewhat. He ordered Ney to seize La Haye Sainte, the English point d'appui in the centre, and which would secure us the approach to the plateau of Mont St. Jean, when we should be prepared to strike the decisive blow; and at the same time he desired him not to attempt anything further until we should be able to appreciate the importance of the Prussians' attack on our right. The only thing that was to be done under the circumstances was to seize La Haye Sainte and then wait a little.

But Ney, yielding to his impetuosity, increased by his regret

for the hesitation of the previous day, rushed on the English with unparalleled vigour and seized La Haye Sainte, when having encountered the enemy's cavalry several times during this combat, and become more closely engaged with them, he followed them on the plateau, where seeing a numerous artillery abandoned, he thought the decisive moment was come, brought all his cavalry by degrees on this plateau, where he maintained a gigantic struggle, but inopportune, since he had not infantry to support the attack. He thus uselessly expended our cavalry, who, had they been employed at a later hour, might have contributed to gain the battle.

Ney's prodigies of valour were therefore only a misfortune, which Napoleon, whose attention, as well as his infantry, was engaged on the right, was not able to prevent. What was to be done? The only possible plan, and that which Napoleon determined to adopt, was to order Ney to maintain his position on the plateau as long as he could, whilst he himself at the head of the guard made a furious charge on the Prussians. Having dispersed these, he intended to rally the guard and lead them to complete the destruction of the English army. The Prussians were met and repelled with a vigour of which the old guards under Morand were alone capable. When Bulow was driven back and beaten between Planchenois and Maransart, Napoleon did not lose an instant, but rallied the guards, and keeping his word to Ney, hastened with them to the plateau, there by one desperate effort to decide his own fate, that of the empire, and of France. Four of his battalions, braving a fearful fire, had already mounted the plateau, and the others would in all probability have ended the struggle, when the Prussian corps commanded by Ziethen, arriving unexpectedly, turned into defeat what might have been a victory, though a sanguinary and dearly purchased one! From the then existing state of things nothing could follow but an unparalleled dispersion of the troops, for there was not a single reserve to serve as a rallying-point, though Napoleon in his own person might have served as such, standing as he did amidst a torrent of fire, but that the increasing darkness hid him from the soldiers' view, and they, thinking him dead, fell into a dejection as great as their previous enthusiasm; and to complete the disaster, the flying troops were pressed by the enemy in front, flank, and rear. Everything tended to turn the lost battle into an unexampled defeat. Now fell that empire which, bowed to the earth in 1814, had again risen in 1815, only to sink again like some gigantic edifice that descends suddenly on the head of him who persists in standing beneath it to the last moment!

It cannot be denied that it was a fearful overthrow; but the

assertion that it was caused by Napoleon's tactics during the day cannot be supported, since it was a material obstacle that compelled him to defer the battle; besides, he had endeavoured to repair the mistakes committed by Reille and d'Erlon; nor occupied as he was at the right, was it possible for him to prevent Ney's premature attack on the left, which, however, he ordered to be suspended until he had driven back the Prussians, when he at once hastened to assist Ney, but was overpowered by the fresh arrival of Prussian troops. He consequently was blameless as a general. And since we must be as just to the conquerors as to the conquered, we must add that both the Duke of Wellington and Blücher deserved their victory—the first, by his unconquerable firmness; the second, by a patriotism that nothing could quell.

But now it must be admitted, though with sincere regret for attacking the memory of an honest man and a brave soldier, struck on this occasion with an unparalleled want of comprehension—it must, we repeat, be admitted that Marshal Grouchy was the real cause of our defeat—the material cause, for the moral one was to be sought elsewhere. We have been scrupulously exact in our detail of the events of that day, and there cannot be found a single valid excuse for his conduct, though during the last forty years many have sought to exculpate him. Having lost the afternoon of the 17th and the morning of the 18th, there still remained the full half of that fatal 18th, during which he might have repaired his faults, and converted a terrible disaster into a signal triumph. At half-past eleven the report of the cannon was heard at Sart-à-Valhain. General Gerard, with the sagacity of a true soldier and the ardour of a Frenchman that loved his country, proposed to advance to the scene of action, asserting that ignorant as they were of the enemy's intentions, they ought to hasten to Napoleon, since if the Prussians were advancing towards him, they would be only obeying their instructions by following them, and if they were gone to Brussels, the best thing to be done was to hasten to assist in completing the overthrow of the English. This was the advice of Gerard, Vandamme, Valazé, and even of the private soldiers. But Grouchy, closing his eyes to what was so evident, rejected the good advice poured on him by all. A neglect of etiquette in Gerard and an excess of susceptibility in Grouchy caused this most excellent advice to be rejected—advice that would have saved the empire, and what was of a thousand times more importance, France.

Two excuses have been adduced in Marshal Grouchy's favour—first, that there would not have been sufficient time to advance from Sart-à-Valhain to Maransart; and secondly, that he would have found on his route 40,000 Prussians ready to dispute the

passage of the Dyle, whilst 50,000 more would be advancing to crush Napoleon. We believe both assertions to be unfounded, and even if they were not, they would not exculpate him. If the time were insufficient, whose fault was it but Grouchy's, who had lost five or six hours on the afternoon of the 17th, and four on the morning of the 18th. If the Prussians were defending the Dyle, who was to blame but Grouchy, who had not seized the bridges on this river, neglected by the enemy, and who had not crossed when he might have done so without difficulty? It was evidently Grouchy's fault; and these inefficient excuses are in reality groundless.

Here is the absolute truth as to what concerns the distance. From Nil St. Vincent, where Vandamme arrived at half-past eleven, to Maransart, the distance is only five leagues. The inhabitants say it can be traversed in four hours at the utmost. There is no doubt but that a league may be passed over in much less than an hour. Taking bad roads into account, which, however, were better than the cross-roads beaten down by the Prussians, we may allow five hours, fully sufficient for the soldiers animated as they would be by the report of the cannon. If we even allow the unnecessarily superabundant time of six hours, the troops would have arrived sufficiently early. Let us give seven, and they would have arrived still more opportunely, at the moment when they would have surprised the Prussians in frightful disorder, beaten back from Planchenois by the old guard. Did we wish to adduce examples of the time in which marches could be effected on the same ground and under similar circumstances, we could quote several. Vandamme's corps left Gembloux at eight, and was at Baraque at two, though an hour had been lost on the way, and the march had been very slow. The distance from Gembloux to Baraque is about the same as from Nil St. Vincent to Maransart. Five hours would consequently have been sufficient for the march. Is a still more conclusive example needed? The distance from Wavre to Gembloux is more than five leagues, and on the following day, the 19th, when the desire of escaping from a victorious enemy hastened the pace of all, Vandamme's corps, which left at sunset, that is to say, at eight o'clock, arrived at Gembloux at eleven.* Therefore five leagues might be accomplished in five hours on the 18th, since they were traversed in three on the 19th.

As to the Prussians preventing the passage of the Dyle, this could not have occurred had not Grouchy neglected to cross by the unguarded bridges of Moustier or Ottignies, and advanced to Wavre to attack a position it would be impossible to force. Indeed, by supposing the enemy to possess a superhuman power of divination, a quality in which our right wing was unfortu-

* Asserted in General Berthézène's *Memoirs*, tome 2, page 398.

nately most defective, we may imagine Blucher foreseeing our plans, and stationing 40,000 men at the Moustier and Ottignies bridges, by which Gerard wanted to cross, and whilst these troops were thus stationed, sending on 45,000 (it would have been impossible for him to send more) to overpower Napoleon. This might indeed be possible; but as we are but mortals ourselves, it is not necessary to suppose that our adversaries are gods!

In reality there was nothing of the kind. Blucher, seeing that he was pursued in the direction of Wavre, stationed Thielmann with 28,000 men in that place, in order to divert the attention of the French, whilst he sent Bulow with 30,000 in the direction of Chapelle St. Lambert. Pirch I. followed Bulow, and Ziethen skirted the forest of Soignes; each commanded 15,000 men. Had Grouchy taken General Gerard's advice, he would have arrived at the Moustier and Ottignies bridges at one or two o'clock, have crossed them without opposition, and found the road to Maransart quite undefended. Had he ordered Pajol and Teste, who had been sent to Tourrines in the morning, to advance to Wavre, where they could have occupied Thielmann for some hours, he himself could have marched with his remaining 30,000 men towards Maransart, where he would have found Bulow too much engaged in the valley of Lasne to attend to anything else, whilst Pirch I. and Ziethen would be probably too much advanced to observe his approach. Had he only drawn off these latter, the essential object would have been obtained, since it was their arrival that ruined all. Had he even attracted their attention, he might have advanced before they could prevent him, and achieved the double advantage of relieving Napoleon and overwhelming Bulow.

Marshal Grouchy's fault can only be lessened by taking into consideration the great services he had formerly performed, and his truly loyal and devotedly good intentions. As Napoleon said, Grouchy was as useless to the army on that fatal day as though an earthquake had engulfed him and removed him from all participation in human affairs. His neglecting the duty imposed on him, that of preventing the Prussians from joining the English, was the real cause of our overthrow—we mean the physical cause—for the moral ones must be sought at a higher source, where Napoleon will appear as a true criminal!

If this campaign of four days' duration be considered from a higher point of view, we shall not find the fault lie with the general, who had never been more profound, more active, or more fertile in resources, but with the head of the State, who had created a factitious position both for himself and France, a position where the most powerful genius must yield in presence of insurmountable moral difficulties. Nothing, indeed, could

be finer or more skilful than the plans by which, without the knowledge of the enemy, he assembled 124,000 men on the frontier, plans which gave Charleroi to Napoleon within a few hours, placed him in such a position between the English and Prussians that he could fight them separately, and when they would have been conquered, would leave him time to meet the Russians and Austrians with the forces that would be organised whilst he fought. The hesitation of Ney and Reille on the 15th and 16th, by which our victory was rendered incomplete, can only be attributed to Napoleon, since it was he who impressed on their minds those memories by which they were so much influenced! It was he who had inscribed Salamanca and Vittoria on the memory of Reille; Dennewitz, Leipsic, and Laon on Ney's; and Kuln on Vandamme's. If the 17th, the day following the battle of Ligny, was lost, which indeed was not of any great consequence, it was caused by Ney's hesitation for one half the day, and by a storm for the remainder. Of course, neither Napoleon nor his lieutenants could be blamed for the tempest; but it was he who had placed himself in a position where the least accident might become a serious danger, a position in which to avoid destruction it would be necessary that every circumstance without exception should be favourable, a combination which nature never accords to any general.

Nor was the delay on the morning of the 18th the result of error, as it was absolutely necessary that the ground should be allowed to become firm for the passage of the horses and cannon; nor could it be supposed that the time given to allow the ground to dry was only giving the Prussians an opportunity of arriving. If Reille faltered before Goumont, if Ney's and d'Erlon's hesitation of the 16th was succeeded by the rashness of the 18th, when our most valuable troops were prematurely engaged, we repeat that the fault was Napoleon's, who had placed them in such strange positions: to him was attributable the real cause of their moral condition, as well as of their prodigious but reckless heroism. Lastly, if Napoleon's attention and presence, together with the reserve, were drawn off to the right, so that he could not prevent the serious errors that occurred in the centre, the catastrophe lay in the arrival of the Prussians, and the cause of this was attributable, not to Napoleon for detaching his right wing to occupy them, for he could not leave them unwatched or unpursued, or without some obstacle to prevent their return, but to Grouchy, to Grouchy alone, whatever may be said; but the error of employing Grouchy—ah! that great error was Napoleon's, who, to recompense a political service, had selected a man, brave and honest indeed, but one that was not competent to command an army under such circumstances. With 20,000 or 30,000 additional soldiers Napoleon might have provided

against all these accidents, and these 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers were in Vendée, which formed a part of the extraordinary position he had created. It was the very extreme of rashness to lead 120,000 men against 220,000 of the best troops in Europe, commanded by exasperated generals, who were determined to conquer or die; and yet the excessive rashness was almost wisdom in Napoleon's position, as it was the only means by which he could win that desperate wager of conquering irritated Europe with the exhausted forces of France—forces which he had had but two months to reorganise. And that we may omit nothing, the feverish excitement of the army that fell from the very height of heroism to unheard-of dejection was to be attributed to the head of the State, who, during a reign of fifteen years, had made an ill use of everything, of France, of his own genius, of all that God had placed under his control! To attribute to Napoleon's military incapacity the reverses which originated in a position it had taken fifteen years to create is not only to substitute the false for the true, but the little for the great. At Waterloo he was not a superannuated general who had lost his activity or his presence of mind, but an extraordinary man, an incomparable warrior, whose mighty genius could not redeem his political errors; he was a giant struggling against the force of events, which he was trying to bend to his will, but who was carried along by the violence of that moral torrent, and vanquished like the feeblest of mortals. Genius become powerless in presence of a reason it has ignored, or recognised too late, presents a very different moral spectacle to a degenerated commander guilty of technical errors. Instead of being a lesson worthy of the human race, for whom it is delivered, or of the God who gave it, it would be only a theme to be discussed for the instruction of the pupils of a military school.

This extraordinary man is now about to appear confronting the moral causes he had himself created, and in the following book we shall find him undergoing a final catastrophe produced almost solely by moral causes, and little, if at all, by material; for though minor events may depend on the latter, it is only the former that can produce really great results. It is they that create and even force events despite of material causes. Mind rules, matter is ruled, nor can aught else be seen by him who observes the world and sees it as it really is.

BOOK LXI.

SECOND ABDICATION.

THE events that occurred on the eastern and southern frontiers had been less important and less unfortunate than those that took place on the northern. General Rapp had retired within Strasburg, and General Lecourbe within BÉfort, and the latter succeeded in checking the enemy by combats worthy of the time when he defended the Alps against the Austrians and Russians. On the Swiss and Savoy frontier, Marshal Suchet, ever skilful and ever successful, made his position good with 18,000 men against an army of 60,000. Though he had but about 8000 or 9000 troops of the line, and about as many of the mobilised national guards, he had succeeded in defending Mount Jura and the Alps from Rousses to Briançon, he had put Lyon in a state of defence, and with his active troops disputed the approaches to Chambéry. Profiting by the errors of the Austrians, he had repelled them, and then proposed an armistice when he heard of the disaster of Waterloo. The enemy having demanded possession of Lyon and Grenoble, the indignant marshal attacked them most vigorously, and killed or took prisoners 3000 of their men. The Austrian General Frimont was disconcerted, accepted the armistice offered by the marshal, and consented to recognise the frontier of 1814 as the line of separation between the belligerent armies.

In Vendée, affairs were equally successful. We have seen how the Vendean chiefs, after the surprise of Aizenay, being discontented with the English and M. de la Rochejaquelein, had dispersed, and were again likely to break up into their old divisions. M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein, having become commander-in-chief of the insurrection, had confided the direction of his staff to General Canuel, an old republican officer, who had quarrelled with the empire. Although MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Antichamp were disinclined to acknowledge a single commander, they submitted through deference to the royal authority, and through respect for the illustrious name of La Rochejaquelein. Soon after, General Canuel urged M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein to centralise the authority, somewhat after the manner of a regular army; but

the other commanders were offended by an arrangement so different to Vendean customs, and still more when it was proposed to lead them into the Marais, where they would receive succours from the English fleet, a promise in which they felt little confidence. They objected, asserting how little assistance could be hoped for from England, and how great the danger would be of accumulating men in the Marais, between the troops of General Travot, who was at Bourbon-Vendée, and those of General Lamarque, who was at Nantes, where they would be exposed to die of hunger in an open country where they had always been beaten. At this time MM. de la Béraudière, de Malartic, and de Flavigny arrived in Vendée, as envoys from M. Fouché, to propose a suspension of arms, on the grounds that as the great question was to be solved in Flanders, it would be useless to shed blood in Vendée, where nothing decisive could ever be effected. When M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein heard of these conferences he looked on them as criminal on the part of MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Autichamp, and deprived them of their command, as faithless to their cause. In Vendée the command being given by the people and not by the king, MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Autichamp remained at the head of their troops, and allowed M. Louis de la Rochejaquelein to attack the enemy in the Marais, where, endeavouring to extricate himself from a perilous position by efforts of extraordinary bravery, he was killed at the head of a column of 1500 men, which was quickly dispersed.

He was succeeded in command by M. de Sapinaud, when the leaders, again taking arms, marched to Roche-Servien, where they met General Lamarque, and were defeated with the loss of 3000 men. In this engagement M. de Suzannet fell pierced with bullets. The Vendean leaders, seeing that they could not withstand their opponents, and that it was not they who were destined to restore the Bourbons, yielded at last to M. Fouché's proposal, and signed the treaty of pacification of their province, after they had uselessly shed their own blood, and that of the brave soldiers who might have been better employed in Flanders than in Vendée.

Thus neither on the frontiers nor in the interior had anything been definitively lost if the Parisians had known how to bear the disaster of Waterloo.

When Napoleon left Charleroi he advanced with a small party of horsemen of all arms to Philippeville, where he arrived on the morning of the 17th, and it was with great difficulty that he could get the gates opened, the governor not being able to recognise the Emperor of the French in such a plight. With grief and deference Napoleon was admitted into the fortress,

where he found M. de Bassano and some of his officers in the greatest consternation and without baggage, nothing having been saved, not even the imperial carriages. Some moments being accorded to mutual condolences, Napoleon sent off several orders; he wrote to his brother Joseph, to inform him of his last reverse, and to desire him to summon the ministers, and in conjunction with them to make such arrangements as the circumstances required; and then, escorted by what attendants he could collect, he with them got into such carriages as could be procured, and set off for Laon, where he had ordered the army to rally.

When Napoleon arrived at Laon, whither the news of our misfortune had preceded him, he was received by the municipal authorities and the commanders of the garrison with expressions of sympathy that touched him most sensibly, and he immediately began to meditate on the line of conduct he was to pursue. At a glance he saw the fate that was before him, saw too clearly, perhaps, that however he might act, the result would be the same. He had trusted his destiny to a cast of the die; he had failed, and all was lost. This mode of regarding events inspired him with wonderful resignation, but perhaps diminished his energy, and even his care in estimating his future plans. He was alternately calm and resigned, bitter and contemptuous, at a time when less penetration and a greater desire for safety might have enabled him, at least for a time, to command destiny herself. Indeed it seemed to him that any advantage he could gain would be but for a short while, and it is not probable that he would stoop to make a great effort for such a reward.

What was most urgent was to give France an exact account of the battle of the 18th June. Napoleon had with him his aides-de-camp, M. de Bassano, the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, M. de Flahault, and M. de la Bédoyère. He himself drew up the bulletin of the battle, with the intention of stating the truth, but without blaming any person. Having rapidly dictated this bulletin, he read it to those who were present, and said he could attribute part of the day's misfortunes to Marshal Ney, but would not do so, as all had done their best, and all perhaps had erred. Indeed it would have been cruel to throw the responsibility of his defeat on a man who had endeavoured to avert it by performing prodigies of heroism. He did not think of Marshal Grouchy, of whose conduct he was ignorant, and whose absence he attributed to some extraordinary cause. The entire blame was attributed to circumstances and the *feverish impetuosity of the cavalry*. Having first consulted the just and truthful Druot, Napoleon confirmed the bulletin, and sent it to Paris by an express courier. He then discussed with those about him what was to be done.

What was he to do at Laon? Would he patiently wait there until the wreck of his army had rallied? And what would the amount of that remnant be? Would it suffice to check the enemy, or delay their march for some days so as to allow time to have the gates of Paris closed, the redoubts armed, and the troops assembled in the garrison? Would it not be better to leave the major-general and Prince Jerome at Laon to rally the army, and for Napoleon to hasten to Paris, appear before the chambers, tell them the truth, and ask them for the means of repairing the late disaster! The means were there if the chambers would stand by the government. Napoleon himself had made considerable preparations beforehand, that in case he should suffer a great defeat he might have some chance of making a successful resistance. The chambers might aid him by their devotion to the common cause, so that now all depended on the firmness and unanimity of the public bodies. Would not Napoleon be more likely to obtain a manifestation of this firmness and unanimity if he were present than if he were absent?

This was a serious question, and now proposed for the third time during Napoleon's career. As in his own person he united the twofold character of general and head of the State, he had on many solemn occasions to ask himself, which was better, to restore its sovereign to the government, or leave its commander to the army? On all these occasions he sacrificed the military to the civil interest, and his plan had succeeded, though at the expense of his personal reputation, for he thus gave his enemies an opportunity of saying, that after endangering the army by his own fault, he had only thought of his personal safety. These were the comments of enemies, for at each of these junctures he had attained some great aim. When he abandoned the army in Egypt and went to found a government at Paris, he became consul and emperor. When at the end of the campaign of 1812 he left his army at Smorgoni, and crossed Germany before it could rise against him, he collected sufficient resources to conquer Europe at Lutzen and Bautzen, and sufficient to save his crown could he have induced his pride to make some sacrifices. He had consequently acted wisely, since on the first occasion he had won power, and preserved it on the second. Would it be so on this third time?

This was a question not so easily answered. When Napoleon returned from Egypt covered with glory, he had only to show himself to throw the despised Directory into the shade. When he returned so abruptly from Russia, he was still believed invincible, and the forces of nature alone were blamed for a misfortune that was looked upon as temporary; besides, at that time no other government than his had been thought of, and the patriotism of France soon supplied him with materials for a

second campaign. But now everything was changed. The world had become accustomed to see him conquered : his genius was still believed in, but the faith in his good fortune had declined, his despotism and ambition were blamed for the reverses of France, and the present disaster was ascribed to his fatal return from Elba. The errors of the Bourbons had prepared the way for his return, and France had allowed his army to impose Napoleon on her, in the hope that he might still be able to conquer ; but when besides his other advantages, he had lost the prestige of victory, would it be possible for him to retain any ascendancy over the chambers, already ill-disposed towards him on the eve of his defeat, and probably still more so on the morrow ? Would they not, as men often do, despise the unsuccessful hero ? Would it not be better for him to remain with the army that still adored him, and attributed his defeat to treachery ? Would he not, though conquered, produce a more imposing effect whilst surrounded by that army, than alone, unarmed, and unguarded, at the bar of an unpitied assembly ?

Napoleon's private feeling was, that it would be wiser for him to remain at Laon to collect the remains of the army, than to go to Paris to place himself in the power of a hostile body of men. He was inclined to remain, but the opinions of those around were divided. Some only thought of what his enemies had so often said, that he always fled from the army when it was in difficulties, and they feared that this would be repeated on the present occasion. Others, taking a more extensive view, considered that by going to Paris he would revive the public courage, restrain party spirit, silence opposition, and unite all good citizens in the sole thought of opposing the enemy. Those with whom this last consideration had most weight, being accustomed to yield to the personal ascendancy of their master, did not perceive that though this sentiment was still intact for them, it had lost more than three-fourths of its importance for others, and they wished to oppose him to the influence of party spirit, in the chimerical confidence that he could produce the same influence as formerly. It was certainly desirable that some strong will should be present to guide the agitation that might easily be foreseen in Paris at such a time. But would not this will be more effective at a distance than near, more imposing in the midst of an army devoted to its commander than in the deserted Palace of the Elysée ? Supposing that an excited assembly should pass decrees subversive of the imperial prerogative, what could it do against Napoleon whilst surrounded by his soldiers ; whilst, were he alone at Paris, with no other escort than the reputation of being vanquished, could it not insult and even deprive him of his sceptre ? He could foresee this humiliating future, though he did not speak of it to those

around him. Almost all of those saw only the necessity for a strong hand at the head of the government, one that could restrain the ill-disposed, and believing in the efficacy of a power under whose influence they themselves still bent, they conjured him to set off at once for Paris. He persisted in a kind of silent resistance; but at length two circumstances led him to form a resolution contrary to his secret inclinations. One was the receipt of a letter from the Count de Lanjuinais, president of the Chamber of Representatives, written indeed after the battle of Ligny and before that of Waterloo, but filled with such strong expressions of affection that it augured well for the feelings of the assembly. The other was, that considering the state of things at Laon, there was but little temptation to remain there. Had Napoleon 50,000 or 60,000 men between Paris and the frontier, nothing could have induced him to leave them, for with his skill in manœuvring he would have been able to check the conquering generals, given time to the public mind to recover its balance, and to the national guards to hasten to his assistance, and by their bold bearing restrain the enemy both at home and abroad. But only about 3000 fugitives had been found between Philippeville and Laon, and it would take eight or ten days to collect 20,000 men with even the semblance of organised troops. "Ah!" said somebody to him, "if Grouchy were indeed a good general, if there were any hope that he had saved the 35,000 devoted men under his command, 25,000 more could soon be added to them, and with these 60,000 resolute soldiers the enemy could be attacked, a battle gained, the march of our opponents arrested, and the tottering fortunes of France restored." But it must be that Grouchy was taken either by the English or Prussians, and not a single corps now remains entire. It would take ten or twelve days to collect 15,000 or 20,000 men at Laon. And this time would be spent in collecting them one by one. It would therefore be much better for Napoleon to proceed to Paris and employ this time in assembling the public authorities, and then return after a few days to assume the command of the army which meantime the major-general would have collected and organised. These specious reasons determined Napoleon, for he could not content himself to spend his time seeking fugitives at Laon, whilst he might be at Paris to restrain party spirit, encourage the administration, and create fresh resources. Had he known that Grouchy was safe, he would have remained; but having every reason to believe him lost, he went to Paris. We may thus say that Grouchy twice caused his ruin—the first time by acting ill, and the second time by exciting an apprehension that he might have acted ill, which indeed was not the case, as he had succeeded in saving his *corps d'armée* as though by a miracle.

Having taken his resolution, Napoleon gave orders that the entire national guard should seek the fugitives in the country round, and bring them to Laon. He left the command of the army to the major-general, Marshal Soult, and took with him his brother Jerome, who had been wounded in the hand and arm. He desired the marshal to reorganise the troops as quickly as possible, and said that when he should have arranged the most urgent affairs he would return to take the command. This was on the 20th June. He got into his carriage and set out for Paris.

Whilst Napoleon was forming this important resolution, the Parisians, surprised by the news from Waterloo, first became stupefied, and then gave way to the most violent agitation. The successive accounts of a decisive success at Vendée, of another in the Alps, together with the brilliant victory at Ligny, had inspired a certain confidence; and it was hoped, with the aid of good fortune and some moderation, that an honourable peace might be concluded. The public mind was occupied by these satisfactory accounts up to the 18th. On the 19th nothing was heard. On the 20th it was said that the ministers had been summoned by Prince Joseph, and the most alarming rumours began to circulate through the capital. It was soon known that Prince Joseph had informed the government that a great disaster had taken place, and that he had advised them to wait patiently for Napoleon's orders. It was more easy to counsel than to preserve composure. The excitement was great, and all felt that Waterloo would only be the signal for a new revolution. Since Napoleon's return from Elba it was generally felt that though the hatred entertained towards him by all Europe rendered him dangerous to France, that still his valour would be her safeguard. But now that he had been conquered at Waterloo, it was universally acknowledged that to descend from the throne was the only compensation he could offer for the danger in which he had placed the country. Those who see no merit but in success said simply that he had played his last game, lost it, and ought now to give place to another. Those who formed their opinions on higher principles said, that having compromised France with Europe during his former reign, he ought not to have returned—that having returned, he could excuse so daring an attempt only by adopting a wiser policy and by achieving a victory; but that since instead of conquering, he had suffered a defeat, he ought by sacrificing himself to put a termination to the dangers he had created but could not remedy.

This was the general opinion expressed by each after his own fashion. The royalists, in great joy, proclaimed loudly that the immediate downfall of Napoleon was due to France, and would be only the just punishment of his crimes. The honest

revolutionists, the young liberals, who, without having chosen Napoleon, had yet accepted him from the army as the only man that could defend the Revolution and France, seeing now that he made too large demands on his good fortune if not on his genius, fell into anxiety and despair, and did not hesitate to say that France alone ought to be thought of, and that it must be saved without Napoleon if it could not be saved with him. Those who were attached to the Bonaparte dynasty through affection or interest, and those revolutionists who were totally compromised, were the only persons who dared to assert that the country ought to stand by Napoleon, and sink with him beneath the ruins of the empire.

There were, however, some clear intellects—very few indeed—who held the same opinion, but for better reasons. They said, that as the error of recalling Napoleon or allowing him to return had been committed, that it could only be repaired by persevering in the course adopted, and supporting him resolutely; that there were still resources for carrying on the war, which in his hands would not fail to be efficacious; that with him it would be possible to resist the enemy, without him, impossible; that it was not only dishonourable but chimerical to think of sacrificing Napoleon in order to treat with Europe; that there was no doubt but that Europe was irritated against him, but it was as much so against France; that the finest promises would be made, but if France were weak enough to listen, God alone could tell what would become of her, her possessions, and her liberty!

This opinion was held by two eminent men, Carnot and Sièyes; by Carnot, because during the three months he had passed in Napoleon's service he had become attached to him, seeing he was simple-minded, candid, ready to admit his errors when not accused of them, and fully devoted to his country. Sièyes, though he did not like Napoleon a whit better than formerly, estimated the actual position with his wonted superiority of intellect, and decided that it would be better to join Napoleon and resist the enemy, or submit at once to the Bourbons. But as he could never adopt the latter alternative, he declared energetically and frankly that Napoleon ought to be supported, and whatever resources the country possessed placed at his command.

He expressed this opinion very warmly to M. Lanjuinais, whom he found terribly dejected by the news from Waterloo. M. Lanjuinais was one of those who had joined Napoleon for the sake of the public welfare; but that tie being severed, there was no bond to attach him to the emperor. "Consider well," said Sièyes to him, "consider well what you are about to do, for it is only this man that can save you. It is not a tribune

you need, but a general. He has the army, and can command it. If you crush him after having made use of him, it is not I that will mourn over him. But do make use of him first, put all the resources of the nation at his command, and you may escape the danger that threatens you. Otherwise you will sacrifice the Revolution and perhaps France with it."

To a certain degree Sièyes was right. If it were intended that liberty should triumph by the aid of the new liberals and the old revolutionists—those, be it understood, who had not committed any criminal excess—all of whom were attached to this noble cause, and all worthy of taking part in its vindication, if there were any desire to save France from the humiliation of accepting a government imposed by foreigners, of preserving her soil and glory from the insults of a victorious enemy, there was but one resource, concord amongst Frenchmen and union with Napoleon. It was he alone who could urge on the army and the more energetic portion of the nation to make those last efforts of patriotism—he alone who could render their efforts efficacious. It was only in the imagination of incorrigible maniacs, such as are to be found at all times, and of whom there were many at that time in the revolutionary party, that there could be found place for the belief that a revolutionary constituted assembly could renew the prodigies of energy wrought by the National Convention.

But it must be admitted that there was another mode of defending the cause of liberty and the inviolability of the French soil than by the hand of Napoleon. Liberty was not necessarily lost by the return of the Bourbons; it might triumph over them as it had over Napoleon when he was compelled to grant the Additional Act; and as to the integrity of the French soil, it would be as doubtful in a desperate struggle with the adverse armies as in frankly accepting the Bourbons, and making conditions either with them or with Europe that supported them, and this latter arrangement would be the least dangerous and the most likely to succeed, were it conducted with skill and sincerity. This might be the project of a good citizen, provided he did not think of his own interests, but of those of his country, that he proposed conditions for the security of liberty and the integrity of the soil, and not for his personal advancement; in a word, that he should propose to himself a patriotic enterprise, and not a base and interested intrigue. But though the members of the two chambers were quite willing to sacrifice Napoleon, they were not—either from repugnance or interest—willing to accept the Bourbons, so that to induce them to do so it would require the most perfect sincerity, the most profound skill and immense influence, in fact, a gifted individual that did not exist.

There were two men at this time who could have done a great deal towards saving the country, M. Fouché and Marshal Davout. Marshal Davout exercised a well-deserved influence over the army. He alone, after Napoleon, had sufficient authority to rally the troops; and if he acted at Paris as he had done at Hamburg, he would be able for a long time to arrest the progress of victorious Europe. His honesty was above all suspicion, and though he was not deficient in political acuteness, he was totally devoid of tact. He was only capable of one line of action: he could summon the members of the government, propose whatever measure he considered the best, even though it were to recall the Bourbons, and then break his sword if his advice were not adopted. But he was quite unequal to leading parties through the difficulties of a complicated discussion, and inducing them to adopt a determination which, however just, should be dissembled for some days. M. Fouché was very different; though he was totally destitute of sincerity and disinterestedness, and had no influence with the army, he possessed in the highest degree the power of deceiving, and of leading men's minds to the object he desired, at the same time that he totally denied his aim. He had too much of those qualities of which Marshal Davout had too little, and in such a crisis as the present, when the country alone should be thought of, he was incapable of thinking of anything but himself. The account of the disaster at Waterloo was a fresh spur to his activity, his vanity, and his ambition. To be rid of Napoleon was sufficient compensation for him, and besides that this event gave the Bourbons almost the certainty of returning, now that the Titan was overthrown, he saw none likely to rise above himself from the present chaos. He saw himself in imagination the sole director of coming events, playing in 1815 the same part that M. de Talleyrand had played in 1814, and that even with an increase of power, as ruling the different parties in Paris at the same time that he was treating with the enemy at her gates, he flattered himself that he would be the arbitrator not only of France but of Europe; and his ridiculous blindness prevented him from seeing that if M. de Talleyrand, by his influence and decision in advising the victorious sovereigns, had obtained the Charter of 1814, he, by trying to deceive all parties, and ending by deceiving himself, would only succeed in delivering France and her most illustrious citizens to the rage of the emigrants and of Europe. In 1814 a reconciliation had been effected, which it only depended on the Bourbons to render durable; 1815 would only produce a detestable revenge. It was an ignoble end on which to lavish so much labour.

The moment the fatal intelligence arrived from Waterloo, M. Fouché commenced to weave plots of every kind. The

Bourbons would not be his choice ; his being a regicide placed an insuperable barrier between him and them. He would prefer the regency of Marie Louise, which would suit both the Bonapartists and the army ; or even the Duke of Orleans, to whom many friends of liberty and many superior officers of the army began to direct their wishes. But if conquered or half-victorious Europe might have consented either to Marie Louise or the Duke of Orleans, there was nothing to be hoped for after such a disaster as the battle of Waterloo but the unconditional return of the Bourbons.

The prudent M. Fouché was quite resigned to such a result, provided it was his own work, and tended to his personal advantage. He commenced by a decided step, which he hoped would be certain to secure his interests. M. de Vitrolles, of whose conduct we have already spoken, since the time he had been arrested at Toulouse had remained a prisoner in Vincennes, where Napoleon detained him as a kind of hostage through whom some future advantage might be gained, and not to have him shot as M. Fouché asserted, when he wanted to have the merit of having saved him. Napoleon had thus unconsciously furnished an excellent instrument for intrigue to M. Fouché, who ordered that M. de Vitrolles should be released from confinement and brought before him, when he told him he was free, advised him not to appear in public, but to hold himself in readiness for the mission on which he intended to employ him. As M. Fouché knew well that there was but one species of mission in which M. de Vitrolles would consent to be employed, there was no occasion that the latter should make any remark on that point. But as the crisis was only at its commencement, it was not possible to do more at that moment in favour of royalty. By releasing M. de Vitrolles from Vincennes, and holding him in readiness to act as ambassador, M. Fouché did what placed him in a favourable light with the Bourbons, at the same time that it gave him an opportunity of opening communications with them.

M. Fouché, of course, did not mention to any person the step he had taken, but on the contrary, showed himself in a very different character to those by whose aid he hoped to effect a fresh revolution. The first thing to be done was to get rid of Napoleon, whom he still feared, especially in the convulsions of that last agony, which would probably be violent ; and though everything indicated the fall of him who had been vanquished at Waterloo, it would be necessary to act with precaution with those whom he wished to lead on to pronounce the sentence of his downfall. Immediately after leaving the council of ministers at Prince Joseph's, M. Fouché summoned the different members of the two chambers, and passed the entire of the 20th, and the

night of the 20th-21st, in these different interviews. "Well," he said to them, "did I not tell you that this man's foolish obstinacy would ruin us? If he had not returned from Elba, we should have got rid of the Bourbons, we had almost arranged with the powers about accepting Marie Louise or the Duke of Orleans, and instead of a violent revolution and sanguinary war with all Europe, we should have had a change effected with tranquillity and almost unanimous consent. There was an excellent opportunity for effecting it even at the Champ de Mai. We knew by a secret mission from Vienna (he alluded to M. Werner's mission to Basle) that the allies were willing to come to an arrangement provided that Napoleon were removed, and if they were conceded, they were willing to accept Marie Louise, the Duke of Orleans, in fact, any arrangement that would suit us. At the Champ de Mai I proposed to Napoleon to abdicate in favour of his son, and thus compel the powers to prove their sincerity. By this sacrifice he would have secured an honourable retreat, and crowned himself with glory. But he would not listen to anything, and you yourself see that this reckless gambler has lost the art of winning, and what can be done with a gambler that can do nothing but lose?"

M. Fouché did not speak so freely to all. With some he was more reserved; to his intimate acquaintances he spoke more fully; but to all he declared his terror of what Napoleon might do on his return to Paris. "He will come back like a madman," he said; "he will propose the most extraordinary measures—ask you to place the resources of the nation at his command, that he may risk them in a desperate chance. Last year he thought to destroy Paris; you may imagine what he will be inclined to do this year, when his only choice will be between death and a dungeon, and you may rest assured that if you do not vote as he wishes, he will dissolve the chambers, that he may get the entire power into his own hands." M. Fouché, having repeatedly and successfully uttered this threat of the dissolution of the chambers ever since their opening, was well aware of the effect it would now produce. The representatives, not more than three weeks in possession of their office, and who felt their influence increase as Napoleon's declined, trembled at the idea of being dismissed, sent back to their homes, and leave France, as M. Fouché said, in the hands of a madman, who the year before was thinking of setting fire to the powder magazine at Grenelle, and who certainly would not attempt less this year. M. Fouché assured them that Napoleon was determined on a dissolution of the chambers, a suggestion which he well knew would deprive them of all coolness of judgment. They were inclined to believe him, as nobody had a better opportunity than he of knowing the imperial plans.

But it was not sufficient to be warned ; they should devise some means of protecting themselves—no easy task, as the Additional Act gave the monarch the power of dissolving or adjourning the chambers.

M. Fouché professed the most profound contempt for the Additional Act, and did not seem to think that it could be an obstacle in any way. He declared that it would be the most egregious folly to be impeded by a valueless Charter, which Napoleon held so lightly that he would not hesitate to violate it whenever it would suit his interests. There was but one thing to be done, and that was to pass a decree by which the chambers should declare that they would not submit to be prorogued or dissolved whilst France was in so critical a position. M. Fouché asserted that this decree was not an attack on the Crown, though it restrained one of its prerogatives. The sceptre would still remain to Napoleon, though he would be restricted in its use. To these reasonings M. Fouché added some hints, by which he insinuated that he was in private communication with the different European courts, especially with the Austrian ; and he declared that no resolution had been adopted inimical to France, but only to Napoleon, and that if he were removed, there was no doubt but that the dignity, liberty, and possessions of France would be secured. He need not be dethroned, but merely prevented from committing any rash act to which he might be tempted ; for the destiny of France should not, he said, be left in the power of a madman, who would rather involve the country in his own ruin than sacrifice himself to save it.

All adopted M. Fouché's views on this measure, and he promised the different members he met that he would give them immediate information of all that he could learn concerning Napoleon's plans. There was one representative, M. de Lafayette, whose distrust he was most successful in awakening. We have already seen the part played by this important personage during the Hundred Days. By according or denying his approbation to M. Benjamin Constant or to Prince Joseph, according as they yielded or refused to do as he desired, he had secured himself so much influence that he had succeeded in obtaining the convocation of the chambers against Napoleon's decided wish. M. de Lafayette attached more importance to this convocation than to the most important clauses of the Additional Act, for he said that once the chambers were assembled, it would be very easy to restrain Napoleon, should he think of resuming his old despotism. There was consequently no man then existing who would more certainly become excited upon hearing of the certainty or even of the possibility of the chambers being dissolved. M. Fouché took care that he should be informed that Napoleon had lost his army, and was now

returning to assemble a second, and that undoubtedly his first care would be to get rid of the chambers; that the representatives should therefore be on their guard, that they might, in defiance of him, preserve an influence so salutary to the welfare of the country. Less than this would have sufficed to awaken the distrust, the zeal, and unbounded daring of M. de Lafayette.

There were two young deputies, MM. Jay and Manuel, both very honest men, and much beneath M. de Lafayette in position, but one of whom, M. Manuel, was about to play a very important part; and both these gentlemen had been greatly deceived by M. Fouché, who intended to use them constantly as instruments during the present crisis. M. Jay, who had formerly been tutor to M. Fouché's sons, and was now representative for Bordeaux, had devoted himself to literature, and was distinguished by his academic success. His mind was cultivated, gentle, and refined; his character timid but independent. He wrote better than he spoke; but he could, when necessary, express his opinions in a few bold, well-chosen words. M. Manuel, the representative of Aix, was an advocate practising in that department, a man who possessed no talent for literary composition, but who spoke extremely well, was endowed with great presence of mind, undoubted courage, and sincere patriotism. He had become intimate with M. Fouché when the latter was undergoing a kind of exile at Provence. Both these young men had up to this time taken no part in politics, and both felt great confidence in M. Fouché, who took care to present himself in the very best possible light to them. With them he affected to belong to no party, to feel no more interest for Bonaparte than for the Bourbons, to be more attached to measures than to men, with no desire to dethrone Napoleon, but ready to do so if the safety of France should need it. He could not have assumed a better disguise, for he only expressed the opinions held by all young and sincere politicians, and in such a character it was not difficult for him to win two young men unattached to any party, and only thinking of the interests of their country. He said to them, as he had said to M. de Lafayette, that Napoleon would arrive in a few hours, that it would only be right to support him, but that they should not allow him, by dissolving the chambers, to deprive them of their share in the government. Such sentiments were calculated to gain not only the persons we have mentioned, but every member of both chambers.

Although the chambers did not open until noon, the greater number of representatives hurried to the Palais de l'Assemblée on the morning of the 21st, and with the excitement natural to such a time, demanded the details of the disaster which had happened on the 18th, which, when they had learned, all

sincerely lamented, and each suggested a remedy after his own fashion; but they were unanimous in declaring that France should no longer be sacrificed for one man, and that the country should be saved without his aid, if it could not be saved with it. To minds so disposed, the rumour that Napoleon was returning, determined to dissolve the chambers, and to carry on a fatal warfare against all Europe, regardless of the risk to France, was calculated to excite a spirit of revolt. Any suggestion, however just, of Napoleon's being the only person capable of opposing the enemy, was received with the greatest disfavour. There were many honest, sensible men amongst the representatives, who on the 20th of March had regretted that the fate of France should be again entrusted to Napoleon, but who at the close of that day had warmly espoused his cause, and felt inclined to believe that he alone could successfully encounter Europe in arms. These were men who dreaded the return of the Bourbons, surrounded by the triumphant emigrants, but who now knew not what to say when they were told that Napoleon was returning like a madman, determined to risk the country in a desperate strife; whilst it was asserted, that if he would abdicate, the enemy would rest contented, and leave France the choice of her own government. To these assertions they could only reply by an embarrassed silence; and the promoters of the ruling idea, that Napoleon should be sacrificed to the safety of France, an idea they had adopted in consequence of M. Fouché's assertions, and on his supposed communication with Vienna—these, we repeat, found at most but a timid and silent opposition. The idea that the chambers would be dissolved or prorogued, which would deprive them of all power of restraining Napoleon on his return to Paris, was most repugnant to the feelings of the representatives, and what they were determined not to brook. Such was the state of public excitement on the morning of the 21st, an excitement partly natural, and partly fomented by the reports M. Fouché had so invidiously circulated.

He had done more than this, for he actually brought over some members of the government to his views. He had not sought to influence Carnot, whom he considered a maniac, undeserving his notice, and who, together with Sièyes, considered that France and the Revolution could be saved by Napoleon alone; but he had produced some effect upon M. de Caulaincourt, who was always inclined to take a gloomy view of things, and confirmed him in the opinion that all was lost, and that nothing now was to be thought of but to save Napoleon from being treated with personal ignominy or cruelty. He expressed the same opinion to Cambacères, who had always held these views, and to Marshal Davout, who began to fear

that he was right. All who disagreed with him he treated as imbeciles; but the witty and talented M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angèly, though most devoted to the emperor, being very impressionable, was completely won over by Fouché's assurance that by his own eloquence and the assistance that would be afforded him he would be able to guide the chamber. To all he said that the present crisis was desperate, that the only imaginable means of escape was in Napoleon's abdication, by which the anger of Europe might be mollified, and possibly Marie Louise's regency established. Of this latter result he seemed quite certain, and supported his belief by allusions to mysterious communications which he did not define clearly, but of whose existence he contrived to convince his hearers, at the same time that he impressed them with an idea of their vast importance.

Such was the result produced by M. Fouché during the twenty-four hours which had elapsed between the receipt of the fatal news and Napoleon's arrival at the Elysée Palace. The first person he met as he ascended the steps was M. de Caulaincourt, whose hand he took and pressed warmly. As Druot alighted from the carriage after him, he could not prevent himself from saying to those around that all was lost: "Except honour," added Napoleon warmly. These were the only words he had uttered since he left Laon. He was paler than usual, but his countenance was firm; his eyes were dry, but his chest was oppressed. He took M. de Caulaincourt's arm, and ordered a bath and some refreshments, for he was exhausted from fatigue, having been almost constantly on horseback for the past six days. Throwing himself on a bed, he told M. de Caulaincourt that the victory of the 16th had offered a good prognostic for that of the 18th; that the second battle seemed to promise a decided victory, but had been changed to a defeat by two circumstances—Grouchy's absence and Ney's precipitation—the latter being more heroic than ever, but in a state of excitement that blinded his judgment; but he added, that the question to be considered was not who was in fault, but rather how the evil that had been committed might be repaired. He then asked M. de Caulaincourt what was to be hoped for from the two chambers, from their leaders, and from the chief men of the State in general. M. de Caulaincourt, whose fault was rather to exaggerate than conceal the truth, did not hesitate to say that the chambers were inclined to seek the public safety in his removal from the throne, and that he would find the greater number ill-disposed towards him. "I divined it," said Napoleon; "I was certain that they would disagree, and thus lose the last chance we had. Our disaster is certainly great, but it might be repaired; disunited, we shall soon fall a

prey to the enemy. They only think of removing me now. But when I am gone they will rid themselves of all connected with the Revolution, and will send you back the Bourbons and the emigrants. The Bourbons—be it so! . . . but they must know what they are doing.” Napoleon had expected this, and was neither surprised nor disturbed. He desired that the ministers and the principal men of the government should be summoned, and then fell sound asleep; for he was worn out from fatigue, and his mind, prepared for every reverse, was no longer capable of that excitement that repels repose.

The Elysée Palace was soon thronged by those who had the curiosity or the right to enter there. Their first occupation was to ask for information concerning the late military events from the officers composing Napoleon's escort. The appearance of these was in itself sufficient. Their clothes, which they had not had time to change, torn by bullets, and stained with blood and dust, their countenances inflamed, and their eyes red from weeping, told but too plainly what they had suffered. Their grief, as is usual with those who suffer, found vent in painful narrations, and even in exaggerations, if it were possible that imagination could add anything to what they had already gone through. They could not indeed say too much of that fatal battle, or of the great losses that had been sustained; but from the accounts they gave, it would seem that the army no longer existed, that it would not be possible to assemble 1000 men, whilst, in reality, as we shall soon show, it would have been possible to form an army equal in numbers and superior in discipline to that of 1814. These sad recitals only increased the belief that there was now no choice but to capitulate to the enemy, a belief that had been but too general before, and it now spread from mouth to mouth, until it reached the assembly of representatives, who were only too willing to give it full credit. There was no possibility of calming the public mind, rousing the courage of the people, or inspiring them with vigour. Alas! when Providence is about preparing any great event, no accessory circumstance is neglected that may contribute to the general result!

After a short sleep Napoleon took a bath. It was announced that the ministers were assembled and waited for him. It was Marshal Davout that came to seek him. Napoleon had not seen him before. He let his arms fall back into the water as he saw the marshal enter, and cried, “What a disaster!” The marshal, whose rugged nature did not easily give way to emotion, advised resistance to the storm, and begged Napoleon not to delay in following him. Napoleon, who had foreseen and resigned himself to everything, hoped for no good result from the council that was about being held, told the marshal that the ministers might

commence their deliberations without him, and that he would join them in a few minutes. He delayed some time, until the marshal again implored him to hasten, when he proceeded to the council, where he was received with respect, and listened to with the most eager curiosity, whilst he briefly but expressively related what had passed, and told of the great hopes of victory which had been succeeded by the disastrous reality of a fearful defeat. Having finished these details, he told the ministers that the country had still great resources, which he would undertake to develop and employ; that there still remained much to be done by a skilful general; that he himself was neither discouraged nor dejected, but that he would need the aid and not the opposition of the chambers; that this was most essential, since by unanimity it was most likely that all would still be saved, but certainly could not be without it. He then reduced all discussion to the question, how they were to act towards the chambers in order to obtain this unanimity on which the safety of the State depended. Nobody opposed this, as it was the view entertained by all present. Napoleon now gave an opportunity to any one that chose to speak. But not one was inclined to do so, except those devoted men who thought more of their country than of themselves. Amongst these, M. de Caulaincourt might have spoken first; but despair had seized him, and he had fallen into a state of passiveness, from which he did not emerge during the time these painful scenes lasted.

Carnot, that excellent man, was moved even to tears, and fancying that everybody felt as he did, asserted that a revolutionary dictatorship should be created as in 1793, and entrusted not to a committee but to Napoleon, who had become in his eyes the personification of the Revolution. In his zeal for the public welfare he fancied that the chambers would think, judge, and act like him, and therefore advised that they should be asked to appoint Napoleon dictator.

This opinion was not shared by Marshal Davout. Feeling no admiration for assemblies which he only knew through the Convention and the Cinq Cents, he said that they would be opposed and paralysed by the chambers, which should be got rid of by being dissolved or prorogued as the Additional Act gave the sovereign the right to do, a right that should now be used in order to give an opportunity for collecting the necessary means for opposing and conquering the enemy. This opinion was warmly supported by Prince Lucien (all the princes were members of the council), who, as we have seen, had been with his brother since the 20th of March, and who seemed desirous that his present zeal should atone for his former opposition. The disobedience he had shown in past times was an advantage, increased by the fact of his never having been a sovereign.

Influenced by the memories of the 18th Brumaire, he joined Marshal Davout in advising to get rid of the chambers; but he found very few to support him. In all assemblies, great or small, the majority are always inclined to a middle course, and here, though the majority admitted that a sort of dictatorship was necessary, they were of opinion that it should be asked for from the chambers, that might agree to it, but that in any case the attempt ought to be made.

Admiral Decrès, clear-sighted whenever an error was to be detected, said that this was all mere imagination, for that though the chambers might submit to Napoleon had he conquered, they would reject him now that he was vanquished; that consequently nothing would be gained by such an appointment from them, at the same time that it would be most dangerous to undertake it without their consent. It was evident that this minister's distrust in the present state of things was in exact proportion to his profound sagacity. M. Fouché had said nothing, but as his silence seemed to imply disapprobation, he, merely for the sake of saying something, uttered a few phrases expressive of his regret for Napoleon's reverses, a regret he did not feel, and of his confidence in the chambers, a confidence that he would be very sorry was not unfounded. Still to preserve some consistence between the different parts he was acting in public and private, he said that they should take care not to offend the chambers, and especially not let it be seen that they had an idea of getting rid of them, but that it would be much better by conciliating them, seek to get the resources necessary for saving the dynasty and the country.

M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, who had become the dupe of M. Fouché, thought in all sincerity that he ought to express himself more distinctly than the rest. He said that it was not necessary that he should give any additional proof of his attachment to the imperial dynasty; he then spoke of the chambers, especially of the opinions entertained by the Chamber of Representatives, who, he asserted, were all imbued with the fatal conviction that the allied powers were only inimical to Napoleon, and that if he withdrew, they would be satisfied, and would accept the King of Rome with Marie Louise as regent. He added that this opinion had taken possession of all minds, even those most disinclined to the Bourbons, and that any other measure would have but very little chance of success. It could not be more plainly stated that the only remedy was that Napoleon should abdicate, and by sacrificing himself, secure the throne to his son, and save those who had attached themselves to him. Up to this time Napoleon had preserved a gloomy silence; but now seeing that M. Fouché's plan was influencing even those who were most devoted to him, he suddenly roused

himself, and fixing a penetrating glance on M. Regnaud, he said, "Explain, speak, conceal nothing. My personal safety is not the point in question; that I am ready to sacrifice, and it is but three days since that I did what I could to rid you of me. It is the safety of the State that is to be thought of. Who is it that can save the country now? Is it the Chamber of Representatives? Is it I? What does France know of the members of this chamber of yesterday, not one of whom is a statesman or a soldier? Is there amongst them a hand strong enough to hold the reins of government? France knows only me, esteems only me. Do you suppose that the army, which will be sufficiently imposing when rallied—do you suppose that that will obey any voice but mine? And if, as at St. Cloud, I should throw all these talkers out of the window, the army would applaud, and France would take no heed. But I do not think of doing so; I can see the difference of times and circumstances. But false ideas must not destroy our unanimity, our only resource at present. Certainly, the safety of the country depending on me alone, I am the apparent object of foreign hate, and it may be believed that if I retire our enemies will be satisfied. You are told that they will accept the King of Rome, with his mother as regent. It is a perfidious falsehood, invented at Vienna and propagated at Paris for our destruction. I know what goes on at Vienna, and they would not accept my wife and son at any price. They want the Bourbons, the Bourbons alone, and that is very natural. When I am out of the way, they will march to Paris and proclaim the Bourbons. Do you wish for them? For my part, I do not see but that they may be better than the present state of things. But the army, the peasantry, the holders of national property, all those that hailed my return with joy, do these wish for them? And all of you, upholders of the imperial family, would it suit you to have the triumphant emigrants return? Personally I have no interest in all this; my career is finished; whatever may happen, the most successful dictatorship would scarcely prolong it a few days. There is no question, I repeat, of me personally, but of France, of the Revolution, and of the interests to which it has given rise, and which may still be saved by unanimity and perseverance. The blow we have received is great, but it is not mortal. None but fugitives remain of the army that fought on the 18th; but if Grouchy, who in all probability was forgotten by the enemy in the ardour of their pursuit of the beaten army, if he have escaped, the fugitives will rally round him. He had 35,000 men, and it is not unlikely but that we can rally as many more, who, though they may be discouraged now, will at the sound of my voice resume their natural heroism. I shall thus have 70,000 soldiers. Rapp and Lecourbe can bring 40,000 more troops of the line

or mobilised national guards, whilst the Alps will be still guarded by Suchet and Brune. This will place more than 100,000 men under my command. I shall have 10,000 more from Vendée. I had not as many in 1814, when I had at least as many enemies to meet as now. Blucher and Wellington have not actually more than 120,000, and I could make them expiate their victory before the Russians and Austrians could arrive. The federalists, the dépôts, the national guard, and the marines would protect Paris from any sudden attack, and when the works on the left bank are completed, the city will be impregnable. Do you not suppose that there would be a great chance with 120,000 men manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, and in front of an impregnable capital? And in all probability France will not let us fight alone. I raised 180,000 picked national guards in two months; could I not get 100,000 more? Could I not get 100,000 conscripts? We are backed by hearty patriots who would come to fill our ranks, and a few months of obstinate strife would weary the patience of the allies, who, if we observe the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, could have no other motive than self-love for continuing the struggle. What then do we need to save us from ruin? Unanimity, perseverance, and goodwill!"

We only give the substance of an address which, bearing the impress of Napoleon's peculiar vigour of thought and expression, made a decided impression on all present, and would have had a still wider influence could it have penetrated beyond the walls of the Elysée Palace. But Napoleon could neither appear or speak in the chambers, nor was there any one to represent him there during the present extraordinary agitation. As we have already seen, the Chamber of Representatives had assembled at an early hour in the morning, and was now anxiously seeking fresh information when a sinister rumour was suddenly propagated amongst the members. It was said that a discussion was going on in the Elysée Palace as to whether the chambers should be dissolved or prorogued, in fact, that a decision was already come to, and would be officially announced in a few moments. It was M. Fouché, who, profiting by the lengthened discussion at the palace, had circulated this perfidious piece of information. It was to M. de Lafayette in particular that he sent the communication—to him who was most convinced that France could only be saved apart from Napoleon. M. de Lafayette, without consulting his colleagues, and calculating on the general feeling, asked permission to speak. His personal consideration, the importance of the present crisis, and the nature of the proposition it was supposed he was about to make, secured him the most serious attention. "Gentlemen," he said, "when now for the first time during so many years I raise a voice which the

old friends of liberty will certainly recognise, I feel myself called on to speak to you of the dangers that threaten the country, and which you alone can avert. Alarming rumours have been circulated; they are now unfortunately confirmed. This is the time to rally round the old tri-colored flag, the flag of '89, the flag of liberty, of equality, and of public order. It is that we must defend from the attacks of enemies abroad or at home. Gentlemen, you will allow a veteran in this sacred cause, one who never adopted any party, to submit to you some preliminary resolutions, whose necessity I hope you will appreciate." Having spoken these words with his wonted simplicity, M. de Lafayette proposed a resolution drawn up in five clauses, which declared the country in danger, the two chambers permanently assembled, and that whoever should seek to dissolve or prorogue them should be declared a traitor. To this was added an order for the ministers of war, of home and foreign affairs, to come at once and inform the assembly of the present state of their different departments. He then proposed that the national guards should be called out throughout the whole empire.

M. de Lafayette resumed his seat amid a general excitement, caused by the unanimity and not by the disagreement of opinions. Adopting this resolution was a violation in many ways of the Additional Act, which Act conferred on the emperor the power of dissolving the chambers, and which, though it gave the chamber the right of questioning ministers on any particular fact, did not authorise summoning them to the bar, or issuing orders to them. This was, in reality, declaring themselves in a state of revolution; but as they felt that they had entered on that path, a step more in advance could not make any great difference. Not one, not even a Bonapartist, remarked that the chamber was thus violating the Additional Act. None spoke but some of those troublesome persons who wish to announce their presence on great occasions when nobody is thinking of them, and only delay the resolutions that all are anxious to adopt. M. de Lafayette's proposal was warmly supported by Lacoste, a deputy from the Gironde, one of those won over by M. Fouché. Another wished that the four ministers should be summoned by a formal order. A third made some observations relative to the organisation of the national guards throughout the empire, and seemed to imply that M. de Lafayette should be appointed commander-in-chief of the body. This last proposal was rejected without discussion, but the rest of the proposition was adopted by an immense majority. It was decided that this resolution should be sent to the Chamber of Peers to be passed there, should the members approve of it. This important measure, the commencement

and almost the termination of a revolution already accomplished in men's minds, was passed without a dissentient voice; for though the members did not wish for the Bourbons, but would prefer the imperial dynasty represented by the King of Rome, they were all impressed with the idea that Napoleon's interests should be separated from those of France, and they considered that they were justified in acting thus towards a man whose ambition, in their belief, had ruined the country. They certainly were justified in doing so, especially at a time when legality was a matter of very little consequence; but they showed a want of discernment in supposing that after throwing Napoleon overboard, the vessel could still float on the waters of the State. The dynasty itself should be rejected, and with it the principles of the Revolution, though these happily, being immortal, could not perish.

Whilst the Chamber of Representatives, having come so abruptly to a resolution, was waiting in the greatest anxiety for the answer to its *plebis scitum*, copies of the resolution had been taken both to the Chamber of Peers and to the Elysée Palace. The members of the Upper Chamber were embarrassed, but offered no opposition. This chamber being accustomed to the performance of its functions, and better skilled in its restraining power, it might in some measure have modified the precipitation of the Chamber of Representatives. But it was not in the imperial Senate, from which the greater number had been taken, that the members could have learned to play the part of an English House of Lords. They were chiefly men weary of revolutions, disgusted with governments of every kind, who had seen both Napoleon and Louis XVIII. pass away, had flattered both, though estimating them at their just value, knowing that both deserved to fall, and who, notwithstanding the regrets that some might feel in secret, were determined to offer no obstacle to whatever Providence should please to decree. There was consequently no opposition offered by them to the resolution proposed in the other chamber. It was not so, nor could it be so, at the Elysée Palace. The dart privately prepared by M. Fouché, and publicly flung by M. de Lafayette, struck the wounded lion as he lay motionless but not dead, and roused him again into life. Shaking off the species of lethargy into which he had fallen, and from which he had roused himself but for a moment to reply to M. Regnaud, Napoleon began to pace the chamber rapidly, as was his wont when greatly excited. With contempt and anger he again repeated, that opposed to the 500,000 enemies marching at that moment against France, he was everything, and all others nought; that what had happened in Flanders was only an accident incidental to warfare, and might be repaired; that he and the army were alone of any

importance; that he would send a few companies of the guards to dissolve this insolent assembly, an act that would be admired by the army, and not noticed by the people; and that if he assumed the dictatorship, it would be for the general welfare. Nobody contradicted him; but after a little while those present thought to calm him, and had scarcely succeeded when a second blow was struck by the announcement that the decree of the Lower Chamber had been passed by the Upper. This immediate and silent consent of a hundred and more peers whom he had appointed but a fortnight before, without offering him a new phase in his knowledge of human nature, still pained him deeply, and awakened the thought that had presented itself to his mind on the very evening of the 18th, that his sceptre fell from him with his sword. He looked at M. Regnaud with less severity than before, and uttered these strange words, "Perhaps Regnaud is right in wishing me to abdicate." M. Regnaud had not uttered the word "abdicate;" but Napoleon, with his usual readiness, gave his proposal its right name. "Well, be it so; if it is necessary, I will abdicate; I do not think of myself, but of France; I do not resist for myself, but for the country. If that needs me no longer, I will abdicate." These words startled all present; three or four grieved to hear them spoken, seven or eight were pleased; to M. Fouché they caused a secret pleasure, and set M. Regnaud's heart at ease, for though he had abandoned his master, he did not mean to betray him. The news of this passed rapidly from one to another, and only facilitated the desertion to which all were but too well inclined.

Though Napoleon was ready to give way to those who, though rejecting the Bourbons, were doing exactly what would bring them back, he was still deeply wounded by the arrogant terms in which he had been spoken of, and forbade his ministers to obey the summons of the assembly. "Let them do what they please," he said, "and if they drive me to extremities by any factious act (there had been some mention of a dethronement), at the head of a few companies of veterans I will fling them into the Seine." Lucien gave it as his opinion that there was no time to be lost; he asserted that the longer they delayed the bolder and more daring the assembly would become, and that the best thing that could be done would be to employ the constitutional powers of the Crown and dissolve the chambers at once. Resolute as Marshal Davout had been a little while before, his courage had sunk since the announcement of the resolution passed by both chambers. "The Chamber of Representatives," he said, "should have been dissolved before it had time to pass the resolution; but now that the resolution was passed, and the chamber strengthened by the adhesion of public

opinion, it would be nothing less than an 18th Brumaire to attempt a dissolution when things were by no means suited to such a *coup d'état*." Napoleon hesitated amidst these contradictory opinions, and seemed to lose his distinctive characteristics. Still the man was not changed, as was sufficiently proved by his return from Elba and by his last campaign. But it was his clearness of perception that constituted his weakness at that moment. He saw that all was lost in a political though not in a military point of view, and his resistance was but a last effort of nature. This last struggle between his judgment and his natural inclinations made him seem to hesitate, and that for the first time in his life. "Venture," said Lucien to him. "Alas," he replied, "I have ventured but too much!" Memorable words, which did honour to his judgment by condemning his past conduct. During this conversation Napoleon and Lucien had passed into the garden of the palace. In an animated and lively dialogue the former showed his brother how little chance of success there was in the *coup d'état* proposed to him. "In such enterprises," he said, "the state of the public mind at the time must be taken into consideration before acting. On the 18th Brumaire, which you are constantly quoting, public feeling was against the assemblies and the ten years of calamity they had caused, and was entirely in favour of men of action, of whom I was looked upon as the very best. The entire public was opposed to the Cinq Cents, and inclined to me. To-day the public mind has taken the contrary direction. The dominant idea at present is that I am the sole cause of warfare, and the assembly is looked upon as the check to my ambition and despotism. My ambition has passed away, and over what shall I be despot? But such is the prejudice of men's minds. I think I might throw these representatives into the Seine, though I might meet more opposition from the national guard than you think. These representatives would hurry through the provinces, excite them against me, saying that I had violated the national representation merely for my own interest, and that I may be able to maintain a desperate struggle against Europe, which only asked that I should be removed, to put an end to its enmity and give peace to France. I know that they would not deprive me of the confidence of the entire country, but they would cause a division, and I should retain what is called the violent party, and should assume the character of a Jacobin emperor, fighting for his crown in opposition not only to all Europe but to all honest men. That would be to undertake a dishonourable and unsuccessful task; for though the country, united under my command, might be able to defend itself, disunited it would be incapable of resistance."

At this moment the Marigny avenue became thronged by

numbers attracted by the disastrous news of the defeat of Waterloo. Amongst these, of course, were many excitable men, some of those who had inscribed their names as federalists, and who, though not anarchists, had all the appearance of such. These were of the lower classes or old soldiers, who, though they had no idea of overturning the framework of society, were still inflamed with rage at the idea of the enemy's again entering Paris. The wall which then separated the Marigny avenue from the grounds of the Elysée Palace was much lower than at present. Some works that had been carried on there had lowered it still more, so that there was scarcely any partition between Napoleon and the crowd. When they saw him they uttered frantic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* Numbers of them, crowding to the low wall, stretched out their hands and implored him to lead them against the enemy. Napoleon bowed, looked at them kindly but mournfully, motioned them to be calm, and then continued his walk with Lucien, who found in this scene an argument in support of his opinion. "If all Frenchmen were as unanimous as these few," said Napoleon to his brother, "you would be right; but they are not. Those members of the chambers who have just rebelled against my authority, and who in a few hours, perhaps, will demand my deposition, these must certainly represent the opinions of a certain number of men in France. They represent those who consider me the cause of this quarrel with Europe, a sufficiently large number to make our disunion most significant. Without unanimity nothing can be done." This was all very true; but how clear must have been that intellect that could see this through the dense cloud of self-interest. But who was to blame if in this fearful conflict France persisted in seeing nothing but Napoleon's ambition opposed by Europe, and that it refused to be any longer compromised by one individual? But France was wrong; as she had allowed herself to be compromised by him, she should have stood by him until the struggle was ended, and then cast him aside, as Sièyes advised. But in this world error begets error, and men are not less injured by those they actually commit than by those they occasion.

Whilst time was thus lost in inevitable discussions, and as is usual, the intervals of events were filled by useless words, the assembly was waiting impatiently for a reply to its message: the members, inflated by the pride of compelling obedience, and at the same time fearing that violence might be used against them, gave vent to their feelings in useless and offensive speeches. They even thought of appointing immediately a commander-in-chief of the national guards of Paris, which would have been perfectly illegal, as the emperor alone had the right to do so,

and that body was then commanded by General Durosnel as lieutenant to Napoleon. This proposition was rejected. It would not be so very easy to seize the executive power so suddenly, whilst the monarch, the legal depositary of this power, was at the Elysée Palace, conquered, it is true, but still one of the most awe-inspiring men. Apart from the consideration in which General Durosnel was generally held, the little inclination that was felt either by revolutionists, Bonapartists, or even by many of the moderate party for M. de Lafayette, the candidate whose appointment was most strongly intimated, prevented this proposal from being adopted. They confined themselves to demanding that an actual titular should be appointed to watch over the safety of the assembly. Meanwhile the members, anxious for a reply, threatened to send a formal order and not a request to the ministers; and some supporters of the imperial dynasty hastened to the palace to say that Napoleon's dethronement would be immediately decreed if the ministers did not at once comply with the invitation that had been sent them. M. Regnaud and M. de Bassano requested Napoleon to come to a decision, and he seemed inclined to adopt their advice of yielding in some measure to the wishes of the Chamber of Representatives. But before allowing the ministers to appear at the bar of the assembly, it should be decided what they should say, for up to this time the discussion had been confined to the possibility or impossibility of dissolving the chambers. This would require a little time, and as persons were arriving constantly at the palace to tell of the impatience of the representatives, Napoleon, with disgust and almost with contempt, and without hope of any important result, consented that M. Regnaud should hasten to the assembly, ask for a short delay, and announce that an imperial message would be sent in a few minutes.

The assembly listened to M. Regnaud with the ardent and childish curiosity of revolutionary times, quite satisfied to hear that the resolution that had been passed was not looked upon as a crime, and that the delay had been occasioned by deference to its wishes, and not through a determination to resist. The members became somewhat calmer, but it was still evident that their patience would not last long. M. Fouché's followers, now the auxiliaries of M. Regnaud, who had no idea that he was only the instrument of an intriguer, told him, that it was amazing what an advance had been made by the public mind, that all were unanimous in desiring an abdication, that they were willing to allow Napoleon the honour of laying down the sceptre, but that if he did not do so at once, it would be wrested from him. It was in vain that M. Regnaud sought to calm them; he, ever devoted to the empire, would sacrifice the father, only that

he might save the son, and had the greatest horror of a deposition that would overthrow the very dynasty itself. The members told him they would wait, but on condition that the abdication should be assured and quick, for M. Fouché's pretended private communications with Vienna, which had been communicated from bench to bench, and looked upon by all as perfectly true, had convinced them that the allied powers would consent to the regency of Marie Louise.

M. Regnaud returned to the Elysée Palace, where it had been meantime resolved that a message should be carried to the chambers by those ministers who had been summoned to attend. The message was, to inform the assembly of the disaster that had befallen the army, and that without exaggeration, to assure the members that the country still possessed abundant resources, and to propose to them that a commission should be appointed, which, in conjunction with the government, would seek, select, and determine how these should be employed. Carnot, minister of the interior, was to present this message to the Chamber of Peers, and Prince Lucien, accompanied by the other ministers, to the Chamber of Representatives. The Additional Act gave Napoleon the right to be represented in the chambers by commissioners of his own choosing, and it was for this purpose he had now sent Prince Lucien, still the most popular of the princes of the family, from the firmness he had shown on the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon had put aside all hope or even desire of success, but he wished that a man, at once eloquent and true to his cause, should be present to repel the insults he expected; nor was he sorry to have an opportunity of showing his ministers that he was not satisfied with the zeal they had shown on this occasion. From these he excepted Carnot, whom M. Fouché had called Napoleon's dupe, and thus deprived him of public confidence, as also M. de Caulaincourt, who could only be useful at a congress or on a battlefield.

The deputation first proceeded to the Chamber of Peers, where the message was received without a remark; the members deferred coming to a resolution until the other chamber should have spoken. Little time was spent in going to the Lower Chamber; but it was more than sufficient for the impatience of the members. It was six o'clock when the ministers arrived, and at a moment when no words would suffice to appease the excitement of the members. The imperial message was announced, and so great was the consequent commotion that it was some time before the members could be induced to be calm, to keep silence, or to listen. It was decided that the meeting should be private, as this communication, which had been so ardently desired, might be the subject of discussion, and perhaps of important revelations. The public was therefore excluded, and

it was nearly seven o'clock when Prince Lucien mounted the rostrum. The prince having announced that he appeared there as imperial commissioner, proceeded to declare the contents of the message. "France," he said, "had experienced a great but not irreparable misfortune. With unanimity and firmness amongst those in authority, the country, being possessed of vast resources, could still meet the enemy face to face. As the emperor was anxious that the representatives of the country should assist him in collecting and employing these resources, he asked that five members from each chamber would assist him in determining on the best mode of saving the country, and that the supplies should be immediately voted and applied as required."

The prince was not received badly. He knew how to comport himself in such a position; besides, as we have already remarked, having never worn a crown, his appearance was not suggestive of that ambition that had ruined France. For these reasons he was listened to with attention. However, he told the representatives nothing new; they had already heard that the army had been brave but unfortunate at Mont St. Jean, that it had fought well and successfully at Ligny; they knew that the country still possessed resources, and that the government wished for the assistance of the chambers in collecting, selecting, and applying them. But all this had no connection with what was now the dominant thought of all—the abdication of the man who was looked on as the sole cause of the war, after whose retirement from power the allies would consent to accept his son. Were the great captain still victorious, the country would be compensated for the hatred he inspired throughout Europe; but he was no longer a guarantee for victory, and that hatred still existed which had raised all Europe in arms against France. Besides, as it was his own despotism that had provoked this hatred, they need feel no scruple as to how they acted towards him, even without taking into account that they were securing the crown to his son. This was the reasoning which had naturally and invincibly taken possession of all minds. They did not say that it was with Napoleon alone they had any chance of resisting, that when he should be gone they would be obliged to yield, and accept the Bourbons—to whom we can see no objection, but who were hateful to that very assembly; but they hurried on, believing that by getting rid of Napoleon they would free themselves from the most imminent danger, and adopt the means most certain to secure peace.

M. Jay, urged on by the Duke of Otranto, and worthy, indeed, of a better guide, vehemently demanded permission to speak. His appearance commanded universal silence, for all knew what he was about to propose, and were anxious to know what would be the result.

He commenced by making some unnecessary remarks as to the danger he ran by speaking on this occasion, as if anything was to be dreaded from him who had been defeated at Waterloo! Still this commencement was listened to with an intense interest and attention, whose very excess gave additional encouragement to the speaker. Then turning to the ministers, M. Jay proposed two formal questions to them, equally direct and embarrassing. He told them to lay their hands on their hearts and declare whether they believed that France, by the greatest efforts of daring, could oppose the armies of Europe, and whether peace was not absolutely indispensable; and secondly, whether that was not impossible so long as Napoleon remained at the head of the government. Having said this, M. Jay looked at the ministers and waited for some time for their reply. All eyes were turned on them, and seemed to demand an immediate answer. They did not speak; but there was one amongst them who dared not to remain longer silent—he whose perfidious whisperings had made men believe that if Napoleon were removed, Europe would be satisfied, and accept his son. So interrogative did the looks of the assembly become that M. Fouché felt himself compelled to speak. He advanced to the rostrum with his pale, sinister, and untruthful face, and merely said that the ministers, having delivered the opinion of the government in the imperial message, had nothing further to say. This ridiculously evasive reply was unsatisfactory to all. It showed that though M. Jay was M. Fouché's dupe, he was not his accomplice. Little satisfied with the ambiguous reply he had elicited, M. Jay continued his discourse, and gave an alarming but unfortunately a faithful description of the existing state of things. He first spoke of the internal state of the country, and endeavoured to prove that Napoleon had turned all parties against him—the royalists, his original opponents, and the liberals, who had become estranged by his intolerable despotism. He then spoke of the 20th of March, of the hopes that had been entertained of it at the commencement, but which had been destroyed by the Additional Act; then speaking with all the prejudice of the period, he declared that Napoleon, having lost the confidence of the liberals, and never having possessed that of the royalists, could no longer rally Frenchmen round him, or direct their energy against the enemy. M. Jay described the passions Napoleon had excited in Europe, quoted the manifestoes of the allies, which declared that they did not war against France but against Napoleon, and undertook to show that though he might make another effort more successful than that of the 18th of June, still that implacable Europe would unceasingly renew its efforts; that the army

might indeed reap fresh laurels, but must yield at last; and then he asked, whether considering this twofold danger, of France disunited by Napoleon, and all Europe allied against them, it was not his duty to offer to resign his authority, and the duty of the chambers to accept that resignation, or even demand it. Encouraged by the general approbation, M. Jay, who did not possess either the energy or action of a true orator, warmed by degrees into real eloquence. He said that he appealed to Napoleon's genius and patriotism to deliver France from the danger into which he had plunged it. Then turning to Lucien, as though to make him in some sort the interpreter of ruined France, "It is you, prince," he said, "you, whose disinterestedness and independence are well known, you, who have never been misled by the charms of a throne, it is you who must advise and counsel your illustrious brother, show him that of his thousand victories, whose immortal glory cannot be dulled by the late defeat, not one could be so great as that he would now gain over himself by surrendering his sceptre to this assembly, that is unwilling to wrest it from him, and willing to confer it on his son, and thus avert the dangers of a second invasion, a hundredfold more to be dreaded than the first." The speaker's powers were exalted by the circumstances in which he was placed, and for the time he obtained an influence which he never possessed before or after, though he always inspired a well-merited esteem. Prince Lucien immediately replied. He spoke eloquently, inspired as he was by circumstances, fraternal affection, and his own talents. All orators are improved by being placed in some great and critical position, which, compelling them to neglect all accessory ornament, forces them to confine themselves to true and fundamental arguments. Indeed there was much to be said in favour of Napoleon. Lucien would certainly have been embarrassed in presence of a sincere, clear-sighted, and courageous royalist, who would say—once the Bonapartes are conquered they lose their merit; they being put aside, the Bourbons must be accepted. Under the Bourbons, liberty may be achieved by perseverance, much more easily than under Napoleon, who only is the representative of physical force. A revolution effected by foreigners is certainly a great misfortune, but this, occurring now for the second time within fifteen months, is your work, is the consequence of your faults. Retire now and let us negotiate with Europe, since you have reduced us to this extremity, and that our hopes of victory are too weak to tempt us to try again to conquer fortune by arms. But in this assembly there was no intelligent and bold royalist to hold such language. There were there only revolutionists and liberals, who would not accept the Bourbons on any terms, and who were weak enough

to believe that they could defend themselves and treat with the enemy without Napoleon's aid. Many answers could be given to such men as these. Lucien knew it, and acted on that knowledge. He commenced by showing that the state of things at home and abroad had been exaggerated, and that neither was as bad as M. Jay had described. Making use of the details furnished by the emperor, he said, that though the army in the north had been beaten, it was not totally destroyed, that 30,000 of the men that had fought at Mont St. Jean could still be collected, who, joined to Grouchy's corps, still in all probability entire, would amount to 60,000, superior to any soldiers of the enemy; that the Generals Rapp, Lecourbe, and Lamarque (no longer needed in Vendée) would bring 100,000, and that with this army in front, and protected by fortifications, Paris, with 600 cannon and 60,000 men supplied by the dépôts, the marines, the federalists, and national guards, would be safe from every attack; that they would thus have time for reflection, time to collect fresh resources; that the conscription of 1815, the application to all France of the mobilisation of the picked national guards, would furnish 200,000 or 300,000 men, all of whom in the hands of a commander like Napoleon would leave no room for despair, or the dread of submitting to conditions imposed by an insolent conqueror; that if thus external affairs were not as bad as they had been represented, he would show that the internal state of the country had been still more exaggerated; France was unanimous in rejecting the domination of the emigrants, there was but a small minority in favour of them, a minority more arrogant than dangerous, which had thrown off the mask in La Vendée, but had been conquered in a few days by General Lamarque; that with the exception of these few partisans of the emigrants, all had but one desire—the national independence and constitutional liberty under that prince, whom France had received with so much joy on the 20th of March; that indeed errors of judgment might produce discord, but that it depended on the assembly to terminate these by standing by the man who had assembled them, and who alone was capable of meeting the enemy; the representatives had only to speak and the whole nation would join them; that it was the most fatal and ridiculous illusion to think of appeasing foreign hate by abandoning Napoleon; that these foreigners had said the very same things in 1814, by which, the Senate being deceived, Napoleon was put aside, the Bourbons were brought back, and France was deprived of her fortresses, her war matériel, and her frontiers; that the promise to be satisfied by the withdrawal of Napoleon was only a *ruse de guerre* to separate the nation from its head; the enemy, indeed, might use such devices, but Frenchmen would render themselves

the laughing-stocks of contemporaries and posterity by giving them credence. Then approaching a more delicate part of his subject, Lucien added: "Think also, my dear fellow-citizens, of the honour and dignity of France. What will the civilised world, what will posterity say, when after having received Napoleon with transport on the 20th of March, having declared that he was a hero come to deliver the country, and having taken a fresh oath of fidelity to him at the Champ de Mai, twenty-five days later now, because a battle has been lost, because foreigners threaten, you have declared that he is the sole cause of your misfortunes, and will drive him from that throne to which you so lately called him? Will you not expose France to the reproach of inconsistency and fickleness if you abandon Napoleon now?" This accusation, though true, but for which circumstances were alone to blame, offended the assembly, and immediately provoked a terrible reply; for when in large assemblies certain truths are rather felt than expressed, it needs but a word to loose them from their source. M. de Lafayette rose opposite to Lucien, and interrupted him with an irresistible reply, as he said in a tone cold and trenchant as steel, "Prince, you calumniate the nation. Posterity will not blame France for abandoning Napoleon, but alas, for having obeyed him too long. Frenchmen have followed him to the plains of Italy, through the burning sands of Egypt, through the heats of Spain, across the plains of Germany and the frozen deserts of Russia. Six hundred thousand Frenchmen lie on the banks of the Ebro and the Tagus—can you tell how many fell on the banks of the Danube, the Elbe, the Niemen, and the Moscow? Alas! had the country been less faithful to him, two millions of her children might have been saved; your brother, your family, we all should have been saved from the precipice down which we have fallen, and from which we know not whether there is any escape." Though Prince Lucien was guiltless of any share in the errors of his brother, these words fell on his ear as the voice of posterity pronouncing judgment on his brother, and deprived his speech of its effect. He had, however, succeeded in calming the assembly somewhat, less by his reasoning, though eloquently enunciated, than by his great resemblance to the great conquered man whom they were about to cast into the chasm, though they could not tell whether even by sacrificing him it could be closed. M. Jay and Prince Lucien were succeeded by some other speakers. M. Henri Lacoste and M. Manuel prolonged the discussion, and involuntarily lessened its violence a little. The desire of a voluntary abdication on Napoleon's part was all that was yet intimated. To pronounce his deposition was an act of which no one could at that time be found capable. The government demanded

that two committees should be appointed by the chambers, to assist in considering what was to be done for the safety of the country. These two committees might by negotiation obtain what the direct intervention of the assembly would make appear a degradation both for the chamber and Napoleon. The truth of this was felt, and the proposed measure adopted almost unanimously. The Chamber of Representatives resolved its own bureau into a committee. It consisted of the president, M. Lanjuinais; and the four vice-presidents, MM. de Flaugergues, de Lafayette, Dupont de l'Eure, and Grenier. The committee of the Chamber of Peers consisted of the president, the High-Chancellor Cambacérès, and of MM. Boissy d'Anglas, Thibaudeau, Druot, Andréossy, and Dejean. These two committees were to meet the ministers with portfolios, and the ministers of State, in the hall in which the Conseil d'Etat held its sittings at the Tuileries, to deliberate on the important subjects submitted to their consideration. They were summoned to meet that very evening, that a definite resolution might be presented to the chambers on the following day.

In the meantime a constant communication had been kept up with the Elysée Palace. The Duke de Rovigo, M. Lavalette, M. Benjamin Constant, and Prince Lucien had returned thither, and concealed from Napoleon nothing of what had passed. Lucien told him there was no longer time for deliberation, and that he must choose at once between a bold stroke or an immediate abdication, so as to prevent some offensive resolution being passed by the chamber. This was the truth, nor did Napoleon deny it. He sometimes became excited when he considered with how little generosity he was treated, and that it was still in his power to seize on the dictatorship by summoning these federalists who crowded beneath his windows, uttering cries of despairing patriotism. Giving way to such feelings for a few moments, he then fell back into a state of apathy, of disgust, and showed some inclination to abdicate, at the same time that he uttered biting sarcasms against those who thought of saving themselves by such a sacrifice. "Take no heed of these men," said the Duke de Rovigo, with his wonted truthful familiarity. "Some of them are bewildered, and others are misled by Fouché. As they cannot see that nobody can save them but you, leave them to their fate. In a week these foreigners will be here, will shoot a few of them, exile others, give them back the Bourbons they deserve, and put an end to this miserable farce. Come, sire, with a few faithful followers to America, and enjoy the repose that both you and we need. The same advice was given in grave, gentle, and mournful tones by M. Lavalette. Napoleon took what was said in very good part, and let them see that in reality he agreed with them, and would act as they advised. He

had a long conversation with M. Benjamin Constant, but one of a very different nature. With him he considered the abdication from the most elevated point of view, and as though it had no personal interest for him. It was quite evident that his most painful feeling was the idea of having been beaten by Europe, and that he had no desire to reign when men's minds were so unsettled, that his ambition had sunk beneath his contempt of men and things, and that the only happiness he could ask in future was the society of a few friends in some peaceful and safe retreat. But it was the risk of abandoning a cause not entirely lost that compelled him, despite his inclinations, to deliberate on his accepting or refusing to make the sacrifice required of him. It seemed to him that were there still a chance of conquering the European powers, or at least of obliging them to negotiate, and so setting the Bourbons aside, that it would be on his part at once fraud, folly, and weakness to surrender, and that he would be one day condemned at the tribunal of sound policy for having yielded too easily. As a father, he would willingly sacrifice himself to secure the crown to his son; but now that he knew what sort of person his wife was, he foresaw that his son was already doomed to be sacrificed to European distrust, a child destined to die a prisoner amongst foreigners. He smiled with disdain when told that if he abdicated, Europe would consent to accept the King of Rome and Marie Louise. With the clear vision of genius he saw that the Bourbons would be re-established within a week after his departure, that the greater number of those who had wrested his sword from him would be dispersed or punished, and M. Fouché himself reserved for a late but certain chastisement. Thus looking into the future, he could see himself avenged of all his domestic enemies. But what chiefly occupied his attention was the consideration whether, whilst there were still so many chances against foreign enemies, he ought to yield to Blucher or Wellington, and he asked himself if it were not folly or cowardice not to do all that was possible to avoid so dire an extremity. He had a long conversation on this subject with M. Benjamin Constant, a conversation in which he displayed both penetration and calmness. To him he repeated that the army recognised but himself, that he needed but utter one word to disperse these representatives, whom he himself had admitted to the arena, but that to do that he should place himself at the head of the party then shouting beneath his windows, lead it against honest men, and become a kind of revolutionary emperor, dragging pinioned France behind him as he went to encounter all Europe allied against him. To this, he said, he felt the greatest repugnance, and that though it would be his greatest pleasure to lead willing France against the enemy,

he could never think of undertaking a desperate strife whilst Frenchmen were disunited, but would rather settle as a planter in the virgin forests of America.

Whilst this discussion was going on at the Elysée Palace the committees from both chambers had arrived at the Tuileries. They with the ministers assembled in the hall of the Council of State, deserted now and badly lighted, presenting a mournful contrast to what it had formerly been when Napoleon, at the summit of his glory, presided over the assembled sections, and ruled them as much by the vigour of his intellect as by the prestige of his then all-potent authority! Prince Cambacérès opened the proceedings by enumerating the objects of discussion. All imposed some restraint on themselves; but some zealous men belonging to each committee were anxious to enter on the true, the only question of the day, that of the abdication. They commenced by making protestations of devotion to the public welfare, and wished to lay down as a principle that they were prepared to make any sacrifice but that of the liberty of the country, and the integrity of its possessions. It was most ridiculous to draw up and put to the vote such resolutions, by which they implicitly pronounced that dethronement that they dared not declare explicitly. The proposition itself and the reply made to it was accepted, but considered only as a general declaration of devotion to the public welfare. The resources of the country in its actual disastrous condition were next taken into consideration. They spoke of the army, the finances, and lastly, of how order was to be preserved by the repression of all hostile parties in the empire. The army was to be recruited immediately by means of the conscription of 1815, as to the legality of which there was some discussion. None objected to this measure, by which 100,000 men would be raised, some of whom had served before. The state of the finances was next considered, and an issue of exchequer bills was spoken of by which 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 might be immediately procured. Lastly, a preventive law was discussed, which would arm the executive against hostile parties, to which not an objection was made by any one present, though nearly all were the sworn friends of liberty. They agreed to everything, anxious to arrive at the most important question—the abdication.

Having decided on the resources for carrying on the war, it was next considered necessary to see how a peace might be concluded; a most important point, warfare being too uncertain not to render it desirable that it should be terminated as quickly as possible. This was the question whose solution all were impatiently awaiting, and M. de Lafayette, more determined than the others, asked if it were not evident that peace or even negotiation was impossible as long as Napoleon was at the head of the government.

This question, proposed in presence of Napoleon's ministers, and some members of the committee who were devoted to the imperial dynasty, was received with loud murmurs. The ministers replied, that had they held the same opinion as M. de Lafayette, that they would have said so to the emperor, and made it the subject of a separate proposition in the present conference. M. de Lafayette said he would accept the proposition as it was now put, and as they would have made it themselves, had they considered it necessary, he would do so now, as he considered it indispensable. He then demanded that all those present should declare, whether, as he himself was convinced, Napoleon's being at the head of government did not render peace impossible, the continuation of war inevitable, and consequently the safety of the country as problematic as the success of the war. To agree to this would be to pronounce a deposition, which no one was willing to do, though all desired an abdication. Prince Cambacérès, who presided, declared that he would not put such a question to the vote. M. de Lafayette's proposition was thus put aside; but it was admitted, that whilst they prepared for war, it would be also necessary to negotiate, and that to do so some form should be adopted which would allow them to open diplomatic relations with the European powers, who had not only refused to reply to, but even to receive Napoleon's communications. It was consequently suggested, as a middle course, to send to the coalesced camp a commission of negotiators, who would present themselves not in Napoleon's name but in that of the chambers. They would be very exacting indeed who would not be content with this proposition, which was the implicit abdication of Napoleon, since the most important function of the executive authority, that of negotiating with foreign powers, was thus exercised independently of and apart from him. It was certainly monstrously illegal; but legality had been so little thought of in the late resolutions of the chambers that that was a point of little consequence. The proposition was passed, and it was decided that the different measures adopted in this conference should be presented to the emperor by his ministers, and to the chambers by persons chosen from each committee. General Grenier, a distinguished officer of the republic, a sensible and disinterested man, was appointed to make the report to the Lower Chamber. But as the resolutions that had been passed fell short of what was desired by that assembly, the ministers, and M. Regnaud in particular, requested General Grenier and his colleagues to delay some hours, promising that they should then have no sooner delivered their report than an imperial message should come to satisfy the greater number of the members of both chambers, who considered that the safety of the State depended on Napoleon's abdication.

The whole night had been occupied by this conference. At an early hour on the morning of the 22nd many persons hastened to the Elysée Palace to offer Napoleon advice, a proceeding which none would have ventured to do formerly, especially in such grave circumstances. His sacrifice was already made, for after the conference of the preceding night it would be impossible for things to continue as they were. How could he consent to negotiations, in which he was to have no part, being carried on with the enemy. Would it not be to allow himself to be excluded from the government? It would have been a real disgrace; and he had no choice, if he would not submit to it, but to crush that assembly by appealing to the people, and attempting, supported by disunited France, to carry on the war against united Europe. Napoleon, as we have seen, had already decided this point. Still two feelings within him rebelled—his natural instinct, and his objection to abandon a cause not entirely lost. It was painful to him to descend from a throne, for it was to exchange it for a narrow prison; it was painful to him to renounce a struggle which, as his military knowledge showed him, still offered many chances. But convinced that disunion, though it might not be appeased by his absence, would certainly not cease to exist whilst he remained, he resolved to yield. But he felt hurt when with indecent haste he was pressed to decide. It was sad and painful to see the agony of his strong will, in which his genius and reverses lost something of that dignity with which they should ever be invested, more especially in moments of such vital importance. Napoleon was alternately calm, gentle, and at the utmost ironical, but only irritated when urged too much. He had no objection to the advice of those who, like the Duke de Rovigo, Count Lavalette, and the Duke de Bassano, told him to abandon men who were not worthy that he should save them, to bear his unperishable glory with him to the free, unbounded wilds of America, and there end his life in profound repose, gazed on with admiration by a world that would do him justice after he should have retired from its precincts. But such advice was taken ill when given by those who seemed to expect some advantage from the sacrifice, either for themselves or for the public. He considered these as misled either by M. Fouché or by their own interests. For this reason he gave a very unfriendly reception to M. Regnaud, and such as he, when they came to speak on a subject of which everybody was speaking at that sad time.

Part of the morning was passed in the palace and grounds of the Elysée Palace in these painful perplexities. Better news came now from the army than what Napoleon and his officers had brought from Laon. Grouchy, who was thought to be lost,

had got safe and sound to Rocroy, and with him more than 30,000 zealous men, around whom would rally the fugitives from Waterloo. Those already arrived at Laon amounted to 20,000, and these would soon increase to 30,000 or 40,000, armed and provided with artillery. In a few days an army of 60,000 men could be assembled, who, with the dépôts, the federalists, and the troops from the west, would amount to 100,000, an army sufficient to cover Paris. This was infinitely better than what had been expected, when it was thought that Paris would be entirely unprotected, and compelled to surrender unconditionally. The minister of war was immediately sent to the Chamber of Representatives to see if this intelligence had led to any useful reflections, or to the desire of preserving for these troops that leader who in 1814 with much inferior forces had held the balance of fate in his hand.

The assembly had met at nine in the morning, and had shown stronger symptoms of impatience than on the preceding days. An effort was made to defer General Grenier's report for some time; but the members could not take an interest in any other subject than that which occupied their thoughts. There was no choice but to yield. At about ten o'clock General Grenier rose to address the assembly, and to him was granted the silence refused to the other speakers. He briefly enumerated the different measures which had been adopted that night at the Tuileries, and concluded with a detailed account of the principal resolution, that which decided that negotiators should be sent in the name of the chambers to the camp of the allies. This was a half consent to the abdication, and the other half was certain to come in a few moments. But notwithstanding this disappointment, impatience and even anger were expressed by every countenance, and murmured by many voices. This speaker, unaccustomed to such scenes, stammered out some words, asking them to wait a little; for, he said, that the ministers had promised him that the present communication would soon be completed by an imperial message. But this was not sufficient, and several speakers hastened to the rostrum to propose resolutions that would only tend to hasten the event so much desired. But as none of these was of sufficient importance or dignity, the assembly paid no attention to them, as they unnecessarily succeeded one another in the midst of this indescribable confusion. Suddenly those who had been influenced by the Duke of Otranto came to announce that the victim was about to defend himself, and that he must be restrained if they did not wish to be sacrificed by him, for the army, having heard what was going on, was prepared to go to any lengths to prolong Napoleon's reign; that intelligence had been received of Grouchy, who had escaped, and was advancing to Laon with 60,000 men. The prospect of such

resources might restore Napoleon the firmness that seemed to have forsaken him, so that there was no time to lose. This was soon confirmed by the account of military affairs brought by the minister of war. The impatience with which he was listened to was in proportion to the importance of his communication. What he said, far from changing the opinion of the listeners, only confirmed them in the resolution they had taken. Once the human mind becomes passionately desirous of any object, everything urges it forward, even what seemed calculated to act as a restraint. Some said that these 60,000 men would furnish Napoleon with a pretext for retaining power, and he would perhaps even employ them against the assembly; others said that they should profit by them to negotiate a peace, and that independent of the man who rendered peace impossible. The excitement increased so far that it was at length proposed that the Act of Deposition should be put to the vote. This idea soon became general; but one of the representatives, General Solignac, who had long since fallen into disfavour with Napoleon, and who was a man of ill-regulated but generous feelings, now stopped the assembly, saying that they would thus insult a man who had reigned for fifteen years, to whom Frenchmen had so lately sworn allegiance, and who had commanded their armies with incomparable glory; a man who deserved their respect, and for whom it was not too much to ask one hour to give him time to lay down the sceptre they wished to wrest from him. "An hour, let it be an hour!" cried hundreds of voices, and a species of shame took possession of this assembly that really wished to preserve the imperial dynasty, and the fatal delay was granted. One hour allowed for abdication to the man who had ruled the world, and who three months before had been received by this very people with such rapture! What a sad and fearful lesson to unbounded ambition!

Although a long time had elapsed since General Solignac had presented himself before Napoleon, he now hurried of his own accord to the Elysée Palace. He was deeply moved when he saw this mighty emperor, once so powerful, but now sunk in an abyss of misery. Napoleon, whose reception of even his most favoured servants when they came to urge his abdication had been anything but gracious, was most affectionate to a man who had been so long in disfavour, but who had sought and obtained for him an hour's respite. He told him that there was no need of irritation, that the Act of Abdication was prepared, and that he was about to sign it. He then led him into the garden, where his presence immediately elicited loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* from the crowd, and let him see how much power was still at his command. He asked the general whether he believed that the tumultuous assembly he had left, and would return to, was

capable of originating a government, a government that could offer a serious opposition to the enemy, and whether the abdication would not lead to the immediate return of the Bourbons, escorted by 400,000 foreigners. This could scarcely be denied. General Solignac, seizing his hands, which he bedewed with tears, fully agreed with him, and Napoleon, touched by the emotion of this honest soldier, and satisfied since he had convinced him of the inconsistency of those who desired his abdication, clasped his hand and dismissed him, promising that the imperial message should be immediately sent to the hall of representatives. He then took a pen and commenced drawing up the instrument, wishing that it should be entirely his own deed; and he was right, for none but he could find words sufficiently dignified for such an occasion.

Having written a few sentences, Napoleon returned to his cabinet, where Joseph, Lucien, and M. Regnaud said, he ought to stipulate that the crown should be secured to his son. He turned on M. Regnaud a glance expressive of the bitterest contempt for M. Fouché's triumphant policy. "My son!" he repeated twice or thrice—"my son—what a chimera! No, it is not in favour of my son but of the Bourbons that I abdicate. They at least are not prisoners at Vienna!" Having spoken these words worthy of his genius, he drew up the following declaration:—

"FRENCHMEN,—When I commenced the war in defence of the national independence, I calculated on being assisted by the exertions and wishes of all, and on obtaining the aid of the national authorities. I was justified in expecting to succeed, and I dared the declarations issued against me by the coalesced powers.

"Circumstances seem to me to have changed. I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they be sincere in their protestations, and feel no enmity but against me alone! My political life is ended, and I proclaim my son Emperor of France, under the title of Napoleon II.

"The present ministry will form a provisional council of government. I am impelled by interest for my son to request the chambers to appoint a legal regency without delay.

"Be united for the sake of the public safety, and that you may continue to be an independent nation. NAPOLEON."

This Act was signed at half-past twelve, and taken to the Upper Chamber by the minister Carnot, and to the Lower by the Duke of Otranto. The latter scarcely concealed the joy he felt at receiving what he considered the bulletin of his victory. It was near one o'clock when he arrived at the Chamber of Repre-

sentatives, whither he had been preceded by several officials. The hour granted to General Solignac was long past, and but for the appearance of the triumphant conspirator come to appease the general impatience, it is probable that all respect towards him who had been vanquished at Waterloo would have been forgotten. When it was announced that the Duke of Otranto had arrived with the imperial message, the representatives hastened *pêle-mêle* to take possession of every disengaged spot, where they stood silently listening whilst the president with much emotion read the declaration we have already quoted. Who would believe it? Those men who had shown so much impatience and anger, either affected by the dignity of the style, the greatness of the man's character and misfortunes, or by the mere success of their own attempt, remained silent for a while, and then gave way to a deep and universal emotion. A few moments were passed in exchanging expressions of pity, gratitude, and regret, and some began to see that if it would have been a difficult task to save the country with Napoleon, it would be utterly impossible to do so without him. They had been urged, as one may say, against their wills to act as they had done, and they began to feel an indistinct consciousness that they had thus secured the triumph, not of the Revolution and the imperial dynasty, but of the Bourbons. This was no injury either to France or liberty; but it was strange to see it effected by these representatives, who were all accomplices or partisans of the revolution of the 20th of March.

The Duke of Otranto then presented his pallid countenance at the rostrum to demand, like a hypocrite as he was, that when France stipulated for her own safety, she should also stipulate that Napoleon's life, liberty, and the security of his retreat should be sacred; in a word, he proposed that a commission should be immediately appointed to treat with the camp of the allies. This almost unnecessary proposal he made solely to have an opportunity of showing that pitiful assembly—whose turn to abdicate was so soon to come—the ridiculous dictator that was to rule over France for one fortnight. M. Fouché was listened to without any particular attention, for after the ample satisfaction that had been given, nobody thought of failing in respect to fallen genius, or of deferring a single hour the negotiation of a peace apparently so important, but in reality so useless, as we shall soon see. But a more important question remained to be discussed, one likely to occasion more dissension—that of replacing the executive authority rendered vacant by the emperor's abdication. A field was now opened for party intrigue, and the declamations of those restless spirits who always bestir themselves on great occasions, either from an inherent vanity that makes them desirous of attracting public attention, or from the

mere necessity of action. The members of the present assembly were all revolutionists or Bonapartists, that is, they wished for revolutionary principles put into operation by a Bonaparte, but not by him who alone was capable of doing what they desired. They asked for nothing but peace with the Additional Act, which had been so much decried, and Napoleon II., whose father had been dethroned. But though the Duke of Otranto had promised that they should have Napoleon II., he began to doubt himself of the fulfilment of that promise, and did not hesitate to express his doubts, now that the positive assertions which he had used in order to dethrone Napoleon were no longer necessary. Fouché's emissaries went about saying, that though it would be desirable to put Napoleon II. on the throne, still that should not be made an absolute condition, lest it might offend the allied sovereigns, and prevent the commencement of negotiations. "Besides," added these men, "though feeling a preference for Napoleon II., the safety of France should not be compromised for a child who is a prisoner in Austria, and probably condemned to remain there; but if, for example, we could get an enlightened, liberal prince, one who has already adopted the Revolution, and broken for ever with the emigrants, and with him a constitutional monarchy, it would not be wise to refuse it for the sake of a child who is almost a foreigner, for nothing is of so much importance as to secure the liberty and safety of France." These insinuations referred to the Duke of Orleans, to whom the attention of many persons was turned, although he had not given any person the right to do so. Though neither himself nor anybody else had thought of proposing him, still his liberality, his prudent but evident opposition to the policy which ended by leading Louis XVIII. to Ghent, his military services during the republic, and even the memory of his father, made him a desirable sovereign for the revolutionists, the new liberals, and the army. Though the assembly had pronounced in favour of Napoleon II., the members would have consoled themselves could they have got in exchange the head of the younger Bourbon branch. The army would not consider itself so completely sacrificed if placed under a prince of military reputation; and as we have seen, the Emperor Alexander, discontented with the emigrants, had himself at Vienna proposed the Duke of Orleans, and had only yielded to the decided opposition of England and Austria. M. Fouché would be satisfied with this prince; but he had no hope that the allied sovereigns would consent, and if he encouraged others to hope, it was only to use him as a mode of transition from Napoleon II., whom he had promised, though he had no certainty that the promise could be fulfilled, to the elder branch of the Bourbons, whose return he foresaw without desiring it. His tactics consisted in encouraging the expression of as many

propositions as possible at once, with the mental reservation that none but that which would suit himself should triumph in the end; but he took very good care not to let this be seen by M. Regnaud, who was a sincere Bonapartist, nor by MM. Manuel, Jay, or Lacoste, who, being decided liberals, naturally dreaded the return of the elder Bourbon branch. He contented himself with saying that extreme prudence was needed, and that they should take good care not to impose any absolute conditions on the allies, for example, such as naming any prince in particular, or acting in any way that might impede the opening of negotiations.

Napoleon's abdication had scarcely been read to the assembly when numerous proposals were at once made. Those who did not desire the imperial dynasty, some from royalist principles—the number of these indeed was very small—and others from love of liberty and peace, proposed that the abdication should be made certain by being accepted, a contract not being definite until agreed to by both parties; that Napoleon should be thanked for the sacrifice he had made; that they should then declare themselves a national assembly, seize the supreme authority, send negotiators to the camp of the allies, and lastly, appoint a commission to undertake the executive functions. These resolutions were supported by many members, by M. Mourgues in particular, who indeed went further than all the rest. He proposed that in addition to these measures, M. de Lafayette should be appointed head of the national guards throughout France, and Marshal Macdonald generalissimo of the army. It must be borne in mind that this marshal, having accompanied Louis XVIII. to the frontier, had refused to serve under Napoleon. The meaning of these last propositions being very evident, one member, M. Garreau, demanded that the 67th article of the Additional Act should be read. The president Lanjuinais observed that it would be quite unnecessary to do so, as everybody was supposed to know it. Cries of "read," "do not read," were heard from every side. But as the number of those who desired that the article should be read had the majority, M. Garreau read as follows:—

"The French nation declares, that in the delegation it has made and is now making of its authority, it neither meant nor means now to give the right of proposing the return of the Bourbons or of any prince of that family to the throne, even in case of the extinction of the imperial dynasty, nor the right of re-establishing either the ancient feudal nobility, or feudal or seignorial claims, tithes, or any privileged or dominant form of worship, nor the power of invalidating the sale of national property, and it formally forbids the government, the chambers, or any citizen to bring forward such a proposition." "I think,"

said the reader of this article, "that my meaning will be understood." "Yes, yes," cried a number of voices; and a return to the order of the day was demanded. M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angély rose to support and defend the order of the day. In the first place, he asked, if the Chamber of Representatives should constitute itself a national assembly, what would become of the Chamber of Peers; and if both chambers should be fused into one, what would become of the Constitution. He showed the advantage of preserving a Constitution that was already established, which only needed a little modification to be most excellent, a Constitution which irrevocably appointed the sovereign, which put an end to all competition, which to be maintained in vigour only needed a temporary measure to supply for a short time the place of the absent minor monarch. Not daring to propose a council of regency, which would have immediately decided the question of dynasty, he chose from amongst the rejected propositions the idea of an executive commission of five members, three to be chosen by the Chamber of Representatives, and two by the Chamber of Peers. He then appealed to their generosity, their dignity, and the gratitude they owed Napoleon. "He is a man," he said, "whom you yourselves have called great, but whom posterity will judge better than we. Lately you chose him, for the second time, to be your sovereign, and it is not yet four weeks since you swore allegiance to him! He has been unsuccessful, what indeed but rarely happened in his military career; you demanded his abdication, and he immediately gave it with a magnanimity of which I myself was witness, for I was the first that dared propose it to him yesterday. He has abdicated, but in favour of his son. Will you repay his magnanimity by refusing to accept his son? Will you annul the act of his abdication, which you have so much desired, by refusing the essential condition of this act? I therefore propose the order of the day on the propositions that you have heard, so that neither the Constitution nor the rights of Napoleon II. be annulled; and I also propose that a deputation be sent to him who was your emperor but a few hours since, to thank him for the generous sacrifice he has made for the benefit of the country."

The assembly, still under the influence of the impression made by the great sacrifice obtained from Napoleon, and influenced by what M. Regnaud had said, unanimously adopted what he proposed. M. Regnaud flattered himself that he had thus secured the crown to Napoleon II.; but M. Fouché did not think so, for the question, which would have been decided by the nomination of a council of regency, had been eluded by the appointment of a simple executive commission. This ambiguity suited M. Fouché very well, for he would be satisfied with any-

thing except Napoleon's return. The next step was to appoint the three members that the Chamber of Representatives was to furnish to the executive commission. M. Fouché, considering his own appointment certain, did not think of himself, but turned all his attention to getting colleagues who would not impede his plans. He could not avoid having Carnot, of whose sincerity he hoped to be able to take advantage; but he made every effort to prevent the appointment of M. de Lafayette, representing him to some as fanatically attached to the principles of 1791, whilst to others he represented him as indispensable to the commission that was to be sent to negotiate a peace at the camp of the allies. He particularly recommended General Grenier, who was esteemed by all parties, and as incapable of detecting an intrigue as of concocting one. M. Fouché, who remained behind the scenes, succeeded in obtaining the following results. Carnot, elected by universal consent, had 324 votes; M. Fouché, elected because of the opinion entertained of his influence at home and abroad, had only 293; M. Grenier, 204; and M. de Lafayette, 142. A second scrutiny was made for the election of a third member, and General Grenier was chosen by a large majority. The names of the elected commissioners were immediately sent to the Chamber of Peers to obtain the approbation of that assembly.

The Chamber of Peers was very much excited at that very moment. The war minister had just communicated the same military intelligence that he had before given to the Chamber of Representatives, the same external observances being observed towards both chambers, though the effect produced was very different. This communication gave rise to a scene at once sad and violent. Marshal Ney rose to speak. He was still under the influence of the excitement of Waterloo, where he had given such instances of bravery, an excitement that was increased by rumours circulated to his disadvantage, and by the suggestions of M. Fouché, to whom he had confided his chagrins. Every eye was turned on the speaker, attracted as much by the strong expression of passion depicted on his countenance, as by a sense of the importance of what he was about to say. He contradicted the assertions of the minister of war, and asserted that there were no longer any resources in the country, that all was lost, that the army indeed had done its duty, but that serious faults had been committed, and he unmistakably indicated, though he did not name, the emperor, by which an irreparable misfortune had been occasioned, and that nothing now remained but to negotiate on any terms, provided their lives were spared. This glorious victim did not know that he was thus rendering a capitulation inevitable, and one, unfortunately, by which all lives would not be spared. It would be

impossible to describe the excitement that followed this scene. Some ill-disposed men were secretly rejoiced at this confusion ; but the greater number of the peers, sincere but weak men, were saddened at seeing the depression of the public mind still further increased by a man of such extraordinary courage. Druot entered as the marshal concluded, and being informed of the statements he had made, began in his usual calm and gentle terms to reproach him for the assertions he had advanced, and which, he said, he would show to be incorrect. Ney defended himself badly, and only proved that his mind was a prey to despair, that he no longer possessed any self-control, and that in fact, so far as he was concerned, nothing should be taken into account but his incomparable services.

The members of the Upper Chamber were still under the influence of this saddening scene when the message from the Chamber of Representatives arrived. There was no hesitation as to their approving the proposed measures ; but the more zealous members of the imperial party, Prince Lucien, and Generals la Bédoyère and de Flahault, both felt and showed displeasure at seeing the sovereignty of Napoleon II. evaded by the equivocal nomination of an executive commission. Count Thibaudeau, a morose revolutionist, who hated the Bourbons, to whom he preferred the Bonapartes, without feeling any particular regard for the latter—indeed he did not feel regard for any one—and who despised Fouché, though he allowed himself to be led by him ; Count Thibaudeau, we say, adopted the general idea that safety should be sought in the immediate abdication of the emperor. He proposed that the decision of the Chamber of Representatives should be adopted, which indeed was inevitable in the existing state of things. This proposition excited violent indignation amongst the partisans of the imperial dynasty. Prince Lucien reminded the Chamber of Peers that they had been appointed by Napoleon ; spoke of the gratitude and fidelity they owed him ; asserted that if respect for the laws had been forgotten everywhere else, it ought to be remembered in that chamber ; appealed to the Constitution, which conferred the succession of the crown on Napoleon II. ; and lastly, quoting the Act of Abdication, of which the succession of Napoleon II. was an essential condition, he demanded that the young prince should be immediately proclaimed in order to save them from the chaos of civil war. "Let us rally round Napoleon II.," cried Prince Lucien, "and I give the example by being the first to swear fidelity to him." Many of the peers, alarmed by the tumult, and approving of the evasive form adopted for replacing the executive, showed their displeasure at the haste with which it was sought to decide so important a question. M. de Pontécoulant, a peer under Napoleon and

Louis XVIII., and equally indebted to both, was one of those who did not wish that any additional difficulty should be put in the way of a transmission from a falling dynasty to the one that was now inevitable. He admitted all that he owed to Napoleon, but said that he owed still more to his country, and that he considered Prince Lucien's proposal extremely imprudent. He reproached him with being a Roman prince, and not a Frenchman, and that he was consequently incapable of forming a correct opinion on such a subject. "If you do not consider me a Frenchman, the nation does," replied Prince Lucien; and he then asserted that Napoleon's abdication would be void unless the right of Napoleon II. to the throne should be immediately recognised. The generous and imprudent La Bédoyère, who had as little command of his temper as Ney, commenced to speak with incredible violence. "There are men here," he said, "who fell at Napoleon's feet when he was successful, but who now desert him in his hour of need. Let them act as they will, but let us do our duty. Napoleon has abdicated in favour of his son; if his son is not proclaimed, that abdication is void, and he must recall it. Let him draw his sword, and we will die fighting at his side! The traitors who have abandoned him, and who probably will persist in their desertion, will form intrigues with foreigners, as they did before. I see some of them on these benches." At these words, which proved that this brave young man had lost all self-control, he was interrupted by a fearful tumult. He was compelled to be silent; many of his friends hastened round him, but could not succeed in calming him. The discussion continued, but in a disorderly manner, and without any advantage being gained by those who wished for the immediate proclamation of Napoleon II.; for the prudent assembly, adopting the evasive policy of the Lower Chamber, merely confirmed the decision that had been made there. M. de Caulaincourt being considered the man best suited to represent the interests of France without neglecting those of Napoleon, together with M. Quinette, a member of the old Convention, and a sincere representative of the Revolution, were appointed to complete the executive commission.

The account of these proceedings caused no additional surprise or pain to Napoleon, for he had indulged no delusive hopes as to his son's fate, and never had believed that the crown, fallen from his puissant brow, would rest on that of a weak child, who was both absent and a prisoner. During the afternoon a deputation of the representatives came to present him the respects and gratitude of that assembly. He received them standing, with the same bearing as when he was at the summit of his power, and addressed them in a tone of mournful gravity, but with the haughtiness which freedom from all personal

interest inspires. Having made a suitable reply to the professions of the deputation, he told them that he had not made the sacrifice for which they thanked him from any hope of advantage to himself, but for France. He had made it that there might be no disunion between himself and his representatives, for success could only be obtained by unanimity. He counselled them, above all things, to preserve union amongst themselves, and to be active in their preparations for defence, for peace could be obtained on the best terms only by those who were well prepared for war. "The time that has been lost in overturning the imperial throne would have been better employed in preparing the means of resistance. But there is time still left; hasten your preparations, for your enemies are approaching, and only deceive you when they say that they will be satisfied by my removal. It is the Bourbons, and the consequence of the Bourbons' coming, that they want to impose on you. I recommend my son to you; it was in his favour alone that I abdicated, and it is only by rallying round him that you will avoid the conflict of contending pretensions, that you can rally the army, or have any chance of saving the national independence. My political career is now at an end, and perhaps with it my life. Wherever I may be, the happiness and dignity of France shall be my only wish. I would serve France as a private soldier, since I may not lead her to battle; but you have decided that I must not think of being useful to her. There is therefore no longer any question of me—only of my son and of France. Believe me that there is no hope but in unity amongst yourselves." Having said these words, he bowed with dignity to the deputation, and retired, leaving them deeply moved.

Here we must again repeat that Napoleon was not deceived; he did not think that there was any greater hope for his son than for himself, and still less did he believe that the assembly, disturbed and betrayed by M. Fouché, would be able to defend itself. But he would for the last time fulfil the duty of a father by recommending Napoleon II.; besides that, he was convinced that asserting this child's rights would be the only means of uniting the different parties, and of arousing the zeal of the army. He therefore wished to make a last effort in his favour. He considered the care that had been taken to avoid mentioning his son's name as a breach of the promise made to himself. He spoke very warmly on this subject to M. Regnaud, reproached him with having induced him to abdicate by promising to secure the succession of Napoleon II., and complained that the failure of this was to be attributed to his want of energy. M. Regnaud did not deserve these reproaches, for deceived both by his own wishes and by M. Fouché, he was

convinced that the father's abdication would be immediately followed by the proclamation of the son. He said all that was possible in his own defence, and promised Napoleon that he would make every exertion to secure the fulfilment of that promise on the following day. Napoleon summoned to the palace two ministers of State, M. Defermon and M. Boulay de la Meurthe, two men on whom he could depend, and requested them to employ all their influence with the Lower Chamber, to induce the members to proclaim Napoleon II. in a formal and unequivocal manner. They both declared their readiness to do so, and M. Boulay de la Meurthe, accustomed to assemblies in which he had formerly played so honourable a part, an honest revolutionist, sharing the opinions of his friend Sièyes, promised not to spare his exertions in this last attempt.

M. Regnaud went to M. Fouché, and represented the false position they were placed in with regard to Napoleon, the danger of not keeping the promise that had been made to him, since it might lead to his recalling the sacrifice he had made, and the absolute necessity there was that something should be done to content him. M. Fouché affected to agree with him, and represented to the young deputies, MM. Jay and Manuel, whom he influenced by deceiving, that something ought to be done to satisfy Napoleon, without, however, making any imprudent engagements to the imperial dynasty. He did not mention his real motives for this advice, which, as we shall soon see, were very different to those he alleged, but said that it would not be wise to exasperate Napoleon by destroying his last hopes, and that they ought to make every effort to assert the sovereignty of the imperial child, under whom liberty would run no risk, and the interests of the revolutionary party would be fully secured. They promised to do as he wished, and agreed to depart from the equivocal policy of the day, without, however, entering into any irrevocable engagement.

On the following day, the 23rd, M. Berenger opened the question by seeking to define the nature of the powers entrusted to the executive commission. Should it assume the nature of a responsible ministry, or possess the inviolability of the sovereign? The mere proposal of such a question was sufficient to rouse the energies of all. Several speakers hastened to the rostrum: some would have the executive commission a responsible body; others asserted that it should be a real regency, occupying the place of the absent minor monarch, and enjoying all his prerogatives. M. Defermon rose, and said that if some fixed and decided principles were not resolved on, things would be thrown into a kind of chaos. Nothing would be easier than to determine the authority of the executive commission, provided regard was had to the bounds of the existing Constitution.

That its principles being those of constitutional monarchy, they had still a sovereign, Napoleon II., the necessary and legitimate heir of Napoleon I., and who succeeded his father by the same right as the living king formerly succeeded to him who had died. "Do you believe," added M. Defermon, "that Napoleon II. is your sovereign?" "We do! we do!" replied several of the members; "*Vive Napoléon II.!*" "Well, then, if such is your opinion," replied M. Defermon, "the executive commission will simply have the powers of a regency, acting with the authority and in the name of Napoleon II., first taking an oath of allegiance to him. You must proclaim him formally, by which you will rally the army, devoted to the dynasty, you will guide the conduct of the national guards, who have been told that you expect Louis XVIII., and you will let the enemy see that your conditions are irrevocably fixed." "Let us wait," said a member, "until we know the result of the negotiations." "No, no," cried many others, "let us obey the Constitution, and proclaim Napoleon II." Almost the whole assembly rose, exclaiming *Vive l'Empereur!* and were about yielding to the general excitement, when some members sought to calm them by showing the necessity of acting with a little more reflection. M. Boulay de la Meurthe, anxious to sustain the present enthusiasm, asserted that the Act of Abdication was indivisible, that it would become void if they refused to pay the price of the sacrifice; and then he alluded with great vehemence to the intrigue on foot to bring back the Bourbons, an intrigue, he said, by which the assembly would be divided, the country weakened, and the gates flung open to the enemy. He denounced two parties—one trying to bring back Louis XVIII., the other wishing for the Duke of Orleans; and he attacked the latter as if it had a real existence, instead of being a mere desire in the minds of some, describing it in the false hues lent by fear, and then having exhaled the last rage of expiring Bonapartism, he ceased, leaving the assembly in a fearful state of excitement. Then commenced many unnecessary repetitions by various speakers, until at length M. Manuel got an opportunity of speaking. His young and handsome face, his simple but decided air, his easy flow of words, and the false reputation of being M. Fouché's principal agent, whose acknowledged opinions he shared, but of whose secret plans he was totally ignorant, won him immediate attention. So well chosen and so firm was the tone he assumed, that notwithstanding the excitement that prevailed in the assembly, he influenced the minds of his auditors from the very moment he began to speak. He blamed those who, by proposing that Napoleon II. should be proclaimed, had raised a most serious and inopportune question, the immediate



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solution of which, he did not hesitate to say, would be the very extreme of imprudence. He admitted that as the question had been raised, it would be difficult to evade it, and that the only way in which it could now be decided was by declaring that they intended to abide by the existing Constitution, which necessarily implied the sovereignty of Napoleon II. Having made this concession to the feelings of the assembly, he sketched a bold and true picture of the different parties by which France was divided, describing their expectations, their pretensions, and their plots; he indicated clearly that his personal preference was not for the Bourbons, and showed, with a great deal of power and dexterity, that the only way to avoid declaring for any party, was to support the existing Constitution literally, without adding any new declaration that might increase the difficulties of the negotiation with Europe. This discourse, the most artistic and effective that this justly celebrated orator ever pronounced, had immense success, for it satisfied the twofold desire of the assembly for Napoleon II. and for peace, by proposing a middle course, by which it seemed possible to secure both.

The assembly authorised M. Manuel to record the following motion: That the chamber passed to the order of the day, recognising that, in accordance with the Additional Act, Napoleon II. was the real Emperor of the French, and that by the decision of the previous day an executive commission had been appointed, which in the existing serious state of things might secure the defence of the country, and assert its rights, liberty, and independence. The entire assembly rose, voted that M. Manuel's speech be printed, and separated amidst cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* M. Manuel had done the assembly a signal service by saving it from making a new declaration that might increase the difficulties of a negotiation for peace, without at the same time doing any further injury to the claim of Napoleon II., already sufficiently in danger. He was the object of universal admiration for a short time. M. Fouché, as far as he could, assumed to himself the honour of having discovered the orator, of having inspired his eloquence, and of having developed his talents for the benefit of France. This successful speech was the commencement of the political career of an orator who was to distinguish himself at a later period by the firmness of his opinions.

The assembly fondly believed that both Napoleon II. and peace were secured. France in her abandoned position had need of hope. She tried to console herself with illusions, realities being denied her.

The executive commission entered immediately on the exercise of its functions, and its first care was to complete its own organi-

sation. It needed a president. M. Quinette and M. Grenier, both devoted to the Revolution, voted for M. Carnot. He was too simple-minded a man to vote for himself, so gave his voice for the Duke of Otranto. M. de Caulaincourt considered Carnot honest but unskilful, and voted for M. Fouché, hoping that the latter, being satisfied, he would assist him in securing Napoleon's personal interests. Fouché voted also for himself, and having the three votes, he became president of the executive commission and virtual head of the provisional government.

It was absolutely necessary to make some appointments. Prince Cambacérès had sent in his resignation as minister of justice; M. de Caulaincourt and M. Carnot could not be at the same time ministers and members of the executive commission. M. Boulay de la Meurthe was provisionally appointed to the ministry of justice, M. Bignon to that of foreign affairs, and M. Carnot's brother to the home department. The appointment of the commander of the national guard of Paris was of more importance than any of these. M. Fouché did not mean to leave this office to General Durosnel without giving him a superior whose devotion to the fallen emperor could not be suspected. Neither did he desire M. de Lafayette, whom he put aside after having made use of him, under the old pretence that he would be needed for the negotiations with the enemy, but took care that Marshal Massena should be chosen, whose great reputation threw all competitors into the shade, and who, being disgusted with men and things, without hope for the country, and devoid of personal ambition, was quite willing to let things take their own course without offering any obstacle.

A commander having been appointed to the national guard at Paris, there was one still needed for the troops that were to defend the capital. Napoleon had intended to appoint Marshal Davout to this office, and as no better could be found, that choice was confirmed. This was making Marshal Davout commander-in-chief, as all the disposable troops would necessarily fall back towards Paris, both those that had fought in Flanders and at the Alps, and those that were unemployed in Vendée. It was decided that the marshal should defend the city on the outside with the troops of the line, and any volunteers that wished to join in the external defence, whilst the national guards should keep order within the walls. General Druot, whose virtues were an infallible guarantee for patriotism and the love of order, was appointed to command what remained of the imperial guard. Nobody doubted but that these heroic men under such a commander would again devote themselves for their country, though they had lost Napoleon. Next came the measures which needed the concurrence of the chambers.

The members of the commission, on the very day of entering

on the discharge of their functions, proposed three resolutions already brought forward in the nocturnal conference held at the Tuileries: the raising of the conscription of 1815, the authorising of some requisitions made according to certain rules, and a suspension of personal liberty. The two first of these resolutions passed without difficulty; but the Act for the suspension of personal liberty met with more opposition. The assembly consisted of honest men, who abhorred arbitrary acts, which from the time of our first Revolution were called revolutionary, and would not employ them on any account. The royalists (as the partisans of the Bourbons were called), who, though a very numerous body in the country, had not more than five or six of their number in the assembly, feared that this measure was directed against them, as indeed it was. This Act required that all those might be arrested arbitrarily who should hoist any other than the national colours, utter seditious cries, take part in the civil war, urge soldiers to desert, or open communications with the enemy outside. These were all undoubted crimes; but all honest men, all those who desired that unswerving justice should reign in France, preferred that punishment could not be inflicted on mere suspicion, nor until the crime had been proved before the legal tribunals. Unfortunately things at that time were little suited to legal rule; besides that, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in England was a very forcible example, so that the principle of the Act was admitted. Still the assembly would not consent that this Act should remain in force more than two months, and made its application subject to the control of a commission chosen from both chambers. Notwithstanding these precautions, 60 out of 359 votes were given against it. This being decided, the assembly determined to turn its attention at once to the framing of a new Constitution, as if a better could be drawn up than the Additional Act, and as though they had forgotten how ridiculous such a deliberation would be at a time when the allies were already threatening the walls of the capital.

Whilst the commissioners were zealously passing these measures negotiators were appointed to go to the camp of the allies. M. de Lafayette could not be excluded from the number, as he had been excluded from every other office, under pretence of his capabilities as a negotiator. He was consequently appointed. General Sebastiani was chosen in virtue of his twofold recommendation of soldier and diplomatist; M. d'Argenson was selected because of his reputation and the independence he had shown in the celebrated law-suit at Antwerp; M. de Pontécoulant because he had been peer under Napoleon and Louis XVIII., and especially because he had refused to consider Prince Lucien a Frenchman; and M. de Laforest

because of his experience in diplomacy. M. Benjamin Constant was added to these as secretary of legation, both because of his talents and of the connection he had formed with foreign princes during the time of his exile. These negotiators were desired to stipulate for the integrity of the kingdom, the independence of the nation (that is its right to choose its own government), the sovereignty of Napoleon II., the oblivion of all recent and anterior acts, and finally, respect for persons and property. It was decided that the legation was to make the best conditions it could, and yield those points that might endanger the signing of peace. The condition concerning Napoleon II. was merely nominal, and only mentioned to please the assembly. It was decided that the legation should first go to Laon, not to meet the sovereigns, who were with the invading column that was advancing from the east, but to arrange an armistice with the Duke of Wellington and Blücher, who commanded the northern column, then marching towards Paris. They were afterwards to negotiate with the sovereigns in person.

Laon was at this time the rendezvous both of our army and of the pursuing foe. Our soldiers having retired in confusion for two days, were ordered to assemble at Laon, whither they had hurried in crowds. Marshal Soult had fused several regiments into one whenever their reduced numbers rendered it necessary. The carriages of the artillery having been saved, he had collected the cannon at La Fère, and had succeeded in regularly organising the 30,000 men who had escaped from Waterloo, and who asked nothing more than an opportunity of avenging their defeat by some fresh efforts of devotion.

Meanwhile Marshal Grouchy, who was believed to be lost, had escaped the enemy by the most fortunate and unexpected chances. Having received the fatal intelligence on the morning of the 19th, intelligence that he could scarcely credit, he immediately began retreating towards Namur, according to Napoleon's directions. He had taken the most direct route, that through Mont St. Guibert and Tilly, and had ordered Vandamme to advance by Wavre to Gembloux. He ran the greatest risk of being surrounded and overpowered on this route; but fortunately the English were so exhausted that they needed rest, and Blücher, hurrying like a madman after those who had escaped from Waterloo, did not even think of Grouchy. Grouchy's divisions passed through Namur on the 20th, the Belgians everywhere testifying the most lively interest for them. Teste's division brought up the rear, and took part in a brilliant combat at Namur, and afterwards in perfect safety joined the *corps d'armée* by the route of Dinant, Rocroy, and Rethel.

A part of Grouchy's corps had thus arrived at Laon, in addition to the troops escaped from Waterloo, and within one or two days more than 60,000 men would be assembled there, all ready, under Napoleon's command, to fight with the courage inspired by despair. All these became depressed or indignant when told of the abdication. As usual, they considered that this had been effected by treachery, and declared that it was useless to be soldiers when the only man capable of leading them against the enemy had been so unjustly dethroned by traitors. When the executive commission learned the state of feeling that prevailed in the army, two deputies were sent to represent to the men, that though Napoleon had retired, their country—something far more sacred—still remained to be defended. One of these deputies was the valiant Mouton-Duvernct, doomed, like Ney and La Bédoyère, to fall a victim to the fierce passions of the time.

Meantime the excitement at Paris was daily increasing, everybody being in an agony of expectation awaiting the termination of this extraordinary crisis. Napoleon was still at the Elysée Palace, where his solitude daily increased as formerly at Fontainebleau. His sole consolation was in the visits of a few faithful friends, such as M. de Bassano, M. de Rovigo, and M. Lavalette, and in the homage of the federalists and of the soldiers who had escaped from the army, and who crowded the Marigny road, and filled the air with loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* whenever he appeared. M. Fouché came to pay a last visit, during which he sought to conceal his embarrassment beneath his colourless face. Napoleon received him coldly and politely, and merely said, "Prepare to fight, for the enemy's plans and yours do not agree; they will have nothing but the Bourbons, and if you refuse them, you will have a fierce battle under the walls of Paris itself." M. Fouché accorded a kind of respectful assent to what Napoleon said, and then retired from a spot where every object seemed to reproach him, and where Napoleon's haughtiness, though free from all reproof, made him feel ill at ease. He preferred going to the Tuileries, where he was master, and where Quinette's inertia, Carnot's simplicity, Grenier's inexperience, and the dejection of the Duke of Vicence, allowed him to rule absolutely. His colleagues, knowing him to be a regicide, and that he had been arrested immediately before the 20th of March, thought that he could never be reconciled to the Bourbons, and having perfect confidence in his activity, knowledge, and capacity, allowed him to act as he thought fit. But whilst the army was falling back on Paris, and that commissioners had been sent to attempt an impossible negotiation with the allied sovereigns, and whilst the chamber considered it both honourable and useful to commence the

discussion of a new Constitution, M. Fouché was only seeking to turn to his own profit the *dénouement* of this painful but burlesque comedy. Although to please the chambers he himself spoke and allowed others to speak of Napoleon II., he had no faith in that prince's cause. He was convinced that the allied sovereigns had as little desire for the son as for the father, and that Louis XVIII. would be the inevitable consequence of Napoleon's defeat. He did not wish for the Bourbons, but he foresaw that they would return. As they were inevitable, he determined to assist their return for his personal advantage. It was not a crime to foresee or even to assist in their establishment on the throne; it was only a foreknowledge of what was to come, a knowledge that none could blame. But if he had the sagacity to foresee the coming restoration, his aid ought to have been given as an honest man, as a good citizen, that is, he ought to have frankly explained his views to such of his colleagues as M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Davout, who were capable of understanding them, at the same time that he guided the others without betraying them; and he should have made conditions not for himself, but for France, her territories, her liberty, and should especially have secured the safety of all such as had been compromised. Such ought to have been M. Fouché's conduct; but such it was not. The project suggested by his head and heart was to help in the restoration of the Bourbons, since no other choice was left, and even at the risk of betraying everybody, to let none into his confidence, that he himself might have all the merit and all the profit, to save as many of the compromised as possible (for when his personal interests were not concerned, M. Fouché was not malicious), but abandon the others; in a word, to turn into an intrigue what ought to have been a skilfully and sincerely conducted negotiation.

It will not be forgotten that M. Fouché had, upon his own authority, set M. de Vitrolles at liberty. On the morning of the 23rd, the day following the abdication, he sent for him, that he might at once commence his intrigue with the royalist party. M. de Vitrolles wished to go first to the court at Ghent, to make arrangements for the return of the Bourbons, and assume there himself the part he desired to play. M. Fouché made him abandon this idea, telling him that this work was to be accomplished with him at Paris, and not at Ghent with emigrant princes, who had nothing else to do than accept the services that would be rendered them. He described this as a most difficult task, and his own position as most delicate, placed as he was between Carnot, whom he called an imbecile fanatic, Quinette and Grenier, filled, as he said, with silly revolutionary prejudices, and M. de Caulaincourt, whom he described as entirely devoted to the interests of his old master. He did not

feel any great fear of M. de Caulaincourt, who, seeing there was no hope for the imperial dynasty, would be easily satisfied, provided that Napoleon's person was safe. M. Fouché assured M. de Vitrolles that all his efforts would be for Louis XVIII., to aid his interests would all his exertions tend, even when seemingly taking a contrary direction, that he had already got rid of Napoleon I., and had his path still obstructed by Napoleon II., and perhaps the Duke of Orleans, but that neither should arrest his progress unless that very great difficulties indeed were put in his way. M. de Vitrolles having received these assurances and explanations, promised M. Fouché that he would remain at Paris instead of going to Ghent. But though he consented to remain, he requested the head of the executive commission to protect his life, to allow him frequent interviews, and give him passports for the agents that he would send to Ghent. M. Fouché replied cynically, "Your head will be hung on the same hook as mine; as for communicating with me, you can see me three or four times every day if you choose; and as to passports, I will give you a hundred if you wish." This being arranged, he advised M. de Vitrolles to appear abroad as little as possible until the day when such precautions should be no longer needed.

Having thus opened a communication with Louis XVIII. through the most confidential agent of royalism, M. Fouché continued to speak to Carnot, Quinette, and Grenier as though he were the irreconcilable enemy of the Bourbons and the emigration, whilst with M. de Caulaincourt he affected to wish, though he could scarcely hope, for the accession of Napoleon II., and to show himself determined to procure Napoleon the treatment that his former dignity and glory deserved. To the many representatives through whom M. Fouché sought to keep up his communication and influence with the Lower Chamber, he insinuated that there would be many obstacles to the accession of Napoleon II.; spoke now, for the first time, of the impossibility of getting him out of the hands of the allies, mentioned the little interest that Marie Louise felt for her son's advancement, and said that it would not be any very great loss if he were abandoned for a Bourbon prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution, the Duke of Orleans, for instance, whose intelligence, opinions, and conduct were known to everybody. All except the decided Bonapartists agreed with this, for both revolutionists and liberals would be quite satisfied with the sovereignty of the younger branch of the Bourbons, preferring an enlightened liberal man to a child, a prisoner amongst strangers from whose hands it would be difficult to free him. But whilst he spoke thus, M. Fouché was only thinking of getting rid of Napoleon II., as he had said to M. de Vitrolles,

and only introduced the Duke of Orleans to get rid of him in his turn, that he might at length come to the Bourbons, who ultimately treated him as he had treated others.

The public excitement still continued ; nor was it lessened by Napoleon's abdication, which was far from being the termination of the crisis. As long as this object had been the term to which men's minds were directed they did not look beyond ; but now that this had been attained and passed, attention was turned to a fresh object. The Bonapartists and revolutionists asked in the greatest anxiety, whether the country were really in a position to negotiate with the enemy and get Napoleon II. in exchange for his father, and whether, if negotiation failed, they would be able to fight. Of the latter, indeed, they had little hope, for they felt that the soldiers, deprived of Napoleon, would lose their self-confidence in losing their leader. Whilst the Bonapartists and revolutionists, henceforth to be ranked as one, were beginning to feel all the torments of despair, the royalists were beginning to grow impatient. Seeing that things were assuming a favourable turn for them, they could not make up their minds to wait. Having a great number of troops at their disposal, some of whom had returned from Vendée since peace was restored there, others of whom had belonged to the household troops, and wished to serve again, the royalists were ready to undertake the rashest enterprise. M. Dubouchage, an old royalist, round whom all the others had rallied, only asked for a signal from the heads of their party to make a sudden attack on the Chamber of Representatives. General Dessoles commenced to form secret understandings with the national guard, amongst whom he had formerly held a considerable command, and sought to reanimate their zeal, which the three past months had not destroyed. These were joined by Marshals Macdonald, St. Cyr, and Oudinot, all three devoted to the cause of the Bourbons. They were requested to put themselves at the head of the royalists, and make some effort ; but they were not men likely to act rashly through excess of royalist feelings ; besides that, M. de Vitrolles, instructed by M. Fouché, told them that any attempt would at that time be premature, and that they must wait for a better opportunity. The royalists, whilst awaiting better times, gathered round the Elysée Palace, to observe what was going on there, and were greatly offended at what they saw.

The Marigny road, which runs beside the palace, was incessantly crowded with succeeding swarms of idlers with anxious and threatening countenances. The greater number, as we have already said, consisted of federalists, men of the lower ranks, and old soldiers, to whom Napoleon did not intend to give arms until the enemy should be under the walls of Paris, and whom M. Fouché did not mean to arm at all.

Some of them, in whom more confidence was felt, had been placed under the command of General Darricau, and under the denomination of sharpshooters of the national guard, had been employed with troops of the line in the external defence of Paris. But these only formed a very small portion; the others, together with some thousands of every rank who had left the army from some motive of pique, crowded the neighbourhood of the Elysée Palace, in the hope of seeing Napoleon for a moment, and of saluting him with acclamations. The dominant thought in the minds of all these men was that a great treason existed somewhere, either in the executive or in the chambers, and that the object of this treason was to abandon France to the power of foreigners, but that if Napoleon would only place himself at their head, he would be able to repel the enemy, and disperse the royalists. This subject was discussed by numerous and noisy groups, who were constantly threatening to commence operations, and who, whenever Napoleon appeared in the garden, hailed him with mingled cries of rage and enthusiasm. Though Napoleon did nothing to increase their excitement, he could not resist the desire of appearing sometimes and receiving these last homages of the people and the army, whom he was soon to leave for ever.

But although he knew that in this crowd he possessed the means of overpowering the provisional government and the chambers, and resuming the command of the army for a few days, perhaps even meet Wellington and Blücher in a final struggle, still, when he looked beyond what would only be a momentary success, he saw that the chances of such an attempt were too few, and he only thought of whether he should retire, feeling that the day was fast approaching when he should be obliged to seek shelter from home perfidy or foreign violence. But those who dreaded his very presence suspected him of projects of which he was not dreaming, and caused M. Fouché the greatest alarm by asserting that Napoleon was laying plans for the recovery of power. The royalists in particular told him that if he neglected their warning, that the federalists, with Napoleon at their head, would soon convince him of the truth by some unexpected attack. This alarm had been also spread through the members of the Lower Chamber.

M. Fouché was too deceitful himself not to suspect others of being so too. He communicated his suspicions on this subject to his colleagues, and sought to alarm them by describing all that Napoleon was capable of, now that he was reduced to despair, at the same time that he was determined, whether authorised or not, to get him to quit the Elysée Palace. As it would not be safe to use violence, it would be necessary to see Napoleon, and endeavour to persuade him to retire. Fearing

that he would not be well received, and little inclined to appear in the presence of the man he had betrayed, he entrusted the task to Marshal Davout, a man whose roughness of manner was well known, and whose attachment to Napoleon had been considerably cooled down by certain slights that he had received during the latter part of his ministry.

Marshal Davout repaired to the palace, in whose courts he found a number of officers who had left the army without leave, and who, like all the rest, declared that treason was abroad, and that Napoleon ought to put himself at their head to crush it. The marshal had several animated altercations with some of these officers, many of them as unpolished as himself, and whom he reproached in vain for their conduct as he left them to wait on Napoleon. He told him the object of his coming, and commenced proving to him that for his own sake, his son's, and the country's, he ought to retire, and thus dissipate the anxiety he caused, and leave the government that freedom of action so necessary in serious and critical times. Napoleon received him coolly, did not hesitate to say that he would have expected anybody rather than Marshal Davout to have undertaken such a mission, assured him, though without designing to enter into his own justification, that he was not forming any of the plans attributed to him, and that he was quite ready to leave Paris if he were provided with the means of making a safe retreat. The marshal retired, mortified by the reception he had met, though he had succeeded in his mission. This honest, sensible, but rugged soldier, whose powers of perception were not very refined, was quite unconscious of the effect he had produced on a man who had been his master but a few days before. He left the Elysée Palace under the influence of the most painful feelings.

Napoleon determined to pass the few remaining days that he was to spend in France at Malmaison. This charming retreat, in which his career had commenced, and where it was about to terminate, was to him an abode filled with memories at once pleasing and painful, and he was not unwilling to imbibe the long draughts of his sorrows amidst its shades. He requested Queen Hortense to accompany him, and this devoted daughter hastened to lavish her last cares upon him. Napoleon deliberated for a long time on the spot where he would spend the remainder of his life. M. de Caulaincourt advised him to choose Russia; but he was inclined for England. "Russia," he said, "is but one man; England is a nation, and a free nation. Englishmen are generous, and will be flattered by my asking for an asylum amongst them, where I shall enjoy the only pleasure left a man who has governed the world—the conversation of enlightened men." But M. de Caulaincourt representing to

him that the passions of the English people were still too much excited to allow them to be generous, he decided on renouncing England and choosing America. "As I am refused the society of men," he said, "I will betake myself to the bosom of nature, and enjoy the solitude that suits my last thoughts." Having come to this decision, he asked that two armed frigates, then lying at Rhodes, should be placed at his disposal, to transport himself and his effects to America. He asked for books and horses, and began to make preparations for his departure.

He had abdicated on the 22nd, and at noon on the 25th he left the Elysée Palace, stepping into his carriage within the garden, that he might not be seen by the crowd. He was recognised, however, and accompanied by cries of *Vive l'Empereur* from the crowd, who had no idea of what was being done with him. Napoleon bowed in acknowledgment of these salutations with an expression of sadness, and left that Paris that he was never to see again, with his heart as much depressed as though he were assisting at his own funeral solemnities. He found Queen Hortense at Malmaison, and the weather being fine, he walked about until weary through the scenes of the most brilliant portions of his life. He spoke continually of Josephine, and again expressed his wish for a faithful portrait of that regretted wife.

M. Fouché was delighted that he was gone, and felt almost as though he were emperor himself, since he who had so long borne the title had been expelled from Paris. Napoleon appearing inclined to leave not only Paris but France, M. Fouché was inclined to comply with his wishes. But he was assailed by two motives of fear, with which he easily imbued his colleagues. He thought that Napoleon in the solitude of Malmaison would be exposed to two dangers—on the one hand, from the royalists, who might seek to rid themselves of him for ever; on the other, from the Bonapartists, who might endeavour to place him at the head of the army that was actually approaching Paris, and tempt fortune for the last time. M. Fouché had no intention of abandoning Napoleon either to assassins or the desperate partisans of the imperial cause. He intended to place him under the charge of General Beker, a man as much distinguished by his moral as his military qualities, a man of well-known honour, who would be incapable of bearing in mind, under existing circumstances, that he had been disgraced in 1809. No other man would have suited such a position, for all honest men would have been revolted at the idea of placing a gaoler over Napoleon. On the morning of the 26th, Marshal Davout sent for General Beker, and told him of the mission that was to be confided to him, assigning two reasons—the first, to protect Napoleon, and the second, to prevent public

agitations from exciting troubles under shelter of a glorious name. He ordered him to set out immediately for Malmaison. General Beker obeyed with regret; but he did not refuse the charge imposed on him, as he considered it an honourable employment to watch over the safety of a great man fallen from his high position, and patriotic to prevent the disorders that might occur in his name. He was told that the two frigates demanded by the emperor should be placed at his disposal; but that in order to obtain a safe sea voyage it would be necessary to procure passports from the Duke of Wellington, which Napoleon might await at Rochefort.

M. Fouché has been accused of having sought to deliver Napoleon to the English by giving them notice of his departure by this demand of a safe conduct. This suggestion, though supported by M. Fouché's equivocal conduct during the entire period, is completely erroneous. He sent General Tromelin, a Breton, and a sincere royalist, to the English camp, to ask for passports which would enable Napoleon to go in safety to America, and at the same time to learn the views of the English commander-in-chief with regard to the government of France. M. Fouché had done this under the false impression that the English, glad to be rid of Napoleon, would give a safe conduct willingly. He made a great mistake, as we shall soon see, for the precaution he took to secure Napoleon from captivity, and himself from the suspicion of the grossest perfidy, was doubly unsuccessful, as it made Napoleon's intended departure known, and exposed M. Fouché to the suspicion of having betrayed him whom he sought to save. Admiral Decrès, who felt no confidence in M. Fouché's precautions, considered that Napoleon would be safer unacknowledged in a trading vessel than on board a man-of-war avowedly bearing the illustrious captive. He opened communications with the American trading vessels at Havre, and made arrangements with two for carrying Napoleon safely to New York. He informed Napoleon of these propositions, and of those of the provisional government at the same time.

A most painful excitement was caused at Malmaison by the announcement of General Beker's arrival. It was at first thought that M. Fouché had sent him as a gaoler. Napoleon had been accompanied by some attendants, civil and military, the greater number of whom were young, and ready for the most daring acts. Had Napoleon but spoken the word, they would immediately have refused to submit to General Beker; but he calmed them, and desired to have an explanation with the general. He received him with polite reserve; but seeing his emotion, he soon discovered that he was the most honourable of men, treated him as a friend, and conversed freely with him.

Napoleon consented and even wished to go; but he did not approve of passports being asked for, fearing that he would be arrested in the harbour and given up to the English by the perfidy of the Duke of Otranto. He might have accepted the offer of the Americans at Havre, but it seemed beneath his dignity to escape clandestinely on board a trading vessel. He desired General Beker to return to Paris and inform the provisional government that he was ready to leave on condition of having the frigates placed at his disposal immediately; but that if he were to wait for an order to depart, he would prefer remaining at Malmaison to staying at Rochefort. General Beker hastened to Paris to fulfil his mission. But M. Fouché was positive, saying that he would not expose himself to the accusation of delivering Napoleon to the English, as he should do if he allowed him to leave without passports; which indeed had been already sent for, and must arrive soon. The answer must necessarily be waited for, and Napoleon remained in the meantime at Malmaison.

It was a great relief to the royalists to have Napoleon removed from Paris, and no less so to M. Fouché, who was in constant fear of some attempt by the inhabitants of the faubourg and the soldiers, who, taking Napoleon as their head, might have set aside the chambers and the provisional government, and attempted a last struggle with the allied armies. Napoleon being gone, M. Fouché was no longer anxious to hasten events, for though he knew that the Bourbons were inevitable, he would not regret to see other candidates for the sovereignty appear on the stage. This was one reason why he should not hurry; but there was another, more rational and more decided, which was, that being himself resigned to the Bourbons, he was desirous to bring round the executive commission and the chambers to the same views, by showing them the necessity of such a result, and meanwhile he hoped to make the change still more profitable to himself. Three of the five members of the executive commission, Carnot, Quinette, and Grenier, believed in all simplicity that it would be possible, partly by an armed resistance and partly by negotiation, to avoid the hard necessity of again accepting the Bourbons. M. de Caulaincourt alone saw this necessity in its unshadowed clearness, and allowed M. Fouché to act as he felt inclined, for he sought no other advantage from the deplorable confusion of those times than better treatment for Napoleon. Had three of the five votes been against him, whilst the chambers were so prejudiced against the Bourbons, M. Fouché would have been compelled to temporise. But temporising would not suit the impatience of the royalists, who now amounted to perhaps 3000 or 4000, though they themselves asserted that since the return

of some from Vendée, and of others belonging to the household troops, they did not number less than 15,000. These urged old M. Dubouchage to act, and he in his turn pressed M. de Vitrolles and Marshals Oudinot, Macdonald, and St. Cyr to give the signal. M. de Vitrolles implored them not to do anything rashly, which might only excite the federalists against them, reveal their plans to the chambers, possibly cause a reaction in favour of Napoleon, and by precipitancy compromise their cause. M. de Vitrolles very naturally assumed another tone when speaking to M. Fouché, whom he urged to proclaim Louis XVIII., by which he would deprive foreigners of the merit of this second restoration, and spare the Bourbons the disadvantage of being replaced on the throne by the hands of the enemies of France. These were very good arguments; but though they furnished excellent motives for action, they did not supply the means of execution. So important a proposition, M. Fouché said, could not be made to the commission, unless it could be proved that it would be impossible to resist the allied armies. There was but one man, Marshal Davout, the minister of war, who would have sufficient authority to make such a declaration. His office, his great military renown, the firmness he had so lately shown at Hamburg, and his being proscribed by the Bourbons, gave him advantages possessed by no other man at the time, and constituted him sole judge of the possibility or impossibility of defence. He was an honest, straightforward man, who would not hesitate to proclaim anything of the truth of which he was convinced. The very responsibility he would assume in the eyes of the world by declaring resistance possible when it was not so, would be a sufficient reason to induce him to declare his real conviction. M. Fouché asserted that it was absolutely necessary that this man should be won over. But it was not so easy to gain access to the simple-minded marshal. Chance, however, so generally favourable in cases of great necessity, furnished the desired opportunity on the very day after Napoleon's departure. The police had given information of Marshal Oudinot's being about to head a royalist movement. This marshal had not taken service since the 20th of March, but had not broken off all connection with Napoleon. He had waited on him, and also on the minister of war. The latter sent for him now, reproached him for holding back, and to test his sentiments offered him an appointment. Marshal Oudinot declined, and when closely pressed by the minister, he said that the cause was hopeless, that the Bonapartes were henceforth impossible, whilst the Bourbons were inevitable and desirable; and that if they were not immediately proclaimed, we should be compelled to accept them from the hands of foreigners, and even on worse

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conditions for them and for the country. He added that the wisest and most patriotic course would be a courageous initiative. He then reduced the whole question to a point of military tactics, by asking Marshal Davout whether he could hope to be able to make a successful resistance to Europe when Napoleon had not been able to do so. He then added, that if Louis XVIII. had not been prevented, he would have acted with justice towards the marshal, for he could appreciate the great qualities of the conqueror of Auerstadt, and would not forget the great services he had rendered to France on that occasion.

Marshal Davout replied, that in his present onerous position, occupying Napoleon's military command, he did not think of his personal interests, but of the responsibility that rested on him, and must admit that he did not believe it possible to resist Europe. Having made this admission, there could be no great difficulty in accepting the Bourbons, the only dynasty that Europe would recognise in France. Marshal Davout being a man of clear good sense, admitted the necessity, and added, that he could easily overcome his own repugnance to them if he believed them capable of acting wisely. Marshal Oudinot asked him what proof of their good sense would he require; and he replied, that the king should return to Paris unaccompanied by foreign troops, who were to be left at a distance of thirty leagues from the capital, that he should adopt the tri-colored flag, pass an act of oblivion for all the acts of military men as well as civilians since the 20th of March, support the existing chambers, and maintain the army in its existing state, &c., &c. Marshal Oudinot retired to communicate the purport of this conversation to those in higher authority than himself. He hastened to M. de Vitrolles, who saw nothing objectionable in these conditions, and wished for a conference with Marshal Davout. The marshal consented, and made an appointment for the same evening. M. de Vitrolles said that he was not authorised to accept the proposed conditions, but was certain that the king would not object to them, especially if he were proclaimed before the allies entered Paris. Marshal Davout considered that it would be an immense advantage if, by the immediate proclamation of the Bourbons, the allies would be prevented from appearing a second time in the capital, and determined to make a formal proposition to that effect on the following day to the executive commission. The marshal was a straightforward man without a ray of diplomatic tact, and who could not understand why a rational proposition should not be immediately adopted.

On the following day, the 27th, the executive commission, the presidents of the two chambers, and the greater number of the ministry being assembled at the Tuileries, the Duke of Otranto, aware of the interview that had taken place between

M. de Vitrolles and the marshal, turned the conversation on the existing state of things, especially with regard to military affairs. Marshal Davout communicated the intelligence he had received, which was far from being satisfactory. During the two past days the Prussians and English had been advancing with redoubled speed, and there was every reason to fear that they would reach Paris sooner than the army that was beginning to rally at Laon. Marshal Davout, with characteristic absence of circumlocution, declared formally, that he considered resistance impossible; that even though a temporary advantage might be gained over the Prussians and English advancing from the north, there would still be the Austrians, Russians, and Bavarians coming from the east, to whom they must finally succumb; that it was better to understand and declare how things stood, and act accordingly; that the Bourbons being inevitable, by proclaiming them themselves they would get them to enter Paris, unaccompanied by foreigners, and on the conditions he had mentioned to Marshal Oudinot. Unlike M. Fouché, who would have made a thousand windings and calculations, Marshal Davout frankly repeated the conversation he had had with Marshal Oudinot, stated the conditions he required, the hope he had received of their being accepted, and finally declared that his advice would be to have a frank explanation with the chambers, making them a formal proposition on this important ground, that it would be better to accept the Bourbons willingly on conditions they should themselves propose, than accept them unconditionally from the hands of foreigners.

This proposal, made in a tone of sincere conviction, did not meet with any opposition from MM. Grenier and Quinette, nor even from Carnot, who had perfect confidence in Marshal Davout's honour, and who, despite his prejudices, was not insensible to the advantages of the Bourbons' returning without foreign aid. M. de Caulaincourt was silent, as was his custom at that time. Had M. Fouché acted as frankly as the marshal, great advantage might have been derived from an immediate and patriotic determination. But either because he was displeased at being anticipated, or that he feared Marshal Davout would be too precipitate, he was rather cool in his approval, and in pursuance of a habit he had adopted, of almost constantly deciding without consulting his colleagues, he told the two presidents, M. Cambacérès and M. Lanjuinais, that they must prepare the chambers for a result that was inevitable. No person seemed inclined to object, when M. Bignon, the temporary minister of foreign affairs, arrived unexpectedly with an important document. It was the first report from the negotiators sent to the allied camp, and contained the following information.

MM. de Lafayette, de Pontécoulant, Sebastiani, d'Argenson, de Laforest, and Benjamin Constant had first proceeded to Laon, where they expected to find the English and Prussian armies. Their object in taking this direction was to obtain an armistice with the troops nearest the capital, and then proceed to treat of the essential conditions with the sovereigns themselves. Having obtained more correct information as they advanced, they had repaired to St. Quentin, where they found the Prussian outposts, and demanded an interview with the commanders of the allied forces. Blucher, who was two days' march in advance of the English, referred them to the Duke of Wellington; but he, supposing that Napoleon's abdication was only a feint to gain time, was of opinion that an armistice should not be granted. Blucher, needing but little inducement to become quite impracticable, refused all suspension of arms unless he got possession of the frontier fortresses and of Napoleon's person. Such conditions could not be accepted. But the officers who represented the enemy's generals declared that they were not come to France for the sake of the Bourbons, who were of very little importance to them, and that when Napoleon and his family should be removed, the allied sovereigns would be willing to agree to whatever conditions would be most advantageous to France. The negotiators were then authorised to proceed to Alsace, where they would find the allied sovereigns. They had now set out for this destination, having first, as was their duty, sent off this report to the executive commission. They repeated that the allies were not absolutely determined to bring back the Bourbons, but that their unchangeable resolution was that Napoleon and his family should be excluded from the throne of France; that once this was agreed to, they would be more yielding on other points, but that they would be seriously offended should Napoleon be assisted to escape—a proceeding that would remove all probability of peace. The legation, in conclusion, advised that other negotiators should be sent to Blucher and Wellington, with authority to make such concessions as would be necessary for obtaining an armistice.

The negotiators had evidently allowed themselves to be misled by the heedless remarks of some Prussian officers, all imbued with revolutionary principles, but who would have assumed a very different tone with regard to the Bourbons had they had to discuss the future government of France officially. Still this report caused an unfortunate revulsion in the executive commission. Three members, who were before willing to submit to the alleged necessity of accepting the Bourbons, now that this necessity seemed no longer to exist, thought it better not to act precipitately, nor seem so ready to make a sacrifice that might be avoided. Had M. Fouché had more sagacity,

of the members, nor divert their thoughts from the existing danger, for having listened for a moment to any novelty that was proposed, they left their seats and hastened into the lobbies to gather any news that might have arrived. As the bureau of the two chambers had been present at the late meeting of the executive commission, the members necessarily got some idea of the discussions that had arisen there. They knew that the re-establishment of the Bourbons had been proposed, and it was to M. Fouché that this intention of recalling the princes was generally attributed. As is always the case amongst partisans, there were various grades of zeal amongst the Bonapartists. The greater number was satisfied to get Napoleon II. instead of Napoleon I.; but there were a faithful few who considered that abandoning Napoleon was an act of treachery, a crime they laid to M. Fouché's charge. One of this minority, M. Félix Desportes, repaired on the following morning, the 28th, to the executive commission, accompanied by M. Durbach, who was less anxious to retain the Bonapartes than desirous to avoid receiving the Bourbons from the hands of foreigners. Both pressed the Duke of Otranto with questions, and told him in the harshest terms, that having sought and won the confidence of the chambers, he had now betrayed them by proffering his aid to the Bourbons. M. Fouché was embarrassed at first, but soon recovered himself, and replied: "It is not I that have betrayed our common cause, but the battle of Waterloo. The Prussian and English armies are advancing rapidly on us, and we are unprovided with all means of resistance. They will not have Napoleon or any of his family on any terms! What part have I in this? If you wish to know how and why I treat with their generals, here is my letter to the Duke of Wellington, which you can read." The Duke of Otranto here gave it to them to read. These gentlemen, being simple enough to believe that the whole subject of negotiation was contained in this letter, were satisfied, and asked and obtained permission to communicate this piece of information to the assembly. They immediately hastened to the Chamber of Representatives, where they read M. Fouché's letter aloud; but though it was neither approved nor blamed, it produced a temporary calm, for the imagination is a faculty which is easily excited or calmed in times of great danger; besides, it dissipated for some moments the generally received suspicion of an act of dark treachery.

Meanwhile the members who had been sent to the French army, on its way to Laon, had fulfilled their mission, and were now come to make their report. This duty devolving on General Mouton-Duvernét, he first described the disorder that had spread through the army, told how it had soon joined

Marshal Grouchy's corps, how the men had believed that they had been betrayed, how their zeal had revived when told they were to fight for Napoleon II.—a name, he said, that had given them fresh vigour; that they were quite ready to do their duty, but that they would require, besides the much needed material assistance, some encouragement from the nation to raise both their moral and physical courage. When he had spoken thus, a unanimous cry was heard, saying, that if Napoleon I. were gone, France still remained—France, that was a thousand times more important than any man whatever; that a proclamation should be drawn up to thank the soldiers for what they had done, to ask them to continue their efforts for their country, which ought to hold the first place in their affections, and to beg them to hasten to fight once more for their independence and liberty under the walls of Paris, where they would find the representatives ready to die with them in defence of these sacred rights. An address breathing these sentiments was drawn up by M. Jay, it was voted during the course of that day, and then entrusted to five members, to be presented to the army. The assembly did what it could; but that was very little. With the best intentions it could not replace the name nor supply the want it had created, by substituting Napoleon II. for his father, a child for a great man.

The members entrusted with this proclamation had not far to go to meet the army, which arrived under the walls of Paris on the 28th and 29th of June, having been harassed by the Prussian and English armies, and even been in danger of being intercepted. At first the Duke of Wellington and Blücher had advanced but slowly, and had conceived the idea of seizing some fortresses before entering France, so as to protect their rear, and allow the column on the east time to advance in line. But when they heard of Napoleon's abdication and the consequent confusion, they made no further delay. Though they feared that this abdication was but a feint, they foresaw what confusion it would cause in the administration, and determined to advance at once to Paris. They agreed to follow the right bank of the Oise, and if possible advance beyond the French army on the left bank, so as to arrive first at Paris. Marshal Blücher, being in advance, was to take the lead and proceed along the Oise, and endeavour to seize the bridges; whilst the English army would follow, and hasten as quickly as possible to his assistance. The Duke of Wellington, who, in his threefold character of Englishman, of victorious general, and of profound politician, had great influence at the court of Ghent, recommended that that court should leave Belgium for Cambray, whilst he would endeavour to open the gates by a *coup de main*. He was detained by the difficulty of moving his matériel, and especially

his portable bridges, so that he was far in the rear of Blücher, whose impatience would not allow him to wait for anybody.

Whilst Blücher reached St. Quentin on the 25th, the Duke of Wellington left Cateau, giving directions to a detachment to seize Cambray and Peronne. On the 26th the Prussian army, continuing to advance, reached Chauny, Compiègne, and Creil. One of his divisions, crossing the Oise at Compiègne, tried to intercept the French army on its way from Laon to Paris.

The French army rallied at Laon, and then fell back on Soissons, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, Marshal Soult having returned to Paris. General Vandamme replaced Marshal Grouchy in command of the right wing, which had been detained so much against its inclinations from taking part in the battle of Waterloo, and now advanced through Namur, Rocroy, and Rethel to Laon in the best possible dispositions. When Marshal Grouchy reached Laon in person he was informed that his line of retreat to Paris was threatened by the Prussians; he therefore hastened to reach Compiègne, whither he had ordered Count d'Erlon to proceed with what was left of the 1st corps, and Count Valmy with the wreck of the cuirassiers. When Count d'Erlon arrived at Compiègne he found the Prussians in front, whom he checked as far as he could, fell back on Senlis, and sent word to his superior in command that the Prussians were on the left bank of the Oise, so that he must choose another route to avoid any disagreeable rencontre on his way to Paris. Grouchy, acting with a vigour that had it been displayed ten days earlier would have saved the French army, sent Vandamme to Ferté-Milon, so that he might reach Paris by following the course of the Marne, and went himself to Villers-Cotterets, where he had arrested the progress of the Prussians by a vigorous attack, and then retreated quickly by the Dammartin road. On the following day, the 28th, the troops were advancing by all the eastern roads towards Paris, and on the 29th had taken up their position at Villette, having by the skill and energy of their leaders avoided the enemy. Blücher in the meantime had reached Gonesse. The Duke of Wellington having sent a detachment to seize Cambray, had opened that town to Louis XVIII., and was himself between St. Just and Gournay, his rearguard being at Roye, and his headquarters at Orvillers, and consequently two days' march in Blücher's rear. The impatience of the one and the dilatoriness of the other had placed this great distance between them, and which might have been a great disadvantage to them had we been wise enough to profit by the opportunity.

Now, for the second time within fifteen months, was the roar of the enemy's cannon heard upon the plain of St. Denis, and increased the agitation that had reigned in Paris during the

preceding days. Our troops presented a very unsatisfactory appearance, exhausted as they were by a march of a hundred or a hundred and twenty leagues, accomplished in ten days. The despatches sent by Marshal Grouchy on his route, inspired as they were by fear of the pursuing enemy, and the terror of being intercepted before reaching Paris, did not help to reassure the public mind. Under such influences Marshal Davout lost all hope of making a successful resistance, an opinion which he was too straightforward to conceal from the Duke of Otranto. He had removed his quarters to Villette, that he might be in a better position to provide for the defence of the capital, and sent word to the Duke of Otranto that the only chance of safety he saw was in following the advice he had given the day before, to proclaim the Bourbons immediately, and thus cause the allied armies to retire; an advice, he admitted, to which he himself had felt the greatest repugnance, but had conquered his feelings from the conviction that it would be far wiser to re-establish the Bourbons spontaneously, than receive them by force through the intervention of foreigners.

M. Fouché agreed with him fully; but M. de Vitrolles, with whom he was in constant communication, but who was not authorised to accept conditions, could only give him vague promises as to what regarded men or measures, and merely repeated that the great services he had rendered on this occasion would never be forgotten. M. Fouché, knowing the value of such promises, endeavoured to obtain some better security for himself and the revolutionary party. M. de Tromelin was now returned from his mission to the English headquarters, and had only brought back similar vague replies, saying that the Duke of Wellington had no authority to give passports to Napoleon, that the Bourbons must be accepted, and that, instead of imposing conditions on them, implicit trust should be placed in the good sense of Louis XVIII., who would do everything that could be reasonably desired. M. de Tromelin also informed M. Fouché that the Duke of Wellington had spoken in the most flattering terms of him, and would be glad to have an interview with him. M. Fouché became greatly alarmed at the prospect of the dangers announced by the military commanders, and by the vague declarations of the royalist agents, and acting, as usual, on his own responsibility, he told Marshal Davout, in reply, that every effort should be made to conclude an armistice, without, however, making any conditions concerning the Bourbons, as by accepting them too hastily they would incur the risk of receiving them unconditionally, without at the same time receiving any guarantee against the entrance of the enemy into the capital. But if the Bourbons were not immediately proclaimed, some other sacrifice must be made to secure an

armistice. The first negotiators had been told in their interview with the Prussian generals that the allies would not cease to advance but on condition that Napoleon and the frontier fortresses should be given up to them. M. Fouché considered that it would be better to sacrifice the fortresses for the sake of Paris; for Paris in itself represented both France and the seat of government. This was a very questionable policy, for surrendering Paris was nothing more than receiving back the Bourbons, whilst delivering up such fortresses as Strasburg, Metz, and Lille was surrendering the keys of the country to the enemy, and which perhaps they would not restore even to the Bourbons themselves. But as M. Fouché was at that time more occupied by the dynastic question than by the safety of the territories, he authorised Marshal Davout to give up the frontier fortresses in exchange for an armistice that would arrest the English and the Prussians at the gates of the capital. He was to transmit this authorisation to Marshal Grouchy, who commanded our retreating army, and from him it was to pass to the negotiators of the armistice, wherever they could be found.

No mention was made of Napoleon in this correspondence. What M. Fouché proposed was to allow him to leave for Rochefort immediately, conceding the condition that he most desired, that of setting sail without waiting for passports. This was the most honourable determination that could be come to, as the enemy could not demand Napoleon from the provisional government when he was no longer in their power. This mode of proceeding would be prudent as well as honourable. Many military men spoke of bringing Napoleon from Malmaison, placing him at the head of the army, and with him as their leader, fighting a last battle under the walls of Paris. By allowing him to leave he would be saved both from the violence of his enemies and the imprudence of his friends. Admiral Decrès and M. Merlin were sent to urge his departure, and to give him full authority to set sail the moment he should get on board the frigates at Rochefort, telling him at the same time that the enemy had demanded that he should be given up to them, and how impossible it would be to answer for his safety at Malmaison, where a troop of horse might surprise him at any moment. This done, the government informed the Chamber of Representatives how much worse affairs had become, proposed that Paris should be placed in a state of siege, the civil authorities still preserving their power, except over the fortresses, where military rule alone should prevail after the proclamation of a state of siege. The chamber, already greatly alarmed by the roar of the cannon, acquired no fresh information by these communications, and almost unanimously voted Paris in a state of siege.

The noise of the cannon on the plain of St. Denis caused as much consternation at Malmaison as at Paris, except, indeed, to Napoleon, who was better able than anybody else to estimate the danger at its full value. Marshal Davout, either to protect Malmaison, or to prevent the enemy from passing to the left bank of the Seine, had barricaded the Neuilly, St. Cloud, and Sèvres bridges, and destroyed those of St. Denis, Besons, Chatou, and Pecq. But as these precautions would not guarantee Malmaison from a surprise, Colonel Brack, of the horse guards, had hastened thither to say that the Prussian squadrons were scouring the plain, and that the place might be surprised if the inhabitants were not on their guard. Greater alarm would have been felt had information been received of Blucher's plans, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak. General Beker had 300 or 400 men under his command, and was determined to defend Napoleon to the last extremity. About twenty young men, amongst whom were MM. Flahault, de la Bédoyère, Gourgaud, and Fleury de Chaboulon, were ready to die in defence of the illustrious victim confided to their zeal. Napoleon smiled at all these demonstrations, assured them that the enemy had scarcely reached the plain of St. Denis, that though the Seine was shallow, it could not be easily forded, and that things were not so alarming as his faithful servants depicted them. Malmaison was nearly deserted. With the exception of MM. de Bassano, de Rovigo, Lavalette, and Bertrand, who seldom left the house, and Napoleon's brothers and mother, with Queen Hortense, none visited there but some officers in tattered garments, and covered with dust, who had escaped from the field of battle, and were come to tell Napoleon of the enemy's march, and beg him to place himself at their head. Napoleon listened to them calmly, pacified and thanked them, and drew his own conclusions from what he heard. Without knowing precisely the position of the allies, he deduced from the different accounts he had received, that, as usual, the impetuous Blucher had got two days' march in advance of the cool Wellington. With his usual promptitude in military tactics, he saw that the allies could be surprised whilst thus at a distance from each other, and that a happy chance might give him at Paris what he had sought in vain at Waterloo—an opportunity of fighting them one after the other—and once more restore the success of the French arms. Sixty thousand men must have returned from Soissons, there were at least 10,000 more in Paris, and these 70,000 were more than sufficient to overpower Blucher, who could not have more than 60,000 under his command. The Prussian general defeated, there was but little hope for the Duke of Wellington. If such a triumph were gained, who could calculate what courage it might infuse into the nation;

and Napoleon, yielding to a last vision of happiness, thought how glorious it would be to render so great a service to France without seeking any personal advantage, and then betake himself to exile when he should have paved the way for a profitable treaty of peace. The greatest result he hoped for, in all probability, from this last feat, would be to secure the crown to his son!

He pondered over this vast project during the night of the 28th-29th; it was on the evening of the 28th he got the information that suggested this plan, when he was suddenly interrupted by the arrival of MM. Decrès and Boulay de la Meurthe (M. Martin could not be met with), who came in the middle of the night to inform him of the intentions of the executive commission with regard to his departure. He admitted them at once, and when he received the order commanding the captains of the frigates to weigh anchor at once without waiting for the passports, he said he was ready to leave, but had first a message to send to the executive commission. He then took a sad leave of these two faithful servants, whom he was never to see again.

At dawn on the 29th he ordered his horses to be got ready, put on his uniform, sent for General Beker, to whom he explained his plans with an energy he had not shown since the 18th of June. "The enemy," he said, "have committed a great fault, but one that might easily have been foreseen from the different disposition of their generals. They have advanced in two masses of 60,000 men each, leaving so great a space between them that one might be overpowered before the other could come to his assistance. This is an opportunity that Providence offers us, and which it would be a crime not to profit by. I therefore offer to resume the command of the army, to which my presence will restore all its courage, surprise the enemy, and having punished them for their temerity, restore the command to the provisional government. I pledge my word," he added, "as a general, as a soldier, and as a citizen, that I will not retain the command one hour after having gained the victory, which I engage to win not for myself but for France."

General Beker was struck by the noble expression of Napoleon's countenance as he pronounced these words. It sprang from the confidence of genius awakening amidst misfortunes, whose shadows it for a moment dissipated. Urged by Napoleon, the general immediately set out for the Tuileries, the unwilling bearer of a proposal that he did not hope would be accepted. It was with great difficulty he passed the Neuilly bridge, which was completely barricaded. He found the executive commission sitting; the members had been in debate all

night. M. Fouché presided, and as usual, seemed to concentrate all the authority in himself.

When General Beker entered, M. Fouché immediately asked with great eagerness whether Napoleon had left. The general replied that all was prepared for his departure, but that before leaving he thought it right to make a last communication to the provisional government. M. Fouché listened with icy coldness as the general explained Napoleon's plan. When he finished, all were silent, until at length M. Fouché replied. He took a few, though a very few, moments to prepare his answer, for he wished that France should be saved, but not by Napoleon. To do him justice, he had but little confidence in the success of Napoleon's military plans, whose value he was incapable of appreciating, looking on them only as a further proof of his rashness, and considering that their failure would only increase the distrust of the allied generals, who already looked on the abdication as a snare, and who, when they would find their suspicions realised, would avenge this last battle upon Paris. "Why," he harshly demanded of General Beker, "why did you undertake such a mission? Are you not aware of our position? Read the reports of the generals" (he flung a bundle of letters on the table); "read them, and you will see that our troops have returned in disorder, that it would be impossible for us to defend ourselves on any point, and that our only hope is in an armistice obtained at any cost. Napoleon could effect no change in our position. His appearing at the head of the army would only cause a fresh misfortune and the destruction of Paris. Let him go, we do not wish to detain him, and we can answer for his safety only for a few hours longer." Not one of his colleagues added a word to what M. Fouché said. He asked the general who were at Malmaison; and being told that M. de Bassano was there, he exclaimed that he knew now with whom that plan had originated, and immediately addressed a note to M. Bassano, assuring him that it would be most dangerous to detain Napoleon a single hour longer.

General Beker returned immediately to Malmaison, where he found Napoleon still in uniform, his aides-de-camp prepared, and only waiting the reply to his message before mounting his horse. Although Napoleon was not surprised by the reply he received, he was pained and even irritated for a moment. But he soon became reconciled to seeing that this last service would not be accepted from him, however great or certain might be its results, and he remembered the opposition he had met in 1814 from his marshals when he could have destroyed the allies dispersed through Paris. This was the second time within fifteen months that doubt, distrust, or ill-feeling towards himself had prevented his profiting by the opportunity that fortune

offered of destroying the enemy ! For the second time he culled the bitter fruit of having wearied, or, may we say, disgusted the world by his genius !

He now only thought of his departure. General Bertrand, the Duke de Rovigo, and General Gourgaud were the chosen companions of his exile. Druot would have been of the number, but as he alone was considered competent to command the imperial guard after Napoleon's departure, he had accepted the command. Napoleon himself had desired him to do so. He regretted Druot, who, he said, possessed the noblest mind and heart he had ever known. But he did not despair of seeing him, Lavalette, and some others in America ; his mother, brothers, and Queen Hortense were also to join him there. All his preparations being completed, he determined to leave in the evening. He had not thought of money, but four millions in gold which had been found in one of the military waggons were confided to M. Lafitte. Queen Hortense offered him a diamond necklace, that he might not be without a resource always at hand, which was at the same time easy of concealment and easily convertible into money. At first he refused ; but when she pressed him with tears to accept it, he allowed her to conceal it in his dress ; then embracing his mother, brothers, Queen Hortense, and his generals, he stepped into his carriage at five o'clock (29th June 1815), whilst all present, even the soldiers of the guard, melted into tears. He drove towards Rambouillet, avoiding Paris—that Paris he was not to enter until twenty-five years later, when he was brought back on a funeral car, brought back a corpse to the Invalids by a king of the house of Orleans, who is himself, at the moment that I write these lines, no longer at the Tuileries ; so quickly do the inhabitants of that dreaded palace succeed each other in this stormy century of ours !

Whilst he was thus quitting France, in which his stay had been so short and sad, his departure was announced to the executive commission and to the two chambers. When this message was read in the Lower Chamber a deep sadness fell on all the members, for they now saw how little advantage was to be derived from the abdication ; they felt that Napoleon had gone for ever, and foresaw that many of themselves would share a like fate, and many fall by the hand of the executioner !

Now that M. Fouché was rid of so formidable a neighbour, he turned with more eagerness than ever to those communications which he converted into intrigues, instead of making them a great and honest negotiation, in the first instance, for France, and in the second, for those men who had been compromised during our different revolutions. He had a twofold object—he wished to obtain the best possible conditions from the allies and from Louis XVIII., and as this would require

time, he was anxious for an armistice that would afford him leisure to negotiate. Not satisfied with having M. de Vitrolles to communicate with the royalists, and General Tromelin to treat with the Duke of Wellington, he chose another agent to send to the English commander-in-chief. This was an intriguing Italian, named Macirone, who had first followed the Roman, then the Neapolitan, and lastly, the English interests, and who had been Murat's envoy when he made terms with the allies. This man had remained at Paris since Murat's fall, and was well known to M. Fouché, who found him a most convenient emissary to send through the enemy's outposts to the English camp. He sent him there to learn what were the Duke of Wellington's views with respect to the armistice and the government of France. At the same time he sent several messengers to the negotiators of the armistice to inform them of Napoleon's departure, in order to prove that the abdication was not a pretence, and to avoid the difficulty of making the success of the negotiations depend on Napoleon's being given up to the enemy.

We have already seen that the first negotiators, having conferred with some Prussian officers on the road to Laon, had then proceeded towards the Rhine, in order to treat with the sovereigns themselves. The second negotiators had been sent to the headquarters of the English and Prussian generals to arrange an armistice. The important mission of arresting the progress of the enemy had devolved on the latter. The solution of the whole question was consequently transferred to the Duke of Wellington's camp. Though Marshal Blücher was a sincere and zealous patriot and a heroic warrior, he was extremely violent, and consequently was not entrusted with the secret plans of the allies; for though his unwearied devotion to the common cause had decided the battle of Waterloo, he did not possess that calm good sense which gains its possessor more influence than glory itself. It was not he, therefore, though nearest in position, but the Duke of Wellington, that was to negotiate the armistice. The commissioners entrusted with this negotiation, MM. Boissy d'Anglas, de Flaugergues, de la Besnardière, and Generals Andréossy and Valence, proceeded first to the outposts, which were exclusively Prussian, as the English army was still in the rear, and were received very politely by M. de Nostitz, who conducted them from post to post; but they did not see Marshal Blücher, either because he did not wish to meet them, or because it was difficult to find him. After many useless passings backwards and forwards, M. de Nostitz himself advised them to go to the Duke of Wellington, who could be more useful to them than the Prussian general. The English commander was at Gonesse, whither

the commissioners repaired. In this they did wisely, for his was the only mind capable of directing a revolution, the second, unfortunately, for us, that was to be accomplished by foreigners.

Happily—if one may use the word in speaking of a time when our country lay at the mercy of an enemy—happily the Duke of Wellington, if he had not genius, possessed good sense, calm, unyielding good sense, and to so great a degree that he need not fear comparison on that point with any name in history. He might be pronounced to be a man without a single weakness, were it not that he possessed a large share of vanity, pardonable, indeed, in his position. Besides his military renown, which had greatly increased during the past few days, he enjoyed the reputation of being a profound politician, capable of conducting any piece of State policy. During the few days he had spent at Vienna he had gained the confidence of all, and during the six months he had been ambassador at Paris he had acquired over Louis XVIII. and the royalist party as much influence as it was possible for any one to exercise over men of narrow minds and violent passions. He entertained a favourable opinion of Louis XVIII., and considered that the repose of Europe and of France would be secured by his being replaced on the throne, but with better advisers than he had had before. Regarding what had taken place in France in 1814 from an English point of view, he believed and said that the Charter granted by Louis XVIII. could render a country free and prosperous, and had only failed because it had not been properly put into operation. The Duke of Wellington, enlightened by his experience of his own country, would have made the operation of the Charter to consist in the establishment of a homogeneous ministry, independent of king and princes, under the influence of the chambers, and capable in turn of directing them. He had seen nothing like this in the ministry of 1814, consisting of a great nobleman, an idle man of talent, absent from his office (M. de Talleyrand was then at Vienna); of M. de Blacas, a royal favourite, a cold, stiff-mannered man, who had no connection with any one but the king; and of a few special men, unconnected by any bond, and all ruled by a royal council, whence the rivalries of jealous princes banished all union of opinion. The Duke of Wellington said repeatedly in his communication to London and Vienna, that what Louis XVIII. needed was a ministry possessing that unanimity necessary to carry on a government. Being near Ghent during the months of April and May, he had constantly repeated the same thing to the exiled court. There was but one objection to be made to this—that however good the proposed remedy might be, it was necessary that those for whom it was meant should give their consent before it could be applied. Louis XVIII. might perhaps

have agreed to accept a real ministry, as it would rid him of the princes, of his family, and of the emigrants; but neither the princes nor emigrants would on any terms have consented to such an arrangement. As the advice of such a man as the Duke of Wellington could not be altogether rejected, those who surrounded Louis XVIII. at Ghent, wishing to defer at least in appearance to this advice, admitted that the ministry had been wanting in unanimity. Who ought to have been blamed for that? Everybody, had justice been done; but there must always be found some victim, who is rendered accountable for the faults of all, and often for those of others even more than for his own. On this occasion the circumstances of the case pointed out M. de Blacas as the victim. This gentleman, of whom we have had occasion to speak before, was not deficient either in intelligence or good sense, besides that he was perfectly upright. But he had the misfortune to be considered the king's favourite, and a haughty and unbending one. But it must be admitted that though tainted with all the prejudices of an emigrant, he had neither caused nor encouraged the errors of the emigrants, for in all things he obeyed the wishes of Louis XVIII., who was not inclined to adopt these errors. He had often opposed the princes, the Count d'Artois in particular; and if a victim were needed to expiate the faults of the emigrants, he certainly was not the one that should have been chosen. But as his formal manner and well-known opinions made him hateful to the liberals, and his being the special representative of Louis XVIII. made him hateful to the princes, he was fixed upon by all as the expiatory victim, and became since the departure from Paris the chosen object of general obloquy. The Duke of Wellington's assertion of the necessity of unanimity in the ministry being adopted, it was added that such could not exist contemporaneously with a favourite who ruled both the king and the ministers; and this opinion was uttered at Ghent by the excited friends of the Count d'Artois, as well as by the moderate party, who wished for a more liberal form of government, so that M. de Blacas, from reasons the most opposed, became the object of universal hatred. So far had this gone that even at Ghent, where all were in exile together, the most violent pamphlets were written against him. There are times when the multitude rail against an individual with an unreasoning hate which they would find it impossible to explain. Such was the position of M. de Blacas in the midst of the royalist party.

M. de Talleyrand, who deserved part of the blame, not only escaped all censure, but even acquired more importance from the general discontent. At Ghent he assumed the entire merit of the prompt resolutions that had been taken against Napoleon

at Vienna, and which had occasioned his second and last fall. These measures originated rather in the passions that ruled at Vienna than in M. de Talleyrand's influence; but the emigrants at Ghent, knowing nothing of the internal machinery at work at Vienna, and judging but by the effect, thought that when they saw the thunderbolt fall, that it had been flung by the hands of M. de Talleyrand. Nobody disputed his deserts, and being absent the entire year, the whole blame fell on M. de Blacas, who had been constantly beside the king; and M. de Talleyrand had the merit of recovering what M. de Blacas had lost. M. de Talleyrand himself, being greatly displeased that his intercourse with the king should be under the control of a third party, joined in the denunciation of M. de Blacas, for which the emigrants repaid him by magnifying his services. All parties joined in a strange kind of unanimity against M. de Blacas, as though he were the sole cause of all their miseries, though he had not in reality caused one. Now arose a number of ideas, to which each contributed his share. The Duke of Wellington, reasoning as an Englishman, said, as was true, that there should be unanimity in the ministry; whilst the more sensible men amongst the emigrants at Ghent, such as MM. Louis, de Jaucourt, &c., said that that would not suffice, that both the favourites and the princes should be removed; that the holders of national property, who were so much alarmed, ought to be tranquillised, as well as the inhabitants of the country districts, who apprehended the reintroduction of tithes and feudal claims; that every effort ought to be made to separate the cause of the Bourbons from that of the foreign powers. The emigrants made no objection to this, but added that some security should also be given to honest men by the exemplary punishment of those whose plots had caused the second overthrow of the monarchy—a protection necessary also to secure the dignity and safety of the Crown. In fact, it was impossible to remove the impression that there had been a great conspiracy, in which, besides the chief men of the army, great numbers of civilians had taken part, and that these, keeping up a communication with Elba, had brought about the catastrophe of the 20th of March. The royalists never considered that this had been the consequence of their own errors, but attributed it to the criminality of those they hated; and to convince them of the contrary, that is to say, of the truth, would have been the more difficult, as it was shared not only by the most sensible men at Ghent, but even by the best diplomatists of the coalition, such as Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the Duke of Wellington. From this combination of ideas, some false, some true, arose a sort of programme, which consisted in saying that on their return into France an unanimous

ministry should be formed, all interests should be secured, the Bourbons kept as distinct as possible from foreigners, and some of the more guilty conspirators punished. All these conditions seemed to be implicitly implied in the removal of M. de Blacas, and the installation of M. de Talleyrand in the office of prime minister.

We should not give a complete idea of the state of opinion in the exiled court if we neglected mentioning that a most favourable opinion was entertained there of the Duke of Otranto. If M. de Talleyrand got the merit of all that had been done at Vienna, M. Fouché was believed to be the originator of all that had been done at Paris. The coalition that had vanquished Napoleon at Waterloo had been organised at Vienna; but his ruin had been consummated at Paris by the intrigue that had led to his second abdication. M. de Vitrolles' letters and the reports of the different royalist agents agreed in attributing the merit of this intrigue exclusively to M. Fouché; and those zealous royalists who had conceived so high an opinion of him before the 20th of March, justified the opinion they then expressed, of M. Fouché's capability of saving their cause, by appealing to the fact that he had saved it ultimately. The more moderate party agreed with these, and all joined in praising the regicide who betrayed Napoleon, whom he detested, for the advantage of the Bourbons, whom he did not love, but whom he did not fear, and whom, with his usual fatuity, he believed he could lead like grown-up children. The emigrants at Ghent would have been horrified at the proposal of adopting as their recognised agent an honest man professing a wise and moderate love of liberty, whilst they considered it the very acme of skilful diplomacy to attach themselves to a skilful intriguer. For them the French Revolution was not the operation of sane and healthy ideas, confounded certainly in a chaos of the wildest theories which an enlightened man might separate and utilise, but a letting loose of the powers of hell, which needed an infernal magician, stained though he may be with regal blood, to restrain and confine. Such a magician they considered they had found in M. Fouché. In truth, he was nothing but a thoughtless, presumptuous, restless intriguer; but had he been the veriest scoundrel, he would have suited them just as well. This was the reasoning of honest men, a reasoning that was the natural consequence of ignorance, which often leads to the brink of evil those who would shrink from it with horror were they sufficiently enlightened to see it in its native horrors.

But the tranquil-minded Louis XVIII. took no part in this excitement, these acts of injustice or prejudice. He did not believe that he had been ruined by M. de Blacas, nor saved by MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché. He did not consider that

he owed his restoration to declarations proceeding from Vienna, nor to intrigues hatched at Paris, nor even to the battle of Waterloo, but solely to his being descended from Henri IV. and Louis XIV. ! His natural good sense, however, made him see some merit in the man who had conquered Napoleon at Waterloo ; him he esteemed, felt grateful for his good wishes, and would even yield to his opinion to a certain degree. The Duke of Wellington had advised him to choose a homogeneous ministry, a ministry that would be *one*, as was the saying of the time, to put an end to the influence of the princes and emigrants ; to choose M. de Talleyrand as prime minister, and dismiss M. de Blacas, not because he had done any wrong, but because he was the object of universal dislike. Louis XVIII. thought this advice very good, except in what regarded M. de Blacas, and this displeased him in the highest degree. With Louis XVIII. favouritism was mere habit. He was accustomed to M. de Blacas, he valued his principles, his uprightness, and his talents ; he knew that he had done no wrong, and he had sufficient tact to perceive that the friends of the Count d'Artois did not persecute the favourite, but the devoted friend of the king. This gave him a motive for upholding M. de Blacas, and feeling unwilling to be deprived of his services. He consequently showed a determination to stand by him.

M. de Talleyrand had left Vienna for Brussels at the same time that the sovereigns and their ministers left the Congress to assume the command of their armies. When M. de Talleyrand was about leaving Vienna he expressed the greatest repugnance to holding office, and said that he would not any longer be the minister of Louis XVIII. unless the emigrants were removed, a resolution that was generally approved by the coalition. The greater number had written to Ghent, saying that M. de Talleyrand's wishes ought to be consulted, and his advice followed in everything. M. de Talleyrand stopped for some time at Brussels before joining the king, but specified the same conditions as were generally agreed on : an unanimous ministry, a cessation of court influence, security for the general interests, the punishment of those who had taken part in the fancied Bonapartist conspiracy, and the separation of the royal cause from that of foreigners. With regard to this latter object, M. de Talleyrand had advised a rather strange combination. The king and his court were to leave Ghent for Switzerland, and enter France from the east, at the same time that the victorious monarchs should enter by the north. M. de Talleyrand, having sent on these conditions, remained at Brussels, apparently waiting their acceptance.

Such was the state of affairs when the Duke of Wellington, learning that Napoleon had abdicated, had hastened towards

Paris, in the rear of the Prussians. His good sense showed him what was to be done. He considered the dispute between Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand most inopportune, and advised the king to all that his minister proposed, except entering France from the east. He considered that Louis XVIII. ought to go to Paris at once, and so put an end to the uncertainty that reigned there, and that he ought to draw up a simple, positive declaration, asserting that the late war had been caused not by the Bourbons but by Napoleon, that he himself was now coming for the second time as mediator between Europe and France, that he promised full security to the holders of national property, that an unanimous and independent ministry should be appointed, the chambers assembled immediately, and lastly, that those who were really concerned in the conspiracy by which Napoleon was brought back to France should be punished. The Duke of Wellington also sent to M. de Talleyrand, advising him to be satisfied with these concessions, to join Louis XVIII. as soon as possible, and enter France by the northern frontier, which was nearer than the eastern.

Having given this advice with all the authority of the conqueror of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington set out to take the command of the English army. When he came near Paris he took as much pains to inspire Blucher with a little common-sense as he had done with the Bourbons and the emigrants. He had been told that Blucher wished to seize Napoleon's person, and as the saying went, *rid the world of him*. The Duke of Wellington wrote him a letter, which will be one of his best claims to glory with posterity. "Napoleon," he said, "does not belong to you nor me, but to our sovereigns, who will decide his fate in the name of Europe. Should they require an executioner, I shall request them to seek some other than me, and I advise you, for the sake of your fame, to follow my example." All difficulty on this subject would be avoided by Napoleon's departure, of which he had not yet heard. He next began to arrange with Blucher the plan of their military operations before the walls of Paris. The English and Prussian armies did not now amount to more than 120,000 men, though the campaign had been opened with 220,000; a proof that their victory had not been won without great loss. These formed a long column extending from the frontier to Paris. As Napoleon was not there to profit by this imprudent march, the danger was not great, especially as the English were making every exertion to reach the Prussians. Still an army of 120,000 men was not very large to bring to overpower the French army before the walls of Paris. The right bank of the Seine, that nearest the enemy, was very well fortified; the left was not so well defended; but then the river must be crossed before a

difficult operation could be attempted. The defenders of the capital could not be estimated at less than 90,000, sixty and some odd thousands of these having returned from Flanders, and the rest consisting of troops that had been in *depôt*, marines, federalists, and military students. It was consequently the very extreme of temerity to think of seizing Paris by force; negotiations would have been infinitely better, both in a political and military point of view. This mode of proceeding would have had the double advantage of not compromising the success obtained at Waterloo, nor of increasing the irritation of the French nation. The Duke of Wellington was inclined to this opinion at first; but Blucher did not take the same view. He wished to have the honour of being the first to enter Paris in 1815, as he had been in 1814, and to be able to levy large contributions for his army, or perhaps even do worse if there were a battle. Fortunately the Prussian general had not equal authority with the British.

Such was the state of affairs at Ghent and at the headquarters of the allied armies when our commissioners met the Duke of Wellington at a few leagues from Paris on the morning of the 29th of June. He received them very politely, but let them see that his plans were already decided on. He seemed to doubt at first of the sincerity of Napoleon's abdication, and demanded that he should be given up to be disposed of as Europe should think fit, which showed that as his fate was to be deliberated on by all, there was no danger that he would be treated with barbarity. The negotiators having told him that Napoleon had left for Rochefort, he replied that his partisans still remained, violent men, who would not leave either France or Europe in repose. He took great pains to explain that Europe did not mean to interfere with the internal government of France, but gave as a friendly advice, somewhat strongly expressed, that the Bourbons should be accepted again. The representatives of the executive commission, considering that Europe had promised not to use any control over the choice of a government in France, showed no disinclination to the Bourbons' return, indeed some seemed even to desire it; but the principle once admitted, there was a long discussion as to the conditions. The Duke of Wellington said that the king ought not to be subjected to the humiliation of accepting conditions; that the French ought to trust to the Charter of 1814, which would secure them liberty if properly put into operation; that the want of the past year was an unanimous and independent ministry, which Louis XVIII. now promised to give; and that all that could be reasonably desired on this or any other subject they would be sure to obtain.

M. de Flaugergues, an intelligent man of decidedly liberal opinions, replied, that he doubted whether the chambers would

accept the Bourbons unconditionally, and he insisted on an alteration in the Charter relative to the chambers taking the initiative, an alteration that was very generally desired. The Charter of 1814 had surrounded the initiative with numerous precautions, and at those times it was believed that the influence of the chambers consisted in sharing the initiative legislation with the Crown, for experience had not yet taught them that this influence can only be exercised by a ministry appointed by the majority, and that so long as the chambers can keep such a ministry in office they possess not only the power of taking the initiative in all legislative acts, but they actually have the entire government in their hands, as far at least as they can exercise it without danger. The ignorance of this truth led to the initiative being insisted on with a puerile but universal obstinacy. The Duke of Wellington promised to demand this concession from Louis XVIII., and then adjourned the discussion to the following day. Before leaving, they asked whether another Bourbon prince (they hinted at, but did not name, the Duke of Orleans) would be as acceptable to the allied sovereigns as Louis XVIII. The duke replied that he would think of it, and let them know at another interview.

The duke spent the remainder of the day in disposing his troops, in endeavouring to impress his own opinions on Blucher, and had several interviews both on that night and the following day with the envoys from the executive commission. In the meantime, these gentlemen had got certain intelligence of Napoleon's departure, and the Duke of Wellington had received very important information from Ghent. The English guards having surprised the fortress of Cambray, Louis XVIII. had entered the place accompanied by M. de Talleyrand, and published the declaration called the Declaration of Cambray, dated June 28th, which was the Declaration of St. Ouen of the second Restoration. In this document Louis XVIII. said, that *one gate of his kingdom being open to him*, he hastened to interpose himself for the second time between Europe and France, the only way in which *he wished to take part in the war*, for he had forbidden the princes of his family to *appear in the ranks of foreigners*; that on his first return to France, he had found the public mind greatly excited, that he had sought to moderate that excitement by taking upon himself the office of mediator and arbitrator; that his government, surrounded as it was with difficulties, *might have committed some errors*, but that the experience then gained would not be lost; he had given the Charter, and meant to maintain it, and even add every guarantee that could assure its successful working; that an unanimous ministry was the very best that he could offer; that the re-establishment of tithes and feudal claims had been spoken of, and the invalidity of the

sale of national property, but these were base calumnies invented for their own advantage by the *common enemy*, for it would be sufficient to read the Charter to see that nothing of the kind need ever be feared; and lastly, that returning now to his subjects, from whom he had received so many proofs of affection and fidelity, he was determined to forget all that had occurred during the late revolution; but that *an act of treason unexampled in the annals of history* had been committed, treason that had caused the blood of Frenchmen to be shed, and had brought foreigners for a second time into the very heart of the country, and that *the dignity of the Crown, the interests of France, and the peace of Europe* called for its punishment; that these conspirators should be arraigned by the chambers before the tribunals of the law, and that justice should pronounce their fate.

The declaration was signed by Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand. It contained, as we see, all the current ideas of the time. The moderate party admitted in this the faults committed in the administration, spoke of the maintenance and development of the Charter, and of guarantees for the holders of national property. The sagacious Wellington had suggested the phrases touching the unanimity of the ministry, and the more violent emigrants what concerned the vengeance that was to fall on the fancied authors of the conspiracy of Elba, which was nothing else than the natural result of the errors committed by the royal government, and Napoleon's skill in profiting by them.

The two facts of the departure of Napoleon, and the arrival of Louis XVIII. with his declaration, simplified very much the task allotted to the Duke of Wellington and the negotiators of the armistice. The latter announced Napoleon's departure, and of course there could no longer be a question of delivering him up a prisoner. The Duke of Wellington immediately proceeded to consider what dynasty should be substituted for the Bonapartist. The question of transmitting the crown to Napoleon II. he did not consider worthy of serious consideration, but only reflected whether, as had been suggested, another Bourbon prince might be substituted for Louis XVIII. Without mentioning any person in particular, he said that it would be infinitely better for the interests both of France and Europe to decide in favour of a sovereign whose claims could not be contested, than to choose one out of the regular line of succession, whose very position would compel him to undertake something novel, adventurous, and brilliant, which would not be very desirable for France at a time that her policy needed to be both calm and prudent. He added, that though he had not received any special instructions on that point, he was convinced that the suggestion would not be adopted. If France,

he said, was determined on having Napoleon II., or some Bourbon prince, besides Louis XVIII., Europe would be compelled to require stronger guarantees, such as the occupation of some fortresses. This was a positive though indirect mode of excluding every candidate except Louis XVIII. The Duke of Wellington then produced the Declaration of Cambray, and pointed out the advantages it offered, with all the intelligence of an Englishman well acquainted with the working of a constitutional monarchy. To this the representatives of the provisional government made but two objections—one touching the restrictions attached to the act of oblivion of all political opinions and actions, and the other concerning the convocation of the chambers. They, as well as everybody else, believed that Napoleon's return had been effected by a conspiracy, and had no objection that those who had taken part in it should be punished; but at the same time they feared that the same punishment might be intended for the regicides. They had not the slightest idea that under pretence of punishing a conspiracy, which had never existed but in the excited imaginations of the royalist party, that the blood of the most heroic and illustrious men in France would be shed, and were quite satisfied when the Duke of Wellington assured them that Louis XVIII. had not the most distant idea of doing anything of the kind, as might be seen by his intention of making M. Fouché one of his ministers. The English general was guilty here of a mental reservation unworthy of his wonted good sense and honesty. He had in some measure adopted the royalist plans of vengeance, not from any silly hatred, but because, in common with many leaders of the coalition, he thought that severity would be very expedient. There was a general feeling of dissatisfaction entertained against the French army, which was suspected of having taken part in the late conspiracy, and of being ready to join in another, and it was considered that a few striking examples of severity would produce a very salutary effect.

The second objection made by the commissioners referred to the convocation of the chambers. The Declaration of Cambray, in saying that those criminals who were to be excepted from the operation of the act of oblivion should be named by the chambers, seemed to imply the convocation of new chambers; and the commissioners desired that the existing chambers should be continued as in 1814, which they considered would be likely to produce a favourable impression on them. The Duke of Wellington thought both objections worthy of consideration, and promised to send to M. de Talleyrand to request him to draw up another copy of the declaration, which would point out more definitely who were meant by the criminals, and which in promising the convocation of the chambers, should

express it in such a manner as not to exclude the possibility that the existing chambers might continue to sit.

These questions being discussed, the Duke of Wellington declared that an armistice would not be granted but on condition that the French army should be withdrawn from Paris, that the English and Prussian armies should be put in possession of at least the outposts, whilst the care of the city should be confided to the national guard, under whose protection the desired arrangements should be afterwards made. The Duke of Wellington did not give any explanation as to how the change in the government was to be effected; but he wished that the foreign troops should appear to have as little part in it as possible, and the French army being sent beyond the Loire, no troops but those of the Parisian national guard should interfere. And effectively, with all the authority of his character and his position, he told the impetuous Blücher that the vainglorious idea of entering the enemy's capital as conquerors should be abandoned; that it was better to seek a useful than a brilliant result; that it was very doubtful whether they would be able to take Paris by force of arms, and even did they succeed, it would only humiliate France, and compromise the prospects of a government whose stability was of importance to all; and that it would be much better to take part outside the walls of Paris in a peaceful revolution effected by the national guard, than accomplish it themselves after a bombardment.

The Duke of Wellington considered that an armistice could be concluded on the following conditions: that Paris should be entrusted to the national guard, whilst an absolute silence was to be preserved as to the future government of France, the re-establishment of the Bourbons being only implied. He desired the commissioners to inform the provisional government of these conditions, telling them that there was no possibility of their obtaining any others. He showed them a letter on this subject from MM. de Metternich and de Nesselrode, dated the 26th June, written when it was known that Napoleon had abdicated, and in which these ministers advised the allied generals not to recognise any authorities, feigned or otherwise, which might have succeeded the fallen emperor, nor to suspend their military operations until within the walls of Paris, when they would be in a position to impose whatever government would suit the allied sovereigns. Nothing, therefore, was to be gained by waiting for the arrival of the sovereigns themselves. It is unnecessary to add that such declarations left no room for proposing the surrender of the frontier fortresses as a means of negotiation. Not a word was said on the subject, for the English general did not want either Metz or Strasburg; he wanted

Paris, that he might be able to re-establish the Bourbons there. He stated these same conditions to the envoy Macirone, and to all the other secret agents of the Duke of Otranto. He wished that the Bourbons should be reinstated with as little appearance of foreign aid as possible, and with a constitutional government such as he found to work well in England. As for M. Fouché himself, he declared that the Bourbons were much indebted to him, and desired nothing more than to have an opportunity of testifying their gratitude. M. de Talleyrand had worked abroad, M. Fouché at home, and both would be considered as the saviours of the monarchy.

Whilst these things were taking place at the English headquarters, Marshal Blucher, dissatisfied with negotiations from which he was almost excluded, and which would prevent his entering Paris as a conqueror, threw so many obstacles in the way of our commissioners that it was with the greatest difficulty they were able to send an account of their interviews with the Duke of Wellington to M. Fouché, or get fresh instructions from him. The marshal did not confine himself to doing what he could to impede the negotiation, but sought to cut the knot with the sword of Prussia by crossing to the left bank of the Seine. For this purpose he sent out a troop of cavalry to seize the bridges. The Sèvres, St. Cloud, and Neuilly bridges had been provided with defensive works, and those of Besons and Chatou burned. But unfortunately the Pecq bridge, though Marshal Davout had given orders for its destruction, had been left standing, in consequence of the opposition of the inhabitants of St. Germain, some actuated by mere motives of local interest, but others impelled by a criminal party spirit. The Prussian cavalry passed through St. Germain, and advanced towards Versailles. These troops ran some risk, as we shall see; but the Seine had been crossed, and France threatened on the left bank, that is to say, on her weakest side.

Meantime, the result of the negotiation was impatiently expected in Paris, and great displeasure felt at the delay. M. Fouché suspected the cause, for General Tromelin and Macirone had succeeded in passing the outposts, and had hastened to tell him all that the English general demanded. But as the couriers of the negotiators had not arrived, he had not learned anything officially, and he availed himself of this circumstance to keep the chambers in ignorance of what had occurred. He confined himself to saying to those about him that there was no chance of an accommodation but by accepting the Bourbons on good and safe conditions. This language excited the greatest distrust, not alone amongst the revolutionists, but amongst the liberals, though the latter would be satisfied if they could obtain liberty with any government. M. Fouché, seeing that

he was suspected, became more undecided than ever, and though he saw that the Bourbons were inevitable, he did not venture to act decisively, but sought to make use of Marshal Davout, who as commander-in-chief understood better than anybody else the difficulty of opposing the enemy, and being a man whose frankness of disposition rendered him incapable of concealing anything, he was capable, as he had done before, of declaring himself for the Bourbons. But instead of addressing the marshal openly and honestly as he ought, he besieged him secretly, sending M. de Vitrolles to urge him underhand to make the desired declaration. This was not the way to succeed, and he even ran the risk of compromising everything by such conduct. M. de Vitrolles' frequent visits to the marshal caused an event that might have had the most serious consequences.

The chamber, as we have seen, had sent some of its members with a proclamation to the army, to console the men for Napoleon's departure, and promise that everything should be done to secure the succession of Napoleon II. When these deputies arrived at Marshal Davout's headquarters they were greatly surprised to find there M. de Vitrolles, a well-known royalist, who was generally believed to be at Vincennes. The conversation that ensued soon degenerated into an altercation: the deputies expressed their astonishment to the marshal, and were badly received by him. They then visited the troops, who applauded them loudly as they spoke of Napoleon II. After this they returned to the chambers, where their report of what had occurred propagated the distrust they had themselves conceived. In the first burst of indignation the chambers thought of denouncing the executive commission as guilty of high treason; but they dreaded the effect of such a declaration, and confined themselves to asserting that some invisible hand was paralysing the defence and threatening the safety of the capital and the established authorities. When told that the army, worn out with fatigue, could only be roused by the name of Napoleon II., several members exclaimed, "*Let us join them, and cry Vive Napoléon II.!*" The entire assembly rose and renewed its engagement to the imperial dynasty in the person of the captive child. What had occurred at Villette produced an animated scene in the executive commission. Carnot was greatly agitated, and in his excitement seemed sometimes inclined to submit to the Bourbons, at others disposed to consider every attempt to bring them back as treason. He now called M. Fouché to account for what had occurred at Villette. He asked why M. de Vitrolles was there, what was his business, who had set him at liberty, and for what purpose it had been done. M. Fouché, who was not easily excited, became angry at last.

"Whom do you blame?" he said to Carnot. "Why do you accuse each in turn of the difficulties that have arisen from circumstances? As you cannot keep quiet, but must needs have a quarrel with somebody, go and attack Marshal Davout at the head of his troops, and you will probably find him prepared to speak to you. If you wish to find fault with me, accuse me before the chambers, and I will answer." This warm reply did not satisfy but almost annihilated Carnot, who, like his colleagues, succumbed beneath the difficulty and falseness of the position. To refuse both Napoleon and the Bourbons was a twofold negation that could lead to nothing. Carnot could not reproach himself with the first, but persisting in the second was unworthy of his intelligence and patriotism.

But it was necessary to come to some determination, and undecided as M. Fouché was, he saw clearer than anybody else the necessity of getting out of this perilous position, where on one side were the armies of the enemy ready to attack Paris, and on the other, the Chamber of Representatives passing in a moment from the deepest dejection to the wildest resolutions. He determined to provoke a serious conference with the military commanders, and force them to declare their opinion on the most important question of the time. Would it be possible or not to defend Paris? Were defence possible, they should fight; if not, they should surrender. This was well thought of, for it presented the sole means of getting out of the dilemma. But there was an absence of the frankness that ought to have characterised such a proceeding, and which, by abridging these moments of anguish, would have spared the dignity of all concerned, and which these protracted tergiversations had so much compromised.

Some slight amelioration of the state of things had prepared the way for M. Fouché's solution of the difficulty. Marshal Grouchy's exaggerated report had led to the belief that the army that was returning in disorder would be incapable of protecting the capital; but their appearance inspired a more hopeful feeling. Vandamme's corps, which had been Grouchy's, was uninjured in personnel and in matériel, and the men, in despair at not having fought at Waterloo, only asked to be allowed to shed their blood under the walls of the capital. The troops returned from Waterloo, though not so well armed, had recovered their appearance and courage. The two masses amounted together to 58,000 men, some having been lost on the way from Laon to Paris, and certainly could not be excelled in valour or moral courage. The bare mention of Napoleon II. excited them; but no matter who the sovereign destined for them, the very sight of the English and Prussians made them

furious. About 12,000 men had been brought to Paris from the dépôts, which raised the number of disposable troops of the line to 70,000. Six thousand federalists had been armed, under the designation of *tirailleurs* of the national guard, and but for the unjust distrust of the government, 15,000 more at least might have been under arms. For the artillery, some thousand gunners from the navy, the veterans, and the students might be reckoned on. It would not have been impossible to assemble 90,000 men before the capital, of which 70,000 were perfectly mobilised, and might be sent to either bank of the Seine. The fortifications on the right bank—that nearest to the enemy—were finished, and completely armed; but those on the left were but just commenced. But this bank, if deficient in fortifications, presented a means of defence in the necessity of crossing the Seine. To operate on the left bank, the enemy would be obliged to cross the river, and in order to effect this, the troops would be compelled to separate into two masses—a dangerous position, by which the French general would be sure to profit. Napoleon, manœuvring at the head of these 70,000 men on the two banks of the Seine, would certainly have brought one if not both of the enemy's armies to a miserable end. But even without Napoleon, a man of so much experience and firmness as Marshal Davout could have offered an effectual resistance, as long at least as he should be only opposed by Blücher's and Wellington's armies.

Marshal Davout had left the troops that had returned from Waterloo on the right bank of the Seine, stationed Vandamme with Grouchy's former corps on the left, and established the imperial guard as a reserve in the *Champ de Mars*, with a bridge of boats close by the Jena bridge to facilitate the communications between the opposite banks. He had stationed some large guns on the heights of Auteuil, to sweep the plain of Grenelle, in case the enemy should attack Vaugirard in force.

The Prussians, as we have seen, had seized the St. Germain bridge, and intended to operate with 60,000 men on the left bank, while the English attacked the right with 50,000. Rapid marches, a few combats, and the occupation of some points in the rear, had reduced the invading armies to 110,000.

Would it be possible to defend Paris successfully under such circumstances? Had the government entertained more decided plans of action, had a few additional military precautions been added to those already taken, there is no doubt but that the English and Prussian armies might have been arrested in their advance, and even severely punished for their temerity. In fact, the heights of Montmartre, Belleville, and Charonne were in a complete state of defence; but the approaches to Villetta, Chapelle, and more especially to the canal of St.

Denis, needed to be better defended. With a little more care bestowed on this part of the works, it would have been impossible to force the right bank, which need cause no further anxiety if guarded by the dépôts, the tirailleurs, and the federalists. In that case the 58,000 that remained of the Flemish army might all have been sent to the left bank to oppose the Prussians. As it was indispensable on this side to manœuvre in order to drive the enemy towards the Seine, our forces should have withdrawn to a distance of two or three leagues from Vaugirard and Montrouge, and some works should have been thrown up to protect that part of Paris. It is therefore certain that with the works on the right bank completed, those on the left commenced, and a large number of federalists under arms, that 25,000 men could be left on the right bank, and 70,000 led to the left to overpower the Prussians. The latter once routed, the English could have little left to hope.

But would this give a chance of a certain success, one that would be truly advantageous to the country? Two hundred thousand enemies were approaching from the east, 50,000 of whom, under Marshal Wrede, were not at a greater distance than four or five days' march from Paris. Even did a desperate and despairing effort succeed, was there not a risk that though Waterloo might be avenged, our troops might meet with a more disastrous fate a few days later? Were Napoleon there to profit by the impulse attendant on such good fortune, there is no doubt but that the allies might be successfully opposed. But Napoleon having left for Rochefort, any success we might achieve beneath the walls of Paris would but irritate the coalition, and perhaps render our position worse.

Still we can easily understand that in the actual circumstances in which France then was, that it was only natural that a disposition should exist to make a last desperate effort, and that Frenchmen should be willing to risk the greatest dangers for the chance of avenging Waterloo on the English and Prussians, though the morrow should entail a harsher fate.

Such were the reflections that passed through the mind of the inflexible defender of Hamburg, to whom the defence of Paris was entrusted. It is only the madness of party spirit that could accuse such a man of weakness or cowardice. He saw all the advantages and disadvantages of the position; he understood how much it was in his favour to have to do with enemies whose forces were divided into two masses by the Seine, and whose line of communication was consequently interrupted, whilst the army defending Paris, commanding all the approaches, could advance at any time en masse on those troops of the enemy that might venture on the left bank, and

do them serious injury. As a general, he was tempted by a battle that offered so many chances. As a citizen, he saw that if he failed, Paris would be exposed to the fury of the Prussian soldiers; and that even if he conquered, his victory, however great, would avail but little when 200,000 of the enemy would arrive in fifteen or twenty days. He could not decide; the citizen and the soldier were at strife within him. M. Fouché inspired him both with distrust and anger, for he had proposed to him a simple and just means of terminating the difficulty, by making a sincere declaration to the chamber, and proposing that the Bourbons should be accepted on honourable and satisfactory conditions. Though M. Fouché had approved of this plan, he had allowed the opportunity to pass under the weakest pretexts, and while he promised the royalists in private to do all that they desired, he sought in public to throw the entire responsibility on the military commander by making him declare that resistance was impossible. The marshal knew not how to decide, at the same time that he felt extremely displeased with M. Fouché, who, instead of simply and honestly telling the truth to the chambers, had ensconced himself in a thousand tortuous windings, seeking to win a secret importance with the royalists; whilst in the eyes of the revolutionists and Bonapartists he threw all the responsibility of refusing to fight and of submitting to the enemy on the commander-in-chief of the army at Paris.

It was while in this disposition of mind that the marshal on the 1st July received the Duke of Otranto's invitation to join the executive commission to deliberate on the expediency of resisting or yielding to the demands of the allied generals. Marshal Davout treated M. Fouché with the same haughty indifference as M. Fouché himself often showed to his colleagues in the commission, and was in no haste to take part in a discussion which he foresaw would be neither sincere nor decisive. Besides having established his headquarters at Montrouge, he was occupied in arranging his troops, in seeing that they were stationed at the posts where they were to fight, and his whole morning was passed in the discharge of his duties as commander-in-chief, and not in those of a member of the government, which indeed were only an accessory to the first. When the executive commission saw that the marshal delayed in complying with M. Fouché's invitation, they all joined in a request for his immediate appearance. He came at once. It was in the afternoon. There were assembled, besides the executive commission, the ministers, the bureau of the two chambers, Marshal Massena, who had the command of the Parisian national guard, Marshal Soult, Marshal Lefebvre, and Generals Evain, Decaux, and de Ponthon, the latter commanding the artillery and engineers.

Marshal Ney had not been asked to attend, his influence having been greatly weakened by the manner in which he had spoken in the chamber.

When all were assembled, the Duke of Otranto announced the object of the meeting, and without telling the entire result of the negotiation commenced by MM. Boissy d'Anglas, Valence, Andréossy, de Flaugergues, and de la Besnardière at the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, he let them know that the allied generals were becoming every moment more stern, and showed no inclination to sign an armistice unless Paris, that is to say, the seat of government, was given up to them. It did not need much sagacity nor much explanation to understand that they did not want to visit Paris with fire and sword, but merely to effect a revolution there.

M. Fouché having briefly explained the question to be considered, became silent, expecting some one to reply; but no one seemed desirous of giving an opinion on so serious a subject. But M. Fouché provoked a manifestation of opinion by addressing those present who belonged to the Chamber of Representatives, and whom he was anxious should commit themselves to a declaration of opinion. He commenced by calling on M. Clément du Doubs,* a very honest man, and very much esteemed, who was a member of the bureau of the second chamber, and who replied that the question being altogether military, should rather be referred to the commanders of the army, and seemed to imply that the illustrious Massena ought to give his opinion. The immortal defender of Genoa, who had disapproved of the Bourbons' return in 1814, and still more of Napoleon's in 1815, was perfectly aware of all the difficulties of the actual position, and were he inclined to exert any influence on the course of events, he would have advised the shortest path to what was inevitable—the re-establishment of the Bourbons. In a weak voice, enfeebled more by dejection than ill health, he replied that, of course, he knew how long a large city could hold out against a powerful enemy; but as he was ignorant of the resources of the capital he could not give a decided opinion in the present instance.

This reply left Marshal Davout, minister of war and commander-in-chief of the army defending Paris, no choice but to declare his opinion. This he did with harshness and ill-humour taking care to show that the displeasure he felt was excited by

* The present generation has both known and respected M. Clément, who was a member of the chambers for forty years. It was the reminiscences of this scene, which he was good enough to write out for me, that have enabled me to correct the reports of many of his contemporaries. His being present at the time, and his well-known veracity, besides that he could have no motive for giving a false colouring to what occurred, justify me in believing what I state to be correct, and as close as possible to the truth.

the tortuous policy, which, instead of putting an immediate termination to our difficulties, had only seemed to take pleasure in complicating them. What information was required from him? Was he to say whether it would be possible to fight outside the walls of Paris? He said it was possible, that there was every chance of victory, and that for his part he was prepared to fight boldly and with every hope of success. He then explained the reasons of his opinion, not indeed with the eloquence of an orator, but with the clearness of a man who understood the science of his profession. What he said had great influence. "If," he added, "the question is merely whether a battle may be fought and won, I declare that I am prepared to fight, and have every hope of success. I here give a formal contradiction to those who assert that I refuse to fight because that I believe victory impossible. I now declare the contrary, and demand that this declaration be registered."

M. Fouché's face, which was not wont to change colour, became paler than usual, and embarrassed by words so evidently addressed to him, he replied in a bitter tone, "You offer to fight, but can you promise to conquer?" "I can," replied the intrepid marshal; "I engage to do so, provided I am not killed within the first two hours."

This reply only increased M. Fouché's embarrassment; but had he been an honest man, with a clear intellect, he would have viewed the question from the point to which the marshal wished to lead him. A victory, however favourable, would not decide anything, as 200,000 additional enemies would in a few days come and collect the wrecks of the English and Prussian armies. When Napoleon at Fontainebleau, in 1814, desired to fight a last desperate battle, all would have been decided, at least for a time, since the enemy in the capital had scarce any resources to fall back on, and he would have held his ground, with his influence immensely increased by the victory. But now, were Blucher and Wellington's armies beaten, within eight days three times the number of enemies would appear, and there would be no Napoleon to meet them. A battle, consequently, could not decide anything. Discussed by soldiers beneath the walls of Paris, a heroic despair might lead them to attempt it; but discussed by civilians, by statesmen in council, it should be rejected, as an undoubtedly generous resolution, but one that might lead to the direst results.

The Duke of Otranto, either not being able or not daring to place the question in a proper light, found himself in a most embarrassing position, from which he was rescued by Carnot, the man who was prepared at any moment to accuse him of treason. This patriotic citizen had just alighted from his horse, and entered the assembly, still covered with dust. He had

been making a scientific inspection of the environs of Paris. He declared that it was his conviction that it would not be possible to give battle to the allied armies without risking the safety both of Paris and its inhabitants. The fortifications on the right bank of the Seine were not sufficiently strong to offer a permanent resistance, and justify the removal of the army to the opposite side. The works on the left bank were utterly insignificant, and there was every danger that if the army were sent to a distance, that the city would fall into the hands of the enemy. The Prussians could only be driven from the heights of Meudon by making a fresh disposition of our troops, which would leave Montrouge and Vaugirard unprotected, and risk the safety of the capital. Nor was it absolutely impossible for the English and Prussian armies to come to each other's assistance. The tides being low at this season, the Seine would be fordable in some parts, and the allied armies seemed to be already occupied in establishing a mode of communication near Chatou and Argenteuil, so that it was very likely that if the battle took place on the left bank, we should have to meet not only 80,000 Prussians, but also 50,000 or 60,000 English in addition. The result was consequently very doubtful, more doubtful than the commander-in-chief seemed to think; nor could even Carnot, whose disinterestedness no man could doubt, as there would be but little security for his life should the Bourbons return, advise risking a battle beneath the walls of Paris.

This opinion, given by such a man as Carnot, who was at the same time a patriot and an officer of engineers, had, as was natural, a great influence on all present. Carnot was supported by Marshal Soult, who said that he had examined the works on the right bank, and had not found them in a satisfactory state, the canal of St. Denis not presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the assailants; and there being no defences behind it, the enemy, after having forced the canal, could enter the faubourgs of Paris *pele-mêle* with our soldiers, whilst the combat might still continue on the left bank.

This opinion was opposed by Marshal Lefebvre, an old revolutionist, who could not be easily intimidated, or induced to approve of the return of the Bourbons. He considered that the works on the right bank could be completed and made impregnable in a few days, and those on the left sufficiently advanced to allow the troops to leave them for a few hours; that there were men enough still in Paris to allow us to send 70,000 active troops to meet the enemy, when it was almost certain that a battle would be gained, and the whole aspect of affairs changed.

This view, indeed, was quite tenable; but neither M. Fouché

or anybody else took a more enlarged view of the case, or saw that a victory gained beneath the walls of Paris could not be decisive, and would at best cause but a slight improvement, and might make matters worse. Viewing the question in a technical point of view, as to whether a battle might or might not be gained, left the decision entirely to the military commanders. The civilians, who composed the greater number of those present, finding that the discussion was altogether military, were glad of the opportunity of getting rid of the responsibility of a decision, and said, that as the question was whether a battle would or would not be successful, it ought to be left to the decision of military men.

This opinion, being agreeable to the greater number, was immediately adopted, and it was decided that a council of war, entirely composed of generals, should be summoned for that evening, and the line of conduct to be pursued decided there. This was only avoiding, not solving the difficulty; for even should the generals decide that it would be possible to defend Paris, it still remained to be considered whether, when the capital had been successfully defended, it would be possible to oppose all Europe.

Had M. Fouché stated this important question as he ought, it might have been decided at once; but he preferred gaining his object by throwing the responsibility on the generals. He drew up the questions to be decided by the council of war in such a way as that each should get a definite reply. These questions were as follows:—In what condition is Paris with respect to defensive works, arms, and provisions? Would it be possible to resist a simultaneous attack on both sides of the Seine? If the combat were unsuccessful, would the city and inhabitants be safe? And how long in any case could the city hold out?

Before the council of war had assembled in the evening, news was brought of a brilliant victory gained by the French over the Prussian cavalry at Versailles that very morning. General Grenier, who had been inspecting our different positions, having sent intelligence that the Prussian cavalry were advancing towards Versailles, Marshal Davout sent General Exelmans to drive them back. General Exelmans, who was one of those who advised fighting to the last, hastened to meet the enemy. He stationed General Piré in ambuscade at Rocquencourt, with the 1st and 6th chasseurs and the 44th regiment of the line, and advanced himself, at the head of the dragoons, by the Vélizy road to Versailles. The enemy's cavalry, composed of the two hussar regiments of Brandenburg and Pomerania, under Colonel Sohr, did not amount to more than 1500 men. General Exelmans came in sight of them near Versailles, and attacked them furiously with the 5th and 15th dragoons, whilst the 6th hussars and 20th

dragoons, under the valiant Colonel de Briqueville, charged them in flank. Briskly repulsed in the direction of Rocquencourt, where they were received by a fusilade from the 44th of the line, and the charge of the 1st and 6th chasseurs, these two regiments were overthrown, and completely destroyed. Only two or three escaped to carry the news of their defeat to the Prussian headquarters. The Prussian infantry stationed at St. Germain then advanced to their assistance; but it was too late.

This brilliant achievement, the last of twenty-two sanguinary struggles, was but a slight consolation for what we had suffered, and made no essential change in the existing state of things. The council of war assembled in the evening at Villette. The members found their task greatly lightened by the manner in which the subject of discussion had been presented to them—being limited to a certain number of points, to which their observations were to be exclusively limited. There could be no doubt but that the decision would be conformable to the wishes of the Duke of Otranto.

With regard to the defence of Paris, the council declared that those on the right bank were sufficiently strong and well defended, but that those on the left were worthless. The supply of arms was declared to be sufficient. It was not thought probable that an attack would be made simultaneously on both sides of the Seine by the Prussian and English armies; but if made, it was believed that it could not be resisted. There was a great deal to be said on this point, as it was most likely that the principal attack would be made on the left bank, to which that on the right would be but secondary. If a small part of the French troops were left on the right bank, 60,000 men might face the enemy on the left, and restrain, if not totally overpower them. This reply left room for discussion. As to what the consequences of a defeat might be to the inhabitants of Paris, the council could not decide, as no general could tell what might be the result of a lost battle. And lastly, it would be still more difficult to say how long it would be possible to resist the enemy, as that could not be known beforehand.

Still the important question was not solved. It was not said whether, if our troops should gain a complete victory over the Prussian and English armies, would we be placed in such a position with regard to the Russians, Austrians, and Germans, that we should have no reason to regret our victory. But the council had been asked certain positive questions, and to these, with one exception, had given suitable and perfectly veracious replies. And these replies were all that the wily president of the provisional government wanted. Since men so competent to judge had declared that the left bank of the Seine was totally undefended, that it would be impossible to resist a simultaneous

attack on both sides, that the consequences to the inhabitants of the capital could not be foreseen, and that resistance could only be for a time, the course to be taken was evident. There was no choice but to treat with the enemy. Carnot, M. Fouché's most formidable opponent in the provisional government, could make no objection to this decision, as he himself had, in opposition to Marshal Davout, asserted that resistance was impossible. Grenier supported the decision; Quinette was not a military man; and M. de Caulaincourt, the fifth member of the government, considered that Napoleon being removed, no alternative remained but to accept the Bourbons on the best obtainable terms. M. Fouché having succeeded in throwing the responsibility on the generals, said that the only resource left was to resume the negotiations for an armistice. Besides sending fresh instructions to our commissioners, who had written for such from the British headquarters, it would be very easy to open a communication with Blücher, with whose troops ours were already engaged on the left bank of the Seine. This could be done best, and in a manner most conformable to the rules of war, by sending an envoy to the outposts between Vaugirard and Issy. This would be sure to flatter Blücher, who was known to be jealous of the Duke of Wellington; and as there was no doubt that the latter would agree to any reasonable proposition, perhaps the best thing that could be done was to flatter the Prussian general, the more unmanageable of the two, by a strictly military proceeding, and which under the circumstances was no additional humiliation. But before despatching an envoy to the Prussian outposts, M. Fouché, for whom clandestine communications always had a charm, determined to send Colonel Macirone again to the Duke of Wellington, and General Tromelin to Blücher, to learn in confidence on what conditions it would be possible to obtain an armistice. He also wished to learn if there would be no choice but the Bourbons, in which case it would be necessary to induce them to make such concessions as would render their return less difficult. He advised the Duke of Wellington (who alone of the two generals of the enemy could understand political considerations) not to hurry his entrance into Paris, to give the public excitement time to subside, to flatter the army, especially by leaving it the tricolored flag, to make some concessions to the chambers, allow them to take the initiative in legislative acts, continue both in their functions, and finally to proclaim an act of complete oblivion for all that had occurred since the 20th March. "If all this be done," continued M. Fouché, "present difficulties will be overcome, and those who are now most opposed to the return of the Bourbons will become the very instrument of their recall." These communications were

to be taken to the Duke of Wellington by Colonel Macirone. M. Tromelin was not to enter into such minute details with Prince Blucher, but confine himself to learning on what conditions arrangements could be made with that implacable Prussian.

It was on the evening of the 1st of July, as we have seen, that the council of war had given its reply; and it was on the morning of the 2nd that the provisional government came to this decision. The two envoys, M. Macirone and M. Tromelin, left in the afternoon, the one directing his course towards Gonesse, the other towards St. Cloud. Colonel Macirone was stopped at the English outposts, and detained until the following morning. General Tromelin succeeded in passing the Prussian sentinels, and in being presented to Blucher, who was pleased at seeing that he had been thought of at last. Since the Prussian general had seen the difficulty of his position on the left bank, where the English could not come to his assistance, he had become anxious to negotiate, and so deprive the Bavarians, Austrians, and Russians who were approaching of all share in the glory of this campaign. He received General Tromelin politely, but let him see that he was determined that Paris should surrender. He would not require any political stipulation, though he allowed him to form some idea of what the allies would demand when they became masters of the capital of France. To remove all doubt from General Tromelin's mind as to the intention of the allies, he showed him, and even allowed him to read the letter that had been written by M. de Nesselrode and M. de Metternich on the 26th of June, and of which the Duke of Wellington had made some mention to the five French commissioners. This letter gave the two generals formal instructions not to cease operations until they had possession of Paris, not to recognise any authority established since the 20th of March, and to make every exertion to seize Napoleon. There was no mention made in this letter of the Bourbons, so that there was still room for the faltering delusion that the Austrians and Russians would not be as anxious for their restoration as the English. But of the determination on the part of the allies to get possession of Paris, and not to recognise the existing authorities, there could be no doubt. These preliminary communications being terminated, General Tromelin left Marshal Blucher, and returned to M. Fouché, whom he informed of what he had learned. Nothing was known of Colonel Macirone, who had not yet succeeded in gaining admittance to the Duke of Wellington.

It was necessary to come to a decision, for the allied troops had already reached both banks of the Seine. The Prussians had succeeded in crossing the river, and were now stationed on

the heights of Sèvres and Meudon, their left towards St. Cloud, their right a little more in the rear along the little river Bièvre. The English were occupied in throwing a bridge across the river at Argenteuil, and were approaching St. Cloud by Courbevoie and Suresnes, in order to bring a part of their forces to Blücher's assistance. The main body of their army was on the plain of St. Denis.

Marshal Davout had taken up his position like an experienced general. Having completed the armament of the works on the right bank, he had stationed there the sharpshooters of the national guards, the men from the dépôts, and part of the Waterloo troops; the rest of his troops with the entire of Vandamme's corps was to be stationed on the left. The imperial guards, as we have already said, were stationed as a reserve in the Champ de Mars, with the command of several bridges of the Seine, so that they could carry assistance to either bank as occasion required. A formidable artillery of heavy guns was stationed on the heights of Auteuil ready to sweep the plain of Grenelle on the opposite bank. About four o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, Marshal Davout ordered a close reconnaissance of the Issy, which was occupied by the Prussians, and having driven them back with some slaughter, he retired, not wishing to commence a serious engagement until he should receive the order to fight. But he was well prepared at every point, and determined, should the enemy's attacks become serious, to make the most obstinate resistance. The soldiers were greatly excited, and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy. These numbers amounted to 80,000, and there was every chance that they could conquer an enemy of 120,000, divided on the two banks of the Seine. Davout's old spirit responded to their cries, and he sometimes felt tempted to attack, and conquer or die before the walls of Paris. But he waited for orders from the executive commission, and was not so rash as to take upon himself to decide the fate of France without the consent of the government.

When General Tromelin returned, the executive commission determined to send three plenipotentiaries to the Prussian outposts. These were M. Bignon, minister of foreign affairs for the time being; General Guilleminot, head of Marshal Davout's staff; and M. de Bondy, prefect of the Seine. The political, military, and civil interests were all represented in this legation. M. de Caulaincourt was desired to draw up three plans of convention, which our negotiators were to propose successively, in case the first should be rejected.

In each of these it was required that individuals, their acts and opinions, private and public property, the monuments of art, and the museums should be held sacred, and that the exist-

ing authorities should be respected and maintained. The only point left open was the occupation of Paris and the manner in which it should be accomplished. In the first plan Paris was declared to be neutral ground, which the French army should leave, and remain at a certain distance corresponding to that observed by the enemy's forces. According to the second project, everything else being the same as in the first, Paris was not to be occupied until some account should arrive from the negotiators sent to the allied sovereigns. (Nothing had yet been heard from them, but it was hoped that they would obtain some concession from the Emperor Alexander.) And lastly, as a desperate alternative, Paris was to be given up, the French army was to retire beyond the Loire, and as much time obtained for the removal as possible, and the capital was to be entrusted to the national guard, who alone were to do military duty there, maintain order, and support the existing authorities.

Carnot's and Grenier's hands trembled as they signed these conditions; despair had taken possession of their souls. Even M. Fouché was affected, he who in the midst of the common ruin thought first of his own safety, and gave but a second place to that of his country. He signed, however, and desired the negotiators to go first to Marshal Davout's headquarters to get his final instructions, and not to leave him until he should acknowledge definitively that there was no other course left to pursue.

MM. Bignon, Guilleminot, and de Bondy left and repaired to the headquarters at Montrouge. The greatest commotion reigned there. All those who were with Marshal Davout became fearfully excited, they threatened, they declared that this was treason. Strange phenomenon! the inflexible marshal did not command the silence that he was wont to have observed in his presence. Sorrow was painted on his usually impassible countenance. Generals Flahault and Exelmans said it would be better to fall beneath the walls of the capital than capitulate to the enemy. So impressed were the three negotiators by this scene that they hesitated to advance beyond the outposts. Druot, the worthiest man of the time, said to M. Bignon, who asked him what was to be done, "that as a soldier he would rather die on the spot where they stood; but that as a citizen he recognised the prudence of negotiating." These words uttered by so good a man were some slight consolation to the three negotiators for having undertaken that sorrowful mission. Davout, yielding to an involuntary emotion, asked them to delay a few moments, and then galloped off with a few officers to take a last view of the enemy's position. Having made a short survey, he returned. That secret voice which speaks to the heart on great and solemn occasion had told him

that the soldier should now give place to the citizen. "I have sent an envoy," he said to M. Bignon; "you may leave."

The three negotiators set out and advanced to the Prussian outposts. Here they met with some incivility from General Ziethen, but were soon conducted to the chateau of St. Cloud, where Marshal Blucher had taken up his quarters.

Rough as he was, Blucher was flattered by seeing the French plenipotentiaries at his quarters, and at not finding himself always considered as second to the Duke of Wellington. He received the three envoys politely, but gave them to understand that neither he nor his British colleague could be satisfied with less than the occupation of Paris and the withdrawal of the French army. All the other points were open to discussion, but these were incontestable. Only a few words had been exchanged when the Duke of Wellington, who had been informed by the Prussians of the commencement of the negotiation, arrived, and the conversation became serious, precise, and confined to the most essential points. As to the time for taking possession of Paris, the number of days to be allowed for the withdrawal of the French troops, and the place where they should stop—these were left open questions. The allied generals made no objection to the stipulation that when they should have arrived in Paris they should not interfere in politics, and that the national guard should alone do military duty in the capital. They had not hitherto concealed that their essential object was the restoration of the Bourbons; but it had not suited them to say, much less to write, that they were come for that very purpose, convinced as they were that it would follow as a matter of course, once Paris was surrendered, and they contented themselves with declaring that the national guard should maintain the established order of things. Strange that the Duke of Wellington, who was most anxious for the restoration of the Bourbons, and had done most to effect that object, was the one least inclined to acknowledge it, and that because of the British Parliament, to whom it had always been declared that no change was contemplated in the French government. With regard to persons and property, the Prussians and the English, affecting not to take any part in politics, declared that they would respect them themselves, and see that they were respected by their armies.

Having spoken in these general terms for some time, the Duke of Wellington said, that in negotiations the manner in which they were drawn up was everything, and asked the French envoys whether they had brought a written plan of the treaty. M. Bignon gave him the third of those drawn up by M. de Caulaincourt, the two first being no longer admissible. The Duke of Wellington then said that he would confer alone

with Marshal Blücher; and at the end of half an hour he returned, having made some alterations in pencil on the margin of the document. A debate ensued on the contested points, and the following conditions were finally agreed to.

"The French army, whose immediate withdrawal had been demanded, was to be allowed three days to depart from Paris, and eight to retire beyond the Loire, the appointed limit of retreat.

"On the following day, the 4th of July, St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly were to be surrendered; Montmartre the day following; and the different barriers on the third day."

The troops were allowed to remove all their property, arms, artillery, regimental chests and baggage. The federalist officers, to whom the obligation of leaving ought not to have extended, as they belonged to the national guard, were specially assimilated to the army by the allied generals, who had an extraordinary dread of their influence over the people of Paris.

These points being decided, it only remained to determine how the foreign armies were to behave in Paris. The French negotiators proposed inserting the following clause: "The commanders of the Prussian and English armies engage to respect and to make others respect the government, the national authorities, the administrations dependent on them, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the government nor in the administration of France."

Such a clause could not possibly be admitted by the allied generals, inconsistent as it was with their avowed though unwritten declarations. They substituted the following, whose hypocrisy is indeed ludicrous: "The commanders of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect and to make others respect the existing authorities as long as they are in office." It was further stipulated that the care of Paris should be confided to the national guard.

Two most important points were still to be decided—the security of persons and property. The French commissioners understood under the title of property the public monuments and the museums. The allied generals, who employed more mental reservations in this negotiation than is usual in the treaties arranged by military men, absolutely refused to adopt the proposed expressions. They remembered that the year before their sovereigns had intended to remove from Paris those works of art that made her the brilliant centre of European civilisation, but not daring to inflict so many wounds simultaneously on France, they had renounced the attempt. They therefore refused to make any promise, but declared in general terms that they would respect both public and private property, *except such as was connected with war*. This expres-

sion being supposed to refer to the artillery, was allowed to pass unnoticed. The hidden meaning of these seemingly insignificant words was revealed a few days later.

The twelfth clause, relating to persons (celebrated because of the illustrious blood that it caused to flow), was accepted as the French commissioners had worded it. It ran thus: "Private individuals and property shall both be respected. The inhabitants of Paris, and all persons actually in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disturbed or questioned concerning the offices they hold or might have held, nor concerning their political opinions or actions."

This clause apparently included everybody civil and military, the old and new revolutionists, the regicides who had condemned Louis XVI., and the marshals who had abandoned Louis XVIII.; nor could any one have suspected that it would afford an opportunity for the most hateful revenge. The allied generals did not make the slightest objection to this stipulation, but seemed to regard it as most natural and incontestable. Every one would wish to believe that two men like the Duke of Wellington and Blucher, so devoted in their patriotism, were also honest in their conduct, and concealed no hidden meaning beneath their silence. Unfortunately it appears that this silence sprang from a disinclination to explain. They, as generals of the English and Prussian armies, themselves fully promised to respect individuals, but did not mean to impose the same restriction upon the government of Louis XVIII., which, once re-established, would be sole dispenser of justice in France. The slightest discussion on this point would have revealed the subterfuge, and perhaps rendered negotiation impossible. They therefore made no remark, and their silence cost France the lives of some of her noblest children.

The three negotiators having done all for their country that its desperate state would allow, left St. Cloud, and returned to the provisional government on the morning of the 4th July. They were thanked for their exertions, having done all that was possible under the circumstances. To avoid the risk of a battle, it was evidently necessary to accept the proposed conditions.

The capitulation was accepted. It was only part of the farce that it suited the allied generals and even the provisional government itself to play. In reality it seemed to contain only purely military stipulations, dictated by the existing state of the armies, and left France at liberty to choose what government she pleased, the Parisian national guard being the sole military force retained in the capital. The allied generals thus preserved a seeming fidelity to the solemn promises they had made, not to impose a government on France; and the executive commis-

sion appeared to sustain the national independence whilst yielding to a physical necessity. It was in this light at least that the executive commission thought it right to view the affair and represent it to the chambers.

The representatives who alone showed any symptoms of vitality—the press was silent—complained of the secrecy observed with regard to the negotiations. But secrecy is absolutely necessary on such occasions. This silence was broken on the morning of the 4th, when the two chambers were made acquainted with the articles that had been agreed on during the previous night at St. Cloud. The subterfuge concerning the government of France suited the chambers as well as the allied generals and the provisional government. Why indeed desire more definite terms? To declare that the capitulation implied the return of the Bourbons would be only saying what everybody saw, except some imbecile persons who cannot understand anything that is not formally enunciated to them. To withdraw this convenient veil after all the protestations that had been made against the Bourbons would only have been to refuse the capitulation, overturn the provisional government, and commence a struggle that it was felt would be unsuccessful. Not daring to attempt a real opposition, whose chances of success had been rendered impossible by being deferred, it was more convenient to the representatives to allow the deception to continue until the day should arrive—and it was not far distant—when they should themselves be expelled by foreign bayonets. The Chamber of Representatives therefore accepted the capitulation of the 3rd of July without an objection, and thanked the troops, that indeed deserved thanks, since it was to them that any consideration that had been shown to France was due.

However agreeable it might have been to the civil authorities to adopt this species of subterfuge, it was by no means so to the army. When the troops learned the terms of the convention, they saw at once that the withdrawal of the army from Paris was equivalent to yielding it to the enemy, who would hand it over to the Bourbons. The irritation was extreme. The soldiers flung down their arms, left their ranks, and mingled with the federalists who traversed the streets, uttering loud cries. Some declared that they ought not to surrender, that they ought to refuse to obey, and depose those cowardly and perfidious generals. Some blamed one, some another; but all joined in execrating the Duke of Otranto, the traitor as he was now universally called, as though he were the sole author of the existing state of things.

The stern Davout recalled the irritated soldiery to a sense of duty, and at length, aided by some generals, especially by the

honest and ever-esteemed Druot, succeeded in pacifying them. Having yielded to the first effusions of despair, the army marched through the streets of that capital that it was unwillingly about to surrender to the enemy. Some corps had not received their pay, and had to bear the twofold misery of the capitulation and poverty. M. Lafitte generously advanced some millions to the treasury. The corps that were most in need were assisted, and all set out for the Loire. The army began to retreat in good order—Marshal Davout not wishing to remain in Paris, though the prudent proposal he had made of receiving the Bourbons unaided by foreigners would have secured him better treatment from them than he had met in 1814. But he wished to fulfil to the utmost the duty he owed the army and the country, and therefore sent in his resignation as minister of war, that he might remain in command of what was now called the Loire army, whose soldiers, by their firmness and good order amidst all the insults hurled against them, secured some respect for France during several months, and were even a support to those Bourbons whom they did not love, and who did not love them, but who had become the rulers of France, and who had more than once to resist the intolerable demands of their pitiless conquerors. Marshal Davout commanded this army in a manner worthy of himself, and once that the Austrians attempted to pass the appointed limit on the Upper Loire, he threatened to advance on them, upon which they retired, though there were 600,000 of the allied soldiers at that time in France.

Whilst the convention of Paris was thus being put into execution the shadow was obliged to retreat before the reality, and those powers dating from the 20th of March prepared to yield to the approaching Bourbons. Colonel Macirone, who had been detained at the outposts, had not been able to see the Duke of Wellington until the morning of the 4th of July, at his return from St. Cloud to Gonesse, after signing the capitulation. The Duke of Wellington received him in presence of M. de Talleyrand, representative of Louis XVIII., Sir Charles Stuart, who represented England, Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian, and M. de Goltz, the Prussian representatives. The British generalissimo now spoke plainly, and told the Duke of Otranto's agent that it was time to put an end to a state of things that had become ridiculous, that the provisional government and the chambers had nothing more to do than to resign their authority, when Louis XVIII., who was at Roye, would proceed to Paris, which he would enter with such resolutions as might be expected from his own good disposition and the excellent advice he had received. This said, he gave place to M. de Talleyrand, who first announced verbally, and then gave in writing, the new

promises made by Louis XVIII. Here is a summary of them as given by M. de Talleyrand himself: "The entire ancient Charter, comprising the abolition of confiscation; the non-renewal of the law passed the previous year restraining the liberty of the press; the immediate convocation of the electoral colleges for the formation of a new chamber; the unity of the ministry; a reciprocal initiative in all legislative acts, by message on the part of the king, and by proposition on the part of the chambers; the hereditary succession of the Chamber of Peers."

M. de Talleyrand then gave the most solemn assurances that the government would be wiser and altogether different from that of the preceding year. The Duke of Wellington then addressed the envoy, and said, "Let M. Fouché act openly with us, and we will do so with him. We can appreciate his services, and the king will not forget them. If he needs assistance, he shall have it from us in a few hours." It was arranged that the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand should meet the Duke of Otranto on the following day at Neuilly to decide with him concerning what still remained to be done to secure the peaceful return to Paris of Louis XVIII. M. Macirone left immediately to take this message to the Duke of Otranto. M. Fouché did not think of refusing the proffered interview, as it tended to the result he sought, which was to arrogate to himself the merit of the return of the Bourbons, which it was no longer in his power to prevent. He informed his colleagues, however, of what he was about to do, but with the air of a man who was making every exertion to save what remained from their common shipwreck, and about to make conditions for the return of Louis XVIII. to the throne. No objection could be made; for the impossibility of resistance naturally leading to the restoration of the Bourbons, there was no choice but to submit, endeavouring at the same time to obtain guarantees for the security of persons and property.

But the arrival of the first negotiators, MM. de Lafayette, de Sebastiani, de Pontécoulant, d'Argenson, de Laforest, and Benjamin Constant, threw unexpected difficulties in M. Fouché's path. When these plenipotentiaries left Laon, they, as we have seen, had repaired to the sovereigns at Hagenau, but had not been able to obtain an interview. They could only see the ministers, who pursued the prearranged system of dissimulation, and affected to have no desire to compel France to accept any particular government. The commissioners being dismissed after a short interview, had returned to Paris with the same illusions, and persisted in believing that the Bourbons were not inevitable. M. Fouché was thus deprived of his principal argument—the necessity of submitting to the Bourbons—an

argument that formed his excuse for an interview with the Duke of Wellington. He endeavoured to prove that their return was unavoidable, supporting his argument by the many proofs he possessed; and he finally announced that he would have an explicit explanation on that evening at the camp of the allies. He was authorised to go there; but M. de Lafayette observed to him that every private arrangement not directly tending to the safety of the general interest would be treachery, and as such would merit and be certain to obtain the meed of eternal infamy.

M. Fouché took little heed of this warning, but repaired on the evening of the 5th to Neuilly, to meet the Duke of Wellington. He found there, besides the British generalissimo, M. de Talleyrand, Sir C. Stuart, MM. de Goltz and Pozzo di Borgo. The Duke of Wellington wished to know, in the first place, whether the French army had left; if the existing authorities were ready to resign; and whether it would be possible to get possession of Napoleon's person, that he might be delivered to the great powers—this was a condition about which the allies were irrationally anxious. The Duke of Otranto replied that the army was retiring gradually, though unwillingly; that the populace was in a state of exasperation; that the Parisian national guard itself, from which so much had been expected, was far from being willing to do what was required; that the greatest precaution must consequently be employed in demanding the desired resignation, or in bringing back the king to Paris. As to Napoleon, it would be impossible to give him up, as he must have already embarked for the United States. This latter piece of information was very badly received, for those present were convinced that his escape had been effected by the connivance of M. Fouché, whom the Bonapartists accused of betraying Napoleon, and the royalists of aiding his escape. He was asked what he meant by these precautions, to which he seemed to attach so much importance. M. Fouché, a more practical and sensible man than the negotiators who had been sent to the Duke of Wellington, and who had confined themselves to demanding the initiative for the chambers, entered into an explanation, and formally announced these two essential conditions: a fresh declaration from the king, granting an entire amnesty to all persons without exception who had compromised themselves before, during, and after the 20th of March; and the adoption of the tricolored flag. Unless these conditions were agreed to, he said he did not think it possible for the king to return, unless by force, to which all seemed disinclined. The discussion on this point continued until four in the morning, but without any result; M. de Talleyrand, the principal speaker, trying to evade the question with all the ease of a fine gentle-

man, and M. Fouché persisting with the tenacity of a vulgar and obstinate man. When the safety of individuals was mentioned, the boundless clemency of the king was talked of; and the demand for the tricolor cockade was answered by adducing the ten or fifteen departments that had assumed the white. The Duke of Wellington insisted on some decision being come to, but could not succeed with either party; and as this interview allowed no time for personal considerations, nothing was said of what was to be done for M. Fouché himself. He took leave, dissatisfied both as to what concerned his private interests and the public welfare, and left the representatives of Europe and of royalty as little pleased with him as he was with them. The Duke of Wellington, however, appointed another interview for the following day, and the negotiators parted without having come to an agreement, but also without having come to a rupture.

When M. Fouché returned to Paris he related what had occurred at Neuilly after his own fashion, but declared more positively than ever that there was no choice but the Bourbons; that there was no possibility of avoiding the formally expressed intentions of Europe; that there could be no suspicion of him, an old revolutionary regicide, when he resigned himself to this unavoidable necessity; that the only thing to be done was to endeavour to obtain satisfactory conditions, to do which he indeed had neglected nothing. There was less credence accorded him on this occasion than he deserved, as it was generally believed that he had only thought of his own interests, and every one considered him a traitor. His colleagues listened to him in silence. Carnot alone spoke his sentiments, and overwhelmed him with reproaches; to which M. Fouché replied by asking him what he would have him do. Carnot, in fact, had believed defence impossible, and consequently the return of the Bourbons was the inevitable consequence of the weakness he had himself announced. Besides, M. Fouché was now indifferent as to the opinion of his colleagues, treated them as of little importance, and only thought of how he could manage the return of Louis XVIII. with the least amount of injury to his party and the most advantage to himself. His first care was to hasten Napoleon's departure from Rochefort. He saw that as long as Napoleon was in France that the allies distrusted the sincerity of the abdication, and would persist in demanding his person. M. Fouché wished to remove this cause of distrust, and at the same time not be responsible for Napoleon's captivity should he fall into the hands of the enemy, for though he wished to deprive him of the crown, he did not wish to deprive him of liberty or of life. We have seen that the frigates had already received permission to leave without pass-

ports. M. Fouché now went farther, and again urged General Beker to hasten the departure of the illustrious fugitive, sending him all the necessary powers, save one, that of communicating with the English cruisers, fearing that Napoleon in his strange confidence in the English might give himself up to them. On the 6th, M. Fouché sent a fresh order from the executive commission enjoining General Beker to compel Napoleon to leave, and impress on him the necessity of doing so to secure his personal safety, and offering, should the frigates be too closely watched, to place at his disposal what lighter vessels were at hand, and even consenting, contrary to former orders, that he should communicate with the English cruisers, but required a written request from Napoleon to that effect, so as to secure himself from the responsibility of the consequences.

Having made these arrangements for Napoleon's safety, M. Fouché considered what reason he should give for the approaching interview at Neuilly. No better need be sought than the attitude assumed by the Parisian national guard. These guards had been opposed to Napoleon's return, and even wished for the Bourbons; but they wished for the Bourbons without the antiquated ideas, the passions, or the arrogance of the emigrants. Still they continued to wear the tricolored cockade, and to pull down the white flag wherever they saw it hoisted. M. Fouché, by means of his communications with the principal commanders of the national guard, induced this body to make a declaration of their continued attachment to the tricolored flag, which was to them emblematic of French glory and of many political advantages. This declaration was signed by some of the most distinguished names in the capital.

M. Fouché did not confine himself to this. Aided by M. Jay, M. Manuel, and many other representatives, he induced the Chamber of Representatives to make a declaration of another kind, but still more significant. The constitution they had undertaken to draw up was long, diffuse, and quite unlikely to be adopted by the Bourbons. But its principles were of far more value than its unmeaning form. At M. Fouché's instigation the essential principles of every constitution, and which should be required from every government whatsoever, were drawn up in a separate form, and it was declared that this should be signed by whatever monarch should ascend the throne. This monarch, whose name was not mentioned, was evidently Louis XVIII., provided that he signed these articles. These principles, which it would be unnecessary to introduce here, as they were enumerated in a very commonplace form, were those that France since 1789, with a constancy that does her honour, has not ceased to proclaim whenever under pretence of restoring order she has not been deprived of liberty.

Whilst M. Fouché was occupied with these cares, now unfortunately useless, the court of Louis XVIII. had successively advanced from Ghent to Cambray, from Cambray to the chateau d'Arnouville, and was now considering what was to be done on entering Paris. The principal persons of the court, the king, princes, courtiers, ministers, ambassadors, foreign generals, and a crowd of sycophants who had appeared with returning fortune, were all discussing together what was to be done; for as revolutions give every one a right to speak, courts are for the time being transformed into a species of republic. The greater number of these debaters declared that to sacrifice the white flag to the tricolored would be sacrificing legitimacy to revolt. To modify, to extend the Charter would be to increase the evil instead of diminishing it! It would be quite sufficient to declare that this Charter should be maintained without promising any extension of its principles. They considered the principles known as those of '89 were a part of the revolutionary heresies which had been weakly encouraged, and as in their opinion the first revolution had been caused by the faults of individuals, and not by general causes, so that of the 20th of March was the consequence of a conspiracy, whose authors ought to be punished. They also believed it attributable to other errors, such as keeping M. de Blacas in office, and refusing to employ M. Fouché. As we have already mentioned, M. de Blacas, the emigrant, was the object of universal blame; and M. Fouché, the regicide, of general favour. If these royalists were to be believed, M. de Blacas had been the cause of all their misfortunes, which M. Fouché would have prevented had his services been accepted, and which he might now terminate if his aid were not declined. He was indeed a regicide, but so much the better! He had emerged from the infernal cavern of the Revolution, he knew it, and could lay the demons that had escaped from it. With him there needed but one precaution—to require that he should betray his origin. They had no doubt but that he would unhesitatingly commit this treason, for they had the testimonies of M. de Vitrolles and others to that effect. They repeated with admiration his prophecies, which had the merit of after-wit. On the eve of the 20th of March, M. Fouché had said to M. Dambray, "It is too late, Napoleon will return to Paris, reign some time, but not long, and then we shall bring back the king." The man who had uttered such significant prophecies could alone bring about their accomplishment. He should therefore be accepted from the hands of that Napoleon he had dethroned, and be made minister to Louis XVIII., whose firmest support he would be.

Though M. de Talleyrand had no desire for a rival, he encouraged this strange idea. He felt his incapacity for

administering the home department, and admitted M. Fouché's superiority in that particular. He considered the occupation of watching, paying, dispersing, imprisoning, exciting, and if necessary, shooting the illustrious or obscure members of the different parties, as far beneath that of treating with the European powers, and therefore felt no jealousy of M. Fouché; and he thought that regulating foreign relations—the most important at that time—whilst M. Fouché would purify the interior, he should rule like a sovereign over France. He therefore proposed M. Fouché as minister of police to the king. He was supported by the Duke of Wellington, who had another motive besides these we have mentioned for favouring M. Fouché. It was necessary to enter Paris and re-establish the Bourbons; but it was necessary to do this conformably to the deceitful programme of the sovereigns, a programme that was all important to Lord Castlereagh, and by which it was declared that France would not be compelled to adopt any particular form of government. But for this necessity they might have left the work to the brutal Blücher, who would have accomplished it in two hours. It was M. Fouché alone who could accomplish this task without any other aid than that of the national guard. The repugnance of Louis XVIII. to M. Fouché had been at length overcome by the continual praises of his courtiers, whose admiration originated in a kind of superstitious feeling; by the recommendation of M. de Talleyrand, who felt the need of a skilful and cynical hand to rule the interior; and by the Duke of Wellington, who wished to have a man that could effect the return of the Bourbons without violence. The king had been first compelled to give up M. de Blacas, and was now forced to accept one of his brother's executioners. He did so unwillingly, for he was proud, and disliked intriguers, especially those connected with the Count d'Artois, and M. Fouché laboured under all these disadvantages. But when entreated long and importunately, he yielded. He consented to M. Fouché's being minister of police, but refused to issue a fresh declaration of principles, or to accept the tricolored flag.

Such was the state of things at court when M. Fouché repaired to Neuilly on the evening of the 6th. He recommenced his sad account of the state of Paris, which was become even worse, he said, since the plenipotentiaries had returned from Haguenau with the false notion that the allied sovereigns were not desirous of the return of the Bourbons, aggravated also by the national guard having resolved to retain the tricolored flag, and by the declaration made by the Chamber of Representatives. This account did not seem to make much impression on his auditors. The Duke of Wellington told him that he would be supported by the English and Prussians, though it would

be better to seek their aid as little as possible. He further said that the plenipotentiaries were either deceiving or had been deceived themselves, and he produced the letters of Lord Stewart, who had been present at the interview at Haguenau, and who spoke most decidedly as to the opinion of the sovereigns. The declaration made by Louis XVIII. would be quite sufficient; and there was no need of a second, which would be a degradation of royalty. As to the amnesty, the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand now uttered their decisive opinion. "As to the amnesty," they said, "you as minister of police are security for that. Who that was connected with the Revolution can fear when you will rule in the police department?" It would seem very natural indeed that when a regicide was allowed to approach the king, that no one need feel uneasy. But though those who had immolated Louis XVI. might be pardoned, it would not be the same with the pretended authors of the 20th of March. M. Fouché had a vague idea of this, nor indeed were those criminated by the 20th of March protected by his holding office; but he was addressed in so decided a tone, and so large a reward was offered him, that he could not resist. He was also told that it would be an offence to Louis XVIII. to make any further mention of the tricolor, and he yielded, having obtained nothing but his own appointment to a most ungracious office.

Having sat together at table, they set out for Arnouville, to present M. Fouché to Louis XVIII. This had been the object of M. Fouché's ambition, unattainable for him during the first Restoration. He was extremely gratified, and in presence of the monarch, who had made a great effort to receive him, it seemed to him as though the crime of regicide had been effaced from his brow. The king, as was his wont on all important occasions, had studied his part beforehand, received M. Fouché with great politeness, and seemed quite unconscious of any former passage in his life. "You have done me great service," he said, "and will do me still greater. I have long wished to attach you to my government, I have an opportunity of doing so now, and I hope that you will be both useful and faithful to me." M. Fouché bowed with the humility of one whose crimes were just forgiven, and for the moment deserved the exaggerated eulogiums of his enemies when he allowed himself to be thanked for treasons he had not committed, at least to the implied extent. He retired delighted with his interview, and passed through crowds of courtiers, curious to see a man whom they looked on as a monster, but a useful one, whom the king should employ to save himself from fresh misfortunes. The wiser portion of them regretted that the assistance of such a man had not been rendered unnecessary by according a little

more liberty to the nation. The Duke of Wellington approved extremely of M. Fouché's appointment, but had also insisted that the tricolored flag should be adopted in order to deprive the enemies of the Bourbons of the popular standard, and now exclaimed almost in anger, "What people! it is easier to induce them to receive a regicide than adopt a rational idea!"

When the Duke of Otranto returned to Paris he was greatly embarrassed as to the manner in which he should inform his colleagues of what had passed. He had told them that he was to have an interview with the heads of the coalition, in order to avoid a second restoration, or at least not to agree to it except on good conditions. But it would not be so easy to tell them definitely that there was no choice but to accept the Bourbons; that beyond the Declaration of Cambray, he had obtained nothing, neither a general amnesty, nor the tricolored flag, nor the continuance of the present chambers; and that the only guarantee granted was a portfolio to himself. However, he was at length compelled to announce that the plenipotentiaries sent to Haguenau had been mistaken, that it had never been intended to leave France the choice of any other dynasty than the Bourbons, that the silence observed on that subject had been only meant to deceive, and that Louis XVIII. must be received immediately, but that they should get all that M. de Talleyrand had promised—that is to say, the abolition of the law touching the press, certain modifications of the Charter, a unanimous ministry, an act of oblivion for the past, in proof of which he, M. Fouché, had been appointed minister of police. This was a strange acknowledgment to make to his colleagues. M. Fouché declared that he had consented to become the minister of Louis XVIII. from no other motive than for the advantage of those who had taken part in the Revolution, the empire, and the 20th of March. There was more truth in what he said than he got credit for, more truth at least in the result, if not in the intention; for he alone of all who were in danger was the only one who could save those not actually doomed to feel the vengeance of the emigrants; and if he did seek to retain power, there is no doubt but that he wished to justify his doing so by preventing as much wrong as possible.

This excuse, true though degrading—for no one is justified in doing ill that he may prevent another from doing worse—had but little weight with the executive commission. M. Quinette and M. Grenier being men void of energy, and M. de Caulaincourt having given up all hope, were silent. But the impetuous, generously inconsistent Carnot, who, though he hated the Bourbons, had done what was necessary for their return, became fearfully excited, and accused M. Fouché of treachery, but

without disturbing the equanimity of a man whose countenance was never lighted by the indignation of wounded self-respect. The Duke of Otranto, as void of sincerity and dignity as he was of real wickedness, had been chosen by Providence as the connecting link between those who were willing to bring back the Bourbons and those who were willing to receive them without acknowledging it. Mournful farce, where nought triumphed but the ever logical, unalterable nature of things.

After what had occurred, M. Fouché and his colleagues could no longer act for an hour in concert. They immediately sent in their resignation to the chamber. The Chamber of Peers separated in silence never to meet again. The Chamber of Representatives also received the resignation of the executive commission in silence, but continued to discuss the most ephemeral of all constitutions, one that was not to last more than twenty-four hours. M. Fouché, in conjunction with General Dessoles, who was again commander of the national guard, chose some assured royalists from that body to guard the approaches to the legislative palace, and prevent all access to the representatives. It was officially announced in the *Moniteur* that the chambers were dissolved, and that Louis XVIII. would enter Paris on the afternoon of the 8th of July. M. Fouché went again that evening to the king to announce that everything was prepared for his return. He was received as the man to whom, next to the conqueror of Napoleon, the Bourbons owed the greatest debt of gratitude.

Let us hasten to the end of this melancholy recital, and add that if the Chamber of Representatives survived Napoleon but about a fortnight, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché survived that chamber but a few months, and both, the one entrusted with a high employment at court, the other virtually but not openly banished, shared in the inactivity of all those who had played an important part in the Revolution or the empire. This was all that either party gained by the revolution of the 20th of March, which ended so deplorably on the 8th of July, and which is now generally known under the denomination of the Hundred Days. By it Napoleon was subjected to a defeat such as he had never experienced, together with a cruel captivity; the chambers that had dethroned him lingered through a few days of humiliating existence; M. Fouché, who deceived and dismissed them, won for himself only banishment and a sullied name; Ney and La Bédoyère met a tragic death; France suffered a second invasion, the loss of Savoy, and several important fortresses; she was deprived of the *chefs-d'œuvres* of art, and compelled to pay a contribution of two thousand million francs; had to submit to a long sojourn of foreign troops, and the fearful consequences of unbridled passions; whilst not

one gained a single ray of true glory—not one, except the army, whose faults were wiped away by incomparable heroism. History must assume all its severity when pronouncing on that disastrous attempt; but to judge it correctly, we must look upon it as a whole, that is, we must consider it both in its cause and effects, as we shall endeavour to do in concluding this book.

When the allied sovereigns in 1814 deprived Napoleon of the French empire, they, by sending him to the island of Elba, left him the possibility of regaining his throne, and by their conduct soon inspired him with the desire to do so. It was not possible that he could remain so near the scenes of rapacity that were being enacted at Vienna, or the reaction of feeling that was being accomplished at Paris, without seeking to profit by so many errors. It could not be otherwise, unless that ambition, that then swayed all hearts, had become extinct in the most daring, the most ambitious heart that ever throbbed. Napoleon left Elba, landed in France, and at his appearance the army, the public authorities, the holders of national property, hastened to join him, and he made a skilful use of the advantages afforded him. His march from Cannes to Lyon was a prodigy; but if we make him answerable for an attempt so fatal to France, those whose mismanagement and ill-regulated passions inspired him with the idea, and furnished the means, must also bear their share of blame.

Napoleon stopped at Paris, instead of pursuing his triumphal march to the Rhine. He offered peace, in all sincerity, and with something of humility, not derogatory to his glory. He was answered only by an insulting silence. He still persisted, at the same time making extensive preparations for war. With unerring tact he selected all that still remained of good in our military resources, and with the soldiers returned from abroad, and the officers on half pay, he formed a body of 300,000 men, and in order to render these completely disposable, he had the fortresses garrisoned with 200,000 of the mobilised national guards from the frontier provinces, and chosen from amongst men who had served before, and who by their devotedness, their age, and physical strength, were capable of rendering a last service to their country. At the same time he protected Paris with 500 pieces of artillery, collected there the dépôts, sailors, and pensioners; and leaving the capital thus fortified, he determined to meet the enemy at the head of 200,000 men. He arrived on the 20th of March, he arranged his plans, and ordered their execution between the 25th and 27th, first in secret, assisted by the bureaux, afterwards openly, when the manifestations of the European sovereigns left no longer any doubt as to their determination; nor did he leave France unconscious of her danger, but summoned all her sons to arms.

It would not be possible to act more judiciously or more promptly, or to accomplish more.

His arrangements for the interior were as expeditious and as skilful, but not so successful. Abroad he had offered peace instead of the war that was expected; but his offer was not heeded, for none felt confidence in him. Nor was he believed at home when he offered liberty instead of the expected despotism. Had he not been sincere, he might have got out of his difficulties by summoning a Constituent Assembly, and abandoning it to the chaos of systems. This he might turn into ridicule and remain sole master. But on the contrary, he sent for the most celebrated writer of the liberal party—his declared enemy, M. Benjamin Constant—and without disputing any of the essential principles of constitutional monarchy, entrusted him with the task of embodying them in the Additional Act. The title was not well chosen—it was too suggestive of the first empire; but it needed only to read the Additional Act to see that it was not the offspring of the first empire, but of a true constitutional monarchy, such as had secured the liberty and greatness of England for two centuries. But the distrust was so general that the very title caused it to be condemned, for it seemed to represent the despot of 1811 in all the extent of his power. But an effort must be made to conquer the general incredulity as well as the armies of allied Europe. M. de Lafayette, one of the most esteemed friends of liberty, admitted the advantages of the Additional Act, and said he would have full faith in it, provided it was put into immediate operation by summoning the chambers. Napoleon now objected, saying that newly assembled chambers, unaccustomed to positions of great danger, would be but little suited to act with firmness during the horrors of war, and instead of aiding government, would cause its ruin. His arguments were of no avail, and to prove his sincerity, Napoleon summoned the chambers, an error to which he was compelled by his false position. It has been asserted that this was all a feint, and that Napoleon only yielded that he might gain the assistance he needed, determined to fling aside the instrument when it could be no longer useful. It would certainly be difficult to penetrate the depths of a mind like his, and everybody is at liberty to form what judgment he pleases on the subject. For our part we have faith in Napoleon's genius, and that genius must have told him that modern societies must be allowed to govern themselves according to their own views; that a man, a great man, might immediately after a great political convulsion rule them for a moment, though but for a moment; but that moment was past for him, and had been abbreviated by his own errors. Besides, his whole mind was fixed on conquering Europe, and having

concentrated all his energies on that one point, he was indifferent as to the amount of power he might possess after the war, saying that there would be always enough for his son. If some persons will insist on conjecturing what he would have done had he conquered, we answer that it is childish to endeavour to calculate what a man would have done under circumstances that never existed ; that liberty must be accorded in its fullest extent, with the implied condition that it is not to be abused ; that there is less discussion with great than with little minds, because that the dispute is reduced to essential points ; and that if Napoleon's impetuous nature became restive under the poignant spur of liberty, he would not have done worse than all those sovereigns who have tried it in France, and who sunk beneath the attempt, because they did not resign themselves to all the consequences of their own act.

These are problems that cannot be solved. What is evident is this : that Napoleon gave a perfectly constitutional monarchy, that he was not trusted—the just punishment of his past conduct—and that to prove his sincerity he was obliged to bring this monarchy into immediate operation by convoking the chambers. These chambers were composed of men sincerely devoted to the imperial dynasty and to liberty ; but they were also influenced by the prevalent feeling of distrust, and dreaded above all things to be looked on as the dupes of a despot who affected to have changed his views. They proved this by their strange susceptibility on many occasions, and far from exhibiting themselves before Europe combined in action with the head of the government, they put obstacles in his path instead of aiding him in his task. The ministers Carnot, Davout, Caulaincourt, and Cambacérès, chosen from amongst the highest and most estimable men of the time, knew better how to fulfil the wishes of an absolute master than to influence public assemblies, and were consequently as unskilful as the chambers were intractable. Napoleon, seeing that discord was taking the place of the unanimity so necessary to the welfare of France, hastened to gain on the battlefield that ascendancy that would enable him to rule men's minds. His choice lay between two plans : either to act on the defensive, by awaiting the enemy, with fortified Paris in his rear, and to manœuvre with 250,000 men, or to choose the offensive, by anticipating the two invading columns, falling on that nearest, beat it, and then attack the other with all the advantages gained by victory. The first plan was the surest, but it would be both slow and distressing, for it would allow our fairest provinces to be invaded ; the second was more hazardous, but would be prompt and decisive if successful ; and the skilful gambler was impatient to throw the dice.

The result of this campaign of three days is already known.

Having collected 124,000 men and 350 pieces of cannon, unnoticed by the enemy, who were within two leagues of him, he commenced operations on the morning of the 15th of June, surprised Charleroi, passed the Sambre, and found, as he expected, an unoccupied space between the English and the Prussians, took possession of it, and succeeded in beating the Prussians at Ligny, while he sent Ney to oppose the English at Quatre-Bras. Had Ney, uninfluenced by what he had endured during the past year, possessed his wonted decision, the English would have been driven back from Quatre-Bras, and the victory of Ligny would have completed the destruction of the Prussians. Ney, though heroic as ever, was unfortunately too hesitating, and the result was not as great as it should have been. Still Napoleon's plan had succeeded in all that was essential. The Prussians were separated from the English, and beaten. Napoleon ordered Grouchy to pursue them, and advanced himself to meet the English. A fearful tempest prevented the battle of the 18th from commencing until noon. Everything, the well-laid plan of the commander and the ardour of the men, promised victory; but from the very commencement there appeared on the right that spectre, the Prussian army, that Grouchy should have followed but did not. Napoleon was therefore obliged to divide his attention and his army so as to be able to face two enemies. Whilst he, with consummate prudence and imperturbable firmness, was endeavouring to husband his strength so as to get rid first of the Prussians and then attack the English, Ney, no longer able to restrain himself, made a premature attack with the cavalry, our most important reserve, and just as Napoleon, having conquered two-thirds of the Prussian army, was hastening to aid Ney in destroying the English, he was unexpectedly attacked by the remainder of the Prussians, whom Grouchy had allowed to pass, despite the exclamations of his soldiers, and at length having accomplished prodigies of valour and firmness, he lost a real battle of Zama! His sword was now shattered for ever.

Had any faults been committed? In a military point of view, none; in a political and moral sense every act of Napoleon's reign had been an error. His generals discouraged, but valorous as ever; his soldiers so excited that they attacked the enemy unbidden, and after performing prodigies of valour, fell into irremediable confusion; the enemy preferring utter destruction to submission—all this the effects of Napoleon's conduct, not indeed during these three days, when he was all that a great commander should be, but of the policy he had pursued during fifteen years.

When Napoleon retreated to Laon he might have rallied the army, heedless of the chambers, whose noisy declamation could

not unseat him from his war horse. But there was no account of Grouchy. None knew that he was safe, and Napoleon thought that he could only collect the fugitives of his own army. He might have remained had he known that within three days he would have an army of 60,000 men, more exasperated against the enemy than ever. But seeing himself without an army, he went to demand one from the chambers, with indeed but a faint hope of success, for by the boding light of the setting sun of Waterloo he had read his coming doom. His arrival at Paris gave birth to an idea that was most natural. This man had again seriously compromised France with Europe. So long as he could defend the country the danger was not so great; but now that he either could not or would not do so any longer, its safety was only imperilled by his presence. The general opinion was that the interests of France should be separated from those of Napoleon, and by the threat of a deposition he was compelled to abdicate.

Napoleon might have dissolved the Chamber of Representatives; he had the right to do so, and had he any hope of saving the country he should have exercised that right. But it is doubtful whether, even supported by the nation, he would have been able to resist the enemy. Had he been reduced to attempt a kind of *coup d'état* against the chambers, which contained his own party—the liberals and revolutionists—and being then supported only by the energetic but violent portion of the population, and obliged to make use of these to keep the upper classes in check, he would have appeared as an exasperated soldier, defending his old tyranny with the expiring remains of Bonapartism and demagoguery.

It was not so that France could be saved. He would not adopt a measure to which he felt so much repugnance, and of whose success he was doubtful. And now M. Fouché, a man void of sincerity, though not really wicked, disliking the Bourbons, who despised him, and still more Napoleon, who curbed him, and desirous of playing a prominent part on all occasions, even in the midst of chaos, hastened to profit by the opportunity that presented itself of getting rid of Napoleon, and excited M. de Lafayette's patriotism by telling him, what was quite false, that the Chamber of Representatives was about to be dissolved. This imaginary project was denounced by M. de Lafayette; and the chamber, impressed with the idea that bleeding France should be wrested from the hands of Napoleon, declared that any one who should attempt to dissolve that assembly should be considered a traitor. Napoleon was thus left no choice between abdication and deposition. He abdicated then for the second and last time.

Still the Chamber of Representatives was not to blame, with

one exception, which was the necessity of realising the real state of things, that is, of being convinced that if Napoleon were put aside, resistance would be impossible, that a peace should be concluded as quickly as possible, and in order to do so that the Bourbons should be recalled, getting from them the best guarantees that could be obtained for the liberty of the nation, and the lives of the illustrious men who had been compromised. The fearless Davout saw, with the plain good sense of a soldier, how difficult it would be to carry on a war without Napoleon, and proposed that the Bourbons should be recalled, not by an intrigue, but by the frank invitation of the chambers. But this would not suit M. Fouché. Whilst secretly treating with the royalists, he was seeking in every direction some other means of solving the political difficulty than by their aid; but finding none, he ended by attaching himself to the Bourbons, at the same time stealthily extending his hand to receive the price of his very equivocal services.

But by thus prolonging the crisis he placed all connected with it in a humiliating light, for the chamber, not expecting to share in Napoleon's fall, was making itself ridiculous by seeking no other means of defence than proclaiming the rights of man; nor was there any greater indication of common-sense in the conduct of Carnot and Lafayette—the one asserting that it would be impossible to defend Paris, and yet refusing to receive the Bourbons; the other believing that the allied sovereigns would consent, if not to the establishment of a republic, at least to that of some other dynasty; and then M. Fouché, the wiliest of men, brought upon himself not alone ridicule, but disgrace, for after deceiving all—Napoleon, the chambers, and his colleagues—he experienced the like treatment three months later when he was dismissed and exiled. He thus disgracefully terminated his career, presenting at the tribunal of history only one excuse for his conduct—that he had not employed the authority he had so basely accepted from the Bourbons in doing more harm than he could possibly avoid. Miserable apology! for what is more repugnant to the feelings of an honest man than to do wrong, great wrong, merely that he may prevent others from doing worse? Such deplorable scenes as these were a cruel revenge on the part of the Bourbons and royalists for the 20th of March! Contemplating such things, one cannot but feel that it would have been a hundred times better that the Bourbons had not been expelled on the 20th of March, as then Napoleon would not have counted in his life the fatal day of Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives would not have been surrounded by foreign bayonets, nor would France have been plundered and trampled on by the foreigners she was again compelled to admit within her walls. To avoid

such sad results, Napoleon should have remained at Elba, occupied in recording his own heroic actions; the revolutionists, instead of overthrowing the Bourbons, should have sought to win liberty by long and patient efforts; the Bourbons should not have driven the revolutionists to desperation, deceived the liberals, alarmed everybody, nor displeased the army; in a word, all should have acted with common-sense! It may well be said that to expect that would be but a childish hope, calculated only to dishearten those who seek to profit by experience. Still let us not be discouraged. We must indeed admit that but little, very little advantage has been derived from the teachings of experience, though so much blood has been shed, and such great misery endured! But this little, accumulating from generation to generation, constitutes what is called the wisdom of ages, and though it does not make men dispassionate philosophers, which they never will be, it renders them gradually less prejudiced, less unjust, less embittered in their conduct towards each other. Let us therefore persevere, and endeavour to find in even the most painful events motives for inculcating a mode of conduct influenced by reason, moderation, and justice to all men, to all parties. The effort would be well repaid though but one single error were prevented. Let not us who in 1848 dreaded a renewal of the scenes of 1793, but were happily disappointed—let us not lose confidence in the lessons taught by history, but continue to present them to the world, though only an occasional advantage may be derived from them.

BOOK LXII.

ST. HELENA.

AMIDST all the joy felt by the Bourbons and the representatives of foreign courts at their entrance into Paris, they were deeply chagrined on hearing of Napoleon's escape. They could not believe themselves safe so long as this great disturber of mankind was at liberty, and in their anxiety they could not decide whether his life ought not to be sacrificed to the general security. His escape was imputed to M. Fouché, whose giving up Paris was forgotten in the displeasure felt at his not having given up Napoleon, and he was now generally accused of having played false to all parties. The approbation which the Bourbons and the allies had been for some days bestowing on their favourite was now changed into extreme disgust. The Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand alone undertook his defence, saying that he had at least opened the gates of Paris, and that if Napoleon's escape was one of the conditions on which he did so, there was not such great cause of complaint. Notwithstanding these sage reflections, the greatest indignation was felt against M. Fouché at the Tuileries, and when he was summoned to the king's presence on the evening of the 8th of July, the day of the monarch's entry into Paris, he did not venture to defend the good deed of the 6th when he renewed the order for Napoleon to leave Rochefort. He excused himself with the greatest humility, and when asked by Louis XVIII., promised to do all in his power to seize the dreaded fugitive either on land or sea. But he did not keep his word, nor did he as minister of police issue any fresh orders when he left the king, so that his former directions remained still in full force. When a man has the courage to act uprightly, he ought to have the pride to avow it. Still, it is well that good should be done, even though he who does it either through weakness or interest has not the courage to confess it.

Napoleon left Malmaison at five o'clock on the morning of the 29th June. The heat was extreme, and Napoleon and his companions proceeded on their way in silence and dejection. When he arrived at Rambouillet he said he would remain

there for the night to rest himself; but in reality he wished to prolong as long as possible his retreat from the throne, from which he was about to descend into a frightful captivity. A regret, one simple reflection on the part of those men who had deprived themselves in the presence of a foreign army of the power wielded by his sword might place him again at the head of his troops, a position preferred to the throne itself. Having passed the night and the following morning at Rambouillet, he left on the morning of the 30th, passed through Tours on the following day, July 1, where he spoke to the prefect for a few moments, then proceeded towards Poitiers, stopped outside the town during some hours whilst the heat was at its height, ran some risk from the Vendean population as he passed through St. Maixent, and arrived at Niort in the evening, without having addressed a single word to his companions during all that long journey. Being recognised, he was received with the greatest enthusiasm, for the inhabitants, to use the language of that part of the country, were *blue*, from opposition to the *whites* by whom they were surrounded. Some imperial troops sent to restrain the insurgents were still at Niort, so that Napoleon was in perfect security there. The small inn at which he stopped was soon surrounded by the populace, soldiers and citizens calling on him to appear, and shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* Though unwilling to appear in public, he came to a window, where his oppressed heart was for a moment relieved by the acclamations of the crowd. "Stay amongst us," was echoed from every side, with promises to defend him to the last. The prefect came to request him to stop at the prefecture, and he yielded to the evidently disinterested request. He passed July 2nd at Niort, partaking in the inexpressible emotion excited by his presence, and from which he felt no desire to withdraw. But on the morning of the 3rd, General Beker respectfully reminded him of the danger of these delays, as the port of Rochefort might be blockaded, by which his passage to the United States would be prevented. He determined therefore to set out, though it was painful to him to leave such friendly and hospitable people. As he left he covered his agitated countenance with his hands, and the cavalry escorted him as far as the strength of the horses would permit. He entered Rochefort on the evening of July 3rd.

The naval prefect, M. de Bonnefoux, understood his duty as well as General Beker. He was determined to obey the government, but at the same time to act with all the deference due to the great man whom fortune had confided to his custody for a few days. The inhabitants shared in the sentiments of those of Niort. They were under many obligations to Napo-

leon, who had caused some extensive works to be erected in the neighbourhood, and the town was crowded with sailors who had just returned from prison in England. Besides a naval regiment stationed in the isle of Aix, there was a large garrison at Rochefort, 15,000 chosen national guards, and a number of gendarmerie collected for the suppression of the royalists, so that there were sufficient troops to defend the fallen emperor, or even to aid him should he make any rash attempt. On the following morning the news of Napoleon's arrival spread through the town, and the inhabitants assembled under the windows calling on him to appear, and uttering frantic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* when he did so. Napoleon was deeply touched, waved his hand in reply to their salutations, and being reassured by the spectacle before him, convinced that he could run no risk whilst surrounded by men so devoted, he determined to remain some days, in order to reflect maturely on what resolution he ought to take. To leave France, and for ever, he considered a great sacrifice. He could not see that whilst all Europe was in arms, those who held power in France would not even accept him as a simple general. He said to himself that even at the last moment the army might change its opinion, and like one condemned to die, he caught at even the most delusive hope. This naturally led to his wasting much time, as he considered that his lingering on the coast might originate some unexpected event, perhaps some despairing effort on the part of the army that would again summon him to take the command.

But if time in thus passing by brought no change in his favour, a change, indeed, of which there was but very little probability, it deprived him of all hope of escaping the English and avoiding a cruel captivity. It could not be possible but that the many emissaries in communication with the English fleet should announce Napoleon's arrival at Rochefort, and render the blockade of the coast still stricter. Up to June 29th the cruisers had not been very numerous or near; but since that day they had approached the two locks, those of Breton and Antioche, by which Rochefort communicated with the sea. Two new frigates, the *Saale* and the *Medusa*, considered the best sailers in the French navy, and manned with excellent and devoted crews, were now in port, and ready to leave at a moment's notice. The orders of the provisional government were that these were to obey the Emperor Napoleon, and transport him whithersoever he desired, provided it was not to any port in France. Captain Philibert, commanding the *Saale*, and under whose orders both frigates were, was an excellent sailor, faithful to his duty, but less daring than Captain Ponée, who commanded the *Medusa*, and who was prepared to make every

effort to land Napoleon on a free soil. This valiant officer considered this a duty he owed both to the sorrows and to the glory of France, personified in the person of Napoleon, who was not the less great in his eyes because he had been conquered at Waterloo.

Immediately on his arrival Napoleon desired that a naval council should deliberate upon what would be the best means of getting out to sea without coming in contact with the English cruisers. The naval prefect assembled for this purpose the best informed naval men of the neighbourhood, and amongst them Admiral Martin, an old officer who had served in the American war, who had been overlooked under the empire, but who behaved on this occasion as though he had always been an object of especial favour. Although the English cruisers were so very near, our two frigates were such fast sailers that no doubt was felt but that once they had cleared the port, they would be soon safe from pursuit. But to effect this the wind should be favourable, which it was not. The captain of a Danish vessel, a Frenchman by birth, but whom want of employment in his own country had compelled him to seek it in Denmark, offered to take Napoleon to America, and to conceal him so well that it would be impossible for the English to discover him. He only stipulated that his owners should be compensated for any loss that might be sustained. There could be no doubt of this man's sincerity; but Napoleon felt the greatest repugnance to burying himself in the hold of a neutral vessel, or to running the risk of being found in so undignified a position. Admiral Martin devised another plan. At the mouth of the Gironde was an armed corvette commanded by a man of daring courage, Captain Baudin—afterwards Admiral Baudin—who had already lost an arm in fight, and who was ready to attempt the most venturous deeds. It would not be difficult to pass from the Charente to the Seudre in a well-armed boat, and then make a circuit of some miles to Royan, where Napoleon could embark. As the attention of the English was much more directed to the Charente than the Gironde, there was every possibility of being able to put to sea and gain the coast of America in safety.

The plan was approved, and though not definitely decided on, it was determined to try whether it would be practicable. In the meantime the wind might change, and it was not impossible but that passports might be sent by the Duke of Wellington. These were only specious excuses for deferring his departure, and were more agreeable to Napoleon than he would admit even to himself. At this very time his brother Joseph, having passed through many dangers, arrived at Rochefort. He had seen the French army advancing towards the Loire.

and had been told that many of the superior officers were vehemently demanding that Napoleon should place himself at their head, and by prolonging the war, seek on a more successful battlefield some compensation for Waterloo.

This news agitated Napoleon not a little, and no wonder. It is true that the French army in approaching the west had been joined by the troops that had been sent into these provinces, and that their numbers now amounted to 80,000 men, who, stationed beyond the Loire, could make a successful opposition to the enemy, who naturally became weaker the further they advanced into France; and our troops might, by fighting with the same desperation as in 1814, gain a victory productive of the most important results. Beaten as they were, the commanding officers, most deeply compromised, could not do better than make a last effort under Napoleon, an effort that would seem both to themselves and the nation only an attempt to rescue the country from the hands of foreigners.

Napoleon began to estimate the possibility of success, ever recurring to the subject with an ardour that soon died away before reflection. Had he made such an attempt, it should have been whilst he was at Paris, with all the resources of France at his disposal. But now that he had abdicated, that he had resigned all legal authority, and with the Bourbons in the capital, he would be nothing but a rebel, and on the Loire, with France not only morally but physically divided, he had no possible chance of success. He would certainly have prolonged the struggle; but it would be by covering the country with ruins, and extending the horrors of warfare from the northern provinces to the central and southern, which had not hitherto been subjected to anything worse than conscription. Napoleon saw that it was too late, and that had he made a last desperate effort, it should have been by dissolving the chambers the very day of his return to Paris. Still it was not for some time that Napoleon could entirely give up the idea of a last struggle. When he had convinced himself of the inability of such a project, and abandoned the very thought of it, it would return with renewed force after some hours, strengthened not a little by the dreary prospect before him. He passed the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July in apparently examining the plans for embarkation that were submitted to him, in waiting for winds that did not come, but really in alternately adopting and rejecting the idea of joining the army on the Loire, which would have been more fatal than his return from Elba, and would in all probability have but added a fresh disaster to that of Waterloo.

It was with great regret that the worthy General Beker saw this lengthened hesitation; nor could he venture to expel, as one may say, from the country a man who, whatever his faults, had

so many claims on every enlightened and patriotic Frenchman. But his departure could no longer be deferred. Common-sense showed that the delay of each hour would but compromise Napoleon's safety; besides that, the orders from Paris left no choice as to the line of conduct to be pursued. All the members of the provisional government, as well as the naval minister Decrès, who was still faithful to his master, repeatedly desired General Beker to hasten Napoleon's departure, both for his own sake and that of the country, as his continued presence on the coast would only make the negotiations for peace more difficult, and give the English time to make the blockade closer. The minister of marine, at the same time that he desired General Beker to hasten Napoleon's departure, authorised him to employ not only the frigates, but every available ship at Rochefort, without any consideration as to what inconvenience might result to the vessels themselves. Though the minister did not say it, it was evident that the provisional government had but a few hours more to exist, and would in all probability be succeeded by one that would issue more rigorous orders concerning the person of the fallen emperor.

On the morning of the 8th, General Beker informed Napoleon of the orders of the provisional government, orders issued in perfect sincerity, and from the most honourable motives. He remarked to him how every day increased the difficulty of escaping the English cruisers; nor did he conceal his fear that very different orders would soon be issued if, as was most probable, the provisional government should be overturned by the emigrants. Napoleon could make no objection to such cogent reasons, but ordered that every preparation should be made for setting out that very day for the island of Aix.

The same evening he stepped into his carriage, intending to proceed to Fouras, situate at the mouth of the Charente, in the harbour of the isle of Aix. The inhabitants being informed of his departure, thronged the road, and accompanied him with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* All were deeply moved, and tears flowed down many a withered cheek embrowned by war and weather. Napoleon shared in the general feeling, and waved his hand in adieu to those who thus sympathised with his misfortunes. His companions followed in several carriages, and towards the close of the day the entire party reached the coast. Though the wind was not yet favourable, he preferred passing the night on board the *Saale*, that he might be able to profit by the first favourable breeze. He got into a boat belonging to the frigate, and was received with all due deference on board the *Saale*. The preparations for his reception were not completed, and he was obliged to accommodate himself as best he could on board the vessel that seemed destined to bear him to America.

As the wind continued unfavourable, Napoleon visited the island of Aix on the following day. He and his suite proceeded thither in the boats belonging to the frigates. The inhabitants hastened to the spot where he was to disembark, and received him with transports of delight. He reviewed the naval regiment, composed of fifteen hundred trustworthy men. They received Napoleon with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* and the still more significant cry of *à l'Armée de la Loire!* Napoleon thanked them for their devotion to him, and then visited the extensive works which had been executed during his reign for the security of this large port. He returned to the quay followed by the inhabitants and soldiers, and passed the night on board the frigate.

On the following day it became absolutely necessary to come to some decision. Fresh despatches were brought from Paris to General Beker by the naval prefect Bonnefoux. These were still more urgent than any of the preceding. They announced that there was no hope of obtaining passports, desired that the departure should take place at once, again authorised the frigates to leave at any risk, and should they be considered too large to escape the vigilance of the enemy, to employ a fast sailing advice boat to transport Napoleon to any place he chose, except it were some port in France. These despatches differed in one point from the preceding. Up to this time the provisional government, foreseeing that Napoleon might be tempted to entrust himself to the English, had forbidden that any aid should be given to his doing so, fearing that it would be looked upon as treachery in them. But now from the violence with which party spirit displayed itself before their eyes, they believed that Napoleon would be safer in the hands of the English than in the power of the victorious emigrants, and authorised a communication with the English frigates, but only on condition of a written order from Napoleon, so that he could not blame anybody but himself for the consequences.

Such instructions being received, there was no longer time for hesitation, and a resolution must be immediately come to. The French Captain Besson, commanding the neutral Danish vessel, repeated his offer of concealing Napoleon so effectually that the English could not possibly discover him; but Napoleon would not consent to this mode of escape. There was still great difficulty connected with the frigates, though the wind had become more favourable, and a small vessel was sent to view the port, and the position occupied by the English. Old Admiral Martin's ingenious proposal of proceeding up the Seudre in a boat, riding across the tongue of land that separates the Charente from the Gironde, and embarking on board Captain Baudin's corvette, was again brought under consideration. An officer

was sent to this captain to get all the necessary information; and lastly, that no means of getting out of this disagreeable position might be neglected, Napoleon determined to send one of the friends by whom he was accompanied to the English cruisers, to inquire whether they had got the passports that had been in vain expected from Paris, and especially to learn whether they were inclined to receive him in a manner suitable to his rank and consonant with his safety. Napoleon felt more inclined to terminate his career by showing confidence in the British nation than by an attempt that might be unsuccessful, and little consistent with his former glory. To be found concealed in the hold of a neutral vessel would afford his enemies the double satisfaction of having captured and of having discovered him in so undignified a position. If he were arrested after a struggle with the frigates, it would be said, that having shed so much blood to advance his own ambitious plans, he had now made it flow afresh to secure his personal safety, and in both cases he would expose himself to be treated as a prisoner of war. Did he even succeed in reaching America, where he would be certain of a warm reception, as he was very popular in that country, he could not be certain whether the government would be able to defend him against Europe, that would not fail to demand his person with threats, and even attempt to seize him by force. Having filled the Old World with warfare, ought he now take the monster with him to the New? Although he contemplated passing a calm unfettered life in the boundless wilds of America, he was too clear-sighted to believe that the Old World would leave him in that retreat, nor seek to tear him from it at any cost. He therefore preferred appealing to the English people, arousing their sense of honour by his great confidence in giving himself up freely to them, and thus compel their generosity to accord him a peaceful and safe retreat. They had received Louis XVIII. and every other prince who had asked their aid, and would they refuse him what they had granted to so many illustrious fugitives? He was not indeed an inoffensive refugee like Louis XVIII.; but in pledging his honour and his fame not to disturb the peace of the world again, would he not be believed? Besides, without becoming exactly a prisoner, he could not object to any precautions that might be deemed necessary to calm the anxiety of Europe. Should he succeed, his dearest wish would be accomplished, that is the only wish his present position would allow him to entertain; for though he could look forward with pleasure to a life of freedom in the solitudes of America, a private life in one of the most civilised nations in the world, in the society of enlightened men, had infinitely more charms for him. He pictured to himself the happiness of renouncing the restless past, and terminating his career in the

repose of private life, amid the charms of friendship, study, and the society of men of talent. Whatever might be the result, he considered that such a chance deserved a trial, and he sent M. de las Cases, who spoke English, and the Duke de Rovigo, in whom he felt the most perfect confidence, on board the *Bellerophon*, from which the flag of the commander of the English station was floating, with directions to make the necessary inquiries.

During the night of the 9th-10th of July, M. de las Cases and the Duke de Rovigo proceeded in a light vessel to the *Bellerophon*. Captain Maitland, who commanded the vessel, received them with the greatest politeness, but did not allow any expression to escape him that could enlighten them as to the intentions of the British government. Captain Maitland knew of nothing that had occurred since the battle of Waterloo. He was quite unaware that Napoleon had left Paris and come to Rochefort. He had not received any passports, and would consequently stop any man-of-war that would attempt to force the blockade, and visit every neutral vessel that might try to elude it. As Napoleon's offering to give himself up had not been foreseen, he had neither been authorised nor forbidden to receive him. He would certainly receive him on board, as an enemy who surrenders is never rejected, and he was certain that the English nation would treat the Emperor of the French with all the consideration that was due to his glory and former greatness. But he could not enter into any engagement on the subject, as he had not received any instructions touching so extraordinary and unforeseen an occurrence. Captain Maitland offered to refer them to his superior in command, Admiral Hotham, who was then cruising in the Port of Quiberon. Napoleon's two envoys agreed to this proposal, and retired very well pleased with the politeness shown by the commander of the English station, but quite ignorant as to what might be expected from British generosity. Captain Maitland followed them with the *Bellerophon*, and anchored in the Basques Channel, that he might be, as he said, in a more favourable position for continuing the communications.

On the 11th, Napoleon received the account brought by M. de las Cases and the Duke de Rovigo: it was rather vague, as we have seen, and though not very alarming, could not inspire much confidence in English generosity. The officer who had been sent to reconnoitre the port announced that the English had come nearer, and were more vigilant than ever, and that it would be almost impossible to pass them unobserved. The only alternative that remained was to force a passage, to which the greatest obstacle would be the *Bellerophon*, that had anchored in the Basques Channel. It was an old vessel,

mounted with seventy-four guns, and being a bad sailer, could not be an insurmountable obstacle to two new, well-armed, fast-sailing frigates, manned with most devoted crews. The other English vessels were of so little importance that they need not be taken into account. There was a corvette with some smaller vessels in the port, and if these were employed immediately and boldly, there was every probability of forcing the blockade.

Napoleon asked the captains of the *Saale* and *Medusa* what they thought of such an attempt. The winds were shifting, and the weather did not present as many difficulties as before. This induced Captain Ponée, of the *Medusa*, to make a heroic proposal. He said that Napoleon's departure might be secured by an act of devotion, which he was quite ready to perform, and of whose success he was certain. He would weigh anchor at sunset, an hour when there generally was a breeze favourable to leaving port. He would make a violent attack on the *Bellerophon*, and not abandon the contest until, by sacrificing the *Medusa*, he should have rendered the English vessel powerless. In the meantime the *Saale* might sail out of port, either distancing or disabling the weak vessels that would attempt to prevent her passage.

This plan offered every chance of success, as Napoleon saw; but Captain Philibert, whose part in the affair would be the least dangerous, and who was consequently more at liberty to view things in a more prudent light, seemed to fear the responsibility that would devolve on him if he should agree to the almost certain loss of one of the frigates under his command. Unless both captains were equally generous, Napoleon could not decide on accepting the proposed sacrifice. He took Captain Ponée's hand, and said, as he affectionately pressed it, that he would not secure his own safety at the expense of a man so brave as he, but would rather that he would preserve himself for the good of France.

The frigates could be no longer thought of; but there was still the project of embarking on the Gironde. The officer who had been sent to Captain Baudin had returned with most favourable information. Captain Baudin declared that his corvette was in excellent condition, and would engage to take it out of port, and conduct Napoleon whithersoever he desired. But the land journey in this case presented the difficulty, that part of the country through which Napoleon would be obliged to pass was almost entirely royalist. All were on the alert, and were Napoleon's party small, there was a risk of being captured; if numerous, there was the danger of attracting the observation of the English. This project was therefore almost impracticable, whilst that of the frigates was quite so.

On the following day, July 12th, Napoleon received his brother's visit, and the despatches containing the latest accounts from Paris. The provisional government had been dissolved, M. Fouché was ruling Paris in the name of Louis XVIII., and there was every danger that hostile orders would be issued. There was now no choice but to leave the coast of France, no matter how, for Napoleon had less to fear from the English than from the victorious emigrants. He therefore left the *Saale*, as the frigates could no longer transport him to another hemisphere. The sailors bade him adieu with great affection, and he landed on the island of Aix, where the inhabitants received him as warmly as before. But it was absolutely necessary to come to a decision, and that quickly. It would be impossible to ascend the Seudre in a boat, and ride across the tongue of land that separates the Charente from the Gironde, as the late despatches from Paris informed him that the white flag was floating over all the country. The royalists had triumphed, and it would be impossible to escape them. But a fresh proposal, as plausible and heroic as Captain Ponée's, was now made. As it had become generally known that because of the extreme prudence of one of the captains, the frigates would not have the honour of saving Napoleon, the younger officers felt irritated, and devised a new way of preserving him from the enemy. They offered to take two *chasse-marée* (a large species of fishing-boat with deck), and man them with forty or fifty resolute sailors, and take them out of port, either by the aid of oars or sails, and abandon themselves to the fortune of the waves, which might lead them to some trading vessel, which they would compel to take them to America. There was no doubt but that favoured by night they might row out of port unperceived. But there was one serious objection: it was not likely that they would immediately meet a trading vessel in these parts, and might be driven to the coast of Spain, where the greatest danger was to be dreaded.

Still the plan was approved, and these brave officers were desired to make their preparations. They selected the strongest and boldest from amongst themselves, to whom they joined a chosen number of sailors, and on the following evening, the 13th, they brought their two small vessels to anchor near the isle of Aix. Napoleon was determined to make the attempt, when an indescribable scene of confusion arose around him. He was accompanied by a number of persons, amongst whom were the families of those who were about to accompany him into exile. Those who were to remain behind felt all the anguish of parting, and the others trembled at the dangers they were about to encounter in frail boats on the fearful waters of the Bay of Biscay. The women sobbed; Napoleon's

habitual firmness gave way. Different obstacles were now started that had not been thought of before, such as the possibility of perishing miserably on the Spanish coast, in case they did not immediately meet a trading vessel, or the danger of being seen by the English, who would not fail to follow and seize the boats. "Well," said Napoleon, as he saw the tears of those around him, "let us put an end to it, and since there is so little chance of escape, let us deliver ourselves up to the English." He thanked the brave young men who had offered to save his life at the peril of their own, and he determined to give himself up on the following day to the British navy.

On the next day, the 14th, he again sent to the *Bellerophon* to know what reply Captain Maitland had received from Admiral Hotham, who, as we have said, was cruising in the Quiberon Channel. This commission was entrusted to M. las Cases and General Lallemand. Captain Maitland repeated that he was ready to receive Napoleon on board, but could not enter into any formal engagement, as there had not been time to communicate with London. He again gave it as his own private opinion that Napoleon would meet the same reception in England that illustrious fugitives always had met. When Captain Maitland spoke thus, he had no idea of the fate that was awaiting Napoleon in England; but it was evident that the desire of inducing the former master of the world to come on board his ship, and the honour of bringing such a prize to his wondering countrymen, induced him to promise somewhat more than he believed would be accorded, for he could not suppose that the English government would leave Napoleon as much at liberty in their country as Louis XVIII. had had. By thus promising more than he himself expected to be done, and that to men whose position inclined them to hope for even more than was promised, he contributed to produce an illusion by means not very far removed from falsehood. As sentence of death had been passed on General Lallemand, he asked whether there was any probability that England would surrender him and some of his companions who were similarly circumstanced to the French government. Captain Maitland declared that there was not the least danger of anything of the kind, and almost resented the doubt as an insult, which proves that he understood how different Napoleon's position was from General Lallemand's, and that he was not altogether ignorant of the risk the former ran in going on board the *Bellerophon*. He repeated that he could not make any engagement as to the person of the fallen emperor, and that he only asserted what as an English citizen he was justified in expecting from the magnanimity of his nation.

M. de las Cases and General Lallemand felt more reassured

by these assertions than they ought to have been, and returned to the isle of Aix to inform Napoleon of the result of their mission. He listened attentively to what they said, and compelled as he now was to entrust his safety to the English, he believed that what he heard justified him in expecting not to be treated with severity, which was as much as his present position could allow him to hope for. Before deciding, however, he determined to consult the few friends who were with him as to what he should do. Every possible means of escape had been proposed, examined, and rejected. The only choice that now remained was between entrusting himself to the English, or taking the desperate resolution to join the army beyond the Loire. The sentiments of this army were well known, its excitement and profound regret, and there could be no doubt but that with Napoleon at the head of these troops they might still perform great things. It would not be difficult for him to join the army. He had the naval regiment of the isle of Aix, consisting of 1500 men, who had uttered the significant cry of "To the Loire army!" He also had the equally well-disposed garrison of Rochefort, besides four battalions of federalists, who offered to stand by him in any attempt he might make. These would altogether amount to 5000 or 6000 men, with whom he could safely pass through Vendée to join the army on the Loire, which would thus obtain a large contingent, and the still more important addition of Napoleon himself. But however easily this might be accomplished, the misfortunes such an enterprise would entail on France could not be overlooked. No greater result could be expected than uselessly to prolong the calamities of war, and end finally with a fresh misfortune, greater slaughter, and a harsher fate for the vanquished. This was so evident, that though Napoleon had erred by returning to France before, he would not now complete her ruin by another attempt of the same kind. He determined at every risk to entrust himself to the English. This he resolved to do with becoming dignity, and wrote the following letter to the prince-regent, which General Gourgaud was to take to England and present to the regent himself.

"Your royal highness," he wrote, "pursued by the parties that divide my country, and become an object of hatred to the European powers, my political career is at end. Like Themistocles, I come to seat myself beside the hearth of the British nation. I place myself under the protection of its laws, a protection I demand from your royal highness as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies."

At any other time this letter would certainly have touched the honour of the English. Midst the hatred and terror

inspired by Napoleon, it was but a useless appeal to a unanimity that was extinct for the time. Napoleon desired M. de las Cases and General Gourgaud to return to the *Bellerophon* and announce his intention of going on board next day, and to ask a passage for the general, who was bearer of a letter to the prince-regent. When these gentlemen arrived on board the *Bellerophon*, they were received with many demonstrations of pleasure excited by the agreeable news they brought. They were promised that the emperor—that was the title used—should be received with all the honour that was due to him, and would be immediately taken to England, accompanied by such persons as he chose. A light vessel was given to General Gourgaud in which to accomplish his mission to the prince-regent.

The moment was now come when Napoleon was to leave France for ever. On the morning of the 15th he prepared to leave the isle of Aix, and addressed the most touching adieux to General Beker. "General," he said, "I thank you for the dignified and delicate manner in which you have behaved to me. Why have I not known your worth until now? You should never have left me. May you be happy. I beg you to make known in France the prayers I offer for her welfare." He ceased to speak, and with the deepest emotion he clasped the general in his arms. The latter wished to accompany him on board the *Bellerophon*, but Napoleon would not allow him. "I do not know," he said, "how the English may behave to me. Should they treat me worse than my confidence in them deserves, you would be accused of having delivered me up to them." These words, which proved that Napoleon was not yielding to any great delusion when he surrendered to the English, were followed by fresh expressions of affection for General Beker, who found it impossible to restrain his tears. Napoleon then descended to the shore amidst the cries and mournful adieux of the crowd, and with the companions of his exile got into the boats that were to take them on board the brig *Épervier*. Captain Maitland awaited him, ready to set sail, and in the greatest anxiety, fearing to the last moment that the trophy he wished to present his countrymen might escape him. When he saw the *Épervier* sailing towards the *Bellerophon* he could not conceal his joy; he ordered his crew under arms to receive the illustrious victim who approached, bearing the weight of his glory and his misfortunes. He descended to the end of the ladder to give his hand to Napoleon, whom he addressed as "Emperor." When they reached the deck he introduced his staff as he would have done to the sovereign of France himself. Napoleon replied with dignified calmness to the politeness of Captain Maitland,

and said he felt perfect confidence when entrusting himself to the protection of British laws. The captain replied, that nobody would ever have reason to repent confiding in English generosity. He made the best arrangements he could for Napoleon on board, and informed him that he would be very soon visited by Admiral Hotham. The admiral soon arrived in the *Superb*, and presented himself before Napoleon with the greatest deference. He requested him to visit the *Superb*, and dine on board. Napoleon consented, and was treated with all the etiquette due to a sovereign prince. Having spent some hours on board the *Superb*, he returned to the *Bellerophon*, though the admiral wished him to remain with him. Napoleon would have had better accommodation on board the *Superb*, but he did not wish to pain Captain Maitland, who was most attentive, and seemed so anxious to retain him. He therefore remained on board the *Bellerophon*, and they set sail for England.

There being but very little wind, the vessel advanced but slowly along the French coast into the English Channel. Napoleon was calm and tranquil; he walked incessantly on the quarter-deck, observing the working of the ship, and asking many questions of the sailors, who always replied with the greatest deference, addressing him by his proper title. So calm was he, and so respectful was the manner in which he was treated, that none would think that he had fallen from one of the greatest of thrones into the depths of an abyss.

The passage was long. On the 23rd of July the coast of France was distinctly visible, and on the morning of the 24th they anchored in Torbay, to receive orders from Admiral Keith, who commanded the different cruising squadrons. The orders soon came, and the *Bellerophon* was directed to anchor in Plymouth Harbour. Two well-armed frigates approached immediately, and stationed themselves one on each side, so that the *Bellerophon* was within range of their guns. Several English officials came to communicate with Captain Maitland; but the subject of these conversations did not transpire. Admiral Keith paid a visit of ceremony to Napoleon; he did not remain long, nor was anything said relative to the intentions of the British government. Whilst this ill-boding silence reigned around the illustrious prisoner, the countenances of all on board, Captain Maitland's especially, were expressive of the embarrassment of men who wished to conceal some disagreeable intelligence, or who were about to retract a promise; and a still more alarming symptom was, that these men, desirous as they were of acting as respectfully as before, dared not do so. General Gourgaud came to say that he had not been able to present the letter to the prince-regent, but had been compelled to give it to Admiral Keith. All this did not augur well.

When Napoleon went on board the *Bellerophon* he had but half deceived himself, because having no choice but to be taken as prisoner of war by the English, or surrender voluntarily to their honour, he preferred the latter, and now waited calmly to know his fate. The scenes that took place in the harbour of Torbay showed him how he was still thought of in the world. He might have been content had he been nothing more than an Erostrates on a large scale, who placed his glory in being talked of. Intelligence of his arrival soon reached the shore, and gradually spread to London, when a wild curiosity seized all England to see the celebrated man whose fame had filled the world for the last twenty years. The English had always represented Napoleon as a hateful monster, who had ruled men by fear; but curiosity is not over nice, and notwithstanding their abhorrence, they were still anxious to see him. The British journals celebrated his captivity with ferocious joy, but blamed the curiosity their countrymen felt to see him, and which these writers did all they could to repress.

This only increased the feeling they blamed, and there was not a horse between Plymouth and London that was not employed in gratifying the curiosity of the anxious multitude. The *Bellerophon* was constantly surrounded with thousands of boats, which lingered there for hours, and many dangerous collisions occurred from the efforts made by the rowers to obtain a good view of the emperor. Nothing abated their eagerness, though a day did not pass without some persons falling overboard. It was known that Napoleon walked for a short while every morning on the quarter-deck of the ship that had brought him to England; this moment was anxiously awaited, and when he appeared, silence reigned around, and an involuntary feeling of respect caused all to uncover, though not a word was spoken either unfriendly or otherwise. The English ministry, finding that pity for misfortune, and sympathy for glory, were lessening the national hatred, ordered that visitors should not be allowed near enough to the *Bellerophon* to gratify their curiosity. They wished to put an end to all this, and were determined that Napoleon's doom should not remain longer unpronounced.

The English ministers were as much astonished as Captain Maitland at Napoleon's surrendering to England. When an account was brought of his having left Paris, they felt as displeased with M. Fouché as were the European diplomatists, and believed that the great disturber had escaped, and was at liberty to overturn Europe on some future occasion. Their surprise was equal to their joy when they learned that the fallen emperor was on board a vessel of the royal navy in

Plymouth Harbour. The confidence Napoleon had shown in the nation did not touch them in the least, and some even entertained the barbarous idea of giving him up to Louis XVIII., who might have the responsibility in the eyes of history of ridding the world of him. But so odious a resolution could not be carried out in a country where all important measures are publicly discussed. Still though this idea was abandoned, the position of the illustrious fugitive presented very serious difficulties. Had he been taken at sea attempting to escape, he would have been a legal prisoner, when there would be nothing more to decide than whether, the war being ended, they would be justified in detaining him who had caused it. But before this question could be discussed, a more delicate one was to be decided, which was, whether an enemy who had surrendered voluntarily could be looked on as a prisoner of war.

The most learned lawyers in England felt very much embarrassed when this question was proposed to them. But this embarrassment could not continue long when contrasted with the consideration that the tranquillity of the world would be always in danger from Napoleon. As Frenchmen, we naturally feel a sympathy for the old companion of our glory; but that should not prevent us from admitting the evident truth, that Europe, kept in confusion during twenty years, and so lately again disturbed, and compelled to shed such torrents of blood, could not neglect the opportunity of protecting herself from the possible attempts of a man of such daring genius. Had he been an ordinarily dethroned sovereign, like Louis XVIII., the laws of hospitality would have commanded that he should be allowed to choose some spot in free England, where he might terminate his career in peace. But it would be impossible to allow to wander through the streets of London the man who had escaped from the island of Elba, and summoned the armies of Europe to the battle plains of Ligny and Waterloo. Though nations are bound to respect the safety of others, they must also protect their own, and the English lawyers appealed with justice to the principle of legitimate defence, which authorises every nation to defend itself when threatened. All societies restrain such persons as are considered dangerous, and all Europe, France included, having had abundant proof of how dangerous Napoleon was, was justified in depriving him of the means of doing harm. Europe had deprived him of his throne in 1814, and had given him the island of Elba; but when in 1815 he escaped from Elba, it was perfectly just to deprive him of his liberty. To deny this truth would be but wilful blindness. But the rights of legitimate defence can only be directed against the existing danger, and terminate when the danger

that called them into operation is at an end. In making Napoleon a prisoner, who would thus expiate his fearful activity, the English would not be justified in tormenting him, shortening his life, nor more especially in subjecting him to humiliation. They were as much bound to respect his genius as to restrain his power. Any greater severity than was absolutely necessary to prevent a fresh escape would be a gratuitous cruelty, that would involve its authors in eternal disgrace. On the latter point the resolutions adopted by the English were not as justifiable as on the former, and the mournful conclusion of our history will show that England compromised her own glory when she forgot the respect due to Napoleon's.

Napoleon's future residence was the first question brought under discussion. The trial that had been made of the Mediterranean showed that that locality would not suit. Some more distant sea must be chosen. The Indian Ocean was too remote, as it was necessary to the general security to have frequent intelligence of the formidable captive. Besides, the Isle of France, the only place that could be chosen in that ocean, was too populous and too much visited to be safe. In such a place Napoleon should be closely confined, an indignity which nobody even at that time thought of committing. There was in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, equally distant from Africa and America, a volcanic island, very difficult of access, too sterile to invite agriculturists, and so solitary that no prisoner detained there, however important, need be shut up in a fortress. This was St. Helena, which, because of the advantages it offered as a place of security, had already attracted the attention of those statesmen who wished to have Napoleon removed from the neighbourhood of the European seas. It was unanimously chosen as the most suitable spot for his detention, and the East India Company gave it up to the State for such time as it should be needed. The climate was not considered unhealthy; it was much the same as that of all islands within the tropics, and could not be particularly dangerous to an inhabitant of the temperate zone, except, perhaps, to him for whom the entire of the Old World was scarcely sufficiently large for the exercise of his boundless activity. We must be just, and admit that if a prison proportionate to his energy were to be selected, the whole world should have been placed at his disposal, a world he had sufficiently tormented to justify its forbidding him all access to it for ever.

St. Helena was therefore decided on. It was arranged that some spot in the centre of the island should be chosen at a distance from that portion that was inhabited, and sufficiently spacious to allow Napoleon to move about freely, walk, or even ride, without being forced to feel that he was a prisoner. All

these arrangements were consistent with what was absolutely necessary, and there was no need for the addition of useless restrictions or humiliations, which must be as painful to the illustrious captive as imprisonment itself. The British government, which had always styled Napoleon emperor, even while at the island of Elba, now yielded to the evil passions of the time, and decided that henceforward he should be called General Bonaparte. It was indeed a glorious title, one of which the greatest potentates of the earth might have been proud. Refusing to recognise Napoleon by the title he had borne for twelve years, a title acknowledged by the whole world, given him by England herself in 1806, through her envoy, Lord Lauderdale, and again when treating with him through Lord Castlereagh in 1814, was not only undignified but imprudent, as we shall soon see. In the present century, that has seen so many sovereigns descend from the throne to go into exile, and again emerge from exile to ascend a throne, whoever in speaking to Louis XVIII. or Charles X. should have refused him the title of king, would have been accused of insulting illustrious misfortunes. It is true that these princes were the undisputed heirs of a long line of kings, the representatives of an authority that had existed for centuries, circumstances that have ever been a strong claim to the admiration of mankind. But genius (at least when possessed in so high a degree as by Napoleon) is an equally good claim, and those sovereigns who had made it their excuse for humbling themselves to the Emperor of the French, for their eagerness in seeking his alliance, and mingling his blood with theirs, were very inconsistent in denying its moral value now, for recognising in Napoleon only brute force that had triumphed for a moment, they justified the world in saying that they themselves had yielded to that influence. So far from giving greater legality or stability to the throne of Louis XVIII. by refusing the title of emperor to him who had been beaten at Waterloo, they rather diminished the prestige attached to sovereignty by showing that it was only an accidental distinction, dependent on the caprice of fortune. It may be said, that depriving Napoleon of the title of sovereign was but a wound to his self-love, which it would have been more consistent with his dignity to have left unnoticed, and which has no claim on the attention of posterity. Certainly, if it were not evident that the intention was to humiliate him, he might be content to be recognised as General Bonaparte by his contemporaries; but it becomes a duty in the vanquished to resist attempted humiliations, and refusing Napoleon his customary titles was but giving birth to fresh subjects of dispute, which necessarily added to the rigours of his captivity, and subjected the British ministers to

the charge of persecution, a charge that has caused no small pain to their descendants, as once that the passions of the moment are allayed, no one wishes to be designated as the persecutor of genius.

It was decided that Napoleon should receive no other title than that of general, and be treated as a prisoner of war; that he and the officers of his suite should be disarmed; that he should be allowed only three companions, but that as General Lallemand and the Duke de Rovigo were considered dangerous, they should not be of the number; that everything belonging to him and his companions should be searched, and their money, plate, and jewels taken away, lest they might serve as means to facilitate an escape; that they were to be immediately conducted to St. Helena, where Napoleon would be allowed a space sufficiently large to ride in, but that whenever he exceeded these bounds, he should be escorted by an officer. We repeat that it was only just to take every precaution to prevent the escape of the illustrious captive who had caused such universal anxiety; but it was a needless indignity to deny him the title by which he would be known to posterity, to remove his sword, and limit the number of his companions. What could be effected by three, four, or six persons? What could their swords and the few thousand louis hidden in their luggage accomplish? Ah! it was not of his sword, which he had never drawn, but of his genius, that Napoleon should have been deprived. But as he could only be deprived of his genius by taking his life, as Blücher wished to do, but which the ministers of free England dared not attempt, and which no sovereign in Europe would have advised, he ought to have been enchained for the sake of public tranquillity; but these chains ought not to have been increased by any unnecessary additions, or sullied by uncalled-for insults.

It was also arranged that as the *Bellerophon* was too old for so long a voyage, Napoleon should be removed to the *Northumberland*, an excellent first-class vessel, which was to be escorted by a squadron composed of vessels of different classes under the command of Admiral Cockburn, who was to direct the arrangements for the reception of the prisoner at St. Helena. Admiral Cockburn was desired to be as expeditious as possible in getting the *Northumberland* out to sea, as it was inconvenient to have at Plymouth an object of such general curiosity, and of which both England and Europe were anxious to be rid.

When these resolutions were decided on, they were immediately transmitted to Lord Keith at Plymouth, with directions to communicate them to those by whom they were to be put into execution. The decision that had been come to had been already announced by the public journals; nor did it cause much surprise to Napoleon, who had had no expectation of being treated

as an inoffensive prince. But great was the grief of his companions, who saw themselves condemned either to leave him or consent to be buried alive in St. Helena. Lord Keith, accompanied by Bunbury, the Under-Secretary of State, came on board the *Bellerophon*, and read to Napoleon the resolutions that had been adopted concerning him. Napoleon listened with frigid dignity, and when Lord Keith had concluded, he calmly and firmly stated his reasons for protesting against the resolutions adopted by the British government. He said he was not a prisoner of war, as he had come on board the *Bellerophon* of his own free choice; to which he was not compelled by necessity, as he could easily have joined the army on the Loire, and prolonged the war to an indefinite period; that even in not wishing to continue the war, he could have surrendered to some other country than England; that had he given himself up to the Emperor Alexander, formerly his personal friend, or to his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, neither of them would have treated him so; that he had surrendered in order to end the sufferings caused by war, and that it was esteem for England that had led him to choose that country as a place of refuge; but that that country had proved herself unworthy of the honour he had done her by the manner in which she had behaved to an unarmed enemy, conduct which would not add to her glory in the eyes of posterity; that he protested against the outrage offered to the law of nations in his person; and that he appealed against the acts of the English government to the English people themselves, and to history, which would not fail to pass a severe censure upon such ungenerous conduct. Napoleon did not deign to notice the arrangements made for his future residence, or the treatment he was to receive, but turned from Lord Keith with a haughtiness worthy of his greatness, a greatness independent of the caprices of fortune or of the violence of his enemies.

He was not the less sensible of the degrading details attached to his sentence of perpetual imprisonment. He was too clear-sighted not to see that his detention was both just and necessary; but he was deeply wounded by such gratuitous humiliations as depriving him of his sword, his rank as a sovereign, and some part of what had been saved from the wreck of his fortunes. He said nothing, but was determined to resist such unworthy treatment to the last extremity. He had at first determined to adopt some such title as princes are wont to assume when desirous of avoiding the restraints of etiquette. He had thought of calling himself Colonel Muiron, in memory of a valiant officer who had been killed in his defence at the bridge of Arcola. But now that the title accorded by France and recognised by Europe was disputed, he would not assist

his enemies in their attempts to humiliate him, nor by his consent weaken the right France possessed to choose him as her chief. He persisted in designating himself the Emperor Napoleon. His sword he was determined to run through whoever should attempt to deprive him of it.

When he returned to his companions in misfortune, he spoke to them calmly, and impressed on them, above all things, that they should consult their domestic interests and feelings in the choice they were to make. They all declared themselves ready to follow him whithersoever he went, and under whatever conditions the hatred of the conquerors of Waterloo should subject him to. He regretted extremely that Generals Lallemand and Savary would not be permitted to accompany him; but he had no choice. He selected as his companions, Marshal Bertrand, Count Montholon, and General Gourgaud. His right to choose did not extend beyond three. It had been understood that their wives and children would be permitted to accompany them, and increase the small number that was to accompany Napoleon into exile. But there was one person who had come with him to England, and whom he esteemed highly, though he knew him but a short time, the Count de las Cases, a well-informed man of agreeable conversational powers, who, having been an officer in the navy, was well acquainted with English, and might be very useful in his new residence. Napoleon was most anxious that he should accompany him to St. Helena, and he was ready to follow Napoleon anywhere. As the British government in limiting the number of his companions had only restricted the number of military men, M. de las Cases was appointed in a civil capacity. He was also allowed a doctor and twelve servants. All this being arranged, everything was prepared for an immediate departure.

When the *Northumberland*, which was fitted out with the greatest expedition, was ready to sail, she joined the *Bellerophon*, that was lying at anchor at Start Point, exposed to very bad weather. Lord Keith, always desirous of tempering as far as possible the rigour of the ministerial orders, had deferred until the last moment the accomplishment of such painful measures as demanding his prisoners' swords or searching their luggage. Their swords were then demanded from such as wore them, and a custom-house officer searched their luggage, and took possession of their money and of any valuables they possessed. The faithful Marchand, Napoleon's valet, whose superior education and simple and modest fidelity were afterwards of such service to his master, had taken dexterous precautions to preserve some resources. The former master of the world possessed no more than the 4,000,000 francs secretly confided to M. Lafitte, about 350,000 francs in gold, and the diamond necklace he had been


compelled to accept by Queen Hortense. The necklace was given to M. de las Cases, who concealed it in a belt. The 350,000 francs were concealed in the clothes of the servants, with the exception of 80,000, which were left exposed, and were taken in charge by the custom-house officer. As this undignified proceeding did not go so far as to search their persons, such things as were concealed remained undiscovered. An inventory was made of what was taken, that it might be given up according as the prisoners should need it. When these painful formalities were ended, the prisoners were put into boats belonging to the fleet, and Captain Maitland respectfully approached and bade adieu to Napoleon in the most touching manner. Although Captain Maitland, in his desire to get Napoleon on board the *Bellerophon*, had promised perhaps more than he hoped could be accomplished, he was neither the author nor abettor of the perfidious treatment the illustrious prisoner had met—treatment that he most sincerely regretted. Napoleon uttered no reproach; he even desired him to bear his thanks to the crew of the *Bellerophon*. As he was about to pass from one vessel to the other, Admiral Keith, with evident unwillingness, and in the most respectful tone, said, "General, England orders me to demand your sword." Napoleon replied by a glance that showed on what terms it could be obtained. Lord Keith did not insist, and Napoleon retained his honoured sword. The moment was now come when he was to part from those who were not to have the honour of accompanying him. Savary and Lallemand flung themselves into his arms, and could scarcely tear themselves away. Having embraced them, Napoleon said, "May you be happy, my dear friends. We shall not meet again, but I shall never cease to think of you, nor of those who have served me. Tell France that my heart's best wishes are for her." Then escorted by Admiral Keith, he got into the admiral's boat that was to take him to the *Northumberland*. Admiral Cockburn, surrounded by his staff, and with his crew under arms, received him with all the honours due to a commander-in-chief. Stripped of all but his glory, Napoleon could here, as everywhere else, enjoy the éclat of his own great achievements. The sailors and soldiers, heedless of the distinguished Englishmen before them, could see only Napoleon, and seemed as though they would devour him with their eyes. They presented arms as he passed, which he acknowledged with calm and gentle dignity. Once his prisoners were on board, the admiral did not lose a moment in weighing anchor, for the harbour was not safe, and he had orders to leave at once. The *Northumberland* set sail on the 8th of August, followed by the frigate *Havannah*, together with several corvettes and brigs carrying troops. This squadron advanced towards the Bay

of Biscay, in order to double Cape Finisterre, and then sail southwards along the coast of Africa. As Napoleon left the English Channel, it was with deep emotion that he saluted the shores of France, visible through the fog, convinced that he looked upon them for the last time.

The moment of parting is one of excitement, which, occupying both the heart and the head, does not allow us to feel all the bitterness of even the most painful separation. It is only when the tumult of feeling is subdued and we are alone that sorrow becomes poignant, that we can estimate what we have lost, what we have left, never perhaps to see again. A profound and silent sadness reigned now in that small circle of emigrants whom the will of Europe was impelling towards another hemisphere. Without affecting an indifference he did not feel, Napoleon was calm and polite in his acceptance of the attentions of Admiral Cockburn, who felt desirous of alleviating the position of his illustrious prisoner as far as his orders would permit. Admiral George Cockburn was a tall old sailor, despotic, irritable, and excessively jealous of his authority, but bearing an excellent heart under this unprepossessing exterior, and quite incapable of increasing the severity of the orders he had received from his government. He had done what he could to make Napoleon's sojourn in his vessel as tolerable as the circumstances would admit, and endeavoured to reconcile him to the customs of the English. Being forbidden to treat him as an emperor, he addressed him as "Excellency;" but his manner compensated for any seeming want of respect implied in the change of title. Napoleon took his place at the admiral's table as commander-in-chief, and his companions according to their rank. The officers of the squadron, being invited successively, were presented to him in turn. Napoleon received them politely, and using M. de las Cases as interpreter, asked them various questions connected with their profession, but without expressing either admiration or disdain for what he saw, praising what was deserving of commendation in the arrangement of the English vessels, but always calmly, unaffectedly, and sincerely. There was one thing he did not like, nor did he hesitate to say so—the length of time passed by the English at their repasts. He, whose restless activity would not allow him when alone to spend more than a few minutes at table, could not consent to remain there for hours with the English. The admiral soon perceived that his national customs must yield to such a guest, and when dinner was finished rose, and with his staff, stood until Napoleon had left the room, offering him his hand if the motion of the vessel were unsteady, and then returned to indulge his English habits with his officers.

Napoleon then paced the deck of the *Northumberland* alone,

or accompanied by Bertrand, Montholon, Gourgaud, and Las Cases, sometimes in silence, and sometimes in giving expression to the emotions that filled his soul. If he were not inclined for conversation, having discontinued his walk, he seated himself on a cannon, which the men soon called "the emperor's cannon." There, as he sat, he contemplated the blue sea of the tropics, and advancing towards the tomb that was to terminate his wondrous career, he thought of himself as of a star that was about to set. He saw the future that was before him, and felt that in those southern climes to which the ship was tending, he would find, not a temporary repose, but an agony, more or less protracted, to be succeeded by death. Become as it were the spectator of his own career, he contemplated its different phases with somewhat of surprise, alternately blaming, excusing, and pitying himself as though exercising his judgment on another, but with the abiding conviction of the greatness of his glory, to which he felt the boundless fields of history could offer no parallel. These reveries never left him sad or irritable, but rather inclined to relate the most striking events of his life. Then joining his companions, he would address him whose countenance seemed to sympathise most with the feelings that influenced him for the time, and relate some part of his career, to which all listened with rapt attention. It is very strange and unaccountable how it was the two extremes of his career that always recurred to him at this period! He either spoke of Waterloo, whose influence still shook his soul like the continued vibrations produced by some mighty concussion of the air, or he reverted to his glorious début in Italy, which had delighted his youth, and shadowed forth so great a future. When he thought of the recent events of Waterloo, he asked himself what it was that could have so misled his lieutenants on that fatal day, what could have caused their inexplicable conduct! Ney, d'Erlon, Grouchy, he would cry, of what were you thinking? Then, without blaming any one for faults that originated with himself, he would consider why it was that Ney, without waiting for his orders, had attempted a final stroke, charging with his cavalry two hours too soon; nor could he find any cause but in the excitement that had seized on his heroic mind. Though he did not doubt either the courage, fidelity, or talents of d'Erlon, he could not understand how that excellent infantry officer had disposed of his troops on that day. He regretted these errors without blaming them, for at the worst they were not irreparable; but he became severe when speaking of the mortal blow inflicted by Grouchy. He did not deny that he was unquestionably faithful and courageous; but ignorant of what we have learned since, he wearied himself ineffectually in divining what could have been his motives. He blamed fate,



that silent deity whom men accuse because he cannot contradict them ; but reflection showed him that fatality was nought but the reaction resulting from his own overstrained efforts. He was apparently convinced that had the English been beaten at Waterloo, it would have had great influence in Europe, and have led to useful reflections ; but that, in any case, had he been successful, the preparations he had made would have been sufficient to repel both the Austrians and Prussians. He was fully aware of the gravity of the position, of the exhaustion of France and the hatred of Europe, but still declared in anguish, that but for the fault of one man the national cause would have triumphed !

He unwillingly reverted to this subject, and only when his feelings became too strong to be repressed, like one who having fallen down a precipice cannot avoid considering what false step it was that led to his misfortune. He spoke far more willingly of his education at Brienne, of the first proofs he gave of military genius at the siege of Toulon, or of the pleasure he had felt in his first successes. He then became animated, and related with a captivating brilliancy that charmed his auditors, how his family dated from the old Italian republics, and how he felt an intuitive preference for France when Corsica was disputed by many masters. He spoke of his entrance into the college of Brienne, of his love of study, his reasoning powers so wonderful in a child of the age he then was, his taciturnity, of his pride that had made the single correction that had been inflicted on him at school so unendurable, how some of his masters had predicted his future career, of his joining his regiment, his connections of Valence, his first affection for a young lady whom he afterwards had the pleasure of rescuing from a painful position, his arrival at Toulon, where he first experienced the pleasures of glory, where, surrounded by the most violent members of the Convention and ignorant generals, he at a glance had seen that Fort d'Etoile was the real point to be taken, and having got permission to attack, seized it, and by this manœuvre compelled the English to retreat ! How fair a presage ! what intoxicating visions, but surpassed, far surpassed by the reality ! Having occupied his mornings in reading, he thus spent the afternoon on the quarter-deck of the *Northumberland*, sometimes pacing it with lengthy strides, charming his companions in misfortune by his recitals, or reclining on his favourite cannon contemplating the furrows made by the vessel that was bearing him to his last resting-place.

As time thus passed away the *Northumberland* crossed the Bay of Biscay, doubled Capes Finisterre and St. Vincent, and was borne by a faint but favourable wind towards the African isles. The passage was slow, and the heat excessive. Napo-

leon suffered, but did not complain. On the 23rd of August they reached the island of Madeira, and were about to stop to take in fresh provisions, but violent wind, rising suddenly, compelled them to continue their voyage. So great was the wind that the frigate *Havannah* and the brig *Fury* were separated from the squadron. Forty-eight hours later the *Northumberland* was able to anchor at Madeira and procure the necessary provisions. The inhabitants, superstitious Portuguese, attributed their sufferings from the late storm to Napoleon. He was, they said, a man of tempests, who could not appear without causing desolation. On the 29th of August they passed the tropic, and on the 23rd September crossed the line, when, as may be supposed, Napoleon was the only one that escaped the ceremonies practised by sailors on those who cross the equator for the first time. But the men's delight knew no bounds when he ordered five hundred louis to be distributed amongst them. The sailors of the *Northumberland*, who knew Napoleon but from the description of the English journals, in which during fifteen years he had been represented as a monster, were every day more surprised to find him calm, gentle, and kind, and divining his unexpressed but evident chagrin, gave him the most touching proofs of sympathy. They were most careful in polishing the gun on which he was accustomed to sit, and showed their respect for his solitary reflections by retiring when he approached.

Napoleon continued his account of his youth, his proscription after the 9th Thermidor, his connection with the heads of the Directory, the explanation he gave them each day when handing in the despatches from the army, the opinions they entertained of his military talents, the impulse that had impelled them all to appoint him to the command of Paris on the day of Vendémiaire, and some months after to the command of the army in Italy; his appearance at Nice in the midst of the old generals, jealous of his promotion, but who were soon satisfied when they saw him by a prodigy of military skill throw his troops between the Piedmontese and Austrians, driving the one on Turin, the other on Genoa, whilst he himself crossed the Po, and took up his position on the Adige, whence he defied the armies of Austria for a year! As he related these exciting deeds all his youthful vigour seemed to revive, and he was again six and twenty. It was strange that whilst it gave him such pleasure to relate his marvellous achievements, creating for himself a kind of mirage in which he beheld the reflection of the deeds of his youth, that he did not feel inclined to give an account of them in writing, as he did when about to set out for Elba. When leaving Fontainebleau it seemed to him that following the example of other great men, writing his autobiography would not be an occupation unworthy of him. But now he did not seem to feel

any interest either for his own glory or that of his companions. He was very much changed since he had gone to Elba; he had sunk much deeper into the abyss in whose depths his great career was about to terminate. At Elba his reverse of fortune was still a novelty, which excited but did not deject him, for deep in his soul a secret hope still abided. But after the 20th of March, after Waterloo, where could hope find a resting-place? Did he even burst the heavy chain with which England had bound him, and safely cross the mighty ocean, where could he go alone, without even the aid of a few of his faithful soldiers? Would France again receive him, would she be willing to aid him in a third attempt when the second had been so disastrous? The human heart struggles long before it completely gives up hope; nor can we find in history the record of a single great mind in which hope ever became wholly extinct. Marius amid the ruins of Carthage, Pompey after the battle of Pharsalia, and Hannibal after the battle of Zama, still hoped, and not without reason. But after Waterloo what could Napoleon expect from fortune? Never was soul so dejected as his, and though he hid from his faithful companions the void that life had become for him, he did not feel it less deeply. This degradation rendered him incapable of the labour which a great literary composition involves. When roused by recollections of the past, it was not difficult for him to speak of his former deeds with all the vigour of his native eloquence; but he did not feel either the energy or the inclination to give a detailed account in writing. Having retired for ever from the active scenes of life, it seemed a matter of indifference to him in what light posterity should view him. Often did his companions, when delighted with what they heard, request him to write what he had related with so much force and vivacity. Gourgaud, Las Cases, Montholon, and Bertrand begged him to take his pen, or allow them to be his amanuenses, and write under his brilliant dictation even as rapidly as he could speak, and thus afford a dignified occupation to the closing period of his career; but he refused, as though even his glory was unworthy of the effort. "Let future generations," he said, "act as they will. Let them seek the truth if they wish to know it. It may be found in the archives of the State." Then the benumbed heart would suddenly warm with a glow of pride. "I trust to history," cried Napoleon. "I have had many flatterers, and now detractors occupy the scene. But the fame of great men, like their lives, is exposed to a diversity of fortune. A day will come when impartial writers will be animated exclusively by the love of truth. They will doubtless see many faults in my career; but Arcola, Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland stand on a foundation of granite, which envy her-

self cannot gnaw away." Napoleon expressed the greatest confidence in history, even in his actual state of calm despair. It was represented to him that history needed information which he alone could give; that if he did not record them, many of his noblest thoughts would be lost; that recording the events of his own life would be a dignified and useful means of employing his great energy; and his companions added, that their aid should not be wanting in erecting this great monument to his fame. These repeated exhortations and his own dejection ended in inspiring him with an inclination for some occupation; for man while on earth will ever find some attraction, were it even in watering plants, or constructing watches, like Diocletian and Charles V. Napoleon finally consented to commence the task he had projected when leaving for Elba. His excitement was too great to allow him to follow the movement of his hand, and even when he did make the attempt, the characters were almost illegible. Employing the pen of M. las Cases, he commenced his dictation with his campaigns in Italy. His plan was to portion out the different parts of his history between the companions of his exile, that all might share in the honourable occupation, and have time to review their work, or make a fair copy. But to relieve his heart from the oppressive recollections of Waterloo, he immediately commenced an account of the campaign of 1815 to General Gourgaud. He had sufficient time, for the voyage was lengthened by the very efforts the admiral made to shorten it. At that period it was usual in naval science, once the equator was passed, to allow the vessel to be borne by the trade winds towards the coast of Brazil, and then turning southwards, endeavour to catch the varying west winds, which would take the vessel to St. Helena. Admiral Cockburn, anxious to shorten the voyage, more for his guest's sake than his own, determined to try another route. By keeping near the African coast, bending a little towards the coast of Guinea, west winds are often met with, which, having taken the vessel towards Africa, are succeeded by an easterly wind blowing in the direction of St. Helena. This was the route chosen by the admiral. It was but too successful at first, as it not only took him into the Gulf of Guinea, but almost to Congo. He was exposed to tempests, oppressive heats, and delays, which caused the very sailors to murmur. Napoleon, who felt no great desire for the termination of the voyage, as it would only enable him to exchange one prison for another, passed his time in dictation. His mornings were spent in dictating an account of the Italian campaigns to M. de las Cases, or that of 1815 to General Gourgaud. These gentlemen would not venture to interrupt him, but followed

him as rapidly as they could, and then retired to make a fair copy of the thoughts they had caught, as one may say, on the wing. These copies were submitted on the following day to Napoleon, who read them attentively, abridging what had been too diffusely related, elaborating what was too cursorily told, and that with excessive particularity as to style, which became of more importance to him as he advanced in years. As he progressed in his task, he was annoyed by the want of documents to which he could refer for dates or details. Like all men of active lives, who have numerous events to remember, his memory often failed as to dates, but never with respect to anything else. His memory was infallible as regarded facts, their importance, the places where they occurred, or the men concerned in them, and he recounted them in a style that left no doubt as to their truth. He also regretted not having possession of his orders, and still more his letters, which would have explained his plans, his motives, and which are as clear evidence of what he meant, now that he is dead, as if he still lived. He was sometimes irritated by the want of these documents, but not so much as to be diverted from an occupation which had become his sole resource. His only recreation was reading, and that was confined to the noblest productions of the human mind. Marchand had brought the books he had with him in the country, which unfortunately were very few. One day whilst he was regretting the smallness of his library, a trading vessel was seen approaching the *Northumberland*. M. de las Cases then remembered that he had taken the precaution of sending a case of books to the Cape. "Perhaps," he said to Napoleon, "it is the vessel with my books." It was; and the case being brought on board, and immediately opened, afforded the illustrious captive, now restricted to intellectual pleasures, one of those trifling satisfactions that were henceforward to constitute the sum of his happiness.

It was now seventy days since they had left England, when they at length met a south-easterly wind blowing from the Cape, which soon bore them towards St. Helena. Early on the morning of the 15th of October, at a distance of twelve leagues, they could discern a peak wrapped in clouds; this was the peak of Diana, the highest point of the island of St. Helena. Napoleon had now reached the gates of his prison. About noon the vessel cast anchor in the little harbour of Jamestown, before a dark, gloomy coast, bristling with rocks surmounted with cannon. The frigate *Havannah* and the brig *Fury*, which had been separated from the squadron at Madeira, had arrived seventeen days earlier than the admiral's vessel. These had announced the approaching arrival of the

prisoner, transmitted the orders sent from London, landed some of the troops, and the usually tranquil island had assumed a warlike aspect at the approach of the man of warfare who was destined to end his career beneath that burning sky.

The island of St. Helena, situate in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, a little within the Tropic of Capricorn, owes its origin to a volcanic eruption. The island, of about nine or ten miles in circumference, inaccessible on every side, is distinguishable from afar by vast rocks which, surrounding the peak of Diana, rear their blackened summits to the skies. St. Helena is constantly enveloped in fog, being the only stationary object in those parts to attract the vapours of the great ocean. The crater of the parent volcano faces the north, and this crater, situate at the foot of the peak of Diana, presents its cooled but yawning abyss to the gaze of the European traveller. Several long, narrow, parallel valleys run from it to the sea, looking as if they had been once the channels through which the lava flowed; and one of these, more spacious than the rest, forms the harbour of Jamestown, the only one by which the island can be approached. Towards the south are plains, separated by deep ravines perpendicular to the sea, and consequently inaccessible, and exposed to the south-east wind blowing from the Cape. Whilst the narrow valleys of the north are watered by the few clouds attracted by the peak of Diana, and display some scanty verdure, the southern plains are constantly swept by a hot dry wind; over these plains no limpid streams murmur, from their arid surface no green turf springs; here and there are seen patches of a meagre vegetation, parched by the winds, and offering little shade in a climate that needs so much. Such is St. Helena; its southern plains hot, windy, and arid, its northern valleys less arid, but profoundly dreary; not unhealthy for those accustomed to live there, but fatal to one accustomed to the great scenes of the civilised world. There are but few agriculturists there, for they could find but trifling occupation on a sterile rock situate at such a distance from any continent. But as the vessels returning from India are carried thither by the wind from the Cape, and the traveller, weary from a long voyage, is glad to tread a firm soil, breathe the land air, see some verdant spot, or taste some fruit or fresh provisions, the East India Company's vessels stop there, as at an hotel placed for their convenience in the midst of the Atlantic Ocean. The 4000 inhabitants of St. Helena, 3000 of whom reside at Jamestown, have no other occupation than feeding a few cattle brought from the Cape, and cultivating some fruit and vegetables; and the greatest joy the whole year affords is when

the vessels returning to Europe from the East exchange some of their Asiatic gold for a momentary repose and refreshment.

It was here that Napoleon was to end his life. Travellers are always rejoiced when they catch sight of land, but it was not so with the illustrious passengers on board the *Northumberland*: they felt like prisoners within view of the prison gates that are about to close on them for ever. The entire population was assembled on the quay, but the numbers were too limited to be called a crowd. Napoleon ascended the quarter-deck, and gazed sadly on the rugged, black abode where he was about to be buried alive. He did not express a wish, but allowed the admiral to decide when he was to land, and where he was to take up his temporary abode. The admiral immediately left the vessel to seek some place where Napoleon could reside until his own residence should be prepared. He spent two days in the search, and then came, with many apologies, to inform Napoleon that he had at length found a small but commodious house, where he might immediately enjoy the pleasure of being on land. On the 17th of October Napoleon left the *Northumberland*, to the great regret of the crew, whom he thanked for the attention they had paid him. When he reached the house chosen for him by the admiral, he found it so exposed to the public gaze that he did not think he could remain there more than two or three days. The admiral promised to seek a better on the following day, one where he would be protected from the observation of the curious.

Plantation House, a pretty residence, situated in a fresh and shaded valley in the north of the island, elegantly built, and sufficiently large, would have suited Napoleon exactly, but was intended for the residence of the governor. The slightest regard for the proprieties of life would have sufficed to indicate this as the proper residence for Napoleon; but from some incomprehensible shabbiness on the part of the East India Company when lending the island to the government, it was stipulated that this house should be reserved for the governor, and Lord Bathurst, with a strange want of consideration, consented. There was therefore no possibility of Napoleon's getting Plantation House, where he could have had an immediate and healthful retreat. He was obliged to remain at Longwood, one of the southern plains, on a farm belonging to the Company, and intended for the residence of the deputy-governor. The house, with some additions, could contain a household of twenty persons. The plain of Longwood was sufficiently extensive to allow exercise on horseback, and was not wholly deficient in shade, being planted in part with gum-trees; but unfortunately Longwood had a south-easterly aspect, and was exposed to the wind from the Cape. This was an inconvenience that could only be discovered with time, and at the first view the site presented

nothing disagreeable. It afforded a healthful and convenient encampment to the troops destined to guard Napoleon's residence, and the site, that looked on the sea, was inaccessible. These were sufficient reasons to determine the admiral's choice, and he proposed to Napoleon to ride over and see whether it would suit him. Napoleon agreed, and on the following day he and the admiral rode to Longwood, where a grassy plot presented an agreeable change after months at sea, and in a solitude secure from curiosity. He was pleased with the site, and consented to the house being immediately put into habitable repair.

As Napoleon had passed the peak of Diana on his way to Longwood from Jamestown, he saw in this tolerably verdant valley a small residence that he liked. On his return from Longwood, he visited and expressed a wish to reside there temporarily. The owner was a native merchant who lived with his family in a neighbouring house. He immediately offered this little dwelling to Napoleon, who wished to take immediate possession of it. He would be obliged to sleep, eat, and write in the same room, but as it looked on a pretty valley, he admired the confined dwelling, which the people about called Briars. As there was some difficulty in accommodating a few servants, a tent was erected beside the little pavilion. The greatest inconvenience was that Napoleon was separated from his companions, who had to come a distance every day to see him. Some kind of accommodation was found for M. de las Cases, whom Napoleon wished to have with him, as he was then writing under dictation the account of his Italian campaigns. Napoleon had in his little abode only the bare necessities of life; but he took little heed of these physical privations, having suffered much more severe in his long and fearful wars. It is true that in those early days the sense of danger and the love of glory absorbed every other feeling, and the severe captivity to which he was now doomed would suffice to poison the greatest pleasure or abundance. It was now that he felt the first bitter fruit of this severity. Until now, as emperor on board the *Bellerophon*, and commander-in-chief in the *Northumberland*, he might believe himself free, for the ship was a floating prison, in which his gaolers were as much confined as he. There had been no surveillance on board the *Northumberland*. But once on land, the admiral, from a sense of his own responsibility, could not venture to allow his captive the entire island as a prison. It was only nine or ten miles in circumference, its coasts were almost inaccessible, excepting by the little harbour of Jamestown, which was closely guarded, and surrounded besides by a number of cruising vessels. Had Napoleon attempted to escape, he would have found it very difficult, particularly at first, when he had

not yet had time to procure accomplices, or a vessel to take him to America. Notwithstanding all this, the admiral, wishing to have a constant certainty of his presence, stationed sentinels all round Briars, with orders not to lose sight of its occupants for a moment. Napoleon's quick glance soon detected them, and the discovery caused one of the most painful annoyances of his imprisonment. The admiral, desirous of making everything as agreeable to Napoleon as circumstances would admit, and knowing that he was accustomed to spend the greater part of his time on horseback, and indeed to compel his contemporaries to do the same, had procured three tolerably good saddle-horses from the Cape, whence all those on the island were brought. Napoleon was about to profit by this attention when he perceived that an English officer was preparing to mount and follow him. He immediately gave up all idea of riding, and desired that the horses should be returned; but considering that this would be a bad return for the admiral's politeness, he kept the horses, but was determined not to use them.

Certain persons have blamed Napoleon for being annoyed by such things, or for allowing the annoyance he experienced to be seen. It is very easy to speak of the sufferings of others, and explain how they should be borne. I am so deeply affected by the afflictions of my fellow-men that I can scarcely blame the faults of those who suffer, and could never have the nerve to examine calmly whether the noble victims of sorrow had at such a time or on such an occasion behaved with the required impassibility. I know none whose sufferings touch me more than those of Pius VII, Louis XVI., or Marie Antoinette, and in considering them I feel a strong desire to abridge their agony.

The human frame presents a sad spectacle when suffering from convulsions of physical pain, and the human mind does not offer a more agreeable object of contemplation in certain phases of moral agony: over such let us with respectful compassion throw a veil. Were Napoleon a Christian anchorite, it might be said to him, "Bend meekly beneath the blows of your executioners." But he, whom neither fatigue, nor physical sufferings, nor the sense of present danger had ever subdued—he, fallen from so great an eminence, quivered beneath humiliation, and these first bursts of impatience may well be pardoned in a man who saw himself in the fetters of kings that during fifteen years had lain crouching at his feet. His companions were unwise enough to increase his irritation by telling him how they were treated at Jamestown. Their least movements were watched, a soldier followed them wherever they went, and they complained bitterly of these annoyances to their master, who felt more for their sufferings than his own. Napoleon could restrain himself no longer: he repeated what he had

already said to Lord Keith, that the rights of nations and of humanity had been violated in his person; that he was not a prisoner of war, but had of his own free choice entrusted himself to the English, and made an appeal to their generosity, of which they had shown themselves unworthy; that he might have gone to the Loire and continued a desperate war, or gone to his father-in-law, or to his old friend the Emperor Alexander, who would have been bound by the bonds of affinity or honour to treat him with respect; that consequently the English had no right to treat him as a prisoner—a right that would in any case end with the war itself, and that even with prisoners there were certain considerations connected with their rank and position which should never be forgotten. Napoleon then recalled how he had behaved formerly to the Emperor of Austria, to the King of Prussia, whom he might have dethroned, or to the Emperor of Russia, whom he could have made prisoner at Austerlitz; but he had spared them the worst consequences of their reverses; and he now angrily compared their conduct to his, forgetting in his eloquent reproaches the real cause of the difference, forgetting that when he treated Alexander, Frederick William, and Francis II. so well, that they did not inspire him with fear, whilst he, conquered as he was, was still a terror to the world, and that it was to his genius, or rather to the abuse of his genius, that he was indebted for this unusual form of captivity. Somewhat relieved by this burst of anger, he cried: "It is not for me to complain. My dignity commands me to be silent in the midst of sufferings; but you who are under no such restriction may complain. You have wives and children, whom it would be inhuman to subject to such things, and for this cause alone you should protest against such treatment."

They did complain, and the admiral, whose countenance was harsher than his heart, did what he could to render their residence at Jamestown supportable. He did not relax his surveillance, for his sense of responsibility made him anxious; but he desired his officers to be more considerate, without, however, abating their watchfulness in keeping the principal prisoner constantly in view.

This state of things improved after a few days. Some of Napoleon's companions were accommodated at Briars. He could have them at table, resume his labours with them, and occupy that ardent mind that fed upon itself when it could find no other aliment. He resumed his conversations with them, and walked out a little without being followed, as it was considered that he could not go far on foot. He traversed the little valleys running northwards and parallel with that of Jamestown. These, being sheltered from the south wind and sun, were, as we have already said, verdant, shaded, and afforded

many picturesque views. One day that Napoleon had gone farther than usual, he entered the unassuming dwelling of Major Hudson, an English officer. He was received most respectfully, he conversed simply and unaffectedly, and retired pleased with the cordial reception he had met. Being at a distance from Briars, he was accommodated with horses for his return. He had a long ride, a pleasure he seemed to enjoy, and of which he had been deprived for some time. He became accustomed by degrees to his singular habitation, considering that he would have a better, and lived there as though it were one of the many bivouacs in which he had passed a part of his stormy career.

Napoleon's host, who was a merchant of inferior rank, but a man of excellent disposition, did what he could to make his garden and humble society agreeable to his guest. He had two young daughters, who spoke a little French, very lively, innocent girls, able to sing a little, and endowed with all the gaiety of youth. They came to visit the fallen emperor, questioned him with the ignorance incidental to their age and position, and played some Italian airs on a not very harmonious instrument. Napoleon replied to their naive inquiries with the greatest kindness. One of them, who had met with the name of Gaston de Foix in a historical romance, and fancied that the hero of Ravenna was a general of the empire, asked if Gaston were very brave, and whether he were dead. "Yes," replied Napoleon with paternal kindness, "he was brave, but he is dead." He interested himself in these children as he did in the birds that flew about his garden. Such were henceforth to be his only recreations. It would be hopeless to seek or desire others.

Thus passed the months of October and November, peacefully and sadly, as were destined to pass the many years of this unexampled captivity. It was about this time that the first accounts arrived from Europe. The exiles had the pleasure of hearing from their families. Napoleon alone got no letter. His mother, brothers, sisters were fugitives, seeking concealment, and had not been able to write to him. Marie Louise had not even thought of sending him an account of his son. The only interesting information he received was afforded by the public journals, which moved him greatly by the details they gave concerning France. The Bourbons, who had entered France so mildly in 1814, had now returned in anger, and under the influence of a fatal delusion. They were firmly convinced that they had been expelled on the 20th of March by a vast conspiracy, which it would be both just and politic to punish. The journals announced that many of Napoleon's devoted friends had been arrested or banished, and all

on his account. Ney, La Bédoyère, Druot, and Lavalette were threatened with rigorous prosecutions and public death. Napoleon grieved deeply for the three latter, for whom he felt the most sincere affection, and pitied Ney, whom he did not esteem so much, but whose warlike energy he admired. He was not offended but afflicted at the mode of defence adopted for the marshal. With that unerring logic with which he reasoned on every subject, he at once pointed out the line of defence that should have been adopted. "They are wrong," he said, "if they think to influence Ney's judges by representing him as my enemy by adducing his conduct at Fontainebleau. There is but one way of saving Ney, and that is by fully declaring the truth. Neither Ney nor anybody else is a conspirator. When he was about leaving Paris he wished to arrest me, and again at Lons-le-Saulnier, and he would have done so, but that he dreaded the people and the soldiers. But as he approached the locality where I was, he yielded to the general and universal feeling that carried away so many others. I must say that he wrote to me at that time in terms most honourable to himself, declaring that he was influenced by the interests of the country and not by mine, and offered to retire in case my policy was not in accordance with the general wish. When we met at Auxerre I anticipated what he had to say by pressing his hand and assuring him that he might trust in me, that my policy, dictated by plain good sense, would be all that Frenchmen could desire. He kept somewhat in the background at that time, for he was disturbed by the consciousness of his false position. That feeling influenced him at Quatre-Bras, and more especially at Waterloo. He was never more heroic or daring than then, when in contributing to our destruction he assured his own. But neither the Bourbons nor I can reproach him with anything but yielding to the force of circumstances. His plea with his judges should be this, 'I have not betrayed anybody, I have been carried away by circumstances, and in regard to that offence, so general and so excusable in a time of revolution, a law has been made—the capitulation of Paris—a capitulation which implicates the honour of the victorious generals and their sovereigns, and which protects all political crimes from further inquiry.' That is the only defence that Ney should make, for that is the entire truth. Either the capitulation of Paris is a nullity, or it must be a protection to Ney. By adopting this defence, which is the truth, he may influence his judges, and even if he should not, he will dishonour them in the eyes of history, and will fall surrounded by the undying sympathy of all honest men. Ney, poor Ney," cried Napoleon, "what a sad fate awaits you!" Continuing to speak on this subject, he repeated, that neither Marshal Ney nor

anybody else had been guilty of treason on the 20th of March, that all had done their duty, civilians as well as military men; but they as well as the rest were borne along by the army and the people. Napoleon then mentioned a remarkable fact, worthy of being recorded in history. "Massena," he said, "has been accused of betraying the Bourbons; but he has done nothing of the kind, as I shall show. After I had returned to Paris and was re-established on the imperial throne, everybody thought it his interest to appear of importance to me; all boasted of the risks they had incurred for me. Massena came to Paris; I asked him what he would have done had I gone to Marseilles instead of Grenoble. Massena is not a flatterer, but still he felt embarrassed, and when I pressed for an answer, he said, 'You did well, sire, in going to Grenoble.' All my marshals would not have answered so frankly, though they would have been justified, except Davout, the only one at liberty to act as he pleased, for he was not in the service, and had been badly treated. Nobody betrayed the Bourbons, and if they exercise vengeance now, it is only to please their party, and to excuse the faults they have committed. But I can foresee the uncertainty of their future career. By yielding to the passions of the emigrants they will only alienate France more and more. It is not my son that will first profit by their mistakes; the house of Orleans will take precedence, but the turn of the Bonapartes may come."

Having uttered these prophetic words, Napoleon again reverted to the injustice of the proposed prosecutions, and showed the greatest anxiety for Ney, La Bédoyère, Druot, and Lavalette. He considered, however, that Druot's universally admitted honesty would serve him as an impenetrable buckler; but he trembled for La Bédoyère, Ney, and Lavalette, and impatiently awaited news of the victims sacrificed as much by himself as by the Bourbons.

Although Briars had been made as comfortable as possible, Napoleon was so restricted there as to space, and so annoyed by the ill-treatment offered to his friends, that he was most impatient to get to Longwood. The admiral, whom he called *his shark*, though he appreciated the goodness of his heart, did all he could to hasten the preparations at his new residence. He had collected all the workmen of the town and fleet, and with wood, tarred cloth, and all kinds of materials, had succeeded in forming a large *rez-de-chaussée*, where Napoleon and his companions in exile could be lodged. When all was prepared, the admiral proposed to Napoleon to take up his residence there, to which he immediately agreed.

He left Briars on December 10, having first taken leave of the family who had received him so well, and repaid their

hospitality with a munificence unrestricted by his actual position. He set out on horseback, accompanied by the admiral on one side, and the Grand-Marshal Bertrand on the other. He wore, as usual, the uniform of the guards, and rode a lively, gentle, easily managed Cape horse. His ride was not disagreeable, and when he arrived at Longwood he found the 53rd English regiment, which was encamped near, under arms. The admiral presented the officers of the regiment, and then conducted him to his new abode. The apartments were very slightly built, covered with tarred canvas, and very plainly furnished. Napoleon made no objection. He had a sufficient number of rooms to sleep, work, receive his friends, and lodge them near him. It was all that he desired. He thanked the admiral, and settled himself down in the dwelling which was destined to be his last. In one room he had his camp-bed arranged, his books in another, and had the portraits of his son and some other members of his family hung around. Behind these two rooms were a reception and dining-room. M. de las Cases, his son, M. and Madame Montholon, and General Gourgaud occupied another wing of the building. The Grand-Marshal Bertrand, who wished to live alone, and his wife, who, though a most amiable woman, could not accommodate herself to living with the rest, had asked for a separate residence. They got one at the entrance to the plain of Longwood, so that they were not guests but only neighbours of the emperor. Their house was called Hutt's Gate.

These arrangements being made, Napoleon endeavoured to reconcile himself to his new mode of life. Having acquired during his campaigns the habit of watching part of the night, his sleep was irregular and broken. He woke frequently, and rose to read or work, then went to bed again, and if he could not sleep, rode out at dawn, returned when the heat became too great, breakfasted alone, dictated or lay down, passed thus three or four hours of the day, then received his companions, drove out with them, their wives and children, dined towards evening, and spent the remainder of the day with his friends, sometimes having some book read, or charming his hearers by accounts of his past life. He sought to lengthen their evening parties, for the later he went to bed the better chance he had of sleeping. "What a victory over time!" he would cry when eleven or twelve struck.

Here, as at Briars, his principal disagreement with the British authorities arose from the strictness with which he was guarded. The 53rd regiment being encamped about a league from Longwood was no great inconvenience, nor were the sentinels to be seen during the day. Napoleon never met them unless he went to a greater distance than he could accomplish on foot.

If he rode some miles from Longwood, he was accompanied by an officer, but at such a distance that his conversation could not be overheard. As Napoleon had expressed the greatest repugnance to ride out while thus followed, the admiral, not wishing to deprive him of his exercise, marked out a space of about three or four leagues around Longwood within which he was free. Beyond that a mounted officer always kept him in sight.

At nine in the evening the sentinels drew near the house, and were stationed so closely that no one could pass. Lord Bathurst had given directions that an officer appointed to the interior service of Longwood should see Napoleon once and sometimes twice a day, in order to secure a physical certainty of his being at St. Helena. The more prominent parts of the island were provided with telegraphs, to announce to Plantation House, the governor's residence, whenever anything of importance should occur at Longwood, especially any lengthened disappearance of the illustrious captive. A guard was stationed on the peak of Diana, to announce to Jamestown the approach of any vessel that might be seen, when a war brig would go out to escort it into port, and prevent the landing of any person or thing without previous inspection. Vessels coming from any part soever were forbidden to hold any communication with the island, or send letters or packets to the inhabitants of Longwood, excepting through the hands of the governor. No vessel could take a passenger on board without permission from the governor, nor leave the harbour until having undergone a rigorous examination. The inhabitants were forbidden all intercourse with Longwood without permission from the authorities, and they were warned that any participation in an attempt at escape should be considered high treason, and punished as such.

These regulations, the results of extreme anxiety and of Lord Bathurst's instructions, were very disagreeable to Napoleon, who was as much pained by everything that reminded him of his captivity as by the captivity itself. Having grown more reserved with the admiral since the precautions that had been taken at Briars, he was even more so now, and would not speak to him on any subject that interested him nearly, fearing that he should not be able to restrain himself. Such subjects he allowed Bertrand, Las Cases, Montholon, or Gourgaud to discuss. These gentlemen, embittered by misfortune, could advance but one argument, one that had no influence with the admiral, namely, that the emperor had voluntarily put himself into the power of the English, that he could not be treated as a prisoner of war, nor could there be any such prisoners now that peace had been concluded; to which the admiral might

have replied, that the safety of Europe required that extraordinary precautions should be employed when an extraordinary man was in question. But he was neither a lawyer nor a logician; he was a simple soldier, influenced by good feeling, but inflexible in the performance of his duty. He had received his orders, and would execute them. These orders were, that the prisoner, whose safety was a matter of importance to the universe, should be well guarded, and he trembled at the very idea of his making his escape. Once he found the guard sufficient he did not dream of adding any other annoyance, and if he erred, it was not from a desire of showing his authority, a weakness of which he was incapable. The entire island might indeed, with the precaution of ascertaining Napoleon's presence at Longwood twice every day, have been allowed Napoleon as a prison, as there was a certainty of his disappearance being immediately announced, and the island was so small, so inaccessible except at Jamestown, that the prisoner would certainly be detected before he could escape. Still, as it was safer never to lose sight of him, the admiral was determined to continue the practice, but with as little inconvenience as possible to Napoleon. The officer on duty did not appear; he lived at Longwood with the exiles themselves, and was satisfied if he saw Napoleon as he walked out or passed from one apartment to another. When Napoleon went out, this officer did not follow so long as he remained within the prescribed bounds, and only mounted his horse when these were passed. When that occurred he remained at a distance, and often lost sight of Napoleon when curiosity or hardihood led him to choose some difficult path. It often happened that he sunk into marshes, and was not able to follow his prisoner; but even then a murmur did not escape him. Though Napoleon's intercourse with the inhabitants was forbidden, it was tolerated, and the exiles were permitted all necessary communication with Jamestown. The admiral, knowing all who came or went, allowed visitors to be received at Longwood, provided they addressed themselves to the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, who at Longwood, as at the Tuileries, took his master's orders as to who should be admitted to see him. Thus Napoleon had not the appearance of being in a prison, to which admission could only be gained by permission of his gaolers.

Notwithstanding these annoyances, Napoleon had at first no objection to the residence in which he was destined to die. Up to this time his health had been good; the inconveniences resulting from the climate, and of Longwood in particular, had not affected his constitution, which was insensible to physical suffering whilst he led an active life, but delicate and susceptible when he remained in repose. It was now January,

the summer of the southern hemisphere; and the place still possessed the charms of novelty, and prevented him or his companions from being tormented by ennui. He suffered from the greatness of his fall, from the extinction of hope; but he had not yet acquired a horror of the place where he was condemned to reside. He walked or rode sometimes to a distance, questioning the few inhabitants he met, especially an old negro that cultivated a field near him, and a poor widow whose two daughters came to offer him flowers. He felt pleasure in assisting them. He sometimes visited the encampment of the 53rd, where he was well received as a soldier by soldiers. He then, as we have mentioned, returned, and resumed his dictation of the Italian campaigns to M. de las Cases, the Egyptian campaign to the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, or that of 1815 to General Gourgaud, after which he would drive out at the close of the day with Madame Bertrand and Madame Montholon, return to dinner, and pass the remainder of the evening conversing on a variety of subjects, or having some interesting work read aloud. He admired our great writers extremely, and read them with the pleasure that a cultivated mind and refined taste enabled him to enjoy.

Still it was not long till he felt the inconveniences of his residence either for himself or his companions in misfortune. Having traversed the plain of Longwood twenty or thirty times he found it dull and monotonous, and when he passed its bounds it was most painful to him to be followed by an officer. It would not be polite to leave this officer at a great distance, or get him into a difficult path; but still his presence was insupportable. He would sometimes, however, pass the barriers of his plain, and try to penetrate the valleys to the north, where Briars and Plantation House were situated. When he compared these verdant, shady valleys with the plain of Longwood, exposed both to sun and wind, he could not avoid seeing that to render his person more secure, he had been placed in a disagreeable and unhealthy situation. His companions declared that it was his death that was desired. He did not go to such extremes, but said that his life was endangered to prevent the chance of his escape.

The plain of Longwood being quite exposed, and defended by steep rocks on the side looking towards the sea, afforded every facility for surveillance, but made it insupportable as a place of residence. When not enveloped by the mists attracted from the Atlantic by the peak of Diana, it was so pitilessly swept by the wind from the Cape, that notwithstanding the moisture of the climate, it was perfectly barren. It afforded no other protection from the sun than the shade of a wood of stunted gum-trees of very scanty foliage. When the sun did not shine, a

disagreeable damp pervaded everything, penetrating even the garments of the inhabitants; and when the sun was visible, its burning rays pierced through the canvas roofs of Longwood. There was no water; what was needed had to be brought by the Chinese servants from the opposite side of the island, and was neither pure nor fresh when it arrived. In addition to these inconveniences, the island was poor and little frequented, food dear and of inferior quality, which was indeed but a slight inconvenience to so temperate a man as Napoleon, but a serious one to his companions in exile, who had brought with them their wives and children, accustomed to all the delicacies of European luxury. "There is nothing very gay here," he remarked one evening to his friends, as he looked at the bare walls and ill-served table; "we have nothing here in excess but time."

His great acuteness soon made him see that his companions were beginning to be affected by the moral evils of exile, which revealed itself in a certain involuntary bitterness towards each other. They were almost as jealous of his favour at St. Helena as at Paris, and General Gourgaud, a sensitive, irritable, and jealous man, could scarcely conceal his displeasure at seeing M. de las Cases admitted to the closest intimacy with Napoleon. Although the Bertrand and Montholon families lived apart, the one at Hutt's Gate, the other at Longwood, they also showed some symptoms of the same failing. The evils of a court did not end with the loss of a throne. But we must not alone pardon, we admire a rivalry—that struggle for the favour of oppressed genius. How many families exalted by Napoleon were occupied by the same rivalries, not at Longwood, but at the Tuileries.

Napoleon knew that these feelings originated in misfortune, and dreaded the consequences to this little colony wrecked on a barren rock. He endeavoured to console them by his attentions, to calm them by the wisdom of his discourse. He concealed his own weariness, and sought to remove that of others by promising them a better future, which, however, he had no hope of seeing realised.

It was in the fourth month of 1816, the time when summer commences in Europe, and winter in St. Helena, when news arrived that a vessel from England was bringing out the new governor, Admiral Cockburn's appointment being but temporary.

The governor was Sir Hudson Lowe, who is indebted to his appointment at St. Helena for an unenviable notoriety. Sir Hudson Lowe was one of those men, half military, half diplomatic, employed by government on occasions where the latter qualifications might be more useful than the former. He had acquitted himself well in many appointments, especially at the

headquarters of the allies, where he had acquired a prejudice against the French, and though he was not so bad a man as his appearance seemed to indicate, he possessed neither a benevolent character nor an obliging temper. As the peace closed the road to military preferment, the expectation of a large compensation induced him to accept a painful mission, accompanied with serious responsibility not only towards his own government, but to history. The latter consideration, whose importance he did not understand, had very little weight with him, and he only thought of avoiding the reproach incurred by Admiral Cockburn of having allowed himself to be influenced by his prisoner. Without intending to be a tyrant, Sir Hudson Lowe was resolved to show the world that he was capable of resisting any influence whatever. This determination necessarily obliged him to come frequently into disagreeable contact with the strong-willed and irritable man whom he had received orders to restrain, but not to drive to despair.

He had scarcely landed when he requested Admiral Cockburn to conduct him to Longwood, and present him to the illustrious captive. The admiral had himself partly originated the custom of permission being demanded of Napoleon through the Grand-Marshal Bertrand before any person was presented to him. This the admiral neglected on the present occasion, and took Sir Hudson Lowe unannounced to Longwood. Napoleon said he was ill, and could not see any person. Sir Hudson Lowe asked when he could see General Bonaparte; he was told on the following day. On that day he returned accompanied by Admiral Cockburn. He was received by the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, who introduced him to the fallen emperor. A disagreeable accident occurred. The admiral, being engaged in conversation at the moment the new governor entered Longwood, did not perceive his position until the doors were closed by the servants, who, thinking that no person was to be admitted but the new governor, refused to open them again. The admiral, greatly offended, mounted his horse and returned to Jamestown with his aides-de-camp.

Napoleon's interview with Sir Hudson Lowe was cold and ceremonious. Napoleon had been piqued by the manner in which the new governor had presented himself on the previous day, and the governor was not much flattered by having his reception postponed to the morrow. There consequently was nothing to make their first visit friendly. Napoleon saw at a glance what sort of person he had to deal with, one of the extreme coalition party, an opinion which Sir Hudson's countenance only tended to increase. Having received him with politeness but reserve, he briefly complained of the annoyances he was subjected to, but without demanding that they should

be ameliorated; he showed that it depended on the new governor whether he was to congratulate himself on his arrival at St. Helena or not. Sir Hudson Lowe declared, but not with great warmth, that it was his wish to do what he could to reconcile his duty with the comfort of the exiles. He then retired after a very short interview.

Sir Hudson Lowe had scarcely left the room when Napoleon remarked to his companions that he had never seen a countenance so like that of an Italian cut-throat. "*We shall regret our shark,*" he then added. He was then told of the disagreeable incident that had caused the admiral to withdraw; he smiled at it at first, but felt greatly annoyed after, when he recollected how sensitive and proud the admiral was. The latter, though offended, was incapable of taking revenge. It was not so with the governor. Wounded by the reception he had met, he was quite capable of enforcing an authority that seemed so lightly thought of. On his return to Plantation House he determined to carry out to their full extent the regulations instituted by the admiral, or those he pretended to draw from Lord Bathurst's instructions. Napoleon complained of having sentinels stationed under his window once that evening set in, and when he rode out, of being obliged to confine himself within certain limits unless he consented to be followed by an English officer. Sir Hudson Lowe replied that these regulations were known to Lord Bathurst, and formally approved by him, and would therefore be carried out to the very letter. He renewed at the same time the order to the officer on duty not to allow a single day to pass without seeing his prisoner twice.

He carried out the same rigour with regard to certain prescriptions which the admiral had permitted, so to speak, to fall into disuse. For example, according to the ministerial orders, no person was to be allowed to communicate with the inhabitants of Longwood without the governor's permission; but the admiral had required no other authorisation than that of the Grand-Marshal Bertrand. The servants had found no difficulty in passing to and fro on their necessary domestic errands. Some Englishmen of rank returning from the Indies, who, being known to the admiral, could inspire no distrust, had been received at Longwood merely by asking permission of the grand-marshal, and their conversation afforded a short relaxation to Napoleon. A continuance of this practice could not have been inconvenient; but Sir Hudson Lowe required that all communication should depend on his permission, and that every letter written at Longwood, or addressed to its inhabitants, should pass through his hands. That there might be less occasion for writing, he appointed a special purveyor for the colony at

Longwood, and for this purpose he chose the proprietor of Briars, where Napoleon had passed some weeks.

When information of these severe restrictions was brought to the exiles they felt greatly irritated, not having expected anything of the kind. When Sir Hudson Lowe paid a second visit Napoleon received him still more coldly than before, and referred him to the grand-marshal concerning everything connected with the execution of his orders. The grand-marshal protested with great vehemence against both the old and new restrictions, and finding Sir Hudson Lowe inflexible, he declared that if he persisted in his intention, Napoleon would not quit his apartments, and that should his health suffer from want of exercise, the new governor would be accountable for it in the eyes of the world. Such threats had but little effect upon Sir Hudson Lowe, who affected to look on his own conduct as quite natural, the necessary consequence of his instructions, and which ought to secure him as friendly a reception at Longwood as had been accorded to Admiral Cockburn. This mode of viewing the subject soon increased that want of cordiality which caused so much suffering to his prisoner, and brought so many humiliating imputations on himself. The fleet arrived from India. Lord Moira, the governor, was on board with his wife, Lady Moira, both most anxious to see Napoleon. But as the latter had declared that he would not allow himself to be treated as a captive, whose prison could be opened or shut at the will of his gaoler, and that he would not admit any person who had not asked his permission through the grand-marshal, Lord and Lady Moira would not venture to make a demand that was at that time surrounded by so many difficulties. As their curiosity was very great, Sir Hudson Lowe, in order to gratify it, sent an invitation to dinner to Marshal Bertrand, enclosing one for Napoleon, in which he said that if *General Bonaparte* had no objection, Lady Moira would be very happy to be presented to him. The only fault in all these proceedings was a want of tact on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe, who had not the least idea of giving offence to the noble prisoner. Marshal Bertrand was greatly offended at receiving such an invitation for his master and himself, nor was Napoleon less so; he felt indignant at the idea of becoming an object of curiosity which the governor could show at pleasure to his favoured guests. But a refusal from Marshal Bertrand was not the sole reproof administered to Sir Hudson Lowe. When he appeared at Longwood it was not with coolness alone that he was received. Napoleon addressed him with great severity. "I am astonished," he said, "that you could presume to send me the invitation that was returned to you by Marshal Bertrand. Do you forget who you are, and who I am? It does not become you nor your

government to deny me a title bestowed by France, recognised by Europe, and by which I shall be known to posterity. Whether you and England consent or not, I am and shall be always known to the world as the Emperor Napoleon. I attach very little importance as to what title you may give me. But I am insulted by your expecting that I would go to your house to gratify the curiosity of your guests. Fortune has abandoned me, but nobody shall make the Emperor Napoleon an object of derision." Having said this, Napoleon became calmer, and Sir Hudson Lowe made many apologies in explanation of his intentions, saying that Lord and Lady Moira had been desirous of offering their homage to his great fame, and he had merely wished to know whether a visit from such distinguished persons would give him pleasure. Napoleon neither approved nor disapproved of these explanations, and dismissed the governor more humiliated than on either of his former visits.

The comparison between Sir Hudson Lowe and Admiral Cockburn was entirely to the advantage of the latter, who soon left for England. Before leaving he went to Longwood to take leave of the grand-marshal, express his regret for the additional rigour with which Napoleon was treated, and for the misunderstanding between him and the new governor, whose intentions, he declared, were not as bad as they seemed. The grand-marshal responded to the admiral's cordiality, and begged him to inform the British people of the state to which the great man who had entrusted himself to them was reduced; he requested him to visit Napoleon, and made fresh apologies for the accident that had occurred on the day that Sir Hudson Lowe had been presented. But the admiral, as sensitive as he was generous, would not see Napoleon again. He requested Marshal Bertrand to present his adieux, and assure him that at his return to England he would not prove himself his enemy. In fact, the admiral had conceived the greatest sympathy for Napoleon, and always said that he was the mildest and most reasonable of the prisoners at St. Helena, and more willing to listen to reason than any of the others.

Admiral Cockburn left, taking with him the regrets of this hapless little colony. He was scarcely gone when fresh difficulties arose. The British ministry required that Napoleon's companions should make a formal act of submission to all the restrictions imposed on their liberty, and that those who refused should be sent back to Europe. The expenses of Longwood had also been objected to, expenses that may be explained by the high price of every kind of provision at St. Helena, and the number of persons to be supported, amounting altogether, masters and domestics, to about fifty persons. The whole expense was about £20,000 per annum. Admiral Cockburn

had never thought of making a remark on the subject. Was it well to estimate the cost of the bitter bread of captivity that was flung to the former master of the world in his prison? In exchange for the liberty of which he was deprived for the public benefit, self-respect might have taught his captors to supply him all material necessities. But it was not so; and now that the passions actuating the men of 1815 have died away, we ask how it was possible that Lord Bathurst could make a formal demand that the expenses of Longwood should be reduced to £8000 a year. The sum is a matter of no consequence, the disgrace was in making such a calculation at all, and for her own sake England ought not to pardon those who cast such a stain upon her history.

We must admit that Sir Hudson Lowe was sensible of the indignity attached to this part of his instructions, and felt an embarrassment that does him honour when obliged to execute these instructions. With regard to the declaration required from the members of the colony, he at first showed himself determined. He drew up with his own hand the document they were to sign, in which Napoleon was styled "General Bonaparte." This would place them in a very painful position. Those who had him in their power might refuse Napoleon his titles if they chose; but to require that his companions in misfortune should by signing a formal act deny his right to the title by which they were accustomed to address him, would be compelling them to become parties to his dethronement. They drew up a declaration resembling that of Sir Hudson Lowe as to the formal engagement of submitting to the arrangements established at St. Helena, but differing as to the titles given to Napoleon. The governor declared, in a brutal manner, that if they did not sign his declaration, he would send them all to Europe. "Do not sign," said Napoleon, "let him send you back. I will remain alone here, where I cannot have much time to live, and the world shall know through what a wretched motive I was deprived of my few remaining friends." The exiles persevered, and Sir Hudson Lowe, feeling at last how odious such conduct must appear, proposed an arrangement by which the titles of emperor and general were to be suppressed, and the prisoner simply denominated "Napoleon Bonaparte." He said, if they refused to accept these terms, a vessel then under weigh should take them to Europe. They submitted without telling Napoleon, for they did not wish to abandon, without friends, without secretary, without servant, that hapless master whose misfortunes they desired to share.

Sir Hudson Lowe was more amenable with regard to the expenses. It is very possible that Napoleon's servants, and those

attached to the three families by whom he was accompanied, were not very economical in their expenditure of English money; but we must repeat that it is incomprehensible how anybody in England could think of making a remark about it. Sir Hudson Lowe ventured to mention the subject to Marshal Bertrand, and sought to excuse his remarks by producing his instructions, which fixed General Bonaparte's expenses at £8000. Marshal Bertrand haughtily replied that he was quite ignorant of the subject on which the governor was speaking, that the emperor's household was very badly supplied with provisions, but had never thought of complaining, or inquiring what such miserable accommodation might cost, that they would not do so now, nor think of mentioning it to their master. Sir Hudson Lowe insisted, declaring that he could not permit such expense. The grand-marshal was greatly embarrassed, and having consulted with the principal members of the little colony, was obliged to inform Napoleon of what had occurred. The disgust he felt may easily be imagined. He immediately ordered that Sir Hudson Lowe should be told that although all nations were bound to support their prisoners, the most painful circumstance attending his captivity was to be obliged to eat the bread of England; that it had always been his wish that he and his friends should live at his own expense; that he still wished to do so, and if permitted to send sealed letters to Europe, he had a family and friends who would not leave him in indigence, and that the British government would be relieved even from the burden of the annual £8000 to which they wished to limit the expenses of Longwood. The reasons of this reply may be easily understood. Although Napoleon's family, especially his mother, uncle, and Prince Eugène, were both able and willing to supply his wants, he did not wish to apply to them, but to M. Lafitte, in whose hands his money was deposited. But he was desirous of concealing the existence of this deposit, lest it should be confiscated with all the other Bonapartist possessions in France.

When Sir Hudson Lowe received this reply, he said that he was ready to transmit Napoleon's letters to his banker, but open, in accordance with Lord Bathurst's instructions; and he insisted that the expenses should be reduced, or supplied from Napoleon's own resources. Shocked at this new species of persecution, Napoleon ordered his steward, Marchand, to choose such articles of his plate as were not absolutely needed, break them, that what had belonged to him might not become an object of sale, and send the pieces to Jamestown to pay his purveyors. This was extremely embarrassing to the governor; for when the inhabitants discovered to what extremities the prisoner at Longwood was reduced, they became heartily

ashamed of the manner in which their government had acted. To lessen this feeling, Sir Hudson Lowe instructed his creatures to say that Napoleon was wallowing in money, and might meet all demands without having recourse to this miserable expedient. What we have already narrated is sufficient to show how far this was true. Napoleon had brought with him about 350,000 francs, and his friends about 200,000. He would not deprive himself of this sum, which he called his reserve fund, and which furnished him the means of making an occasional alms, or requiting a service. Not wishing to expend this money, which, in fact, would not have long sufficed for his expenses, or reveal the deposit left with M. Lafitte, he was compelled to sell his plate. He had a great deal, much more than he needed. Marchand, who kept a watchful eye on all domestic details, had had time to send this plate from the Elysée Palace to Rochefort, and it would be sufficient to supply Napoleon's household wants until Sir Hudson Lowe or Lord Bathurst became conscious of the promptings of shame.

Embarrassed by this dispute, Sir Hudson Lowe announced that he would take on himself to increase to £12,000 the sum of £8000 appointed by Lord Bathurst, and would send to England for fresh instructions. The sale of plate then ceased, and there was an end to this disgraceful transaction. About this time another admiral came to succeed Admiral Cockburn, not as commander of the island, but of the naval station. This was Sir Pulteney Malcolm, a man of high principles, whose goodness of heart was reflected in the amiable expression of his countenance. Immediately on his arrival he waited on Napoleon, observing all the forms of respect due to the august captive. His gentle dignity and respectful sympathy produced an immediate effect on Napoleon's impressionable and sensitive nature, and completely won his good opinion. Napoleon from the first treated him as a friend, and conversed freely and kindly with him. Sir Pulteney frequently repeated his visits, and Napoleon desired that he should always be introduced without ceremony, as he attached no importance to etiquette except to impress his guardians. As Sir Pulteney perceived that one of Napoleon's greatest inconveniences arose from want of protection from the sun, very little being afforded by the meagre gum-trees of the Longwood plantation—sent to his ship for a large and handsome tent, which he caused to be erected by his sailors close to Napoleon's dwelling. Napoleon was greatly touched by this attention, and frequently dined or worked under Sir Pulteney's tent. This gentleman, in his desire to alleviate the fate of the exiles, thought nothing better could be done than to bring about an accommodation between Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, and thus contribute to ameliorate the

execution of Lord Bathurst's instructions, if not the instructions themselves. He spoke on this subject to Napoleon, admitting that Lord Bathurst's orders were most objectionable, but that Sir Hudson Lowe was bound to fulfil them, and could not avoid causing annoyance to the inhabitants of Longwood; that he was neither a bad nor ill-intentioned man, but shared in the terror felt not only by the British but by all other governments lest Napoleon should again escape as he had done from Elba; that the thought of this clouded his reason; that it would be better to forgive him, meet him, and impress him by a frank explanation, which would produce a better understanding, and ameliorate the position of the inhabitants of Longwood. "You are mistaken," replied Napoleon to the amiable mediator. "I can read men's countenances, and Sir Hudson Lowe's bears the impress of a bad heart. I also understand the full value of an attempt to escape, but I have no idea of doing anything of the kind, for two reasons—in the first place, because escape would be impossible, and in the next place, because it would lead to no result. There is no part for me to play in the world; I can expect nothing but to remain here during the remainder of my life, which cannot be long, and employ myself in inditing some notes for the edification of posterity. Though I may cause my enemies to lose their reason, I need not lose my own; I do not seek to escape from their iron grasp, but from their insults. I ask no more of your countrymen than to allow me to die un-insulted. I expect nothing from another interview with Sir Hudson Lowe. Though I can restrain myself when necessary, I feel the greatest repugnance to that man's presence; his aspect offends my eye and embitters my words." Sir Pulteney was not discouraged, but still pressed Napoleon to receive Sir Hudson Lowe, who, on his side, desired the interview from a sincere desire of reconciliation.

Napoleon yielded to entreaties made in so friendly a spirit, but consented only on condition that Sir Pulteney should witness the interview. Sir Hudson Lowe came to Longwood with Sir Pulteney Malcolm, and felt somewhat embarrassed as he presented himself before his haughty prisoner. Napoleon received him politely, and allowed him to enter on a justification of the complaints made of him at Longwood. He replied calmly and almost conciliatingly, until the governor with great want of tact introduced the subject of expenditure, which had been put aside but not decided, when Napoleon, casting off all restraint, broke forth into the harshest language. "I am surprised, sir," he said, "at your presumption in addressing me on such a subject. It is not my custom to meddle in the details of my kitchen. If it suits you to see after them, you must do so without speaking to me on the subject. If there were not women

and children here, condemned with me to exile, I would take my place at the table of the officers of the 53rd, and certainly these brave men would not refuse to share their meal with one of the oldest soldiers of Europe. But I have to support several families, who are as desirous as I of accepting nothing from the unworthy government that oppresses us. Could I write to Europe without taking you into my confidence, neither my family nor France herself would allow me and the friends who have consented to share my misfortunes to want what we need." Having said this, Napoleon became still more excited, and scarcely allowing the governor to utter a word, addressed himself exclusively to the admiral, speaking of Sir Hudson Lowe only in the third person. He forgot himself so far as to use the most insulting language. The admiral in excuse of the governor's conduct said that he must obey his orders. Napoleon replied that there were appointments no man of honour would accept, that Sir Hudson Lowe was no soldier, having oftener wielded the pen of a staff officer than the sword of a soldier. At these words Sir Hudson Lowe, who had restrained himself, and respected in his prisoner misfortunes to which the century offered no parallel, left the room in a rage, declaring that he would never again set foot in Longwood.

When he left, Napoleon, ashamed of his want of self-control, apologised to Sir Pulteney Malcolm, saying that he would not have been so excited, but for the governor's want of tact in speaking of the contemptible affair of expenditure; that he had foreseen that the interview would lead to no good result; that Sir Hudson Lowe's countenance produced upon him an impression that he could not control; that he admitted he had done wrong, and he added what was a full apology for his error. "I have but one excuse to offer, admiral—I am no longer at the Tuileries. I could never forgive myself for the insults I have offered Sir Hudson Lowe were I not his captive." These annoyances occupied a part of the year 1816, after which Napoleon's life subsided into the dull monotony which continued till his death, interrupted occasionally by the pangs of physical pain. His habits continued the same. Sleeping but at broken intervals, especially when the dulness of his evenings made him retire early, he frequently rose during the night and read or dictated if Marchand were near, then retired to another bed, seeking the repose that fled him, rose when the sun came to illumine the plain of Longwood, and commenced riding round what he called his "circle of hell." This constantly repeated round became daily more disagreeable, nor could he get beyond it, except accompanied by the hapless officer left to guard him. Even the pleasure he felt in conversing with the old negro who possessed a field in the neighbourhood, or with the widow whose

daughters brought him flowers, was spoiled by the dread of compromising them, or exciting the governor's distrust. He dreaded even doing a service to any person lest he should be suspected of endeavouring to procure accomplices for some fancied project of escape. These restraints, acting on an irritability of temperament which great dangers alone could subdue, became to him a real torture. "Ah!" he said to M. de las Cases, "would that we were with our families and a few friends on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi. Can you imagine the pleasure of riding unrestrained at full speed through the vast forests of America? On this rock one has scarcely room for a gallop." When the rays of a tropical sun darted fiercely on his brow he retired to the unpicturesque shade of Sir Pulteney's tent. "An oak," he cried, "an oak," and in passionate tones expressed his longing to repose beneath the foliage of that fair tree of France. When Napoleon returned from his ride he lay down, hoping that fatigue would bring slumber, then took a bath, in which he remained a long time, a habit that eventually became injurious from the debility it induced, but which he liked, because it relieved a pain in his side, the first symptom of the disease of which he died. He then occupied himself in reading or dictating, resuming, in fact, the occupations we have already described, and finished the day in the society of his friends, when some book was read aloud, or he continued the account of his life, which was ever listened to with the same eagerness. These were not the worst days of that dreary period, dreary for any one, but particularly so for him whose restless activity had once kept the world in commotion. There were days, and these most numerous, when the Cape wind prevailed, that dry, sharp wind, which painfully affects the nervous system, beats down plants and trees, and prevents the very grass from growing, so that on this rock, surrounded by ocean mists, the only change from an all-penetrating moisture was to a continuous and oppressive wind. Napoleon remained within doors whilst this wind continued, and sunk in sadness, considered whether this fearful climate had not been chosen with the perfidious intention of shortening his life. This painful suspicion seemed verified when he learned that there was near him an agreeable residence, Plantation House, situated in a verdant and sheltered valley. "If they wish my death," cried he, "why did not they treat me as they did Ney? One bullet fired at my head would have sufficed. Europe can hate as intensely as the emigrants, but she has not as much courage. Europe dared not kill me, but she dared condemn me to a lingering death." Napoleon was mistaken. Europe only thought of securing his person, and solely occupied with that idea, never thought of inquiring whether the precautions taken to secure that object were compatible

with the preservation of his health. Europe entrusted the responsibility to England, who allowed it to devolve on a minister, and he transferred the care to a subaltern, who was continually alternating between anxiety for his own responsibility and irritation caused by the insults of his prisoners. Lord Bathurst had been, as we have said, so culpably negligent as not to require the East India Company to give up Plantation House, and Sir Hudson Lowe had not had the good taste to offer it, preferring to keep it for his family.* These motives were not as culpable, but probably meaner than those suspected by Napoleon. His enemies had no wish to assassinate him; but regarding him with no other feeling than that of fear, they allowed him to endure the agonies of a lingering death at the hand of subalterns.

Sir Hudson Lowe had brought with him wood with which to construct a new habitation for Napoleon; he also brought furniture and books. More solid materials than wood were necessary as a protection against the alternate heat and moisture of the climate. Napoleon refused everything but the books, of which he took a few from the ill-sorted collection that had been brought, read them with avidity, and often made them the subject of his evening conversations. Though the evenings at Longwood were sad, they were, as one may say, illumined by the brilliancy of his intellect. The tone of these conversations was sometimes piquant, occasionally, though rarely, gay, and sometimes when treating of history, war, science, and literature, rose to a sublimity that was unfortunately but too often beyond the capacity of his auditors. He frequently played with the children of Madame Bertrand and Madame Montholon, had Fontaine's fables read for their amusement, regretting that much of the author's depth of observation was beyond the capacity of the little listeners; but he was ever ready with the most appropriate argument to influence their minds. One of Madame Montholon's sons complained that he was obliged to study every day. Napoleon said to him, "Do you eat every day, my little friend?" "Yes, sire." "Then if you eat every day, you must study every day." Quitting the children, he would turn to the loftiest themes in politics and philosophy.

Among the books brought to St. Helena were some pamphlets connected with the events of the day, which it was supposed would interest him. Some of these were written against himself, some against his enemies. Amongst these was "The

* In saying this we do not calumniate Sir Hudson Lowe, who says in one of his despatches that he would at once have resigned Plantation House to Napoleon could he have got a suitable residence in the island for himself and his family. This is admitting that he thought more of his own convenience than of that of his prisoner, who certainly was entitled to more consideration than Sir Hudson and his family, however interesting they might be.

Weathercock's Dictionary," which since 1815 had become very popular, because it stigmatised the mobility of public men, who in their eagerness to hold office had not hesitated to transfer their services from one government to another. This book, being written by opponents of the Bourbons, was naturally enough very agreeable to the poor exiles, who felt a lively satisfaction in seeing punishment dealt out to those who, instead of being like them on the rock of St. Helena, were parading through the Tuileries, disavowing the usurpation under which they had served, and celebrating the legitimacy they had opposed. It won a smile from Napoleon when first he read it, but soon getting weary, he flung it aside. "It is a detestable book," he cried, "degrading to France, degrading to humanity! Were it to be believed, the French Revolution, which originated such generous principles, has made us all, nobles, citizens, and people, only a set of degraded creatures. That is false and unjust. Look at the religious wars in France, England, and Germany, and you will find as many interested changes originating in motives as mean. Henry IV. saw as many of them as I or Louis XVIII. The Fronde can offer as many, and certainly that France was not degraded which a few years later won the battles of Rocroy and the Dunes, and produced Polyeucte, Athalie, and the Oraisons Funèbres of Bossuet. Do not be so ready to rejoice at the punishment of your adversaries; you may be assured that the sword that smites them has a double edge that may be turned against yourselves." Somebody observed that the men he excused had betrayed him. "No," he said, "they did not *betray*, they *abandoned* me, which is a very different thing. There are fewer traitors in the world than you think; but, on the other hand, there are numbers of weak men who yield to circumstances far more powerful than themselves." Napoleon saw, though he did not say, that these men, exhausted by the extraordinary demands he had made on their moral strength, had sunk under the trial, and sought under new masters the reward of the essential services they had rendered to France. "Fouché," said Napoleon, "is the only real traitor I have met; Marmont, the wretched Marmont, who injured me more than Fouché, was not a traitor. He was misled by vanity and the hope of playing a great part, and he believed that by abandoning me, and depriving me of the means of overwhelming the coalition in Paris, he was saving France from a great catastrophe. But he did not betray me as Fouché did." His auditors, surprised at his forbearance, asked why, knowing in 1815 that Fouché was a traitor, he did not restrain him. "The question," replied Napoleon, "did not depend on the conduct of an individual, however important he might be. It should be decided by the loss or gain of a battle, and had I

by accusing Fouché anticipated that event, I should but have disturbed the stability of my government. I was obliged to have patience and wait, but I let Fouché see that I was not deceived. He has avenged himself for my contemptuous forbearance; but after Waterloo, even without the presence of a man so dangerous as Fouché, I should have been lost. Traitors," he repeated, "are rarer than you think. Great vices and great virtues are the exceptions. Men in general are weak, and changeable because of their weakness; they seek their advantage wherever they can, advance their own interests without intending to injure others, and on the whole are more deserving of pity than blame. They must be taken and made use of as they are, and impelled to something higher when it is possible. Of this you may be sure, contempt will never elevate them. To induce them to exert their capabilities, you must lead them to believe themselves better than they are. In the army, cowards are made brave by telling them they are so. The only way to deal with men is to affect to believe that they possess the virtues with which you wish to inspire them."

This subject led Napoleon to another, in treating which he displayed the same practical philosophy and the same elevation of thought. "It is weakness," he said, "and not wisdom, to distrust men too much. It would but lead to want of confidence in all, to hesitation in one's choice, and to the frequent neglect of useful instruments. Besides, if it becomes known that you are of a suspicious disposition, everybody about you will seek to turn it to his own advantage. Had I listened," he added, "to all I was told, I should have had none but cowards in my army, and traitors in my household. There are but very few of you here, my friends, all bound to be complaisant to each other, and I do not yield credence to what you say ill of one amongst you, and I am right." This was an allusion to certain divisions that were beginning to disturb him. "No," he continued, "men must not be believed when they speak ill of each other. Lannes died for me like a hero, though he often used language that, had I taken it seriously, might have led to his being accused of high treason. This is the reason that, after long experience, I consider violating the secrecy of the post-office as both useless and dangerous. Nobody will conspire by post; all that can be got in letters are remarks originating in idleness, revenge, or ill-feeling. Who would wish to hear all that is said of him even by his best friends? It would be very imprudent, very unwise of anybody to make such an attempt, even were it in his power. He would be compelled to hate even his best friends. We are all so thoughtless when speaking of each other! If one heard all the remarks that are made, one would often detest those who

deserve to be esteemed. To read letters is but to listen to general conversation that will engender prejudice and injustice, which are more injurious to one's self than others. A government in doing so deprives itself of valuable instruments; and when practised by a private individual, friends, thoughtless in language, but sincere in their attachments, come to be looked upon as enemies. It is far better not to know all that is said, however high-minded we may be, for there are some remarks that we may find it difficult to pardon. We can only be certain of pardoning such when we never hear them."

At another time taking up some of the wretched pamphlets published against him in England, Napoleon ran through the tirade of serious calumnies of which he was the object. "If my enemies are to be believed, it was I," he said, "that assassinated Kleber in Egypt, blew out Desaix's brains at Marengo, strangled Pichegru in his dungeon! Kleber, Desaix, Pichegru! I esteemed Kleber highly, despite his faults. He was too fond of pleasure, and was sometimes dangerously indifferent; but he was passionately fond of glory, and unsurpassed as a warrior on the field of battle. I assassinate the man by whose death I lost Egypt! Desaix was an angel; I loved him better than anybody else, and nobody loved me better than he. It was his arrival that won the battle of Marengo, and could I strike him down at the very time he was rendering me a service that promised so many others! Pichegru was in all probability the most intelligent general of the republic. He had been one of my masters at Brienne, the remembrance of which made me always feel the greatest commiseration for him. While in command of his army he was guilty of crimes for which he was denounced by Moreau. The wretched man injured himself sufficiently without my assistance, and it was this conviction that led him to destroy his life after ruining his fame. And I am now accused of having destroyed the three! The calumny is more remarkable for its folly than its wickedness. The violence of enmity is so great that it very quickly leads to absurdity. The accusations it invents are revolting whilst we are young, ardent, and proud. We become accustomed to them with time, and rather wish they should exceed all bounds, as their very excess is a justification." Napoleon then introduced and explained in succession the most exaggerated events of his life, especially the pretended poisoning of the men sick of the plague at Jaffa. As to what had occurred there, he said, that being obliged to retreat, he could not take with him twenty men sick of the plague, without running the risk of infecting the whole army, and as these were certain to be killed by the Arabs, he said to Desgenettes, that perhaps it would be greater humanity to give them a little opium; but

the latter, with great presence of mind, replied, that his profession was to cure, not to kill. He added, that almost all were dead before the army left, that the five or six who remained had not taken opium, and that this unjust accusation had been propagated by an assistant in the infirmary who had been dismissed for adulterating the medicines.

Napoleon spoke with haughty calmness of these atrocious calumnies. There was one subject of which he spoke as haughtily but not as calmly, the catastrophe at Vincennes. He spoke of it with reserve, and it was evident that he felt a repugnance to the remembrance. Unlike all those who had taken part in that sad event, he admitted it fully. "The Bourbon princes," he said, "wished for my death, and it is evident to any person that reads Georges' trial, that several of them were aware of the plots laid for my assassination. The Duke d'Enghien was waiting within a league of the frontier for the renewal of hostilities, in order to take up arms against France, and by every right, according to the laws of all times, he deserved the punishment I inflicted on him. After all, my blood was not puddle, I had the right to defend it against those who sought to shed it, especially when in my own person I defended the repose, prosperity, and glory of France. I struck, I had the right to do so, and would do it again."

The very violence with which Napoleon expressed himself showed that his conscience reproached him. His right to defend himself being admitted—and never was royal crown placed on a head more worthy of being defended than his—he forgot that he should do so legally; that by the Duke d'Enghien's arrest on a foreign soil, and forcible transportation into France, the laws were violated both in the form of the commission, and by the immediate execution of the sentence. Even when an enemy becomes a lawful prisoner, policy must be consulted, and that often counsels indulgence, and such an advice is equivalent to a command, as it requires the justification of necessity as well as legality to sanction the effusion of human blood. He forgot that the death of the Duke d'Enghien, far from being beneficial to the consular government, did incalculable injury in inducing Europe to take up arms, and that under some circumstances personal considerations should have great weight, and that the descendant of the conqueror of Rocroy ought to have been sacred to the conqueror of Rivoli.

Napoleon loved to contemplate his reign as a whole, and would say, that if the annals of the world were consulted, no founder of a dynasty would be discovered more innocent than he. There is not one, indeed, to whom history can make fewer reproaches as far as relates to the getting rid of relatives or rivals; and there is no doubt that, except on the field of battle,

where the sacrifice of human life was immense, nobody has shed less blood than he, which was partly due to his own disposition, and partly to the manners of the time. Comparing himself to Cromwell, he said, "I ascended a vacant throne, but it was not I that rendered it so. I was lifted to the throne by the enthusiasm and gratitude of my contemporaries." This assertion was quite true; but though lifted to that throne amid the approving admiration of his countrymen, Napoleon had fallen from it with equal *éclat*. This fall could not be accounted for by treason, which he himself admitted did not exist: the cause was to be sought in his own errors, which he would sometimes admit with sincerity, sometimes gloss over with sophistry, according as the admission hurt his pride more or less. In accordance with a general law, where he had no excuse to offer, he employed subtleties and inaccuracy, and became so accustomed to these practices that it was impossible to say whether he believed what he said or not.

When recounting the fall of the empire in 1814, we gave a summary of the errors which conduced to that result, and which, in our opinion, amount to six. These were:—

In the first instance, abandoning in 1803 the firm and moderate policy of the consulate, in breaking the peace of Amiens, and quarrelling with England, whose interests were almost beyond our reach.

Secondly, having subdued the continent in the three battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, not returning in 1807 to a moderate policy, and instead of seeking to humble England by uniting the continental powers against her, rather to profit by the opportunity for attempting a universal monarchy.

Thirdly, in allowing at Tilsit that this universal monarchy should rest on the interested aid of Russia, an aid whose recompense was to be the possession of Constantinople.

Fourthly, in plunging into the Spanish abyss, which engulfed all our strength.

Fifthly, in not trying to finish this war by perseverance, but rather seeking a solution in Russia that could only be found in the Peninsula; a policy that led to the unparalleled catastrophe of Moscow.

The sixth and most fatal error was, that after having again stood conquerors at Lutzen and Bautzen, we had rejected terms of peace at Prague, which would have left us an extent of territory much larger than policy would have given grounds either to hope or desire.

It is unnecessary to say that midst the endless weariness of his captivity Napoleon recalled these memories only as the incidents of conversation suggested them. He did not discuss them methodically, as we have attempted to do. He sometimes

touched on one subject, sometimes on another, ever offering most excuses for what was least excusable.

Concerning his outbursts against the English, and breaking the peace of Amiens, he said that the celebrated scene with Lord Whitworth had been greatly exaggerated, and that he could not submit to the refusal of the British ministry to evacuate Malta. But he forgot that it was his own policy that had caused affairs to assume so threatening an aspect, of which the English took advantage and refused the evacuation of Malta. He admitted that it had been his intention to make a descent on England, and that but for the error committed by one of his admirals, he would have conquered the island. It cannot be denied that vaster and better calculated preparations had never been made, and that had Admiral Villeneuve appeared in the English Channel, 150,000 Frenchmen would have crossed the Straits of Dover! What would have been the result had Napoleon gained such a battle as Austerlitz in England, and become master of London, as he was at a later period of Vienna and Berlin? Would the haughty aristocracy of England have bowed before that terrific blow, or would they have prolonged the struggle against their conqueror, imprisoned to a certain extent, as he would be, within the limits of his conquest? We cannot say. Running such hazards was certainly staking on a desperate game his own and France's greatness.

Napoleon could offer no justifiable reason for his project of universal monarchy, devised when, having failed in his attempt on England, he turned to attack the continent. He had designed, he said, that this universal monarchy should be but temporary, an external dictatorship, such as France had bestowed on him at home, and which he would have resigned in time. In the first place, if France in 1800 needed a powerful arm to save her from anarchy, this was not the case with Europe. What she had to dread was the ambition of the actual head of the French government, and to be placed under his dictatorship would have been what she most feared; it would have been an attempt to cure a disease by increasing the malady. The necessity for an external dictatorship could in no way be deduced from the existence of a domestic one. To be endurable it should be of short duration; and it would have been incumbent on Napoleon to prove to the nations that he exercised the office of dictator for their benefit. He should have endeavoured to do them good, instead of inflicting on them the mass of evil which in 1813 induced all Europe to rise and destroy this universal dictatorship.

Speaking of this chimera of universal monarchy, Napoleon added, that being compelled to defend himself incessantly, he had become master of Europe almost against his own will—a

false assertion that has been frequently repeated by those who wish to flatter his memory and policy. There is no doubt but that the European States, in consequence of the oppressions they endured, were only watching for an opportunity to throw off the yoke, and that so overpowered were they after the affair of Tilsit, that but for the Spanish war Austria would not have ventured on the celebrated *levée de boucliers* in 1809; and that after the victory of Wagram, if Napoleon had not undertaken the Russian campaign, nobody would have ventured to raise a hand against him.

He spoke with more sincerity of his third great error, the Spanish war. This war, he said, had compromised the moral character of his government, divided and exhausted his forces. He alone could understand how much and how completely. The transaction at Bayonne was one of unpardonable perfidy; the war in Spain drew to the south the troops that were needed in the north, and exhausted their strength by the fierceness of the struggle. How could he have been so sincere in speaking of this point when he was so little so in treating of others? Perhaps it was that the error was too evident, or it was perhaps attributable to the nature of the excuses he made. Having founded, he said, *the fourth dynasty* in France, he could not tolerate the Bourbons in Spain, as their very position made them the necessary accomplices of England. This reason should indeed have some weight; but had Napoleon, instead of anticipating events by a crime, allowed the incapacity of the Bourbons and his own popularity in Spain to produce their effect, the Spaniards themselves might have asked him to place both thrones under the same ruler. This error originated in a natural impatience of character—the source of many he committed; nor was this excuse for the Spanish war—which he must have considered a good one, since it induced him to admit that he had done wrong—of greater value than many he adduced in palliation of the errors of his policy.

He was equally candid in admitting the mistake he made in not endeavouring to conquer the Spaniards by perseverance, and of seeking in Russia a solution he could not find in Spain. He made a singular admission on this subject. "Alexander," he said, "had no real desire for war, nor had I. When we arrived at the Niemen we were like *two braggarts*, who wished for nothing more than that somebody should interfere to separate them. At that time I had not a good minister of foreign affairs. Had I M. de Talleyrand, for example, the Russian war would never have taken place." This was true, and Napoleon's admission will afford subject of reflection to those ministers who shrink from arresting their masters when they see them approaching a dangerous descent.

He attributed the fatal result of the campaign to the burning of Moscow. "There was a sufficiency of provisions in Moscow," he said, "to support an entire army for more than six months. Had I passed the winter there, I should have resembled an ice-bound vessel, that recovers her liberty of action on the return of the sun. My army would have been intact in spring, and if the Russians had been reinforced, so should I too, and as in 1807, after the battle of Eylau in February, I fought that of Friedland in June, I might have gained some brilliant victory with the return of summer, and ended the campaign of 1812 as successfully as that of 1807." There was some truth in this, but it may be said in reply, that though his infantry could be supported in Moscow, the cavalry and artillery would have been without forage; and that if reinforcements had been brought to Osterode in 1807, the same facility did not exist for bringing supplies to Moscow; and that the army of 1812 was not in as good condition as that of 1807.

Napoleon could not offer a plausible nor even specious excuse for the last serious error of his reign—the refusal of peace at Prague. He repeated the worn-out commonplace policy that Austria was not sincere, and whilst apparently treating at Prague, was secretly engaged to the allied powers, an assertion completely falsified by the most authentic documents. If Austria were not sincere at Prague, there could be no better means of convicting her of insincerity than by accepting the conditions she proposed, namely, to leave us Westphalia, Holland, Piedmont, Florence, Rome, and Naples, that is, double what we could demand, refusing us only Hamburg and Lubeck with which we had nothing to do, Sicily which we had never had, and Spain that we had lost. Had these conditions been accepted, and Austria broken faith, she would have been convicted of falsehood, and public opinion would have been in our favour. But there is evident proof that she would have accepted our adhesion with delight, for it was with the greatest reluctance that she went to war, and had formally refused to join the allied powers until the fatal term appointed for mediation had expired. Napoleon had no desire to speak on this subject, so painful to his self-love, for he had deeply deceived himself in supposing that he had inspired Austria with so much dread that she would never dream of opposing him. Austria did fear him, and very much too; but this feeling was not so powerful as to paralyse her judgment or prevent her adopting a course evidently conducive to her interests. He sought to avoid this reproach by saying that his marriage, by inspiring him with fatal confidence in Austria, had been the cause of his ruin. An undignified and mendacious excuse; for M. de Metternich had repeatedly told him that his marriage

would have a certain but not unlimited weight with the court of Vienna, and would not prevent war being declared against him should he refuse the conditions offered at Prague, which had but one fault, that they were too favourable to us.

It was thus that Napoleon reasoned on the events of his reign, sincerely when his self-love could find specious excuses, sophistically when it had none to offer; but at all times conscious of his faults without admitting them, and calculating that the greatness of his glory would justify him with posterity as it had done with his contemporaries.

He spoke more readily and with more confidence of the internal government of the empire. In contemplating his conduct in 1800 he justly considered himself as a great regenerator, who, collecting the fragments scattered by the axe of the Revolution, had reconstructed the fabric of modern society. It was easy for him to show why he had sought to fuse the different classes which had been so rudely torn asunder, why he had recalled the old noblesse, and elevated the citizens to the same rank by conferring on them the titles their long services had merited; and thus presented to Europe a vigorous and revived nation worthy of her companionship. But while seeking to place France in a respectable light, and bring her into pacific relations with Europe, it was not necessary that the latter should be kept in constant fear. On all these points Napoleon spoke as a legislator, philosopher, and politician, and when some of his companions blamed him for recalling the old nobles who had betrayed him, he repelled what he looked on as a miserable objection by the following peremptory reply: "The two men," he said, "who most contributed to my ruin were Marmont, who in 1814 deprived me of the troops with which I intended to destroy the allies in Paris, and Fouché, who excited the Chamber of Representatives against me in 1815. If I have been ruined by traitors, these are the men. Can it be said that they belonged to the old noblesse?"

It was with great pleasure that Napoleon spoke of his exertions to give France an active, powerful, honest, and enlightened administration. He enumerated the roads, canals, ports, and monuments he had built; his labours for the perfection of the civil code, of which he attributed a large portion to Tronchet; his long presidency of the Council of State, where he said there was the greatest liberty of discussion, where he had often met with obstinate opposition; for, he added, men being courtiers does not deprive them of self-love, and I have known councillors of State, simple masters of requests, who, once a discussion had commenced, would persist in upholding their own opinion in opposition to mine—so true is it that if, at least in subjects connected with administration, men are

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assembled with the serious purpose of thorough investigation, a relative and occasionally fruitful liberty of discussion will arise.

(Napoleon admitted that he had not been a liberal sovereign, but said that he had advanced civilisation, adding, that as a dictator his part had not been to bestow liberty) but to prepare men for it. He did not deny the trial that had been made of liberty in 1815, but shunned the subject, as though ashamed of an experiment from which he had derived no benefit. When alluding to this subject he spoke of constitutive assemblies with profound sagacity, though he had employed them so little, and attributed his misunderstandings in the Chamber of Representatives rather to the want of experience in the use of liberty than to any essential defect. "Such assemblies," he said, "must have leaders to guide them as well as an army has; with this difference, that an army accepts appointed commanders, whilst an assembly selects its leaders. The Chamber of Representatives in 1815, summoned by peal of cannon, had not been able to find or seek its leaders."

(Napoleon always said, that had he not had time to do more than lay his plans, but not to complete anything, that his reign had consisted of a series of sketches, and then giving play to his imagination, he would tell all that he would have done had he obtained a frank and lasting peace from Europe—a peace he unfortunately refused when he could get it in 1813, and sought in 1815 when it was impossible of attainment. "I should have allowed my subjects," he said, "a large share in the government. I should not only have summoned them around me in really free assemblies, but would have gone to meet them myself. I would have listened to them, and have allowed them full liberty to contradict me. I would have travelled with my own horses through France, accompanied by the empress and my son. I would have seen and heard for myself, redressed their wrongs, and the same hands that had disseminated the evils of war should then spread the blessings of peace. I should have grown old as a paternal and pacific prince, whom the people having so long applauded as Napoleon the warrior, would then bless as Napoleon the pacific, drawn like the Merovingians of old in a car yoked with oxen.")

We relate these dreams of the great man only because they convey an important lesson—that the opportunity of doing good should not be neglected, as once allowed to pass, it can never be recalled. It was thus that the evenings of captivity were spent, and when conversation beguiled the time until a later hour than usual, Napoleon exclaimed with delight, "Midnight, midnight, what a victory over time!" time of which he could never find sufficient in other days, but which now hung heavily on his hands.

The first half of the year 1816 was passed in disputes; the second was better employed in diligent historical occupations. Napoleon now devoted most of his time to M. de las Cases, as his Italian campaigns interested him extremely, and recalled his first and best enjoyed successes. Although occasionally dictating the Egyptian expedition to Marshal Bertrand, and the campaign of 1815 to General Gourgaud, he showed a decided preference for Italy. He wished to have copies of the *Moniteur* in order to verify dates and various details, but not being able to procure these, contented himself with the *Annual Register*. His memory was so very correct that he very rarely had to make an alteration. In order to write as rapidly as Napoleon dictated, M. de las Cases made use of certain modes of abbreviation, which obliging him to rewrite his notes, a great part of his nights were spent in that occupation. He brought the copy next day to Napoleon, who corrected it with his own hand. This occupation became very hurtful to M. de las Cases' eyes, though often relieved by his son, who frequently assisted him in seizing the rapidly expressed thoughts of the powerful historian. To this labour Napoleon added another. Feeling the inconvenience of not knowing English, he determined to learn it with the assistance of M. de las Cases. His mighty genius found great difficulty in learning languages, for though endowed with a most correct memory for events, he had none for words. This did not prevent his making the attempt, and he soon began to read, but not to speak English. These different occupations caused M. de las Cases to be frequently alone with Napoleon, which excited no little jealousy in that small colony, where it would seem that unity of misfortune should have produced unity of feeling. General Gourgaud had given proofs of extraordinary devotedness to Napoleon; but all his good qualities were spoiled by an overweening pride and never-ending jealousy. Having been with Napoleon in his last campaigns, he considered he had an exclusive right to assist him in his military narrations, and was deeply hurt at seeing that M. de las Cases was his master's habitual confidant. However, each was to have his turn, and when the concluding period of the empire became the subject of dictation, General Gourgaud being better acquainted with that period, he enjoyed the privilege of long private interviews with his master. Being as impetuous as courageous, he was unable to control his feelings, and in that limited circle where the slightest impulse was necessarily perceptible, he became the frequent cause of quarrels and annoyance. These disputes added greatly to the inconveniences suffered by Napoleon. He endeavoured to restrain this ill-feeling, which he perceived even when efforts were made to conceal it from him, by

employing his authority to repress the impetuosity of General Gourgaud, and by soothing the wounded sensibility of M. de las Cases, a reserved and somewhat morose man. "What," he said, addressing all, "have we not unhappiness enough? Must we add to it by our own fault? If the consideration of what you owe each other does not suffice to restrain you, think of what you owe to me. Do you not see the pain that your discussions cause me? When you return to Europe, which will be soon, for I have not long to live, your greatest glory will be that you have been my companions on this rock. You will not then acknowledge the disunion that exists amongst you; you will speak of your friendship, and call yourselves *brothers in St. Helena*: if this must be done some time, why not begin now, as well for your own dignity as for my peace and happiness?"

Notwithstanding the constant guard kept over the poor exiles, they sometimes went into the town under various pretences, but in reality to learn some account of the exterior world. They rode in, accompanied by a guard, to whom giving their horses in charge, they got a little more liberty, by which they profited to procure some communication with Europe. The proprietor of Briars, being appointed purveyor to Longwood, often aided their correspondence, very harmless correspondence indeed, as it was confined almost exclusively to communications on domestic subjects, and the most culpable not going further than denouncing the cruelty of the British government to the European public. They should have confined themselves to such harmless correspondence, and not do anything to arouse the suspicious spirit of Sir Hudson Lowe. M. de las Cases wrote a detailed account of their sufferings at St. Helena on a piece of silk, as being most convenient to conceal, and entrusted it to a servant who was about returning to Europe. This was discovered, either through the treachery of the servant or the closeness of the search. M. de las Cases, who had given particular offence to Sir Hudson Lowe, was condemned, in virtue of the established regulations, to leave St. Helena. An armed guard seized both him and his, and took them to Jamestown. Sir Hudson announced to M. de las Cases, that having infringed the regulations forbidding clandestine communications, he should be conducted to the Cape and thence to Europe. There was no choice but to submit to this absolute master. M. de las Cases' papers were examined, and amongst them were found the journal he had kept of his conversations with Napoleon, and the manuscript of the Italian campaigns. Both were detained provisionally.

Napoleon was greatly irritated by this violation of his privacy, and the loss of so respectable and so useful a man as M. de las

Cases. He demanded the manuscript of the Italian campaigns, which was given to him, and complained bitterly of M. de las Cases being removed for the commission of an act so natural and so innocent as the expression of pain at miseries he suffered, and when it was evident there was no idea of attempting an escape, as nothing of the kind was alluded to in the papers that had been seized. As there was not at that time a vessel ready to sail, M. de las Cases was detained in the island, but forbidden all communication with Longwood. This delay gave Sir Hudson Lowe time to reflect that M. de las Cases could do him and the English ministers more hurt in Europe than in St. Helena, as once free, he could make the voice of misfortune be heard, a voice that would command attention even in the British Parliament. He offered M. de las Cases to allow him to return to Longwood on condition that he would profit by his month's sequestration, and make no attempt at correspondence in future. The same reflections had suggested themselves to M. de las Cases. He considered that by denouncing the treatment to which the exiles were subjected, he might be more useful to Napoleon in Europe than at St. Helena. Feeling also some anxiety about the health of his son, who was suffering from the tropical climate, he declined Sir Hudson Lowe's offer. He could not get permission to see Napoleon except in presence of witnesses, to which he would not agree; but he let him know the motives of his determination, and having sent him some things he had in his care, he embarked towards the end of December 1816, having been eighteen months with Napoleon, twelve of which he passed in St. Helena.

Napoleon was very much affected by the departure of M. de las Cases. Of all the companions of his exile, he possessed the most varied information, and besides being most useful from his knowledge of English, he was of a gentle disposition, though somewhat over sensitive. Although Napoleon was convinced that M. de las Cases had been principally influenced in forming his resolution by the desire of denouncing to Europe the treatment suffered by the exiles, he also felt that anxiety for his own health and especially for his son's had some part in his determination, and foresaw that the suspicions of the governor, the evils of the climate, or domestic duties would gradually reduce the number of those who had followed him and afforded him some society in his terrible solitude. Marchand, his valet, who read well and wrote rapidly, a sensible, prudent man, most touchingly devoted to his master, and gradually becoming rather a friend than servant, was the most frequent auditor of those exclamations that burst from a suffering soul, and which seem addressed to God alone. "If this continues," said Napoleon with a sigh, "Marchand and I will soon be left

alone." Then turning to his valet, he said, "You will read to me, and write as I dictate, and having closed my eyes, you will return to Europe to enjoy the competency that I shall secure you."

The 1st of January 1817 gave occasion to a little domestic fête. Napoleon's friends hastened to pay their respects as eagerly as when at the Tuileries, anxious to show that though proscribed and in chains, he was still for them the Emperor Napoleon. Here was no display of pride as at Paris, but the outpourings of affection, of a repentant and humbled heart become communicative in proportion to its sorrows. Madame Bertrand and Madame Montholon, with their husbands and children, and General Gourgaud, came, followed by Marchand and the servants who had accompanied their master to St. Helena, to offer their wishes for his happiness on the first day of the year. Alas! what happiness could they wish him? That his life on that rock might not become insupportable; that his health might not decline too rapidly; that some symptoms then beginning to show themselves might not lead to too great an excess of suffering; for none would venture to hope, much less to speak, of seeing him again on the throne of France, or even free in America. Napoleon was sadder than usual, both because of the memories awakened by the day, and the departure of M. de las Cases. He received his companions with affability and with what was for him unusual emotion, and thanked them in the most expressive manner for their devotion to him. It had always given him pleasure to make presents, and he now occasionally drew from the wreck of his fortune that Marchand had saved some testimony of gratitude for those who had done him a service. From these he now selected some gifts to bestow on the children he loved, or on their parents, gifts that became to them most precious memorials. When this affecting scene had ended, the day being fine, he breakfasted with his friends under the tent erected by Admiral Malcolm, and which afforded the only shade he could enjoy at Longwood. Here was passed the greater part of the day, when the beauty of the weather, the attentions and affectionate conversations of his friends, seemed gradually to disperse the cloud that hung upon Napoleon's brow. France was the theme, and the brilliant past; but none spoke of the present, though some ventured to mention the future, a subject that was usually avoided, for, however profoundly meditated on, it presented no prospect but a prison! Still, some hope was beginning to dawn, owing to the prospect of ministerial changes in England. It was evident from the tone of the journals that a reaction had taken place, and that the public mind was recovering from the excitement of 1815; that more liberal ideas had begun to prevail, and that the

hatred against France diminished in proportion as these ideas gained ground. Lord Castlereagh's ministry had been violently attacked; the opposition had called Lord Bathurst to account for his cruelty to the prisoner of St. Helena; and there was every probability of an immediate change in the English cabinet. Their expectations did not go so far as to hope that a new minister would allow Napoleon to assume any important part in the world; but his chains might be lightened, or he might be sent to some other island, or perhaps allowed to retire to America. This was not very likely; but so inclined is man to hope, that when probability fails, he bases his expectations on chimeras! The day was consequently devoted to dreams of a better future, and the company separated at night with lighter hearts.

The year 1817 was even more mournful than the preceding, and the coming years seemed to offer no better prospect, for in a captivity to which death alone seemed to promise a termination, despondency must naturally increase with time. Napoleon had altogether given up riding, which was so necessary to his health. The space of three or four leagues, in which he was allowed to ride unguarded, seemed from custom to be as confined as the enclosure within the walls of a prison. Having in his rides to a greater distance occasionally been altogether lost sight of by the officer on guard, the latter told him that he had received orders to keep closer to his person, which led to Napoleon's entire abandonment of that mode of exercise. For two months he did not go out except for a short walk. He had been in the habit of receiving English or Dutch travellers returning from India, and who had asked the Grand-Marshal Bertrand to be allowed the honour of paying their respects. Sir Hudson Lowe attempted to change this mode of proceeding; and Napoleon, seeing that the object was to make Longwood a prison, whose doors should open only at the will of his gaoler, refused to receive any more visitors. This total seclusion, especially since M. de las Cases' departure, had deprived him of all relaxation, and induced a mental lassitude, which, joined to physical inertness, would be sure to produce an immediate and injurious influence.

About this time there arrived three commissioners, appointed by the allied powers to combine with Sir Hudson Lowe in guarding the prisoner of St. Helena. The allies had signed a document in approval of the proceedings of England, and conferring on her the charge of guarding Napoleon, but on condition that commissioners appointed by them should reside at St. Helena, to ascertain not only the continual presence of the prisoner, but the manner in which he was treated. Prussia, certain that England would take good care to secure her old enemy, and

feeling little interest in the manner in which he was treated, did not send anybody. Russia, Austria, and France had each sent a commissioner. These men, shut up in an almost uninhabited island, had no prospect of compensation but in occasionally seeing and conversing with their illustrious prisoner. The French envoy, M. de Montchenu, an old royalist, a violent partisan, but not a bad man, was accustomed to say that the abominable French Revolution had been effected by men of talent, and that their leader, Napoleon, more talented and more wicked than the rest, was a demon that ought to be kept in an iron cage. He had no desire to visit him, but wished to ascertain as frequently as possible a visual certainty of his physical presence at St. Helena. M. de Sturmer, the Austrian envoy, was desirous of sending some interesting details to Prince Metternich, the most inquisitive man in Europe. The Russian envoy, M. de Balmain, who had been desired by Alexander to see that Napoleon was strictly guarded, but without unnecessary cruelty, was less anxious to see him than his colleagues, and often laughed at the anxiety of the Frenchman and the curiosity of the Austrian.

These commissioners were greatly disappointed on their arrival at St. Helena. Sir Hudson Lowe having announced at Longwood that they came accredited by the treaty of the 2nd of August 1815, Napoleon peremptorily refused to receive them in virtue of that title. As obstinate in adverse as in good fortune, he would not depart from the principle he had once laid down—that having voluntarily surrendered to the English, he could not be considered a prisoner. He consequently declared, that he would receive these gentlemen if they came as private individuals, but not if they presented themselves in virtue of the treaty of the 2nd of August. This persistence is very much to be regretted, as besides the recreation that the society of these commissioners would have afforded him, some details of his captivity might have become known at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and might have awakened a sense of shame in the Emperor Francis, and touched the generous heart of Alexander. This idea had suggested itself to Sir Hudson Lowe, who immediately profited by the difficulty raised by Napoleon, and declared that the commissioners should not enter Longwood except as authorised by the above-mentioned treaty. This opinion was not shared by the three envoys, who were desirous of seeing Napoleon, no matter by what right, that they might assure themselves of his presence, and enjoy a society that would have been sought by everybody. But Sir Hudson Lowe, fearing that they would interfere in the mode of guarding the prisoners, would not agree to any accommodation, so they were compelled to remain at St. Helena

without being admitted to Longwood. They rode occasionally round the buildings occupied by Napoleon, or took up their station at some opening of the road where they might hope to see him, but were compelled to content themselves with a distant view, or details received from others. They also acquired some information from Napoleon's companions. One of them had known Marshal Bertrand, another General Montholon and General Gourgaud. They received these at their houses, or went to Hutt's Gate to visit Madame Bertrand. They thus acquired the certainty of the presence of the illustrious prisoner at Longwood, and let fall some information which, though very insignificant in their eyes, was of great importance to poor captives in a desert island two hundred leagues from their country. M. de Montholon, the most adroit of the residents at Longwood, possessed the art of engaging the commissioners in conversation, and often succeeded in extracting some interesting details from them. In the expectation of pleasing his hapless master, or arousing his expiring hopes, he endeavoured to persuade him that the Russian envoy would inform the Emperor Alexander of the treatment to which he was subjected, or that public opinion would force a change of the Castlereagh ministry in England, and that from a new cabinet he might obtain permission to live free in America, or at least be permitted a change of residence.

Chance had also procured Napoleon a means of communicating with Europe through Dr. O'Meara, who had taken up his abode in the neighbourhood. Napoleon had not brought a doctor with him from France, but had met one on board the *Bellerophon*, who had succeeded in winning his favour. This was Dr. O'Meara, an intelligent, skilful man, and not as obstinate in the English mode of practising medicine as the greater number of his professional confrères. Napoleon, who did not feel confidence in any medical man but the illustrious Corvisart, whom he characterised as *the embodiment of experience* in a man of high intellect, generally refused every remedy, and would have nothing to do with those prescribed by English physicians. He listened, however, to Dr. O'Meara, whom he had taken into his service, laughed at his prescriptions, but often conversed with him on various subjects in French or Italian, or sent him to Jamestown to learn the news of the day. Sir Hudson Lowe had not subjected Dr. O'Meara, as being an Englishman, to the same restraints while with Napoleon as the other inhabitants of Longwood, because that he believed him to be, as he was, incapable of betraying his government, and that the utmost he would attempt would be some harmless politeness. Dr. O'Meara by skilful management got through his delicate office without betraying anybody, obliging Napoleon

by the harmless complaisance of procuring him some news from Europe, serving Sir Hudson Lowe by the daily assurance of the presence of his prisoner, which the officer at Longwood could not always do, and winning favour in London by communicating to the prince-regent some details concerning Napoleon, which, without being any breach of confidence, were most interesting to the curiosity of the prince.

The sea was visible from some points of the plateau of Longwood, and once a sail came in sight, all were anxious to know what vessel it was, whence it came, who were on board, and what cargo it bore. Dr. O'Meara was immediately despatched to Jamestown, and returned with papers and sometimes with letters which had escaped the vigilance of Sir Hudson Lowe. Napoleon's captivity was sometimes lightened for a moment by the information he thus obtained. At one time he learned the acquittal of Druot and the escape of Lavalette, at both of which he rejoiced greatly; at another he heard of the celebrated *ordonnance* of the 5th of September, which confirmed the pleasing hope that the violent party would soon lose ground in Europe. He also received letters from his family, which affected him deeply. Some told him that his son was in good health and growing tall; others, that his mother, his sister Pauline, and his brothers were anxious to join him at St. Helena, and that they placed their fortunes at his disposal. Napoleon was touched by these offers, but persisted in refusing them. Considering himself at St. Helena as one condemned to death, he would no more consent to his mother or sister coming there than to their ascending the scaffold with him. Knowing that, with the exception of his mother and Cardinal Fesch, his relatives had scarcely sufficient for themselves, and having four or five millions secretly deposited with M. Lafitte, he would not consent to be a burden to them. He had no longer any occasion to draw upon this private deposit, as Sir Hudson Lowe had ceased to torment him about his domestic expenses. He therefore assured his relatives that he felt much obliged by their offer, but could not accept it.

Notwithstanding his complete seclusion, Napoleon occasionally received some Englishmen returning with the Indian fleet to Europe. This event, as we have mentioned, was always a source of festivity to the inhabitants of St. Helena, as these vessels coming from so great a distance took in fresh provisions at Jamestown, giving money or goods in exchange, and causing a momentary animation on this ocean-bound rock. Travellers of every grade, the better informed in particular, felt the greatest desire to see Napoleon. Men of high rank, magistrates, and men of learning, passengers on board the Indian fleet, took no notice of Sir Hudson Lowe's mean arrangements, but

addressed themselves directly to Marshal Bertrand to obtain the honour of an interview with Napoleon. Amongst these were Lord Amherst and several other distinguished persons. Napoleon received them, conversed with calmness, gentleness, and politeness, sometimes of India, sometimes of English affairs, but ever with his wonted superiority of intellect. The most distinguished of them asked, could they take any message for him to Europe; but he replied with dignified resignation, "I give you no commission. Tell your ministers what you have seen; I am here on a rock, circumscribed to even narrower limits than those prescribed by nature, and where I cannot ride, I who have spent my life on horseback; I dwell beneath a wooden roof where I am sometimes oppressed by heat, sometimes seriously inconvenienced by a penetrating damp. If I leave the house, a pitiless gaoler surrounds me with spies. I cannot write to my family or hear from them without taking this gaoler into my confidence. Two of my companions have been already removed, and God alone can tell whether the others will be left. If your ministry wished my death, it would have been more generous to give me a soldier's death as they did to the illustrious Ney. If they do not desire my death, let them give me air and space for exercise. They need not fear my attempting to escape. I know there is no place for me in the world, and that I must die in your fetters. But the question is, am I to be tortured whilst in them? I ask for nothing; let those who see my position make it known if their feelings bid them. I do not ask them to do so."

The despondency with which Napoleon spoke of himself was justified by the state he was in. Those who saw him were struck by the great change in his countenance, and though not near death, it was evident that it could not be very remote. He had entirely given up riding, disgusted by the restrictions to which he was subjected. Although summer commenced about the end of 1817, he passed six months without mounting his horse. Dr. O'Meara told him that this giving up of his habitual exercise would be fatal. "So much the better," he said, "the end will come the sooner." He began to feel a dull pain in the right side, and O'Meara told him he required exercise. "Yes," he said, "a ride of ten or twelve leagues would do me good, but how is it to be had on this rock?" He had always liked a prolonged bath. He indulged in this practice now more than ever, as it relieved the pain from which he suffered. He would remain for hours in a warm bath and then go to bed. The result was that he became visibly weaker. Though depressed, his mind neither lost its strength nor vivacity; but his body became daily weaker, and he said to those around him, "*You see now that it was not my body but my mind that was of iron.*"

Sir Hudson Lowe, fearing that this rapid decline of Napoleon's health would be attributed to him, became very anxious. Many persons in England had complained of the manner in which the captive at St. Helena was treated, and he did not wish to furnish grounds for such accusations. Not daring to allow him to ride unguarded, he thought that a change of residence would be a certain remedy, particularly as the buildings at Longwood, being formed of earth and wood, were falling into decay. Plantation House would have suited the prisoner in every way; but this the governor determined to keep for his family, and build another for Napoleon. Lord Bathurst had given him permission to do so, provided that the new residence should not be too expensive. Whether it was that the price of ground in the neighbourhood of Plantation House was too dear, or that the plateau of Longwood afforded greater facilities for observing the prisoner's movements, Sir Hudson Lowe determined to choose that locality for Napoleon's new residence, merely selecting some spot near the peak of Diana where the south-east wind would have less influence. He informed Napoleon of his intention, and submitted various plans for his approval. Napoleon replied that any residence in that part of the island would be fatal to his health; that it would require three or four years to complete the building, at the end of which time he would have more need of a tomb than of a house; that he would have the inconvenience of being surrounded by workmen, without being able to profit by their labour; and that if it were his taste that was to be consulted, he declared he had no desire for a new house, the one he had being quite good enough to die in.

This reply did not deter Sir Hudson Lowe, who commenced building on the most sheltered part of the plateau of Longwood, taking care, however, that a high wall of turf should prevent the progress of the work from being offensive to the senses of the exiles.

The 1st of January 1818 was sadder than the preceding anniversaries, particularly than the New Year's Day of 1817, though that had been clouded by the departure of M. de las Cases. Napoleon exerted himself less, and ceasing to dictate to his companions, left the care of his glory to posterity. "What advantage can there be," he said, "in giving these memoirs to posterity, that will sit in judgment on us all? We are only litigants who fatigue their judge. Posterity will appreciate these events better than we. The truth will be divined without any trouble on our part." Napoleon dictated less now, but read more. His lively perception of the beautiful, refined by time and suffering, afforded him a delicious enjoyment in the master works of the human intellect. He spoke less now

of an evening of the events of his own life than of the subjects of his studies, sometimes reading aloud to his companions passages from the great writers of all ages, which he enunciated with an accentuation that proved how fully he appreciated his authors.

He frequently read the Holy Scriptures, whose sublimity captivated him; but of all the authors of antiquity, Homer was his favourite. He considered him sublime and true to nature, feeling a particular charm in the contrast between the refined and elevated sentiments, the frequently noble characters of the *Iliad*, and their manners simple even to grossness, saying that the costume was of little consequence, provided the man was a reality, the type of every age, of every land. What particularly charmed him in Homer was the union of grandeur of sentiment and perfect truthfulness. "Homer," he said, "saw and acted for himself. Virgil was but a college professor, who did neither one nor the other." This harsh opinion of Virgil was the result of Napoleon's not possessing sufficient knowledge of Latin to appreciate the delicious language of the poet of Ausonia, and of his admiration for grand and striking descriptions, less frequent in Virgil than in Homer.

Amongst modern writers he preferred the dramatists. He did not admire vagueness, or a mingling of the tragic and comic. He despised what we call the drama, which he designated the *tragedy of waiting-maids*. He praised the dignity of Corneille, the eloquence of feeling in Racine, and the truly comic in Molière; he thought little of Voltaire as a dramatist, but esteemed him highly as a prose writer, both as to matter and style. Highly sensitive to the graces of style, but always desirous of solid information, he read Madame de Sevigné with great pleasure, but said, that after having read her letters with delight, he found that he had gained nothing. He considered that history, with the exception of memoirs, was badly written in France, an inferiority he attributed to literary men being kept in ignorance of public affairs. He often spoke of the difficulty of historic composition, which he had often practised himself, and said, speaking of the history of France, "There is no medium; it should be written in two volumes or in a hundred."

In proportion as weariness and inaction injured Napoleon's health and brought death nearer, the more frequently did he speak of philosophy and religion. "God," he said, "is present everywhere in the universe, and blind and dull must be the eyes that cannot find Him there. For me, He lives in all nature, I feel myself beneath His all-powerful hand, nor do I wish to deny His existence, for I do not regard Him with dread. I believe Him to be as merciful as He is powerful, and I am

convinced that when we return to His paternal bosom, that we shall there find the presentiments of human conscience verified, and that what truly enlightened minds have here declared to be good or evil will find the same judgment there. I do not speak of the errors of nations, for the mistake of one is never that of another, but that what the great minds of all countries have declared to be good or ill will be found to be such with God. I feel no doubt on this subject, and despite my faults, I feel confidence in approaching the throne of Sovereign Justice. I feel less confidence when I come to consider the different forms of religion. There I everywhere meet the hand of man, which often repels and shocks me. But one must not yield to such a feeling, which savours greatly of human pride. If on putting aside those national traditions with which every people has encumbered religion, we still find the idea of God's providence fully expressed, and the difference between good and evil clearly recognised, we have all that is essential. I have visited mosques and seen men kneeling before the Eternal Power, and though the manner was repugnant to my national customs, I could see nothing ridiculous in the form. Calumny has misrepresented my actions, and said I professed Islamism at Cairo, whilst to the Pope at Paris I affected to be a Catholic. There was some truth in it, for even in mosques I found that which awakened a feeling of respect in my mind, and though not impressed as in Catholic churches, midst which my childhood was passed, I there saw man kneeling in humble acknowledgment of his weakness before the Majesty of God. Every religion that is not heathen has a claim on our respect, whilst as Christians we have the advantage of being members of a creed derived from the purest sources of morality. If all are deserving respect, how much more ought we to respect our own, and each ought to live and die in that in which his mother taught him to adore God.

"Religion forms a part of our destiny. Together with the soil, laws, and customs, it constitutes the sacred whole which we call Fatherland, and whose interests we should never desert. When at the time of the Concordat some old revolutionists spoke to me of making France Protestant, I felt as much revolted as though they had asked me to abdicate my title of Frenchman, and declare myself English or German."

These elevated subjects leading to the consideration of certain moral questions, Napoleon spoke of what was called his *fatalism*. "Calumny," he said, "has caricatured that as well as my other opinions. I have been represented as a kind of stupid Mussulman, convinced that everything was decreed on high, and who would neither turn aside from a precipice, or avoid a horse at full gallop, because of the conviction that life or death was not

in our own hands, but depended on an inflexible and unyielding destiny. If that were the case, one might lie in bed all his life expecting that Providence would put food into his mouth. Such opinions would be very inconsistent with the great efforts I have made—often indeed with little success—during my long wars to establish the pre-eminence of human intelligence over chance. I, in common with every rational man, believe that we are entrusted with our own fate on earth; that it is both our right and duty to improve it as far as we can, nor relax our efforts until we find them unavailing. It is then only that we must cease to act, and resign ourselves to a fate that cannot be averted. Precaution is quite useless on a battlefield, every spot is equally dangerous. I have seen men leave what they considered a dangerous position, and seen them struck down just as they arrived at what they hoped to be a place of safety. A soldier's anxiety about his safety during battle leads only to the loss of presence of mind and courage, without in any way lessening the danger. It is better to resign himself to the chances of the position, and think no more of the projectiles flying through the air than of the wind that fans his hair. It is then that a man is most courageous, cool, intelligent; and being calm, his perception is unclouded. Such is the theory of my fatalism, and what I sought to impress on my soldiers in language suited to their capacity when I assured them that their fate was decided on high, that since cowardice could bring no advantage, they might as well secure themselves the reputation of bravery, precepts which I strengthened by wearing on my own brow, to which every eye was directed, an air of indifference which ultimately became habitual. This was the fatalism of the soldier; but as a general I certainly adopted another system; and I think that I may say without vanity that no commander has ever exercised his intelligence and exerted his will more than I in my campaigns. You perceive that I can justify the opinions I hold, since they are founded on true and practical knowledge."

Napoleon was subjected to very great annoyance during 1818. We have already mentioned that General Gourgaud was a very irritable man. M. de las Cases being gone, his jealousy was now entirely directed against General Montholon, whom at this period Napoleon employed more frequently than the others in writing under his dictation. This misunderstanding was increased by other causes. Both the Montholon and Bertrand families contributed in a great degree to alleviate the captivity of the august prisoner. But they differed very much in disposition, and held opposite opinions on many subjects interesting to the little colony. The Montholons were intelligent, well informed, gentle, and accustomed to society, and considered that

instead of irritating Sir Hudson Lowe by always suspecting him of bad intentions, it would be of more advantage to him for whom they had sacrificed themselves to endeavour to mollify Sir Hudson by judging his proceedings more gently. The Bertrands, who lived apart at Hutt's Gate, were reserved and irritable, and considered it a point of honour to profess an abiding opposition to the tyranny of the gaoler of St. Helena. This led not only to difference of opinion, but of conduct in the two families, which would have been of very little consequence but for the interference of General Gourgaud. Things went so far that the consequences might have been serious between Generals Gourgaud and Montholon, had not Napoleon interfered and prevented an outbreak that would have led to the most deplorable results in the land of exile. He was greatly displeased, and interposing his authority, obliged the two soldiers to abandon their quarrel. His greatest displeasure was directed against General Gourgaud, who was most in fault, and who expressed a wish to leave St. Helena. Napoleon gave him his congé. "I prefer being alone," he said, "to being tormented in my misery by such insensate passion." He saw General Gourgaud very rarely during the remainder of his stay at Longwood, but remembering his former devotedness, he gave him invaluable proofs of his gratitude when he came to take leave. General Gourgaud took with him from St. Helena the first narrative of the campaign of 1815, and published it as his own on his return to Europe. The same work, revised and acknowledged by Napoleon, has been published in a collection of his writings. It is fortunate that both have been preserved, for though they agree perfectly in all essential points, each contains some details wanting in the other, and which explain many events of this memorable campaign.

About this same time Napoleon was deprived of other friends whose loss affected him still more. Admiral Malcolm, whose conduct had proved that a man might do a great deal to alleviate the fate of the illustrious prisoner without infringement of duty, was removed from the command of the seas around the Cape. His intimacy with Napoleon had been disagreeable to Sir Hudson Lowe, who feared that the admiral's conduct might be regarded as a condemnation of his own.

His place was supplied by Admiral Plampin, a man of frigid temperament, with very little desire to visit Longwood. Napoleon parted from Admiral Malcolm as from a friend.

This loss was succeeded by another, which, though not so painful to Napoleon's feelings, caused a disagreeable change in his habits. He had become accustomed not only to English medicine, but to Dr. O'Meara, who brought him news, and gave him a correct account of the contents of the English journals, in

which he felt the greatest interest, as his last ray of hope lay in the prospect of a change in the English ministry. Sir Hudson Lowe having discovered that Dr. O'Meara was in the habit of taking news to Longwood, required that he should inform him of the subject of his conversations with Napoleon. Dr. O'Meara refused, saying that as a true and loyal Englishman he would tell anything he should hear connected with an attempt to escape, but that as a physician he could not betray what his patient had confided to him. This irritated Sir Hudson Lowe, who ordered that Dr. O'Meara should be subjected to the same restrictions as the Frenchmen attached to Napoleon's service, that especially of being followed by a guard whenever he left the precincts of Longwood. Napoleon asserted that his doctor ought to be attached to him personally, and that if the physician could conserve his liberty only as the dependent of the governor, he would resign him altogether. This led to a long dispute, during which many little incidents occurred. Dr. O'Meara was alternately removed, restored, again removed from Napoleon, and finally, with a great deal of rough treatment, sent back to Europe.

Napoleon was now without a physician, which in itself he did not esteem a great privation. "The human frame," he said, "is a watch, which the watchmaker cannot open and repair. Doctors introduce curiously formed instruments, but they cannot see what they do, and it is only by a miracle that they serve the poor machine." This prejudice was strengthened by the unsuccessful attempts that had been made to remove his own disease. He found no relief but from exercise, and some draughts suggested by himself. He thought at first that the tropical climate had given him a disease of the liver. His usual sagacity soon led him to conclude that his malady was in the stomach, which was confirmed by remembering that his father had died of a disease of that organ. This was further confirmed by several fits of vomiting with which he was seized at this time, and he considered himself a better physician than any of those at St. Helena. He had too much good sense, however, not to feel a certain confidence in a science that had been practised for ages, and having indulged in some invectives against mediocre physicians, admitted that it would do him good if he could consult some intelligent man of great experience. He often said, "I have no faith in medicine, but I have in Corvisart. As I cannot have him I desire to be left in peace."

As it was generally known on the island that Napoleon's health was declining, Sir Hudson Lowe became alarmed at the responsibility he had assumed in removing Dr. O'Meara, which induced him to offer the services of Dr. Baxter, of the English

navy, a man very generally esteemed. But this doctor was refused by Napoleon, who felt a distrust of the man esteemed by Sir Hudson Lowe. Besides having incurred the responsibility of having deprived Napoleon of a physician at a time that his health was declining, he had lost the testimony of a person whom he could trust to assure him of the presence of the prisoner. This had become more difficult since Napoleon had adopted the habit of sometimes remaining for eight days without leaving the house, which often compelled the officer on guard to remain waiting for hours for an opportunity to see him. Sir Hudson Lowe had thus caused great inconvenience to himself by removing Dr. O'Meara. He had several conversations on this subject with M. de Montholon. "What can I do?" he said. "If I yield, I shall be accused in Europe of having succumbed to an ascendancy that none has been able to resist; and if I do not, you will accuse me of barbarity."

"The precautions you have taken to prevent an escape," replied M. de Montholon, "of which he is not dreaming, are most irksome to Napoleon, and are the cause of the seclusion in which he persists in living. The more precautions you take, the more retired he will live, which, by injuring his health still more, will but subject you to a moral responsibility both at present and before the tribunal of posterity. You wish to obtain at any cost the daily proof of his presence at Longwood. Dr. O'Meara should not have been removed. Since you have deprived yourself of his services, you must trust to me and my desire to facilitate the accomplishment of your duty and our own. If you attempt force, you will find us in front of Napoleon's door, and your blood and ours will expiate the intended insult. It is therefore that I request you to count on me for procuring your officer the means of seeing his prisoner without giving offence." The result was that the officer, being informed by M. de Montholon of when Napoleon was about to pass from one room to another, hastened to see him, and thus the thoughtfulness of an intelligent and faithful servant prevented the most deplorable disputes.

Napoleon persisting in remaining within doors, and taking very long baths to relieve the pain in his right side, became rapidly weaker. His legs swelled, and his extremities became subject to a continuous chill, which could only be removed by long, continued, external warm applications. His pulse had always been very slow (scarcely amounting to fifty-five beats in his ordinary health), which showed that there must be some difficulty in the circulation. The celebrated Corvisart had, with his rare medical perspicuity, foretold to Napoleon, that should he ever abandon an active life, he would suffer severely, for his circulation would become still lower, and cause such results

as swelling of the legs, cold feet, &c. Napoleon did not regret this fulfilment of the great physician's prophecy, but looked on the symptoms as the announcement of approaching liberty. But the instincts of nature still existing, he yielded to the entreaties of MM. de Montholon and Bertrand, and rode out occasionally. He was offered a small horse, which he accepted, and rode on several occasions. It was near the close of 1818, and the commencement of summer in the southern hemisphere, which procured Napoleon an unanticipated pleasure in his rides. This pleasure was succeeded by some improvement in his health. In the January of 1819 he seemed almost recovered, his complexion became less leaden in hue, his eye less dull, and his legs were no longer so much swollen. Marchand, who loved him as a father, did not conceal the joy he felt. "My son," said Napoleon (he began to call him so about this time), "your affection gives me pleasure; but do not deceive yourself, it is but a last gleam of health. My great constitution is making a final effort, but it will be succeeded by a reaction. I shall be set free, and you too. You will return to Europe, and as far as depends on me you shall be happy there."

There was also a moral cause for this momentary improvement. While in the state of weakness from which he was now recovered, he had almost entirely abandoned all occupation. He no longer thought of dictating his campaigns. One might almost say that he was weary of life, and that he left to posterity the task of vindicating his fame. Some hundreds of volumes were spread around him in confusion; he sometimes took up one, sometimes another, but flung down each in turn, too depressed to feel an interest in any. He unexpectedly met with some historic works relating to the great captains of all ages, and seized on them with avidity. Though his education had been most excellent, he had but a very general idea of the history of Frederick, Turenne, Condé, Gustavus Adolphus, Cæsar, Hannibal, Alexander. The lives of these men written in detail had the greatest charm for him. His physical strength was now almost restored, and with it his intellectual powers. He felt himself equal to continuous attention, and was seized with a burning curiosity to learn the deeds of those celebrated commanders. This study had, of course, a charm for him that it would not have for others. He found in it what others did not seek, and wished to see what progress his predecessors had made in the military art, and thence judge what advance he had made himself. He soon adopted wider views, and resolved to write the lives of illustrious commanders. He would pronounce upon their actions—and where could a more competent judge be found—he would write a history of the military art, at once brilliant and profound, that art which had been his passion and

his glory, and which with the science of politics is the greatest that can engage the intelligence of man. It is strange but most creditable to Napoleon's genius, that from this moment, charmed by the deeds of others, he abandoned the narrative of his own actions, of which he had recounted but a few, and devoted himself to the contemplation of the lives of the great commanders of ancient and modern times. He first turned his attention to Catinat, but, as he said, found him *overrated by the philosophers*. Then passing to Turenne and Condé, "*We must*," he said, "*bow to merit*." He felt the greatest admiration for Turenne. Next to him came Condé, Frederick, and Cæsar. He was in need of books that treated of these subjects, and Sir Hudson Lowe, being informed of this new occupation, was very well pleased to find that he was not thinking of attempting to escape; he sought in the library at Plantation House every book connected with the history of the military art. He found some and sent them to Longwood. Napoleon set to work with his wonted activity, and soon learned all that was to be known of the lives of Frederick, Turenne, and Cæsar. He also wished to study and write those of Condé, Prince Eugène, Marlborough, Gustavus Adolphus, and the Nassaus amongst the modern; those of Alexander and Hannibal amongst the ancients. Having finished these, he intended to turn to those of minor note, if he lived long enough to accomplish the task. He still wanted books, especially a Polybius, which he was greatly annoyed at not possessing, as he wished to go to the fountain-head for his information concerning Hannibal, for whom he felt the greatest admiration. He had Cæsar's Commentaries, a book that may be had everywhere, even on the most deserted rock in the ocean. This enabled him to form a judgment of the great Roman captain, and dictate to Marchand pages which will be immortal, both because of the two Cæsars—him of whom these pages treat, and him who composed them.

The improvement apparent in his health at the beginning of 1819 did not continue. He was attacked with violent pains in the stomach, felt the greatest repugnance to food, and great difficulty in digesting it. He often threw up blackish matter, and had once a long fainting fit. There was a distinguished physician, John Stokoe, on board the *Conqueror*, and he was brought to the illustrious patient, whose permission had not been asked, but who made no objection to him as he was not an emissary of Sir Hudson Lowe. Napoleon received him very well, displayed his usual want of confidence in all medicine, more especially in the English. "It is my end," he said, "that is approaching, and my own soothing draughts are better than anything you can order me." Doctor Stokoe repeated his visits several times; but the qualities that won him Napoleon's

confidence lost him that of Sir Hudson Lowe, who soon forbade his visiting Longwood. A doctor had been sent for to Europe, as well as some servants and a priest or two, as there was not one at St. Helena: so great was the want in this respect that when one of Napoleon's servants died, the burial rites were performed by a Protestant minister. Cardinal Fesch was requested to make a suitable selection. His connection with the different courts of Europe afforded him facilities for this purpose denied to the rest of his family.

Whilst awaiting these arrivals Napoleon had to bear another parting, which pained him more than all the rest. Madame de Montholon, whose amiable disposition had largely contributed to soften the rigour of his captivity, found her health injured by the climate, and the English physicians declared that she had had disease of the liver for some time. She was anxious also about her children, and it became absolutely necessary that she should leave. Napoleon wished M. de Montholon to accompany his wife; but he, seeing the state of his master's health, refused to leave him. Madame Montholon left with her children; but Napoleon felt that he must soon send the husband after the wife, and that Madame Bertrand would soon follow, as her children would also need a European education; she would probably be followed by her husband. He knew that however great the devotedness of his followers might be, it should yield to domestic duties; but he did not complain, only saying that he ought to die if it were only to avoid being left alone. He saw death approach, but he felt neither fear nor regret.

Towards the end of the year 1819 Napoleon's disease resumed its slow but progressive course, and he returned to his solitary mode of life. It was with great difficulty that the officer on duty could see him, and Lord Bathurst's orders that his presence should be reported every day were no longer observed. He was often several days without seeing the captive, but considering that the constant visits of the servants to the sick room, their eagerness and evident anxiety, could not be a plan to conceal an escape, he contented himself without getting further proof of his prisoner's presence. There was no need of fear, for had the doors of his prison been thrown open at this time, the utmost that his strength would have permitted would be to go outside the door for a little air. But Sir Hudson Lowe became embarrassed by the repeated orders of Lord Bathurst. He had recourse to an ingenious but rather undignified means of communicating with his prisoner. Letters for Napoleon had always been delivered through Marshal Bertrand; but Lord Bathurst, considering that this was treating him too much like a sovereign, ordered that all communications should be given

to him personally. This affording a sure means of seeing Napoleon, Sir Hudson Lowe determined to profit by it. He sent to Longwood an officer on horseback, who behaved politely enough in other respects, but said he had a packet to deliver to *Napoleon Bonaparte*. He was sent to Marchand, who, aware of the customary forms, and fearing that there was some intention of violating them, told him that all communications intended for the *Emperor Napoleon* should be transmitted through the Grand-Marshal Bertrand. The officer was dismissed in this fashion, and Marchand immediately told his master of what had occurred. Napoleon at once desired his servants to refuse admittance to all that should present themselves, and fearing that force would be used, he took a resolution after the fashion of Charles XII.

"It is as good," he said, "to make a tragic end here in defence of our dignity as to die on a bed of sickness." He ordered his pistols to be loaded, and desired his servants to do the same, and it was resolved that whoever should force the emperor's door should receive a bullet in his head.

Sir Hudson came himself, accompanied by his staff, sent for MM. Marchand and Montholon, spoke of his orders not being executed, and declared that whoever would resist should be sent to the Cape. He was told in reply, that no alteration could be made in the etiquette observed around the emperor, and that it was not under existing circumstances that any want of respect should be shown him. Sir Hudson Lowe left in anger, declaring that the orders of the British government should be executed by force. On the following day an officer with a strong escort presented himself, told the domestics that he had a message to deliver to *Napoleon Bonaparte*, and must be admitted. He was referred to Marchand, who told him to go to the grand-marshal. Thus repulsed, he commenced to walk through the house knocking at the doors, and at last approached that of the emperor. Napoleon was quietly reading in his apartment, his pistols loaded near him, his entire household standing behind the door, ready like him to make a tragic end of their captivity in defending their master from this last humiliation. The officer passed from door to door, knocked at all, but finding that none was opened, mounted his horse and returned to Plantation House without having accomplished his mission.

This was a fruitless and pitiful attempt directed against such a man as the prisoner of St. Helena, and a very heartless one, considering the state of his health. Napoleon was as revived by this scene as though he had again heard the roar of cannon, which had so often resounded in his ears. Sir Hudson Lowe did not venture to persevere, but confined himself to threats, which did not produce much impression after his late mishap.

About the same time, the end of the year 1819, the personages sent by Cardinal Fesch arrived at St. Helena. These were a young Italian doctor named Antomarchi, a man of some intelligence, little experience, and extreme presumption; a good old priest, the Abbé Buonavita, an old Mexican missionary, and a young priest, the Abbé Vignale, both very good men, but deficient in information and intelligence. With these came three or four servants to fill the vacancies in the emperor's household. These new-comers spent some days in the town before coming to Longwood, and by accepting some attentions from Sir Hudson Lowe, produced a rather unfavourable impression on their master, whose antipathy to the governor had become a real passion. But Napoleon soon forgave them as he listened to the accounts they brought of his family, especially of his mother, his sister Pauline, and his brothers Lucien and Joseph. His mother and sister pressingly renewed their request to be allowed to come to St. Helena: Joseph and Lucien made a more agreeable proposition, that they should spend three years with him alternately. Napoleon was greatly touched by this offer, though his anticipation of an approaching death made it perfectly useless.

He had a conversation concerning his health with the young doctor Antomarchi, and submitted to a minute inspection at his hands, but only smiled at his opinion, and told him, as he did all his doctors, that he would *rather die of disease than of medicine*. He desired him to visit the garrison hospital, and observe what effect the climate produced on Europeans, saying that he might thus acquire some information that would be useful in his case. He then had an interview with the two priests, whom he found to be both unpretending and ignorant. "It is exactly such a selection," he said, "as I should expect from my uncle Fesch. Always the same intelligence, the same discernment. This doctor knows nothing, though he believes he knows a great deal. My uncle gave himself unnecessary trouble when he sent such a physician to me, who would not listen to any one but Corvisart! I have had a conversation with these two priests on religious subjects—of what else is one to speak when death is so near? and that single interview has exhausted their powers. I wanted a learned priest with whom I could speak of the dogmas of Christianity. He certainly could not inspire me with more faith in God than I possess already; but he might have strengthened my belief in some important points in the Christian faith. It would be so agreeable to approach the tomb with full confidence in the Catholic religion! But I cannot expect anything of this kind from my two priests. They can, however, celebrate mass for me."

There was a large dining-room at Longwood which Napoleon

did not use, as since the disputes between his friends he breakfasted and dined alone, that he might not oblige them to meet at table. But since Madame de Montholon's departure he dined with M. de Montholon in one of the two rooms to which he was now confined. He had the large dining-room converted into a chapel, where mass was to be celebrated every Sunday. He did not compel any person to attend, though he commended those who did—and these were the greater number; and this mass, celebrated on a rock in the midst of the ocean, had for Napoleon an indescribable charm, awakening as it did all the memories of childhood. He was never heard to reprove any person for neglecting this religious duty, but would not suffer an irreverent word to be spoken on the subject. The young Antomarchi having made some remarks that displeased him, he reproved him severely, and said that for himself he did not object to one's having faith or not, that he formed no opinion of anybody, but that he would not permit any want of respect towards the most venerable religion of the human race, and which was the national faith both of the French and Italians. These words were spoken with an air of authority that forbade reply, especially to one who was not accustomed to be contradicted even at St. Helena. Napoleon added, as he turned to those present, "Do you know where those go who will not go to mass? To Cagliostro or Mademoiselle Lenormand. It must be admitted that mass is better than that."

The vessel that had brought the doctor and priests had also brought several cases of books. Weak as Napoleon was, he wished to have these cases opened in his presence. Having examined several volumes, he exclaimed that he needed something else—that books were not all that should be sent to a father. In the bottom of one of the cases was found concealed the portrait of the Duke de Reichstadt, taken from life, and which had been procured by Prince Eugène. Napoleon seized it with delight, gazed at it for a long time, and had it hung in a part of his room where he could have it constantly before his eyes. He then returned to examine the books, but complained much of not finding a Polybius, an author whom he so much wished to read, as being the principal historian of Hannibal. He found several works on modern history. He read these eagerly, sometimes with pleasure, sometimes with anger, but filled them all with notes.

The state of his health became more alarming every day. Of all that Dr. Antomarchi had said, only one opinion impressed him, and that because it agreed with Dr. O'Meara's, Dr. Stokoe's, and his own, namely, that in his case exercise was absolutely indispensable, and the only remedy that could be used with any hope of success. It was the only remedy, indeed, in which

he had any confidence; but he still felt the same repugnance to go out followed by an officer. Dr. Antomarchi said that riding was good exercise, but not the only one, and that gardening would be quite as healthful. This was a real ray of light for Napoleon, and procured him some moments of enjoyment, the last of his life.

He immediately adopted this new mode of exercise, compelling the entire colony to do the same. It was the commencement of the year 1820, and the weather was delightful. Napoleon desired that everybody at Longwood should follow his example—rise at four, and furnished with spades, set to work in the garden. Nobody was exempted from this service, and all, from MM. Bertrand, Montholon, and Marchand, down to the simplest domestics, including the Chinese, worked under his orders. This occupation gave universal pleasure, it relieved the weariness of the exiles; but even had it been otherwise, they would not have shunned the labour, since it was not only an amusement but an advantage to their master. A few days of this exercise made an evident improvement in his health, and again, as at the end of the preceding year, his decreasing pallor, the abated swelling of his legs, his slight increase of appetite, and less frequent vomitings gave hopes of an abiding improvement. For a long time past Napoleon had laid aside his uniform, retaining only the white culotte and silk stockings. With these he wore a civilian's coat. This he now changed for the costume of a planter. Clad in a dress of some light white Indian material, a straw hat, and a stick in his hand, he directed the labours of his household with the air of an officer of engineers. His first undertaking was to erect a turf embankment as a protection against the south-east wind, and this was soon sufficiently high to shelter the house and garden from this hateful wind. He then transplanted trees, amongst others, some lemon-trees, and above all, an oak, the tree he had so much longed to see again, and which is all that has survived of the garden cultivated by his glorious hands. As there was a deficiency of water, he had it brought from a reservoir that Sir Hudson Lowe had constructed at the foot of the peak of Diana. This water being turned with great skill on the garden at Longwood, soon covered it with verdure, for in these burning climates, if heat and moisture combine, vegetation progresses rapidly. Napoleon's garden soon yielded vegetables, which it gave him great pleasure to see on his table. When Sir Hudson Lowe was informed of the new occupation of his illustrious captive, he sent to offer him plants, instruments, and workmen. Napoleon accepted part of what the governor offered, and at the expiration of two months his garden, thanks to the exertions of his household, began to assume a new aspect, and his

health and temper improved. He worked, and made the others work, from four in the morning until ten, when the heat became oppressive. They then breakfasted under a tent, he and his friends at one table, the servants at another. He afterwards retired to rest for awhile, bade the others do the same, and closed the day with reading and dictation.

These occupations were resumed with equal ardour next morning, and for the short time this improvement continued, he was gay, amiable, sometimes witty, sometimes learned. When some plant or insect attracted his attention, he would occasionally burst forth in the most lofty and eloquent reflections on God and creation. At other times he would give the most picturesque and piquant descriptions of physical truths derived from the observation of particular facts. A servant, digging in one of the canals cut for the purpose of irrigation, had injured the root of a yew, and when Marchand pointed out the injury, Napoleon said, "If you were hungry, and an agreeable repast were placed behind you, you would turn to gratify your appetite. This tree will do the same. Its roots, which have been uncovered on this side, will turn to the other, and the tree after a momentary decline will resume its former vigour."

This physical labour enabled him to resume his intellectual occupations, and his returning health was accompanied by a remarkable awakening of intelligence. He dictated the life of Cæsar about this period, or wrote numerous notes on contemporary works sent to him from Europe. He had already made some annotations on the works of M. de Pradt, and now at the commencement of 1820 he commenced his notes on a work on the Hundred Days written by M. Fleury de Chaboulon, a well-intentioned young man, but who often spoke on subjects of which he was ignorant or did not understand. Napoleon had covered the pages of this work with notes most indulgent to the author, but replete with revelations most interesting to history. He was also engaged, but in a different spirit, by a work possessing a different kind of importance, and written by General Rogniat, on the principles of war. General Rogniat had been a distinguished officer of engineers; but his military qualities were spoiled by an ill-judging and malevolent mind. His work, chimerical for the most part, showed but little good feeling towards the captive of St. Helena, whom he had once most submissively obeyed, but now calumniated without reserve. This book excited Napoleon's anger, though it caused him no anxiety as to his fame. "It would be something serious," he said, "if Frederick the Great were living, and criticised my campaigns; however, I should be able to answer him; but such persons," meaning Rogniat and some others, "cannot cause me any alarm." Although this was his estimation of General

Rogniat, he did him the honour of replying to him by annotating his work, and thus secured for the author an immortality he could not otherwise have obtained. Napoleon in these notes has traced in a style of unprecedented clearness, precision, and strength the principles of his art, even to their least details, together with some pages dedicated to the campaigns of the most celebrated commanders, a subject that had the greatest interest for him at the time. Never was a loftier or simpler style chosen to treat a great subject, for it was of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Napoleon, and of their actions viewed on general principles of policy and war, that he treated. We may add, that calumniating mediocrity was never punished more severely or by a nobler hand.

This was the last gleam of his genius, and we may say of his life. Having shown extraordinary activity during some months, he rapidly declined with the disappearance of the fine weather, and his health became worse than ever during the latter half of the year 1820. He again became sedentary, sad, indolent in body and mind, and had only time to finish the lives of Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick. The fine weather returned with the last months of 1820, but made no improvement in his health. He no longer took exercise, his legs began to swell, his feet became cold, and the very sight of food was offensive to his stomach. From this time he no longer doubted of his approaching end, and except that he regretted not having completed all that he had intended to write, he beheld the approach of death with pleasure.

He had never seriously thought of attempting an escape. The island was too closely guarded to allow the smallest boat to approach unperceived, and so constant was the watch kept over his person that it would have been impossible for him to disappear for more than a few hours without being discovered, even though concealed in the most secret part of the island. It is not unlikely that his great dislike to the officer on guard arose from the consciousness of its being impossible for him to escape from his gaolers. There is no doubt but that he considered escape next to impossible. A still stronger motive prevented him from thinking of it. Contemplating the existing state of things with the discrimination of a profound observer, he saw that though the world was not forgetful of his glory, that it could very well do without him. This convinced him that he was for ever excluded from active life. His only hope was to obtain another residence. Though he saw that public opinion in England was undergoing a change, he did not expect that the Whigs would soon come into office, nor did he suppose that they would restore him to liberty. Lord and Lady Holland had testified the liveliest interest in his welfare, and felt that

the great captive might be kept in safety without causing him unnecessary torture. They had sent him presents of books, fruits, and wines, accompanied with sincere expressions of sympathy, which gave him the greater pleasure, as they assured him that he was not the object of universal hatred. But there was a great difference between private sympathy and an important decision of government. He had therefore no hope but from death, the sole comfort of the hopeless. Though the prospect of completing the writings he had commenced might make a prolongation of life endurable, it could furnish no motive for desiring existence, and besides, what could a few additional pages add to his fame? They would have been valuable to the few who could have appreciated them, but would not have added in the least to his glory. Death had not for him the horrors it has for others, and if there were moments when a physical instinct awakened within him some faint desire for life, still his soul welcomed death as a friend that came to open the portals of the hideous prison of St. Helena. This feeling was strengthened by other circumstances.

Although M. de Montholon had remained at St. Helena since the departure of his wife and children, without showing the least desire to follow them, this self-sacrifice could not last for ever, as the general would naturally be obliged at length to consider the interests of his family living without him in Europe. The Bertrands, too, who resided at some distance from Longwood, and who, though depressed in spirits, were most assiduous in their attentions, had several children, whose education could not be much longer neglected. Madame Bertrand had respectfully informed Napoleon that this duty would soon oblige her to leave St. Helena. Though Napoleon could not blame this resolution, it pained him deeply. He saw that the grand-marshal would not allow his wife to set out alone on so long a voyage, and he requested him to accept his congé for such time as circumstances would require. Although the Bertrands, from their temperament, and living at a distance from Longwood, had not afforded him so much consolation in his captivity as the Montholons, he still appreciated the noble probity of the grand-marshal and the high principles of his wife, and felt depressed at seeing that the little colony would soon be reduced to Marchand alone. "You have no children to educate," he said to him; "you will remain to close my eyes. You will read to me, you will write a few more pages, and then you, too, will leave. But I see it is time that I should go."

The year 1821 came at last, that year that was to terminate the wondrous career of Napoleon. At the commencement of January his health improved, but only for a few days. "It is a respite," he said, "of a week or two, and then the disease will

resume its course." He then dictated a few pages touching Cæsar to Marchand; they were the last he wrote. About the same time he saw the death of his sister Eliza announced in the papers. It pained him deeply. She was the first person of his family that had died since he had attained the use of reason. "She has shown me the way," he said; "I must follow." The symptoms of his disease returned now with greater violence than ever. Napoleon's complexion became livid, his glance was expressive of as much power as ever, but his eyes were sunken, his legs swelled, his extremities became cold, and his stomach rejected every species of food, and these ejections were accompanied by a discharge of blackish matter. February brought no other change than an increased intensity of the symptoms. Not being able to digest any food, the august invalid became weaker every day. He was tormented by intense thirst, and his pulse, once so slow, beat with feverish rapidity. He wished for air, though he could not endure it when admitted. The light pained him, and he now never left the rooms in which were his two camp-beds, being removed occasionally from one to the other. He did not dictate any more, but had Homer read to him, and the account of Hannibal's war in Livy, not having been able to procure Polybius.

His health became still worse in March, and on the 17th, thinking that during a short drive he could breathe more freely, he was put into a carriage, but when brought into the air, he very nearly fainted, and was borne back to the bed in which he was to die. "I am no longer," he said, "that proud Napoleon whom the world has so often seen on horseback. The monarchs who persecute me may set their minds at rest, I shall soon remove every cause of fear." Napoleon's faithful servants never left him. Montholon and Marchand remained day and night by his bedside, an attention for which he showed himself profoundly grateful. The grand-marshal told him that neither he nor his wife would leave, and Napoleon thanked him warmly. The grand-marshal asked permission for his wife to visit him. "I am not fit to be seen," he said; "I shall receive Madame Bertrand when I am better. Tell her that I thank her for the devotion that has kept her for six years in this desert."

In this desperate condition, no longer able to go out, seeing only his dearest friends, and unable to bear light or heat, he was become totally invisible to his gaoler. The unfortunate Sir Hudson Lowe was seized with terror, as though so serious an illness and the sadness depicted on every face at Longwood were only a feint got up to conceal an attempt at escape. The officer on guard, who behaved most considerately, had no such suspicions, and endeavoured to reassure the governor by declaring that the illness was real, and that there was no

necessity for tormenting the illustrious captive by an attempt to see him. This did not satisfy Sir Hudson Lowe, who found the commissioners as doubtful as himself. M. de Sturmer had been recalled by Austria, for it was evident that England would never allow her prey to escape, and the presence of an Austrian envoy would only render his country responsible to public opinion for the treatment inflicted on the son-in-law of Francis II. M. de Balmain had married a daughter of Sir Hudson Lowe, and in general adopted his opinions. M. de Montchenu, the French envoy, was most anxious to be assured of the presence of the prisoner, and wished for some means of solving the doubts he entertained. Impressed by these suspicions, Sir Hudson Lowe finally gave orders to an officer to force the door of the invalid's chamber if necessary, as fifteen days had elapsed since he had been seen. The officer on duty behaved with great delicacy, and told MM. Marchand and de Montholon of his embarrassment, assured them that he would not force Napoleon's door, but requested them to afford him an opportunity of seeing him. M. de Montholon, who did not consider, like the grand-marshal, that these disputes compromised Napoleon's honour, came to an understanding with the officer. He placed him outside one of the windows, which he partially opened as the invalid was removed from one bed to another. The officer could distinguish his noble countenance, become pale and meagre under the influence of approaching death, and immediately wrote to the governor that it was not a fearful comedy that was being enacted at Longwood.

The unfortunate governor was no sooner delivered from one cause of fear than he was assailed by another. Having first apprehended an escape, he now reproached himself for allowing his prisoner to die without proper assistance. He insisted that a doctor of the island should attend with Dr. Antomarchi, by which means he would have a daily witness of Napoleon's presence, an exact account of his illness, and a reply for those in Europe who would say that he had allowed the glorious invalid to die without medical aid. Dr. Antomarchi, alarmed for his own responsibility, also desired that he should be assisted by one or two physicians; but Napoleon refused, not wishing to be tormented by remedies in whose success he had no confidence. There was, however, a doctor at St. Helena belonging to the 20th regiment who was universally esteemed. Napoleon yielded to the entreaties of his friends, and consented to receive him, which he did with great politeness, but repeating what he had so often said when he spoke of his health, that it was a *lost battle*, affected to approve his advice, but did not follow it, wishing, as he said, to die in peace.

Having now reached the last days of April without any

renewal of hope, or wishing for it, and considering his end as very near, he determined to make his will. He had still four millions with the interest in the hands of M. Lafitte, and some part of a sum of money confided to Prince Eugène. He had drawn 200,000 or 300,000 francs of the latter sum through the assistance of M. de las Cases when he had returned to Europe. He still retained his reserve of 350,000 francs in gold, which he had brought with him to St. Helena. This he distributed between M. de Montholon, the grand-marshal, Marchand, and his other attendants, to enable them to return to Europe and supply their first expenses on arriving there. Of the four millions remaining in France, he left two to M. de Montholon, to secure him a competency, 700,000 or 800,000 francs to the Bertrands, and about 500,000 to Marchand. He also gave the latter the diamond necklace of Queen Hortense, and appointed him executor in conjunction with MM. de Montholon and Bertrand, in acknowledgment of his undeviating fidelity. He left legacies to his other servants suited to their condition, endeavouring to secure a competency to all after his death. Though not very well pleased with Dr. Antomarchi, but grateful for his attention, he left him 100,000 francs; nor did he forget the Abbé Vignale, the sole remaining priest at St. Helena. He even remembered the Chinese servants, who had served him faithfully. Having provided as far as he could for all, he collected any objects of value he possessed, and left them by will as souvenirs to his son, his mother, his sisters and brothers. He did not forget the generous Lady Holland, to whom he left one of his snuff-boxes. To these legacies he added some expressions of affection for Marie Louise. He had learned to estimate this princess at her just value, but he wished to honour in her the mother of his son.

Napoleon devoted several days to making these arrangements and committing them to writing. His labour suffered frequent interruptions from pain and weariness. All was arranged at length, and with his usual love of order he had a legal document drawn up of the transfer of his will, and all that he possessed, to his testamentary executors, that there might be no cause of dispute after his death. He desired that the rites of the Catholic faith should be observed at his burial, and that the dining-room in which he was accustomed to hear mass should be converted into a *chapelle ardente*. Dr. Antomarchi could not help smiling as he heard these orders given to the Abbé Vignale. Napoleon considered this as a want of respect to his authority, his genius, and his death. "Young man," he said in a severe tone, "perhaps you are too clever to believe in God; I am not in that position—a man cannot become an atheist merely by wishing it." This severe lesson, spoken in terms

worthy of a great man at the point of death, overwhelmed the young doctor with confusion; he made a thousand excuses, and made profession of the most satisfactory moral principles.

These preparations for death weakened Napoleon, and perhaps hastened his end. Still it was both a moral and physical relief to him to have arranged his affairs, and secured, as far as he could, the fate of his companions. Meeting death with a smile as dignified as it was grateful, he said to Montholon and Marchand, who never left him, "It would be a great pity not to die, now that I have arranged all my affairs so well."

The end of April had arrived, and every moment increased his danger and suffering. He had no relief from the spasms, vomitings, fever, and burning thirst. Napoleon was relieved by occasionally drinking some drops of fresh water brought from the foot of the peak of Diana, the spot where he had wished to have a dwelling erected. "I wish," he said, "if it is possible, that I should be buried on the banks of the Seine, or at Ajaccio, in my family domain, or should my body be fated to continue a prisoner, at the foot of the fountain whose waters have afforded me some relief." This his friends promised with tears, for they no longer concealed from him a state he so well understood himself. "You will return to Europe," he said to those that surrounded him. "You will return bearing with you the reflection of my glory, with the honour of your own fidelity. You will be esteemed and happy. I go to meet Kleber, Desaix, Lannes, Massena, Bessières, Duroc, Ney! They will come to meet me. They will experience once more the intoxication of human glory. We shall speak of what we have done. We shall talk of our profession with Frederick, Turenne, Condé, Cæsar, and Hannibal." Then pausing, Napoleon added with a peculiar smile, "Unless there should be as great an objection in the upper spheres as there is here below to see a number of soldiers together." This badinage, alternating with the most solemn discourse, produced a profound effect upon those present. On the 1st of May the agony seemed to commence, and he was in constant torture. On the 2nd and 3rd Napoleon was in high fever, and suffered from continual spasms. Whenever his sufferings abated, his mind was as radiant as ever, and he spoke with clearness and serenity. During one of these intervals he dictated, under the title of first and second reverie, two notes on the defence of France in case of an invasion. On the 3rd he became delirious, and amid his ravings these words were distinguishable: "My son. The army. Desaix." It would seem as though he had a last vision of the battle of Marengo recovered by Desaix. The agony continued during the entire of the 4th, and the noble countenance of the hero was terribly distorted. The weather was terrible,

it was the bad season at St. Helena. Sudden gusts of wind tore up some of the planted trees. On the 5th of May there was no doubt but that the last day of his extraordinary life had dawned. All his servants, kneeling round his bed, watched the last flickerings of the vital flame. These were unfortunately attended with bitter suffering. The English officers, assembled outside, listened with respectful interest to the accounts the servants gave of his agony. Towards the decline of day his life and sufferings decreased together; the cold extending from the extremities became general, and death seemed about to seize his glorious victim. The weather had become calm and serene. About twenty minutes past five, when the sun was setting in waves of light, and the English cannon gave the signal for retiring, those around the bed perceived that the patient did not breathe, and cried out that he was dead. They covered his hands with kisses, and Marchand, who had brought to St. Helena the cloak the First Consul had worn at Marengo, laid it over his body, leaving only his noble head uncovered.

The convulsions of the death agony, always so painful to witness, were succeeded by a majestic tranquillity of expression. That face, so wondrously beautiful, now restored to the slenderness of youth, and the figure clad in the mantle of Marengo, seemed to present again to the witnesses of that touching scene General Bonaparte in the meridian of his glory.

The governor and the French envoy wished to feed their eyes on this spectacle, but showed all due respect in presence of a death that was as extraordinary as the life it terminated.

During the six years that had now terminated, Napoleon had expiated the fear he had caused the world, a fear that inspired those who surrounded him with more or less cruelty—for fear is cruel—in proportion as they were more or less distant from the victim. The officers on guard, coming in some way in contact with him, could not help taking an interest in his welfare, and lightening his fetters whenever they could. Sir Hudson Lowe, not meeting him directly, was quarrelsome, sometimes persecuting him through distrust or resentment, and sometimes experiencing a movement of pity when told of the sufferings of the prisoner. Lord Bathurst, at two thousand leagues' distance, not being cognisant of the sufferings of his victim, was filled with the passions of Europe, and acted most unmercifully. He left a sad legacy to his country, for if justice compels us to admit that England had a right to restrain Napoleon, it must also be conceded that she had no right either to torment or humiliate him.

In obedience to Napoleon's instructions, his body was opened, and from the examination it would appear that cancer in the stomach was the principal cause of his death. The liver was

slightly diseased, which shows that the climate had some, though not a determining influence on his general health. There is no doubt but grief and suppressed despair, joined to want of exercise, had accelerated the progress of the disease and shortened his life, though it would be impossible to say by how many years.

The inspection of his body revealed several wounds, some very slight, and three very distinct. Of these three, one was in his head, one on the ring finger of the left hand, and a third in the left thigh, the last a very deep wound resulting from a bayonet thrust received at the siege of Toulon. Of these wounds the origin of the latter alone can be historically ascertained. From the measures taken and the exact description made of the body, it appears that Napoleon was five feet two inches (French measure), the body well proportioned, the feet and hands remarkable for the regularity of their form, the shoulders wide, the chest well developed, the neck a little short, but bearing firmly and erect the largest and best formed head ever submitted to the investigations of science, and a countenance whose beauty even death respected, of which his contemporaries have preserved an ineffaceable remembrance, and of which posterity will say, when comparing it with busts from the antique, that it was one of the most beautiful that God had ever made to manifest the workings of genius. His life, so pregnant in action that it seems to comprise centuries, did not last more than fifty-two years. MM. de Montholon and Marchand dressed him in the uniform he preferred, that of the chasseurs of the guard, and placed upon his puissant head the little hat he was accustomed to wear. A single priest and a few friends prayed for some days beside his inanimate body. What a wonderful lesson (conformable to the termination of his career) was presented by the profound solitude that surrounded the death-bed of the man that the universe had looked up to and flattered! To the honour of soldiers it must be recorded that as long as his coffin remained open, the English troops defiled around. When at last the tomb that was to receive him was completed, and which was situate near the fountain whose waters had afforded him some relief, his friends, followed by the governor, the staff of the island, the soldiers of the garrison, and the marines of the naval squadron, bore him to the spot where he was to repose until when in accordance with his wishes he was transported to the banks of the Seine. The English soldiers fired a salute of cannon over his inanimate body, and his companions in exile, having knelt for a while beside the tomb that had just received the remains of the greatest man the world had seen since Cæsar and Charlemagne, prepared to return to Europe. As a concluding lesson to the

many that may be derived from this tomb, we must add that the exiles from St. Helena were received with general interest even in England, whilst the unfortunate Hudson Lowe, who was merely the instrument of his government, was met with coldness by his countrymen, with ingratitude by the ministers he had obeyed, and with embarrassment by his very friends. Eternal justice of Providence revealing itself here below! At St. Helena, Napoleon expiated the misery he had caused the world, and those to whom it was allotted to punish him had to expiate the disrespect they had shown to glory and genius!

Before concluding this history, whose length will, we hope, be pardoned in consideration of the great events of which it treats, we must pronounce on him who is the subject of it the judgment of posterity, at least as far as it can be interpreted by a man, were he as just and enlightened as we do not pretend, but wish to be.

Napoleon was endowed by nature with a clear, penetrating, vast, comprehensive, and peculiarly active mind, nor had he less decision of character than clearness of intellect. He always went directly and undeviatingly to his object. In reasoning he seized at once the decisive argument; in battle, the most effective movement. To conceive, resolve, and perform were with him but one indivisible act; so wonderful was his rapidity that not a moment was spent in reflection between perception and action. Any obstacle presented to such a mind by a trifling objection, by indolence, weakness, or disaffection, served but to cause his anger to spring forth, and cover you with its foam. Had he chosen some civil profession where success can only be attained by persuading men and winning them over, he might have endeavoured to subdue or moderate his fiery temperament; but flung into the career of arms, and endowed with the sovereign faculty of seeing the surest means of conquest at a glance, he became at one bound the ruler of Italy, at a second the master of the French republic, at a third the sovereign of Europe. What wonder that a nature formed so impetuous by God should become more so from success; what wonder if he were abrupt, violent, domineering, and unbending in his resolutions! If apart from the battlefield he exercised that tact so necessary in civil business, it was in the Council of State, though even there he decided questions with a sagacity and clearness of judgment that astonished and subdued his hearers, except on some few occasions when he was misled for a moment by passion, or want of sufficient knowledge of the subject under discussion. Both nature and circumstances combined to make him the most despotic and impetuous of men.

In contemplating his career, it does not appear that this fiery, despotic nature revealed itself at once or altogether. In his youth he was lean, taciturn, and even sad, sad from concentrated ambition that feeds upon itself until it finds an outlet and attains the object of its desires. As a young man he was sometimes rude, morose, until becoming the object of universal admiration, he became more open, calm, and communicative, lost the meagreness that made his countenance so expressive, and as one may say, unfolded himself. Consul for life, emperor, conqueror at Marengo and Austerlitz, still exercising some little restraint on himself, he seemed to have reached the apogee of his moral existence, and his figure, then moderately stout, was radiant with regular and manly beauty. But soon, when nations submitted and sovereigns bowed before him, he was no longer restrained by respect for man or even for nature. He dared, attempted all things, spoke without restraint, was gay, familiar, and often intemperate in language; his moral and physical nature became more developed; nor did his extreme stoutness diminish his Olympian beauty, his fuller countenance still preserved the eagle glance; and when descending from his accustomed height from which he excited admiration, fear, and hatred, he became merry, familiar, and almost vulgar, he could resume his dignity in a moment, for he was able to descend without demeaning himself; and when at length, in advancing life, he is supposed to be less active or less daring, because of his increasing embonpoint, or because that fortune had ceased to smile on him, he bounds more impetuously than ever on his charger, and shows that for his ardent mind, matter is no burden, misfortune no restraint.

Such were the successive developments of this extraordinary nature. It is not so easy to estimate Napoleon's moral qualities, for it is rather difficult to discover goodness in a soldier who was continually strewing the earth with dead, or friendship in a man who never knew an equal, or probity in a potentate in whose power were the riches of the universe. Still, though an exception to all ordinary rules, we may occasionally catch some traits of the moral physiognomy of this extraordinary man.

In all things, promptness was his distinctive characteristic. He would become angry, but would recover his calmness with wonderful facility, almost ashamed of his excitement, laughing at it if he could do so without compromising his dignity, and would again address with affectionate words or gestures the officer he had overpowered by his burst of passion. His anger was sometimes affected, for the purpose of intimidating subalterns who neglected their duty. When real, his displeasure passed like a flash of lightning; when affected, it lasted as long as it was needed. When he was no longer obliged to command,

restrain, or impel men, he became gentle, simple, and just, just as is every man of great mind that understands human nature, appreciates and pardons its weaknesses because he knows they are inevitable. At St. Helena, deprived of all external prestige, his power departed, without any other ascendant over his companions than that derived from his intellect and disposition, Napoleon ruled them with absolute sway, won them by his unchanging amiability, and that to such a degree that having feared him for the greater part of their lives, they ended by loving him for the remainder. On the battlefield he had acquired an insensibility that was almost fearful; he could behold, unmoved, the ground covered with a hundred thousand lifeless bodies, for none had ever caused so much human blood to flow as he. This insensibility was, so to speak, a consequence of his profession. Often would he in the evening ride over the battlefield which in the morning he had strewn with all the horrors of war, to see that the wounded were removed, a proceeding that might be the result of policy, but was not; and frequently sprang from his horse to assure himself whether in an apparently lifeless body the vital spark did not still linger. At Wagram he saw a fine young man in the uniform of the cuirassiers lying on the ground with his face covered with clotted blood; he sprang at once from his horse, supported the head of the wounded youth on his knee, restored him by the aid of some spirituous remedy, and said, smiling, "He will recover; it is one more saved!" These are no proofs of want of feeling.

In everything connected with finance he was almost avaricious, disputing even about a centime, whilst he would give millions to his friends, servants, or the poor. Having discovered that a distinguished savant who had accompanied him to Egypt was in embarrassed circumstances, he sent him a large sum, blaming him at the same time for not having told him of his position. In 1813, having expended all his ready money, and learning that a lady of high birth who had once been very rich was in want of the very necessities of life, he immediately appointed her a pension of 24,000 francs, as much as 50,000 at the present time, and being told that she was eighty-four years of age, "Poor woman," he said, "let her be paid four years in advance." These, we must repeat, are no indications of want of kindness of disposition.

Having but little time to devote to private friendships, removed from them by his superiority to other men, but still under the influence of time and habit, he did become attached to some, so strongly attached as to be indulgent even to weakness to those he loved. This was the case with regard to his relatives, whose pretensions often provoked his anger; but

seeing them annoyed, he relented, and to gratify them, often did what he knew to be unwise. Although the admiration he had felt for the Empress Josephine passed away with time, and though she had by many thoughtless acts lowered herself in his esteem, he always entertained for her, even after his divorce, the most profound affection. He wept for Duroc, but in secret, as though it were a weakness.

As to his probity, we know not by what standard to estimate such a quality in a man who from the very commencement of his public career had immense riches at his command. When he became commander-in-chief of the army in Italy, and was master of all the wealth of the country, he first supplied his army abundantly, and then sent assistance to the army on the Rhine, reserving nothing for himself, or at most only a sum sufficient to purchase a small house, Rue de la Victoire, a purchase for which one year's pay would have sufficed; and had he died in Egypt his widow would have been left destitute. Was this the result of pride, disdain of vulgar enjoyments, or honesty? Perhaps there was a little of all in this forbearance, which was not unexampled amongst our generals, though certainly as rare then as it has ever been. He punished dishonesty with extreme severity, which might be attributed to his love of order; but what was still better, and seemed to indicate that he possessed the quality himself, was the positive affection he showed for honest people, carried so far as to take pleasure in their society, and make no concealment of his feelings.

Still this man whom God had made so great and so good was not a virtuous man; for virtue consists in a fixed idea of duty, to which all our inclinations, all our desires, moral and physical, must be subjected, and which could not be the case with one who, of all that ever lived, put least restraint upon his passions. But if wholly deficient in what is abstractedly understood as virtue, he possessed certain special virtues, particularly those of a warrior and statesman. He was temperate, not prone to sensual gratifications, and if not exactly chaste, he was not a libertine; never, except on occasion of ceremony, remained more than a few minutes at table; slept on a hard bed, though his constitution was rather weak than strong; bore, without even perceiving it, an amount of fatigue that would have exhausted the most vigorous soldiers; and was capable of prodigious exertion when mentally occupied with some great undertaking. He did more than brave danger, he seemed unconscious of its existence, and was ever to be found wherever he was needed to see, direct, or command. Such was his character as a soldier; as a general he was not inferior. Never had the cares of a vast military command

been borne with more coolness, vigour, or presence of mind. If he were occasionally excited or angry, the officers who knew him best said that all *was going on well*. When the danger became serious, he was calm, mild, encouraging, not wishing to add the excitement attendant on his displeasure to that which naturally arose from the circumstances; he remained perfectly calm, a power acquired by the habit of restraining his emotions in great emergencies and calculating the extent of the danger, turning it aside, and thus triumphing over fortune. Formed for great emergencies, and familiarised by habit to every species of peril, he stood by, in 1814, a calm spectator of the suicidal destruction of his own power, a destruction achieved by his ambition; and still he hoped when all around despaired, because he perceived resources undivined by anybody else, and under all vicissitudes, soaring on the wings of genius above the shock of circumstances, and with the resignation of a self-judged mind he accepted the deserved punishment of his faults.

Such, in our opinion, was this man, so strange, so self-contradicting, so many-sided. If among the principal traits of his character there is one more prominent than the rest, it is a species of moral intemperance. A prodigy of genius and passion, flung into the chaos of a revolution, his nature unfolds, develops itself therein—he masters that wild confusion, replaces it by his own presence, and displays the energy, audacity, and fickleness of that which he replaced. Succeeding to men who stopped at nothing, either in virtue or crime, in heroism or cruelty, surrounded by men who laid no restraint on their passions, he laid none on his; they wished to convert the world into a universal republic, he would have it an equally boundless monarchy; they turned everything into chaos, he formed an almost tyrannical unity; they disorganised everything, he re-established order; they defied sovereigns, he dethroned them; they slaughtered men on the scaffold, he on the battlefield, where blood was shrouded in glory. He immolated more human beings than did any Asiatic conqueror, and within the narrow precincts of Europe, peopled with opposing nations, he conquered a greater space of territory than Tamerlane or Gengiskan midst the deserts of Asia.

Absence of restraint is the essential feature of his career. Had not Alexander lived, we might say with justice that this great captain, this sage legislator and consummate ruler, was the most insensate of politicians. Did skill in politics depend solely on the amount of intelligence possessed by the individual, Napoleon would have surpassed the greatest statesmen that ever lived. But the skill of the politician is more the result of moral character than intellect, and that was the point in

which Napoleon failed. While young, before he had subdued the world, he was compelled and resigned to encounter obstacles, and displayed as much tact, finesse, and patience as anybody could. When in 1796 he went into Italy with a small army, finding it to his interest, he protected the priests, and conciliated the princes, despite all that the Parisian republicans might say. When he went to the East, when he had reason to dread the antipathy of the Mussulmans, he, heedless of the remarks of devotees at Paris, sought and succeeded completely in winning the Arab sheiks by allowing them to hope he would become a convert to their faith. When at a later period he had to accomplish a very different task—the Concordat—he, by wonderful address and energy, succeeded in overcoming the prejudices of Rome, and what was equally difficult, those of the philosophers. All that such a task needed of finesse, skill, constancy, and energy, he, as we have shown elsewhere, employed in such a manner as proves that he was deficient in no quality necessary to constitute a political genius. But at that time he was not master, and consequently checked the impetuosity of his disposition. When his power became supreme he restrained himself no longer, and of the qualities of a political genius he only retained the smaller portion—intelligence—whilst the moral qualities had altogether disappeared.

We must, however, say in his justification, that if politics are ever inopportune, it is in a time of revolution. When we speak of politics, we mean a slow development based on the past, combined with respect for what has gone before; when we mention revolution, we understand a sudden disruption from all that has existed. A true system of politics is the work of many generations, through which the design of attaining a certain end is transmitted, and which proceeds to its object with consistency, patience, and if necessary, modesty, making perhaps a step or two in a century, but never seeking to reach the goal at a bound. This is such a work as Henry IV. undertook, when he had suppressed the different parties at home, and sought to lessen the power of the houses of Spain and Austria, united as they were by blood and ambition, a scheme he transmitted to Richelieu, which Richelieu bequeathed to Mazarin, and Mazarin to Louis XIV., who pursued it until he placed his grandson on the Spanish throne, and separated Spain for ever from Austria; such a scheme as when in Prussia the great elector laid the foundations of the military importance of his nation, carried on in the first instance by the Elector Frederick III., when he placed the crown on his head; then continued by Frederick William, who created an army and treasury to support his new title; and finally, by Frederick the

Great, who, when the crisis came, combining a determined daring with the slowness of political progress, struggled for twenty years against Europe, and eventually secured the greatness of Prussia, and changed a small electorate into one of the greatest monarchies on the continent.

It was no wonder, therefore, that Napoleon, who was both a despot and a revolutionist, could not be a diplomatist; for though he did prove himself one for a moment when he reconciled France with the Church, with Europe, and with herself, still his attempts against England undertaken soon after the breaking of the peace of Amiens, his project of universal monarchy after Austerlitz, the war in Spain, which he endeavoured to terminate in Moscow, and his refusal of peace at Prague, proved him worse than a bad politician, for it gave the world the sad spectacle of genius degenerated into folly. But we must admit that it was not he alone, but the principles of the French Revolution, that, raging within him, induced him to throw off the restraints of reason.

And yet this bad politician was a wise legislator, an excellent ruler, and one of the greatest captains the world ever saw. The turmoil of a revolution, so far from being an obstacle to the development of his character under these aspects, rather afforded aid and a field for display. To complete our task, we must estimate him in his different characters of legislator, administrator, and captain.

The real school in which Napoleon cultivated his talents for organisation was war, than which there is none better, sterner, or more practical. To calculate the general movements of his army, and having arrived on the battlefield, to fight successfully, is only half the duty of a great captain. To prepare his resources, that is, to recruit, drill, clothe, and arm his men amid the incessant and violent movements of war, is the other half; both of which are so important that it would be difficult to say which is most so. In a word, to organise and fight are the two principal phases of their art for all true warriors. Inferior generals, such as the greater number unfortunately are, get their armies from their governments, employ them in whatever state they find them, and can do no more than complain of their condition, without ever seeking to improve it. This was not the case with the young Bonaparte.

When he crossed the Alps with brave but famishing soldiers, his first care was to lay a discreet, just, and economical hand on the riches of Italy, to prevent rapine, and having abundantly supplied his own army, to send assistance to that on the Rhine, which was to aid him in his designs. When he arrived in Egypt, where neglected resources were as plentiful as in Italy, he procured abundant provisions for his own army, while relieving

the country from the exactions of the Mamelukes and the incursions of the Arabs. As it was not possible to get supplies from home, he in a few months had manufactured under his own orders, powder, muskets, cannon, cloth, and all that was needed in that distant clime. One of the greatest inconveniences to which Egypt was exposed was the incursions of the Bedouins, who would suddenly descend on the cultivated lands, pillage them, and then as suddenly disappear. One day that a caravan was passing he stopped it a moment, and having ordered one, two, or three foot-soldiers with their provisions and cartouches to mount each camel, he cried, "Now we are masters of the desert." On the following day he formed the regiment of dromedaries, which could, with the swiftness of the Bedouins themselves, carry some hundred tired foot-soldiers to any distance; and he thus cured the Arabs of their taste for pillage, at least for such time as the French remained in Egypt. A single glance, and with his talent for organisation he comprehended what was needed, and it was done promptly and efficiently.

(Placed at the head of the government in France, he found everything in chaotic confusion, and felt even more than he had done in Italy and Egypt the necessity of restoring order, peace, and prosperity.)

He did not feel any great anxiety about giving a political constitution to the country. The friends of liberty (and we are of the number) blame Napoleon for not having done so. Though holding the same general principles as these gentlemen, we believe them to be in error in this particular. It was not possible that Napoleon could establish a definite political organisation, as the form of our government was destined still to vary many times beneath the tempest of revolutions; and France, sometimes inclined to adopt a despotic form when suffering from the excitement of liberty, sometimes turning to liberty when oppressed by excess of power, has been fluctuating for three-quarters of a century between despotism and anarchy, like a much-disturbed pendulum; nor can we yet say what form of government she will ultimately choose, though everything seems to indicate that it will not be despotism. Napoleon, therefore, could not be the legislator of France in a political sense, though he might be, and in reality was so in every other.

The policy that succeeded the disorders of the Revolution could not be that of liberty, but of reparation. The general desire was, that bankruptcy, requisitions, confiscations, imprisonments, and sanguinary executions should be succeeded by order in the finances, respect for persons and property, by victorious armies not compelled to support themselves by pillage; in a word, by peace and security. Napoleon, animated by a spirit of

reparation, was quite equal to his part and to the public wants. His wonderful activity permitting him to undertake many things at once, he, in the first instance, undertook to remodel the civil and military legislation, and the entire machinery of the administration. When we say that he remodelled the legislation, we do not pretend to assert, for example, that he invented the Civil Code. To claim the right of invention in such a sense would be the same as claiming the merit of having invented human society, which is not a thing of yesterday, but originated with man's first appearance on our globe. France had before Napoleon's time possessed civil laws, some borrowed from the Roman code, such as those that regulated contracts between individuals, and which do not vary with time or country; others dependent on national customs, varying as these customs vary, such as laws relating to domestic connections, to marriage, inheritance, &c. The first needed only to be reproduced in a clear, precise style, free from all ambiguity, which might lead to litigious disputes. The second needed to be modified according to the principles of real equality, which do not demand that however much men may differ in talents or in virtue, they should possess an equality in property, riches, or social rank, but rather that all should be subjected to the same laws, bound by the same duties, corrected by the same punishment, recompensed with the same rewards; and that the children of the same father should have equal claims to his inheritance, leaving, however, to the parent the power of rewarding the most worthy, but without permitting him to disinherit those whom he has the misfortune not to love. On these points, as on every other, the French Revolution, yielding to various impulses, oscillated between one extreme and the other. It became necessary to fix a medium between the retrograding and the unwisely innovating tendencies with regard to marriages, inheritance, wills, &c. Napoleon possessed no more extensive education than what is acquired in a good military school; but he was born amid the great truths of 1789, truths that may be misunderstood until they are fully explained, but which once understood, serve to throw light on every subject. Every day M. Portalis and Cambacérès, and above all, M. Tronchi, came to inform him of what was to be discussed next day; the Council of State; he reflected on it for twenty-four hours, attended at the discussion, and then with a supreme good sense fixed the exact point to be chosen between the old and new order of things, and what was more, stimulated the industry of all as an example. He contributed in two ways to the formation of our codes—by deciding where innovation was to stop, and by accelerating the accomplishment of the task. This work had been frequently attempted before; but those who undertook it,

yielding to the prejudices of the times, had adopted exaggerated views, which they afterwards regretted, or were ashamed of, and finally gave up the task altogether. Napoleon took charge of the stranded vessel, set it afloat, and carried it into port. This vessel was the Civil Code, nor can any one deny that this is ~~the code of the modern civilised world~~. It was certainly a great and untainted glory for a young soldier to be able to prefix his name to the civil organisation of modern society, nor was it less honourable to France, where the work was accomplished. If England has the merit of originating the best political constitution of modern States, France deserves the praise of having framed, in the Civil Code, the best form of the social State. Glorious and noble partition of glory between the two most civilised nations of the world!

Whilst Napoleon was thus occupied with the civil legislation, his expeditious and creative hand was also applied to the administrative. Finding the administration of the provinces in the same state as that of the other parts of the government, he there, as in the amendment of the civil legislation, selecting from the past and the present what was excellent in both, created the modern system of administration. In former times the provinces legislated for themselves, and enjoyed, as far as local interests were concerned, almost unrestricted power. The sovereign, either from respect to the old terms of union, or from some confused idea that as the centre was denied all liberty, the extremities should be allowed a great deal, permitted these to do as they pleased, provided they did not fail in paying their subsidies to the State. The sovereign assumed the entire direction of general affairs, but left the care of such as were local to the country. This tacit contract had to yield to the great phenomenon of the French Revolution. It was not just that the sovereign should have entire control over the general interests of the country, nor that the provinces should have the unrestricted charge of local affairs, for the general interests of the nation ought to be regulated by the nation itself, to whose inspection the interests of the provinces ought also to be subject. The money employed by the provinces to defray their expenses is a part of the general wealth, which they should not be allowed to squander; the local regulations established by the communes concerning manufactures, markets, and dues, are a part of the social legislation which ought not to be regulated by particular interests.

The great phenomenon of modern unity should consist in the sovereign's renouncing all claim to the sole administration of general affairs, the provinces renouncing, on the other hand, all pretensions to the exclusive regulation of local affairs; both

should amalgamate, so to speak, and become a powerful whole, guided by the general intelligence of the nation. This would require in the central seat of government a head of the executive, assisted by the principal citizens of France, for the regulation of general affairs; and in the provinces the heads of the local administration, assisted by respectable citizens of the place, for the regulation of local affairs, and responsible to government for everything connected with that department, and to the department itself in all things relating to the locality. From the recognition of these principles arose the prefect and council of departments. Had circumstances permitted the First Consul to act consistently with the principles he had laid down, he would have made the councils of the departments elective. But immediately after the fearful convulsions that had just subsided, between the frantic politicians of 1793, men most hateful to the country, and the great proprietors returned from emigration, such elections would have been impossible, or at least attended with serious inconveniences. He reserved the selection to himself, and chose sensible, moderate men who could administer the provinces in a respectable manner. This was a consequence of his dictatorship, which was not intended to be permanent, but to pass away with that office. The principle itself was fixed, that a prefect was to administer the affairs of the department, subject to the control of a council, and that this office was to become elective as soon as our terrible divisions should be sufficiently allayed.

This surveillance of the State as to all that concerned expenditure, taxation, the character of the local legislation, was to be provided for, and could not be unconditionally entrusted to the executive, the representative of the State. For the attainment of this object Napoleon adopted an institution suggested by Sièyes, and borrowed from the ancient monarchy. The royal council, besides the other affairs in which it was formerly employed, gave its advice on such as resulted from the relations of the State with the provinces. These relations, being closer under the new régime, should naturally be submitted to the Council of State. Napoleon, without carrying out any particular theory, but adopting whatever presented itself as suitable to his purpose, confided to the Council of State this general surveillance, which essentially constituted what is called centralisation. Desirous that the budgets of the communes and departments should be under the control of the State, that their ordinances should be in accordance with the principles of 1793, that one commune should not be able to re-establish the *jurandes*, another impose taxes inconsistent with modern principles, and that there might be an arbitrator for such cases of dispute, he desired that all such questions should be

referred to the Council of State, at which he himself presided constantly and with indefatigable application. Without such a regulator our system of centralisation would have been the most intolerable of despotisms. Prudent in all that relates to the expenditure of the departments, moderate when they plead their different interests before it, and legislative when municipal arrangements are to be decided on, the Council of State is an enlightened, firm regulator, independent though appointed by the executive, because that its functions originate an administrative spirit, which subdues that of servility, and which, under every régime, though it may succumb for a moment to a new government, rises again, as it were, involuntarily, and like the branches of some healthy plant resumes its original direction after having bent beneath a momentary restraint.

It was by assiduously presiding in this council, whenever he was not engaged in some campaign, and presiding there for seven or eight hours consecutively with the closest application, the rectitude of extraordinary good sense, and a respect for the opinion of others, such as he ever displayed on special subjects, deciding sometimes on facts, sometimes inventing or modifying as our administrative laws required, that Napoleon created at the same time a system of legislation and jurisprudence. It was thus that he became the true author of this firm, effective, and upright system, which makes our administration the most luminous that exists, renders our political strength more manageable than that of any other country in Europe—an administration which, when revolutions distract our governments, alone preserves its calmness, conducts the current affairs of the country wisely and steadily, collects the taxes, lays them up with care, applies them as occasion needs, levies soldiers, drills and disciplines them, provides for the expenses of towns and provinces without permitting anything to be lost, keeps France erect whilst her head totters, and seems like a ship impelled by modern mechanism which keeps her course steadily though her crew be negligent or bewildered.

War, by rendering Napoleon irresistible, made him a bad diplomatist; but it made him, in return, one of the greatest organisers the world has produced, and in that, as in everything else, he was indebted for his superiority partly to nature, partly to the force of circumstances.

In order to estimate correctly his place amongst great captains, we must first sketch the history of that powerful art which creates, raises, defends empires, and which, like the science of legislation, must have for its basis a rare union of intellectual and moral qualities. Unfortunately this history is still to be written. Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Frederick, and Napoleon have given some occasional sketches, but considered as a whole,

connected with the progress of science, the revolutions of empires, and the advance of the human mind, this history does not yet exist, and for this reason it is most difficult to assign their proper place to great military commanders. Still the history of military art presents some prominent features which immediately attract attention, and by whose assistance we may trace the general progress of things, and fix some few points whose permanency has stood the test of ages.

What is generally called a great war has not often occurred in the world, because to produce such would need the joint operation of great nations, great events, and great men. It does not depend alone on the importance of the changes effected, for were that the case, we might say that the conquerors of Asia had carried on great wars. To make a war "great," there should be a display of science and of the genius of combination, which implies skilful and energetic resistance to a conqueror. Though Alexander changed the whole aspect of the then civilised universe, so great was the stupidity of that Asia over which he triumphed that one could scarcely say that he carried on a great war. His not advancing into Asia until he had secured the sea-coast of Syria, a combination so much admired by Montesquieu, was so necessary from his want of a navy that it was evident to the simplest officers of the Macedonian army, and was suggested to Alexander rather by instinct than genius. The three battles that secured him the conquest of Asia were the consequences of heroic rashness—battles decided by the cavalry commanded by Alexander in person, which, attacking the confused masses of Persian horsemen, as cowardly as they were ignorant, was to them the signal of flight, in which they were immediately followed by the foot. It was the Macedonian discipline, led indeed by the daring of Alexander to immense distances, that was the true conqueror of Persia.

It was not thus that Cæsar and Hannibal fought. With them heroism was opposed to heroism, science to science, great men to great men. Cæsar, despite the vigour of his character, and the mingled daring and prudence of his enterprises, betrays a certain restraint in his movements, resulting from the military customs of the time, and from which Hannibal alone seems to have been free. The Romans, accustomed to carry on warfare in savage countries, and constantly on their guard against the wild impetuosity of barbarians, always encamped with great skill, and when they arrived in the evening on a spot chosen by a practised eye, in a few hours they were entrenched within a real fortress, formed of palisades, surrounded by a ditch, and almost impregnable. Their mode of encampment has never been surpassed, nor even equalled; but as Napoleon with wonderful sagacity remarked, it would be useless to attempt anything

of the kind now, as such a camp as theirs could not hold out against modern artillery for two hours. This precaution of encamping every evening engendered a certain timidity in their movements, made great military results of rare occurrence; nor could those great battles, which, though they bedew the earth with human gore, lessen the horrors of war by abbreviating them, take place unless with the consent of the adverse parties. If one refused to fight, the war might be continued to an indefinite period, or should end in a siege, or a regular or unexpected attack on the enemy's camp. Thus we see Cæsar, the boldest of Roman generals, act with unrestrained freedom in the country of the Gauls, whom he fought when it suited him, for their heedless daring was easily excited; but in Spain and Epirus, where he had to encounter Romans, he changed his plan, and employed endless devices on the Segre in attempts to induce Afranius to come out of his camp, and only succeeded by starving him out, after having obliged him to change his position. At Dyrrachium, in Epirus, his mode of encampment rendered him invulnerable to Pompey, who, by a similar process, had rendered himself equally so to him. Then, not knowing how to terminate this lengthy campaign, he advanced into Macedonia, hoping to induce Pompey to follow; his tactics succeeded; but in his new position, being again made to experience the impregnability of the Roman camp, he would have found it impossible to reach his adversary if the impetuosity of the Roman nobility had not forced Pompey to descend into the plain of Pharsalia, where the superiority of the Gallic legions won Cæsar the sovereignty of the world.

This mode of warfare undoubtedly involves very skilful and often very daring combinations to oblige an unwilling adversary to fight; but that cannot be called "great war," in all the freedom, precision, and importance of its movements—such wars as we in our time have seen decide in a few days struggles that would formerly have continued for years. There is but one general in ancient times—Hannibal—in whose movements we discover this freedom of action and scientific correctness of procedure, and who has no equal in antiquity for the boldness, daring, fertility of resource, or success of his plans. This was the opinion of Napoleon, a supreme judge in such matters, and one that we may safely adopt on his authority.

During the middle ages, military art neither attracts nor merits the attention of posterity. There we see terrible conflicts where blood flowed in torrents, where humanity displayed its usual passions; we see cowards and heroes, crimes and virtues, but neither a Cæsar nor a Hannibal. We here mark the absence, not alone of great wars, but even of the military

art. Barbarism with its heedless daring flung itself on the effete Roman civilisation, where military science still existed, but whence the warrior virtues had departed; and when innumerable hordes of barbarians rushed down with the impetuosity of mountain torrents, destroying the Roman empire, and overwhelming the civilised world, we occasionally see such men as Clovis and Pepin commanding their armies, battle-axe in hand, or we find a matchless ruler like Charlemagne, but nowhere do we find a great captain. In that age of individual prowess, poetry itself, the sole historian of the period, assumed the conventional form of the time, and celebrated the paladin mounted on his proud war-horse, who did battle for Christ against the Saracen, who charged no less vigorously in defence of Mahometanism. This was the age of chivalry, a name that reveals its nature, that is, a mounted knight clad in mail, fighting with his own sword as far as his address and physical powers will allow. But this state of things was soon changed by the progress of European society. Commerce and industry in collecting a numerous and wealthy population in the towns, whom the necessity of self-defence rendered courageous, gave birth to the foot-soldier, our modern infantry. The Swiss defending their mountains, the inhabitants of the Italian and German towns guarding their walls, and the Dutch their dikes, originated the infantry, and won that arm an importance that has only increased with time. A great discovery, for which we are equally indebted to the progress of European society and the knowledge of explosive materials, contributed powerfully to this phenomenon. The cuirass was not only useless but dangerous when opposed to projectiles impelled by powder. Henceforward men were freed from the weight of useless armour, and physical force was replaced by intelligence and thoughtful bravery. The towns, surrounded by salient and threatening walls, suddenly assumed another form and appearance. The walls were lowered to protect them from the cannon, and instead of high round towers, were defended with bastions of moderate height, sharp and angular, so that the cannon could protect the entire profile. This was the origin of our modern scientific fortification.

This change began in Italy, was propagated and perfected in Holland, in the wars against Philip II., and produced those three great men the Nassaus. Genuine military art again appeared, though still timid and restrained in its movements, and possessing none of the qualities that distinguished it under Hannibal and Cæsar. War took up a position, and remained, as it were, enchained in the fortresses of Holland, protected by dikes and scientifically constructed bastions. The entire science of the generals of that time consisted in attacking

a fortress, investing it, protecting themselves by lines of contravallation against the besieged, of circumvallation against relieving armies, and in procuring provisions; whilst the enemy, on the other hand, endeavoured to secure the place by cutting off the besiegers' supplies, or in seeking to divert them from their undertaking. There were displayed neither great science nor decisive battles, but rather skirmishes to cut off supplies, or to draw off the besieger from the attack; and so far was this system pursued, that during the career of the Nassaus, from 1579 to 1648, that is, from the proclamation to the recognition of the independence of Holland, there were not more than five or six engagements that deserved the name of battles, whilst there were a hundred sieges of greater or lesser importance. The Dutch, to whom the sea was open, endured this war of sieges for two-thirds of a century with the greatest patience, because that they felt themselves safe, and that their commerce secured them the means of paying their troops; and it was this patience that aided or rather originated the justly admired perseverance of the Nassaus.

At this period the institution of infantry—at once the cause and effect of the independence of nations—commenced by the efforts of the Swiss against Austria and Burgundy, and continued by the Dutch towns against Spain, received a new impulse from the struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism. It was that justly popular hero Gustavus Adolphus, who, next to the Nassaus, and in the Thirty Years' War, made the greatest advance in modern military art. Sovereign of a poor but valiant nation, called on to defend himself against a pretender, his cousin, King of Poland, who commanded a nation of horsemen, he placed his confidence in the infantry, and devoted all his efforts and intelligence to the better organisation of that arm. This infantry was a species of Macedonian phalanx, closely serried, armed with pikes of enormous length, and having in front and on the flanks a few musketeers. These phalanges were very unwieldy; but Gustavus Adolphus, like a true reformer of infantry, exerted himself to mingle the pikemen and fusiliers with it, to get rid of the armour that offered no protection against fire-arms, to render his army more manageable, and to increase his artillery and render it lighter. Although he did not make his artillery perfect, he advanced it sufficiently to enable him to conquer the King of Poland, whose strength lay in his horse, and compel him to renounce his pretensions to the Swedish crown. He then obeyed the call of the Protestants beaten by Wallenstein and Tilly, and advanced into Germany, impelled by sincere religious feeling as well as a desire for glory. One thing must be noticed, which proves how slow is the progress of what is

called scientific warfare. This hero, one of the bravest men that God ever created, was extremely timid in all his movements. Faithful disciple of the Nassaus, he manœuvred around fortresses, would not leave the shores of the Baltic until he had conquered the fortresses on the Oder; and because the Elector of Saxony would not confide Wittenberg to him, and so allow him to pass the Elbe in safety, he suffered Tilly to take Magdeburg before his eyes, and wreak his vengeance on that devoted city. The report of this event circulated throughout Europe, and cast a momentary doubt on the capabilities of the Swedish hero. Still, not being able to resist the cries and entreaties of the Saxons, and knowing by experience that he could depend on his infantry, he met Tilly for the first time on the plain of Leipsic, won a battle that brought Austria to his feet, and then, though Oxenstiern, more daring than his king, advised him to advance on Vienna and conclude the war, he first went to enjoy his triumph at Frankfort, then lost a year in desultory marches through Bavaria, spent some months in protecting Nuremberg against Wallenstein, followed him to Lutzen, and then, almost in spite of himself, on that celebrated plain fought and won the second great battle of his heroic career, and then, like Epaminondas, he died in the arms of victory. We must undoubtedly admit that Gustavus Adolphus was one of the noblest of human beings, whether we consider the vastness of his courage, the dignity of his sentiments, and the extent and greatness of his views; and it would be a great error to attribute the timidity and uncertainty of his movements to want of personal courage. It was not he, but the military science of those days, that was timid. But this science was destined soon to change; a new revolution was about to be effected in three acts: the first performed in France by Condé, Turenne, and Vauban; the second in Prussia by Frederick; and the third again in France by Napoleon. To the immortal glory of our country be it said, that it was France that commenced and completed this revolution.

As we have just shown, military art reduced to gyrate round some fortification, either for the purpose of capturing or succouring the place, resembled a bird attached by a cord to the earth, and unable to walk or fly to its destination, that is to say, to the decisive term of the war. Gustavus was the disciple of the Nassaus, and the French for a while, the imitators of Gustavus. Many of our officers, the valiant Gassion especially, had been formed in that school, and brought its principles with him into France, when the genius of Richelieu engaging us in the Thirty Years' War, we were called upon to play the chief part, rendered vacant by the death of Gustavus. It was, of course, on the banks of the Rhine, and the frontier of the Low

Countries, that our generals encountered those of Austria and Spain, countries recently disunited but always allied. Vauban, adopting the science of besieging from the Dutch, carried it to a degree of perfection that has not been surpassed even in the present century. But military art was still confined to the defence and besieging of fortresses, when suddenly a young prince, endowed with extraordinary sagacity, impetuous, fond of glory, whom God had made as daring as Alexander, and whom his position as prince of the blood made superior to the ordinary timidity attendant on a sense of responsibility, entered the lists, and weary of the methodic warfare of the Nassaus, which would not tolerate a battle but at the last extremity, freed himself from the restraints by which the genius of generals seemed bound. The first time that he assumed the command he was surrounded by councillors appointed by the court to restrain him; but he took heed of none, except Gassion, who was as daring as himself; he seized a defile leading to the plain of Rocroy, debouched boldly in face of a brave and experienced enemy, attacked the adversary's wings, composed of cavalry, according to the method of the age, put them to rout, then turning to the infantry, that had maintained its position in the centre like a *citadel that would repair its losses*, scattered its ranks with his cannon on that day which terminated the existence of the Spanish infantry. On that day, indeed, Condé made no change in the mode of fighting, which was still the same as it had been at Pharsalia and Arbelles; but he proved himself an innovator, by giving battle at once, by immediately advancing to the termination of the war—a method which is eventually the most humane, though it may be for the moment the most bloody.

It was by such conduct that Condé won for himself the reputation of dauntless daring. At Friburg, a little later, by despising the difficulties of the ground, at Nordlingen, by not allowing himself to be disheartened when he saw one of his wings beaten and his centre forced, he, by persisting in a daring design, regained a battle that had almost been lost. By a happy combination of boldness and foresight he became the greatest general that modern times had produced until then. Beside him, prior to him, afterwards under his command, and soon independent of him, was formed a general who was to become his rival, not as daring as he on the field of battle, but more so on the march and in the general conception of his campaigns. Need we say that this was Turenne? Condé, as prince of the blood, was not entrusted with tasks easy of accomplishment, for there are none such in war; on the contrary, to him were confided vast undertakings, for which abundant resources were provided. Turenne, who eventually became the

favourite of royalty, was at first, especially on the Rhine, appointed to the most difficult undertakings, where he had to encounter an enemy much superior in numbers. He distinguished himself by the most daring marches, as when in 1646 he descended the Rhine, which he crossed at Wesel, to join the Swiss, and compel the King of Bavaria to accept terms of peace; or when in 1674, affecting to be oppressed by fatigue at the termination of a campaign, he suddenly emerged from his cantonment, rushed unexpectedly on the enemy's winter quarters, put them to flight, and drove them beyond the frontiers. We may say that Condé introduced a spirit of daring into battles—Turenne into marches. After the death of these two great captains military science came to a standstill, doing little more than groping its way, until the middle of the eighteenth century, when a great struggle enabled the military art to take a second step, and advance to what may be truly called scientific warfare.

In order to form a correct idea of what had been accomplished, and of what still remained to be done, we must consider how armies were then constituted, the proportion and employment of the different arms, and the manner of giving battle. All this will be found described with wonderful correctness in the memoirs of the illustrious Montecuculli, one of the most scientific generals of the time. Notwithstanding the improvement that had been made in the infantry, it did not yet form more than half the strength of an army, the other half being entirely composed of cavalry. The artillery was very unwieldy and scanty, not affording more than one cannon to every 1000 men. The order of battle was such as we find described by the historians of Cæsar and Hannibal (the only masters studied at that period), that is, the infantry was always in the centre, the cavalry stationed on the wings, and the artillery (replacing the war engines of the ancients) in front, no account being made of the nature of the ground, except that the cavalry closed their ranks, fell back, or in a word, did what they could whenever the ground occupied by the wings did not allow them to deploy. The artillery commenced by firing on the enemy in order to break their ranks, then the cavalry from the wings attacked whatever force was opposed to them, and if successful, turned to the centre, where the foot was engaged, and completed the defeat of the enemy by attacking them in flank or rear. There were but few battles in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, or Turenne that were conducted in any other way. It was thus that the celebrated battles of Lutzen, Dunes, and Rocroy were managed. This plan is not pursued in the present day. The cavalry is not uniformly stationed on the wings, the infantry in the centre, nor the artillery in front. Each arm is stationed

according to the nature of the ground—the infantry in the more difficult positions, the cavalry on the plain, and the artillery wherever it may be employed to most advantage. The infantry, amounting to four-fifths of the troops, constitutes the strength of the army. A portion of the cavalry is attached to the infantry to examine the nature of the ground, and a larger or smaller portion of artillery, according to the nature of the ground, is appointed to support the efforts of the foot; and if, as during the empire, there is a large reserve of cavalry and artillery, these are under the commander-in-chief, to be employed in striking a decisive blow, if he is capable of using his resources with the promptitude of genius.

Both ancients and moderns were induced to station the cavalry on the wings, in order to protect the flanks of the infantry, that in those days had not learned to manœuvre as in modern times, and present a front to every side by forming into square. The infantry, until towards the termination of the seventeenth century, was a true Macedonian phalanx, a species of long square, with its longer side to the enemy, and this side was composed of pikemen, mingled with musketeers. The latter were generally placed in front, where they fired, protected by the length of the pikes, then when the enemy approached they ran along the battalion, where they took up their station on the wings, leaving the pikemen to charge or repulse with the cold iron. It is easy to understand that had artillery been as effective in those days as at present, such a battalion would soon be destroyed. The balls, falling on a mass of men sixteen or sometimes twenty-four deep, would occasion fearful destruction. This battalion, protected with pikes only in front, would not be able to defend its flanks from an attack of cavalry.

To avoid the inconveniences of this arrangement, it was not unusual to see the Austrian and Spanish infantry, as in the battles of Lutzen and Rocroy, form into four large masses turned towards each side, thus resolving the entire mass of the infantry into a single great square.

This difficulty has been overcome by fixing the bayonet to the musket, an invention that has made our excellent Vauban the true author of modern tactics. By thus attaching the bayonet to the musket he effaced the distinction between pikemen and musketeers. Nothing henceforward was needed but a foot-soldier, who could first fire and then meet the approaching cavalry at the point of the bayonet. This important change led to the modern mode of organising the infantry. But all the consequences deducible from a principle are not immediately drawn. We do not during war profit by the lessons it gives; it is during the silence and meditation of peace that they produce fruit.

During the latter wars of Louis XIV., the bayoneted musket did not produce all the results of which it was capable. Experiments were made at first: the ranks of the infantry were thinned, that the enemy's fire might do less injury, and being more fully deployed, were able to do more execution.

But it was in the middle of the eighteenth century, so fruitful in revolutions of every kind, that the great revolution in military art was effected. In that age, when doubt and inquiry invaded every profession, military men also began to seek after improvement in their art. There was one German monarchy almost as powerful as Bavaria, but being better situated, could offer more effective resistance to imperial power; for being placed in the north, it could not be so easily attacked. This kingdom possessed a vigorous and valiant population, who, from the distinction they had gained in the wars of the seventeenth century, had become ambitious, and being animated by a Protestant spirit, were prepared to make fearful opposition to Catholic Austria; this monarchy was Prussia. The great elector had been a military sovereign. His successor, a vain prince, was fascinated by the title of king, which he purchased from the emperor at the expense of his military strength. This title, useless as it seemed, was but a fresh stimulus to ambition, and Prussia having become a kingdom, her increasing dignity added to her desire for glory. He who had been made king was succeeded by a sickly, morose prince, irritable almost to madness, but who possessed some really good qualities. Careful of the lives and money of his subjects, and feeling that Prussia should support her rank as a kingdom, he amassed riches, and trained soldiers, though he disliked war, and would not undertake it himself. His passion for tall grenadiers is well known, and those who wished to flatter him presented him with tall soldiers, as other monarchs have been flattered by gifts of horses or pictures. This prince, whose gloomy imagination rendered him unequal to the continual burden of a crown, endeavoured to lessen the weight by sharing his responsibilities with two favourites. The civil department he confided to M. de Seckendorf; the military to the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau; the one a skilful intriguer, the other possessing a real genius for war. The Prince of Anhalt-Dessau had served in the latter campaigns of Louis XIV., had distinguished himself at the head of the Prussian infantry at Malplaquet, and was convinced that the fate of battles would thenceforth be decided by the infantry. By continually exercising the Prussian infantry on the square of Potsdam he came to learn the full extent of the advantage of Vauban's invention; he armed these troops with bayoneted muskets, and almost completed the organisation of the modern battalion. He did not confine himself to this, but

instilled into the Prussian infantry, whom he reviewed every day, his own spirit; a most serious advantage, for however important the mechanism of an army be, its moral tone is no less so, for deprived of this, the best organised army is but a well-constructed machine void of all motive power.

His king approved and aided him; for though determined not to go to war himself, he wished that at least his people should be prepared to do so. He was unconsciously impelled by a deep, confused, and indefinable instinct, without indeed suspecting the importance of the work at which he was labouring, nor divining that his son would employ the resources he had so well prepared.

This son, brought up by French Protestants, from whose hands he passed into those of the philosophers, was full of genius and impertinence. He regarded the authority derived from antiquity as a tyrannical extravagance, religion as a ridiculous prejudice, and recognised no other authority than that of intelligence. He felt the greatest aversion to the military pedantry that prevailed at the court of Berlin, which caused so much displeasure to the king that in a fit of passion he struck with his cane him who was to become the great Frederick. The great Frederick beaten and shut up in a fortress because of his dislike to a military life is one of those strange spectacles that history sometimes presents.

This extraordinary father died in 1740, and the son immediately claimed the arms of Achilles, that he had not before recognised as his own. The Emperor Charles VI. had just died, and left his daughter, Marie Therese, sole heiress of his possessions, which it was not believed she would be able to defend. Everybody wished to get a part. Bavaria ambitioned the imperial crown; France hoped to conquer the Austrian possessions on the left of the Rhine; Spain even had some design on Italy; and the young Frederick thought of enlarging his dominions, and making them more worthy of the rank of kingdom. Still, although every one of these wished for a portion of Marie Therese's inheritance, none ventured to touch it. Frederick acted like one who sets fire to a house that he intends to rob. He attacked Silesia, an example that was soon followed by all Europe, and thus kindled the conflagration from which he derived so many advantages. Having inherited from his father a well-supplied treasury, and an army ever ready for battle, he entered Silesia in October 1740 (six months after he came to the throne), conquered the entire province in December, for Austria had no army to oppose him, and proved the superiority of an inferior prince who holds himself prepared for war, to a more powerful one who does not.

All Europe exclaimed that the King of Prussia was a madman,

who would expiate his temerity the following January. The Austrians having assembled their forces, advanced from Bohemia into Silesia; whilst Frederick, deficient in experience, allowed them to take up their position in his rear and cut him off from Prussia. He turned round, marched towards the Austrians with the audacity that marked all his actions, and offered them battle, although he had never deployed a battalion, and that Austria was in his rear, whilst the Austrian army lay between him and Prussia. Had he been beaten he would never have seen Berlin again, and strange to say, his first battle was entirely conducted according to the tactics of antiquity. His fine infantry was in the centre, commanded by the brave Marshal Schwerin, the cavalry on the wings, and the artillery in front, the same as in the battles of Rocroy, Dunes, and Lutzen. The Austrian cavalry was also stationed on the wings, and being greatly superior both in discipline and numbers, dashed forward and bore along the Prussian cavalry (*procella equestris*) together with the youthful Frederick, who had never before been present at such a scene. But whilst the two cavalries, the one pursuing, the other pursued, were hurried to the rear, the solid Prussian infantry remained firm in their ranks. Had their tactics been the same as those of Condé or Alexander, the Austrian cavalry would at their return have attacked the Prussian infantry on both flanks and utterly destroyed it. But it was not so; the old Marshal Schwerin, having held his ground with immovable resolution, advanced, got possession of the stream and mill of Molwitz, and when the victorious Austrian cavalry returned they found their infantry beaten and the battle lost. Frederick triumphed by means of his infantry, which conquered whilst he was borne to the rear. But, as he said himself, the lesson was a good one, and he soon became a general. Europe declared that this victory was miraculous, proclaimed Frederick a great warrior, and no longer a madman; but what was of more importance, the Prussian infantry gained an ascendancy it retained until brought into contact with the infantry of the French Revolution in 1792.

During the succeeding years Frederick gained a second, third, and fourth victory; and after various alternations of fortune, whilst Bavaria and France wearied themselves in vain efforts to obtain, the one the imperial crown, the other the left bank of the Rhine, Frederick alone attained the object he had in view, and won Silesia, the just reward of a profound policy, and of a war conducted on excellent and modern principles.

Such a province as Silesia is not to be won or lost at a single blow. The pious Marie Therese had two motives to render her implacable—regret for her dismembered patrimony, and pain at seeing the pride of Austria humbled by a young innovator, who despised both God and the empire. She waited an opportunity

of revenge, and she soon found it. Frederick, though perfect master of himself in everything connected with policy and war, could not restrain his taste for raillery, and Europe offered him subjects for amusement. At Paris a fascinating and intellectual woman, the representative of refined society, governed the reckless indifference of Louis XV. A beautiful and licentious woman, the Empress Elizabeth, presided over the ignorance of the Russian court. Having offended both of these by his remarks, Frederick had made them the allies of Marie Therese, and brought on himself that terrible Seven Years' War in which English gold could scarcely sustain him against the entire continent. It was this war that gave the great impulse to military science.

At Molwitz, as we have seen, Frederick arranged his troops after the fashion employed at the battles of Rocroy, Pharsalia, and Arbelles, stationing his infantry in the centre, and the cavalry on the wings. Struck by the superiority of the Austrian cavalry, he endeavoured to improve his own, of which he had great need on the plains of Silesia, and did succeed in imbuing it with a solidity in which the Austrian horse was deficient. But it was on the Prussian infantry that he principally relied for success. Two motives induced him to this—the excellence of the infantry itself, to which he principally owed his first success, and the nature of the ground on which he was to fight. Silesia is a plain, but it was not on this plain that the possession of Silesia was to be decided, but in Bohemia, and especially amongst the mountains lying between the two provinces. He saw the special necessity of the infantry, and that both cavalry and artillery were only to be used as auxiliaries more or less necessary according to the spot in which they were to be employed. In a word, he there learned the art of proportioning his resources to the nature of the ground.

At Molwitz he had placed his infantry in the centre, his cavalry on the wings; but he arranged these arms very differently at Leuthen and Rosbach. At Leuthen, a battle that Napoleon declared to be the masterpiece of Frederick the Great, he perceived that the Austrians were supporting their left on the wooded height of Leuthen, and extending their right into the plain. He profited by a curtain of hillocks that lay between him and the enemy to advance the greater part of his infantry to the left of the Austrians, and deprive them of the heights of Leuthen, and having dislodged them, he charged them on the plains with his cavalry; and thus on the verge of destruction he in one day re-established his affairs by destroying or capturing half the forces opposed to him.

At Rosbach he was encamped on a height difficult of access, with marshes on his right, and woods on his left. The Prince

of Soubise, adopting tactics different from those of the seventeenth century, thought to surround the Prussians, but he only succeeded in getting the French army entangled in the woods on the enemy's left. Frederick allowed the French to advance into this dangerous spot, then met them with a few battalions of excellent infantry, attacked them in flank with Seidlitz's cavalry, and routed them so effectually that but for the triumphs of the Revolution and the empire we could not revert to that combat without a feeling of shame.

Frederick, by employing the different arms according to the nature of the ground, effected a complete change in the art of combating. He had, however, adopted a favourite mode of attack, for in war, as in everything else, each individual acquires a peculiar mode of operation, and this was to attack one of the enemy's wings, and by the conquest of the wing to decide the victory. This mode of operation gave rise to the celebrated discussions on the *oblique order of attack*, which occupied the attention of military men in the eighteenth century.

Frederick did not alone effect a change in the employment of the different arms, but also in their relative proportions, reducing the cavalry to a third instead of a half, and in developing the artillery, which he rendered more numerous and less unwieldy.

He accomplished still more important alterations in that department which requires the greatest intelligence, the general direction of operations. During the preceding century military art consisted in hovering round some fortress, either to effect its capture or prevent its seizure by the enemy. Frederick having to oppose the armies of all Europe, one perhaps advancing from Bohemia, another from Poland, a third from Franconia, and to meet all these perhaps at the same time, was compelled to neglect the less imminent for the greater danger, to sacrifice the ancillary to the principal, to engage his enemies in succession, one after the other, and save himself by the skilful husbanding of his forces. Although, thanks to the progress made in each department of military art, and to Frederick's unusual position, warfare had become more animated, active, and daring, it was still far from the degree of perfection it has attained in our century. Frederick, confined to Silesia and Saxony, that is, to the narrow space between the Oder and the Elbe, had never thought of embracing the entire extent of an empire in one vast view, and selecting some particular point, by attacking which unexpectedly he might terminate the war. He had indeed thought of entering Dresden, which was not remote, but had never dreamed of marching to Vienna. If he hastened to Erfurt from Glogau or Breslau, it was because that having completed the conquest of one enemy, he was told of

the approach of another, towards whom he hastened as some fierce animal pursued by dogs rushes sometimes on one, sometimes on another, when after being bitten by one, he is attacked by another. In short, he had commenced a great revolution, but had not terminated it. For example, he still followed the practice of encamping, and not knowing, like Napoleon in 1814, how to profit by the opportunity afforded by some false movement of the enemy to effect a decisive blow, he shut himself up in the camp at Buntzelwitz, where he passed several months awaiting some favourable turn of fortune, which did indeed occur, and saved him from utter ruin by substituting Peter III. for Elizabeth on the Russian throne. Encamping was not the only ancient practice that he retained; he also protected his frontier with what was then called the *défilé* of the army. When seeking to prevent the Austrians from entering Silesia, he, within a space of from ten to fifteen leagues in breadth by thirty or forty in length, burned down the crops and farm-houses, cut down the trees, and instead of opposing the enemy with skilful operations, he met them with famine. Warfare, from a defect in daring or science, degenerated into cruelty. Although Frederick had changed the order of battle by subjecting it to the nature of the ground, and by being compelled to meet three enemies at once, had given general movements an importance hitherto unknown, still he did not advance military art to its ultimate perfection. This he left to the French Revolution, and to the extraordinary man who bore its standard to the confines of the civilised world.

He accomplished enough; and there are few who in the great march of civilisation have made such strides. By the strength of his individual character and by his genius, he opposed to France, Austria, and Russia, a nation which even after the acquisition of Silesia did not contain more than six or seven millions of inhabitants. We must briefly enumerate some circumstances in explanation of this seeming miracle. In the first place, Frederick was assisted by England with money, though not very liberally; but still he did receive pecuniary aid from her. With this money he procured soldiers, and as Germans were fighting against Germans, on the eve of battle he converted his prisoners into recruits, and so supplied the deficiency of the Prussian population. His central position between Russia, Austria, and France enabled him to meet all his enemies by hastening from Breslau to Frankfort on the Oder, from Frankfort to Dresden, from Dresden to Erfurt; and he was also favoured by another more important circumstance—that though Austria's opposition to him was serious, that of Russia and France, guided by court caprice, was by no means so. Every year Elizabeth sent against him an army, which,

whether successful or not, retired into Poland after fighting a battle. The French, opposed to the English in the Low Countries, and badly governed both in a civil and military sense, occasionally sent an army, which discomfited, as at Rosbach, did not again make its appearance. Frederick had consequently no real enemy but Austria, which does not render his success less astonishing, nor would it have saved him, did he not possess what in our days is called the *right of legitimacy*. His enemies entered Berlin twice, but instead of dethroning him, as they would have done had there been any pretender to set up in opposition to him, they retired after levying a contribution of some hundred thousand crowns. Though these circumstances do not diminish what was extraordinary in his success, they help to explain how a petty prince was able unassisted to oppose during seven years the three greatest powers in Europe, disconcert them by his unexpected attacks, weary them by his tenacity; how he was able to wait until fortune brought a change of sovereign to Russia; and how his genius and constancy disarmed three women whom his raillery had exasperated. His exploits are not on this account the less wonderful, and deserve to be classed with those of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Napoleon.

It was the French Revolution that gave the last and decisive impulse to military art. The civilising improvement made by substituting the infantry for cavalry, that is to say, that had replaced a mounted nobility by the strength of the nation, was destined to receive its final impulse from the French Revolution, which was nothing else than an outburst of feeling on the part of the middle classes. The French in 1789 were under the influence of two feelings—regret at seeing France declining since the time of Louis XIV., which they attributed to the frivolity of the court; and indignation against the European powers, that wished to prevent the French from reforming their institutions on the principle of civil equality. This caused the whole nation to take up arms. The old royalist army, though deprived by emigration of the greater number of its officers, sufficed in the commencement, and won several battles under Dumouriez, whose genius had been frittered away until his fiftieth year in vulgar intrigues. But that army melted, so to speak, in the terrible fire of the conflict, and the Revolution replaced these forces by countless thousands of the middle classes, who resolved themselves into infantry. Cavalry, artillery, and engineers cannot be raised at a moment's notice; but there is no such difficulty with the infantry, especially in a country essentially military, and filled with the pride and traditions of war. These foot-soldiers, incorporated into the semi-brigades that remained of the old army, inspired the old soldiers with

fresh courage, adopted their discipline, and attacked the enemy, first as skilful sharpshooters, and then charged them *en masse* at the point of the bayonet. With time their discipline equalled that of the best drilled armies of Europe, those formed in the schools of Frederick and of Daun; with time they formed cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and whilst acquiring the discipline they needed, they preserved their original daring and activity, and thus became the finest army in the world.

It would be impossible that whilst the powerful impulse of '89, combined with our ancient military traditions, furnished us with armies, it should not at the same time give us generals, nor that our infantry, as well drilled as the best German armies, but more active, more alert, and more daring, should not exercise some influence upon their officers; nor did this incongruity exist, for there arose Pichegru in Holland, and Moreau, Kleber, Hoche, and Jourdan in the midst of Germany. Whilst generals capable of commanding a great army sprung up, it followed, as a matter of course, that there ought to appear not two, but one who could guide all the armies of a vast empire, for moral influences resemble physical when acting on several bodies at the same time; they impel each to a distance proportionate to its weight and volume. Whilst Pichegru, Hoche, Kleber, Desaix, and Massena were the offspring of this national impulse, he who was superior to them all first revealed his genius at Toulon. This master, whose name has been echoed throughout the universe, was young Bonaparte, brought up in the schools of the old régime, in the study of the most scientific branch of the military service—the artillery—deeply imbued with the modern spirit, he united with his personal hardihood—the greatest perhaps with which mortal was ever endowed—the daring temper of the French Revolution. Gifted with that universal genius which fits men for every employment, he possessed, moreover, a taste peculiar to himself, that of studying the character of the country on the map, and an inclination to seek in physical geography the solution, not alone of military, but of political problems. Ever poring over his maps, a practice too much neglected by military men, and which was still less practised before his time, he was constantly meditating the configuration of the ground where war happened to be raging at the time, mingling with these reflections the dreamings of a young man, saying within himself that were he master he would do so and so, send the armies of the republic in such and such a direction, little suspecting that he would be master one day, but conscious of some undefinable impulse within, as we sometimes feel the motion of the water beneath our feet before it forces through the ground and bursts forth in an unceasing spring. His meditations showed him that since Austria had

resigned the Low Countries, her only vulnerable point was Italy, whither the war, to be decisive, should be carried. Almost wearying the Directory, in whose service he was, with the repetition of these views, he was appointed commandant of Paris, and when Schérer allowed himself to be beaten, general of the army in Italy. Immediately on his arrival at Nice the young general saw at a glance that it was not necessary to force the Alps, but *to turn them*, as he most profoundly remarked. The Piedmontese and Austrians were guarding the pass of Montenotte, the spot where the Alps decline, to rise at some distance as the Apennines. Making a feigned attack on Genoa, in order to call off the Austrians, he forced at night the pass of Montenotte, where the Piedmontese were alone on guard, drove these back on Turin, after overpowering them in two battles, compelled the King of Piedmont to accept peace, and then descended to the Po in pursuit of the Austrians, who, seeing that they had been deceived at Genoa, were hastening to protect Milan. He crossed the Po at Plaisance, entered Milan, hastened to Lodi, forced the passage of the Adda, and stopped at the Adige, which his great intellect saw should be the true frontier between Italy and Germany. A less profound genius would have hastened southward to seize Florence, Rome, and Naples. He did not even think of doing so. "It is with the Germans," he said to the Directory, "that we must dispute Italy—it is they we are to oppose. Going to the south, we should meet at our return a Fournova like Charles VIII., or a Trebbia* like Macdonald." He decided, therefore, to remain in the north, and with his usual penetration he saw that the Po was too lengthy to be easily defended; that the Isonzo, from its advanced position, might be turned through the Tyrol; and that the Adige alone could be successfully defended, because that immediately on leaving the Alps its waters fall into the marshes of Legnago, and being situated beyond the Tyrol, could not be turned. The young Bonaparte alleged the following reasons for taking up his position on the Adige: "If the Austrians seek to force the Adige in the mountains, they must pass by the plateau of Rivoli; if they prefer the plain, they will appear in front of Verona, or in the direction of the marshes in the neighbourhood of Legnago." This condition of things obliged him to station the greater part of his troops in the centre, that

* Although Charles VIII. was victorious at Fournova, he ran great risk, and would have perished there with all his army but that the troops in his rear were inferior to his own. At Trebbia, Macdonald met troops as valiant as those he commanded, and was very near being destroyed, not through his own fault, but through that of the Directory, that had sent him to Naples. General Bonaparte's reasoning was correct in reference to both, and proves that it is in the north, and not in the south, that the possession of Italy is to be disputed.

is, at Verona, placing two detachments of the guard, one at Rivoli, the other in the direction of Legnago, to be reinforced according to the direction taken by the enemy; he remained immovable in this position, besieging Mantua as an amusement between the different apparitions of the Austrians. It was this correctness of appreciation that enabled the young Bonaparte, with thirty-six thousand men, scarcely increased by fifteen thousand during the course of the war, to oppose all the Austrian armies, and within eighteen months fight twelve pitched battles, more than sixty lesser engagements, take more than one hundred thousand prisoners, overwhelm Austria, compel her to yield the line of the Rhine to France, and obtain a general peace.

Most certainly one may peruse all the pages of history without finding a parallel to this. It presents a degree of perfection in general conception of plan, and an acquaintance with military science, that has never been equalled. His clearness of conception was demonstrated in passing the mountains of Montenotte whilst drawing off the Austrians by a feigned attack upon Genoa; and when master of Milan, advancing to Verona, instead of hastening to Rome or Naples, seeing that as Italy was to be disputed with northern soldiers, it was in the north that victory should be obtained, whilst the south was to be left like a fruit that would fall from the tree when ripe; and then choosing the Adige from amidst so many lines of defence, because that it was not as lengthy as the Po, nor exposed to be so easily turned as the Isonzo, and remaining immovable in that position until he had attracted thither and destroyed all the Austrian forces. His military science was shown by awaiting the enemy at Verona, where, if they should appear, his excellent position at Caldiero would enable him to repel them; and should they turn towards the plains, he would meet them in the marshes of Arcola, where valour would be more potent than numbers. Should they descend on our left by the Tyrol, he was ready to receive them on the plateau of Rivoli, and then master of both routes—that of the valley through which the artillery and cavalry were advancing, that through the mountains by which the infantry was marching—he first drove back the artillery and cavalry into the river, then captured the infantry that had lost the aid of the other arms, and with fifteen thousand men took eighteen thousand prisoners. And he accomplished all this at the age of twenty-six, combining the daring of youth with the profound judgment of mature age. Such feats, we must repeat, are unparalleled in the annals of history both for greatness of conception and perfection of execution.

The entire career of General Bonaparte presents the same distinctive features: a wonderful perspicacity in discovering

the ultimate object to which all the efforts of a campaign ought to tend, and profound skill in profiting by the configuration of the ground on which the battle was to be fought; in a word, he exhibited equal superiority in directing the general movements of an army, and in the art of giving battle.

In 1800 we had possession of Switzerland as far as the Tyrol, with the plains of Swabia on our left, and those of Piedmont on our right. The Austrians, not anticipating the daring movements of their young adversary, had advanced towards Huningue on the right, and to Genoa on the left. The First Consul conceived the design of rushing from both sides of the Alpine chain on their rear, and proposed to Moreau to descend by Constance on Ulm, whilst he would advance on Milan by the Great St. Bernard. Moreau hesitated to throw himself into the centre of Bavaria amidst masses of the enemy. The First Consul allowed Moreau to carry out his own ideas, whilst he crossed the St. Bernard without a beaten track, rolled his cannon, encased in trees, down precipices, fell unexpectedly on the Austrians' rear, and compelled them at Marengo to give him up in one day the entire of that Italy which two years before had cost him twelve battles and sixty combats; whilst Moreau, pursuing his own methodic and sage plan, took six months to reach Vienna.

In this case, too, the point of attack was chosen so correctly that when the blow was struck the enemy was completely disarmed. The decisive battle, indeed, does not seem to have been as skilfully conducted as that of Rivoli. The ground was level, nor did it offer any favourable position, and owing to a badly executed reconnaissance, the French remained ignorant of the vicinity of the Austrians. The First Consul was surprised, and ran the risk of being beaten. But his lieutenant was not Grouchy, but Desaix, who by his opportune arrival secured the victory. Although the battle ran the risk of being lost through an accident, Bonaparte's unexpected arrival on the enemy's rear was not the less a prodigy of daring, comparable only to Hannibal's passage over the Alps accomplished two thousand years before.

When in 1805 the young consul, now become emperor, was obliged to renounce his attack on England, and turn his attention to the continent, he in fifteen days led his army from Flanders to Swabia. We generally pass through the defiles of the Black Forest to reach the sources of the Danube, and by this route the Austrians advanced in great haste. He arrested their progress by the apparition of heads of columns in the principal defiles; then suddenly disappearing, he advanced along the left by the Swabian Alps, debouched at Nuremberg, on the Austrians' rear, shut them up in Ulm, and compelled

an entire army of 60,000 men to lay down their arms before him, a feat unprecedented in the annals of history. Freed from the largest portion of the Austrian forces, and learning that the Prussians were assuming a threatening aspect, he without hesitation advanced to Vienna, bringing in his train the armies from Italy under Massena. These he rallied in the Austrian capital, then hastened to Austerlitz, where he found the Russians united to the remnant of the Austrian forces. Here, by affected hesitation and feigned retreats, he tempted the temerity of Alexander, who, listening to the advice of young men, sought to cut off the French army from Vienna. By this movement Alexander exposed the plateau of Pratzen, where his centre was stationed. Napoleon descended with the rapidity of an eagle, cut the enemy's army in two, drove one portion into the lakes, the other into a ravine. He then turned to the Prussians, who, instead of joining the coalition, were compelled to beg pardon on their knees for having gone to war with him.

Here again Napoleon's general movements are unparalleled in correctness and daring; the battle itself was a prodigy of skill and presence of mind, and it was not strange that empires should fall before such miracles of science.

Instead of the certain and durable peace he might have concluded with Europe, the conqueror of Austerlitz, intoxicated with his success, brought on himself a war with Prussia and Russia. The Prussian army advanced behind the mountainous forest of Thuringia, in order to protect the central plains of Germany. Napoleon left them in that position, turned back to the right until he came to the neighbourhood of Coburg, then debouched on the extreme left of the enemy's line, approached the Prussians in such a manner as to cut them off from the north, where the Russians were expecting them; overpowered them at Jena, at Auerstadt, and by constantly attacking them while retreating, he captured them to the last man at Prenzlau, near Lübeck. On that day the Prussian monarchy ceased to exist, and the work of the great Frederick was annihilated.

He was now compelled to go to the north in search of the Russians, to correct them of the habit they had acquired of incessantly urging against us the German powers, whom they abandoned after they had compromised them.

Napoleon advanced to the Vistula, and encountered the two great dangers of climate and distance, which were to be so fatal to him at a later period. His army at first preserved its moral and physical vigour; but the distance compelled some of the men to desert, and cold and hunger soon disgusted others. Napoleon displayed extraordinary strength of will and powers of organisation in preserving his army undiminished. With unconquerable energy he struggled on the frozen plains of Eylau against the

barbaric energy of Russia, spent the winter in strengthening his position by the taking of Dantzic; and spring being come, and his army recruited, he descended along the Ale to the Niemen. He calculated that the Russians would be compelled to approach the shore in search of provisions, and cross the Ale before him; and he advanced in expectation of this event, from which he expected a decisive result. On June 14, the anniversary of Marengo, he found the Russians crossing the Ale at Friedland. With the exception of Oudinot's grenadiers, all his troops were far behind. Hastening to the spot with those under his immediate command, he ordered Oudinot to *tirailleur*, and brought up the remainder of his army in haste. Instead of attacking the Russians when all his forces were collected, he waited until they had crossed the Ale. To induce them to fight, he drew back his left a little, gradually advanced his right towards Friedland, where the Russian bridges were, destroyed these, and when he had thus deprived the enemy of all means of retreat, he again advanced his left, with which the Russians had refused to engage, drove his opponents into the Ale, and drowned or captured almost their entire army, the last that Europe had to oppose to him.

We again repeat that all these feats were accomplished with an equal degree of perfection. His foreseeing that the Russians would attempt to reach the shore in order to join their magazines, and should necessarily cross the Ale in face of the French army, his following and surprising them, and waiting until they had almost crossed the river, his seizing the bridges, and when these were seized, driving the enemy back on the Ale, were all real prodigies in which the profound foresight of the general operations were only equalled by his presence of mind in the definite operation of the battle.

In Italy, Napoleon had been but a general acting under orders, and with limited resources; in Austria, Prussia, and Poland, he was general, but head of the State, with the resources of a great empire at his disposal, capable of effecting operations equal in magnitude to his conceptions. In one day he destroyed Austria, in another Prussia, and Russia on the third—and this at distances from home to which war had never before been carried. He was at first the model of all subordinate generals; afterwards, that of the all-powerful and successful commander. Warfare was no longer confined to the circumference of a fortress; those classic battles, with the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the wings, were at an end; the general movements were proportioned to the empire to be conquered, and the general features of the battle conformable to the ground on which they were fought. His battles surpassed though they have some resemblance to that of Leuthen, and his movements

were very different from those of Frederick, who, hastening breathless from Breslau to Frankfort on the Oder, from Frankfort to Erfurt, never struck a decisive blow which could terminate the war. Not but that the activity, the constancy, and firmness of Frederick, deservedly called the Great, are worthy of all admiration! It is also true that the French general, animated by prodigious personal daring, and deeply imbued with the spirit of the Revolution, and studying the nature of the ground as none had ever done before, attained to such magnitude and correctness of plan that his blows were at once sure and decisive, and to a certain degree without appeal! With him, we may say, that military science attained the summit of perfection.

These wonderful successes unfortunately corrupted, not the general, who was improving daily in his art, but the politician, by persuading him that everything was possible, by leading him sometimes to Spain, sometimes to Russia with armies declining in quality, because incessantly recruited, and through ever-increasing difficulties, across such distances as from Cadiz to Moscow, through such varieties of climate as from Africa to Siberia, driving men from forty degrees of heat to thirty of cold, variations that animal life cannot support. The greatest, the most consummate of commanders necessarily succumbed beneath such rash attempts.

Many of those who have constituted themselves Napoleon's judges have shown too little severity to his policy, too much to his military operations. They have reproached him with being the general of success, but not of defeat, one who could invade, but not defend, who was foremost in offensive, the most inferior in defensive warfare, all which they sum up in these words, *Napoleon never knew how to retreat!* This we hold to be an incorrect opinion.

When the intoxication of success led Napoleon to such a distance from Paris as Moscow, and to a climate of thirty degrees of cold, there was no possibility of retreat; nor could Moreau, who had effected that admirable retreat from Bavaria in 1800, have possibly brought the French army uninjured from Moscow to Warsaw. Such disasters as that of 1812 are not the chances of war, which allow alternate advance and retreat; they rather resemble some lofty edifice that crumbles on the head of the daring mortal who had ventured to raise it to such a presumptuous height. The soldiers, elevated to the highest degree of excitement when setting out for Russia, were suddenly surprised by a destructive climate, conscious of the immense distance from their home; and knowing that the nations in their rear were hostilely inclined, they sank into a dejection great as their previous excitement had been, nor was there any authority that could any longer keep them in order. The

question was not in this case that of a practical retreat which the commander was not capable of effecting, it was the edifice of universal monarchy falling on its daring projector!

But he is not a true general who cannot act in adversity as well as in prosperity, for warfare is such a succession of favourable and unfavourable chances that he who is not as equal to the one as to the other is not fit to command an army for a fortnight. When General Bonaparte, amidst the fevers of Mantua, was attacked by the Austrians in the November of 1796, when with no more than 10,000 available troops he entered the marshes of Arcola to destroy the advantages of number, he displayed a firmness of mind and fertility of invention under difficulties which most certainly have not often been equalled. When at Essling on the Danube, in 1809, the period when his great political errors were commencing, he was deprived of his bridges by an unusual swell of the river, he showed no want of firmness in adversity when he fell back on the island of Lobau with imperturbable coolness. The resistance at Essling itself was a prodigy effected by Lannes, who fell during the effort, and of Massena, who would have lost his life there, had God not made him as fortunate as he was persevering; but it was Napoleon's firmness which, midst the commotion of Vienna and the demoralisation of our generals, discovered resources unseen by others, adopted that firm and patient system which restored victory to our standards at Wagram, and that firmness so much admired in Massena in reality belonged to Napoleon. This moment presented one of those extremes in warfare, the greatest and most gloriously endured of all those whose remembrance has been preserved in history.

The most decisive of all proofs is the campaign of 1814, when Napoleon, with a handful of men, some exhausted, some raw recruits, opposed all Europe, not by beating a retreat, but by profiting by the false movements of the enemy, by retarding their progress by terrific blows; and it furnishes another example of his fertility of resource, his presence of mind, and indomitable firmness in a desperate position. Napoleon certainly did not carry on a defensive war like the greater number of generals, by retiring methodically from one line to another, defending the first well, then the second, then the third, and thus gain time, which is not to be despised, though it is not sufficient for the successful termination of a crisis; he carried on defensive war as he did offensive; he studied the ground, endeavoured to anticipate the enemy's movements, to surprise and overwhelm them, as he did Blucher and Schwarzenberg in 1814, and which would have secured his safety, but that all around him, men and things, were completely exhausted.

If he were not, correctly speaking, a general of retreats,

because that, like Frederick, he considered attack the best mode of defence, he was as great in his unsuccessful as in his successful wars. In both he preserved the same vigour, daring, and promptitude in seizing the proper point of attack, and if he failed, we must repeat that it was not as a soldier, but as a politician, who had undertaken what was impossible of accomplishment.

Napoleon was no less great in the organisation of his armies than in battles and in the general direction of operations.

Before him, the generals of the republic divided their armies into divisions composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and at the very utmost reserved one division unengaged, composed like the others, and intended for any unexpected event. Each lieutenant-general fought a separate battle, the part of the commander-in-chief being confined to aid whichever should be in greatest need. By this plan, defeats could be avoided, and even battles gained, but not one of those decisive battles which compels a nation to lay down its arms. Napoleon changed the organisation of armies, and in such a way that the power of deciding a victory was in the hands of him who held the supreme command.

His army was divided into corps, of which the principal was composed of infantry, with a portion of artillery as a support, and some cavalry to clear the ground. Besides the guard (his usual reserve), he formed masses of cavalry and artillery, to be employed like a thunderbolt when the decisive moment should arrive. When the Russian infantry appeared immovable at Eylau, he charged them with sixty squadrons of cavalry and artillery, and made a breach that could not afterwards be repaired. When Bernadotte had allowed our line to be broken at Wagram, Napoleon, with a hundred pieces of ordnance, stopped the victorious centre of the Archduke Charles, and restored the battle, which Davout ended by seizing the plateau of Wagram. This was the reason that he formed two reserves besides the guard, one composed of heavy cavalry, the other of artillery, *à grande portée*, which in his hand resembled the club of Hercules. But the club of Hercules must be wielded by the hand of Hercules, and with a general inferior to Napoleon this arrangement would often have had the inconvenience of depriving skilful lieutenants of a special arm of which they might make successful use, and placing them in the hands of a commander who could not employ them. Thus all the generals of the republican army on the Rhine being accustomed to act almost independently, having a certain portion of each arm under his command, regretted the old arrangement; that is, they regretted a state of things which, though it diminished the general result, gave each a greater degree of importance.

The organisation of an army does not alone consist in the disposal of its different parts, but also in recruiting and supporting it. Napoleon's skill in leading recruits from their villages to the banks of the Rhine, thence to those of the Elbe, Vistula, or Niemen, in collecting them in depôts, watching over them with extreme care, scarcely ever allowing one to escape, and leading them, as it were, by the hand to battle, was something extraordinary. It consisted in an infallible memory of all details, in profound discernment of the neglect or disobedience of subalterns, in a constant endeavour to correct such faults, in an indefatigable strength of will, and in incessant labour, which often consumed his nights, even when the day had been passed on horseback. Notwithstanding all these efforts, the roads were often covered with deserters, which only showed how the nature of things had been outraged when men were transported from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Volga.

To these different duties of a commander-in-chief there is another still to be added, that of conquering the elements when snow-clad mountains are to be traversed, broad and rapid streams, and sometimes even the sea itself, to be crossed. Antiquity has bequeathed Hannibal's passage of the Pyrenees and Alps to the admiration of mankind, and there is no doubt but that nothing greater, or perhaps even so great, has ever been accomplished. The crossing of St. Bernard, the passage of the Egyptian army through the English fleet, the preparations for the expedition from Boulogne, and the crossing of the Danube at Wagram, are great operations which will be no less admired by posterity. The last, in especial, will be an eternal subject of admiration. The difficulty on this occasion consisted in having to seek and fight the Austrians beyond the Danube, in leading 150,000 men across that broad stream, whilst 200,000 of the enemy were waiting to force us back into the waves; nor was there any possibility of avoiding this danger by seeking a passage either above or below Vienna, as the first would bring the troops too much in advance, the second lead them too much to the rear. This difficulty was got over in a most wonderful manner. In three hours 150,000 men and 500 pieces of cannon crossed the river in presence of a stupefied enemy, who did not think of attacking us until we had landed on the left bank, and were in a position to oppose them. The passage of the St. Bernard, extraordinary as it was, could not be compared to Hannibal's crossing the Alps; but the passage of the Danube in 1809 equals any effort ever made to overcome the combined powers of nature and of man, and will be for ever looked on as a prodigy of profound calculation executed with the calmest daring.

Full justice would not be done to Napoleon's military genius

if we did not add that to his various intellectual endowments he joined the power of ruling men's minds, of inspiring them with his passions, of subduing them as some great orator subdues his auditors, sometimes restraining, sometimes urging them forward, inspiring them with fresh courage when they falter, and ever holding them in check as a skilful rider curbs a restive horse. He was not deficient in any intellectual or moral quality necessary to a great commander, and we may safely say, that had not Hannibal existed, he would have been without an equal.

To sum up what we have said of the progress of scientific warfare, we repeat that two men, Hannibal and Cæsar, carried that art to the highest degree in ancient times, but that Cæsar, impeded by his mode of encamping, showed less daring in his movements, less fertility of invention, and less perseverance in all phases of fortune than Hannibal; that in the middle ages, Charlemagne, though an excellent sovereign, does not fulfil the idea of a true general, because that military art was in too rude a state in his time, when almost all soldiers were horsemen, and had but a few archers to assist them; that it was with the development of the middle classes in towns that the infantry first sprung into existence, an event that took place first amongst the mountains of Switzerland, then in the German, Italian, and Dutch towns; that powder, in destroying salient walls, compelled the towns to lessen the height of their walls, and the subtle art of modern fortification arose; that it was then in attacking or defending towns that scientific warfare again appeared, in which art the Nassaus were the first teachers, and in which they displayed an intelligence and firmness admired even now, but that the art itself, being confined to the capture of fortresses, was still very timid; that in the sanguinary strife which sprung up in the north of Europe between Catholics and Protestants, and lasted thirty years, Gustavus Adolphus, opposing a brave and steady people to the Polish cavalry, gave a fresh impulse to the infantry; that when he came into Germany he made military art more daring, and less restricted to fortress warfare than in the time of the Nassaus; that in France, Condé, with a happy union of intelligence and daring, first displayed the real genius of battlefields, and Turenne that of great movements; but still the infantry was not sufficiently effective, because of being divided into musketeers and pikemen, till Vauban, in attaching the bayonet to the musket, enabled the infantry to be ranged in three ranks; the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau being entrusted with the organisation of the Prussian army, formed the modern battalion, which could discharge an extensive fire without presenting a dense body to the enemy; that Frederick adopted this plan, and having to fight

on the frontiers of Silesia and Bohemia, changed the classic order of battle, and was the first that adapted his troops to the nature of the ground; that being alternately opposed to Austrians, Russians, and French, he enlarged the circle of operation, and was consequently the originator of two great improvements; he was succeeded by the French Revolution, which, having only popular masses to oppose to coalesced Europe, resisted by means of the number and impulse of the old armies; that the infantry, which is the expression of the development of nations, took a definite position in modern tactics, without depriving the scientific arms of theirs; that finally, one extraordinary man, with a vast and profound intellect, and daring as the Revolution that gave him birth, carried military art to its ultimate perfection by profound meditation of the physical geography of the countries where war was being carried on, by always selecting the right position from which to strike an effective blow, by joining the science of general movements to the art of fighting according to the nature of the ground, by always seeking in the configuration of the ground or the enemy's position the opportunity for a great battle, by never hesitating to fight one since it was the natural consequence of his general plan, by arranging these battles so well that each caused the overthrow of a great empire, which produced in him the most dangerous of all intoxications, that of conquest, which inspired the desire of universal monarchy, and occasioned his fall; so that this wise legislator, this skilful administrator and great captain, was by reason of his very superiority a bad politician, since losing his reason in the midst of victory, he passed from triumph to triumph until he fell into an abyss.

If we now compare him to those great men his rivals, not in the special light of a general, but under the more general relation of talents and destiny, the subject assumes a wider, more moral, and more instructive aspect. If we wish to estimate him by his fame, by the importance of what he effected, the excitement he caused mankind, and the influence he exerted in the world, we must again seek his compeers in Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Frederick, and by close comparison between him and them our conception of his character will become fuller and more correct.

Alexander, inheriting his army from his father, and instructed in all the learning of the Greeks, whose applause he ardently desired, invaded Asia, where there were none but the feeble Persians to oppose him, and advanced to the limits of the then known world. Had not his soldiers prevented him, he would have proceeded to the Indian Ocean. Compelled to return, his sole desire was to recommence his adventurous expeditions. It was not of his country, which had no need of such vast

conquests, that he thought, but of the glory of having overrun the world as a conqueror. His desire was to be celebrated and applauded at Athens. Although generous and even kind-hearted, he killed his friend Clitus, and his two best lieutenants, Philotas and Parmenion, because in a thoughtless moment they had seemed to cast a doubt upon his greatness. Fame was his object, the vainest ever sought by a great man, and when having allowed some time for his army to rest, he again commenced the pursuit of this sole aim of his exertions, charmed by the delights of Asia, he fell a victim to intoxication and to fever. Posterity has been captivated by his heroic grace; but no life could be more tumultuously useless than his, for he did not carry Grecian civilisation beyond Ionia and Syria, where it had been already planted, and he left Greece in a state of anarchy, which only prepared it for the conquest of the Romans. In a moral sense one would prefer being the wise and clever Philopœmen, who did not excite so much attention, but who prolonged the independence of Greece, though it was but for a few days.

With Alexander's career, at once so active and so profitless, compare that of Hannibal, the most extensive, the most important, and the most energetic ever pursued by man. This mortal, on whom God bestowed the greatest gifts of intellect and character, and those best suited for the accomplishment of great deeds, was descended from a long line of warriors, all of whom had died in defence of Carthage. His soul was of a metal tempered in the burning furnace of hatred which Rome had excited around her. At nine years of age he left Carthage with his father, to go, like his ancestors, to live and die fighting against the Romans. War was the amusement of his childhood. As a child he slept on the field of battle, acquired for his body an insensibility to pain, his soul became incapable of fear, and his mind acquired the power of judging as calmly amid the tumults of war as others whilst in perfect repose. When his father and brother-in-law had died fighting for their country, though he was but twenty-two years of age, the Carthaginian army demanded him as general, and almost forced this choice upon the Senate, who was jealous of the glorious family of Barca. He assumed the command of this army, which he imbued with his own sentiments of daring, firmness, and hatred of the Romans, led it into Europe, as little known then as the interior of Africa is now, ventured to cross the Pyrenees and Alps with 80,000 men, of whom he lost two-thirds in this extraordinary passage, and impressed by the profound conviction that it was at Rome that Rome should be conquered, he excited against her all the Italian towns that had unwillingly submitted to her sway. He attacked the Roman generals, inducing them

to leave their camps by piquing the courage of some, the vanity of others ; overcame several, and would have triumphed over all, but that he met an opponent worthy of him in Fabius, who saw that it was not in battle, where he was invincible, that this Titan was to be overcome, but by perseverance, the essential virtue of Rome. Hannibal, seeing that he had erred in calculating on the Gauls, excitable and fickle like all barbarians, advanced into the centre of Italy, possessing rich and civilised towns, governed, like Rome, by a Senate, of which the people were jealous. Although an aristocrat himself, he destroyed the aristocratic party, bestowed power on the democracy, made Capua the centre of his empire, where he did not, as was said, sink into pleasures for which he had no taste, but stopped to recover from fatigue, and recruit his impoverished army, for which alone he collected the riches of the country ; then abandoned by his cowardly nation, he called the whole world to his aid, carried the war into Greece and Asia, destroyed all the forces sent against him, and maintained himself so firmly in his conquest for twelve years that the Romans began to consider his presence in Italy as an incurable evil. But the time came when the Romans in their turn besieged the walls of Carthage, and he was recalled to oppose his weakened army to the renovated forces of the Romans, and then, according to the usual course of human affairs, his matured success yielded to the rising fortune of Scipio. When he returned to his country he attempted to reform it and render it equal to a renewal of the struggle with Rome. Denounced by those whose maladministration he attacked, he fled into the East, attempted to rouse the weakness of Antiochus, but he was pursued by the hatred of the Romans ; and when he found the struggle vain, he swallowed poison and died, the last of his family, all of whom had laid down their lives in the same sacred cause, resistance to foreign rule. In contemplating the career of this great man, endowed with talents so varied and courage so heroic, we look on every side to detect a fault, but in vain. We seek for some personal motive of pleasure, luxury, or ambition, but no other can be found than hatred to the enemies of his country. The Roman Livy accuses him of avarice and cruelty. Hannibal had amassed great riches, not for his own enjoyment, but to pay his army, composed of mercenaries, and the only mercenary army that never revolted, restrained as it was by his genius and by his wise distribution of the spoils of victory. It is true that he sent to Carthage several bushels of rings taken from the Roman knights who had fallen beneath the sword of the Carthaginians ; but we do not hear of a single act of cruelty committed off the field of battle. The reproaches of the Roman historian become an eulogium, and posterity has said, what will be repeated to the latest times, that

Hannibal has presented the world with the noblest spectacle that man can offer—genius unsullied by egotism, and actuated alone by patriotism, to which Hannibal fell a glorious martyr.

History presents us with another martyr, not of patriotism, but of ambition, a man of rare genius, possessing most seductive qualities, but laden with vices, and guilty of the most fearful attempts against the constitution of his country. This was Cæsar, the third great man of ancient times. Endowed with wonderful talents, brave, haughty, eloquent, refined, lavish, and still simple in his greatness, but making little distinction between right and wrong, his only thought was to succeed where Sylla and Marius had failed, to become, in a word, the master of his own country. Alexander sought to conquer the world; Hannibal to prevent the conquest of his country; Cæsar, a Roman, only thought of gaining the mastery of that Rome which had conquered almost the entire world. For this he employed the vilest arts. Still he was not cruel; but his forbearance arose not from goodness of heart but from policy, for he did not wish to recall the proscriptions of Marius and Sylla to the terrified imaginations of his countrymen. When seeking to become edile, prætor, and high priest, he contracted immense debts in order to purchase the votes of his fellow-citizens. He corrupted wives and husbands as he had endeavoured to corrupt the people. To all his other modes of corruption he studied to add the noblest of intellectual gifts, and became one of the most perfect of human orators. Become the delight and scandal of Rome, it was not possible for him to remain there longer. He joined with the avaricious Crassus and vain Pompey, whose weakness he ruled, and had himself appointed to the command of the army in Gaul, the only country that was left to be conquered within the limits assigned by nature to the Roman world. He conquered Gaul, not for the benefit of his country, which did not need of such an addition, but that he might form for himself devoted soldiers, and acquire riches to pay his own debts and those of his needy partisans. Fighting during summer and intriguing during winter, he, from his quarters in Milan, swayed the vanity of Pompey and the avarice of Crassus, ruled the Roman world for ten years, and when Crassus died in Asia, and there was none to prevent the collision of his ambition with Pompey's, he first artfully tried to avoid a struggle of whose danger he was aware, but when he found that impossible, he crossed the Rubicon, marched against Pompey, whose legions were in Spain, drove him from Italy into Epirus, where he turned, as he himself has well expressed it, *from a general without an army to encounter an army without a general*. He destroyed Pompey's legions, which were under the command of Afranius in Spain, returned

then to Epirus, fought Pompey himself, and terminated at Pharsalia this struggle for the supreme command. The remnants of Pompey's party were still in Africa and Spain; these he conquered, and returned to Rome to triumph over all his enemies, and found that great system called the Roman empire, but was assassinated by the republicans, because he prematurely sought to assume the name as well as the reality of supreme power. In this life, when a man's aim is vicious, so are the means by which he tries to attain it; but we must allow Cæsar the merit of having endeavoured to substitute the empire for the republic, not by blood, as Sylla and Marius had done, but by bribery and corruption suited to the Roman customs, and by intellectual powers corresponding to their taste. The distinctive characteristic of this wonderful man, of this great politician, great orator, great warrior, and in especial, this great profligate, clement without goodness, was that, regarded under every aspect, he was the most highly endowed being that ever appeared on this earth.

How many a page of the mighty tomes of history must be perused, how many centuries gone through, before we arrive at the ninth, where we find another great man, Charlemagne, standing on the confines of the ancient and modern worlds!

It is perfectly natural, and by no means appertains to the wonderful, that in the midst of civilisation, with its attractive, varied, and productive knowledge, where learning itself begets a desire for its possession, that we should find men infatuated by literature and science—loving them for themselves and for the advantages they confer, seeing it is they that give the impulse to all things, impel the ship across the ocean, the carriage along the road, that it is they that give birth to justice, and to the force that supports her, and finally, that it is they that render human society so fair, so attractive, so gentle, and so safe! What eyes that have once enjoyed the light would not love it? But when in the midst of profound darkness an eye that has never possessed this advantage anticipates, loves, seeks, and obtains illumination, and endeavours to reflect its rays around, we behold a prodigy worthy of the admiration and respect of mankind. Such is the spectacle presented by Charlemagne to the universe.

Born a barbarian in the midst of barbarians, who possessed indeed some rays of ancient science transmitted by the clergy, he was seized with the most glowing desire for what we call civilisation, to which he gave another name, but loved as much and for the same reasons as we. At that time civilisation was Christianity. To be a Christian in those days was equivalent to being a true philosopher, the friend of what was right, of justice, and of social liberty. Charlemagne was induced by all these

motives to become a fervent Christian, and to endeavour to propagate Christianity throughout the barbarian world, abandoned to brute force and the grossest sensuality. Austrasia, or the north-eastern part of the uncultivated and ill-defined France of those days, was at war with the south-east, or Neustria, and both were opposed to the south, Aquitaine. France was threatened with fresh invasions from the barbarian Saxons on the north, and by the Arabs on the south, both very nearly if not altogether pagan nations. If a strong hand did not arrest their progress on the north or south, the rising kingdom of the Franks would be destroyed, the different nations which composed it would be again brought into contact to each other, and fresh invasions bear away the seeds of civilisation which had been only just planted. Charlemagne resumed and completed the work of consolidation which his father and grandfather had commenced. We cannot say whether he was a great captain, or whether it was possible that he could become such in the age in which he lived. A captain at that time meant one who, like Pepin or Charles Martel, would, battle-axe in hand, lead his followers further than others through the serried ranks of the enemy. Brought up by such men, Charlemagne was certainly not less valiant than they; but he did better than combat as a soldier at the head of his rude soldiery: he, during a period of fifty years, guided their headlong bravery to the carrying out of his well-digested, wise, and decided views. He united Austrasia, Neustria, and Aquitaine; he pursued the Saxons until he made them Christians, the only mode of civilising them or disarming their ferocity; he repulsed the Saracens in the south, nor did he attempt to subdue them altogether, which would have obliged him to penetrate as far as Africa, but wisely stopped when he had reached the Ebro. He founded, supported, and governed an immense empire, without drawing upon himself the accusation of ill-regulated ambition; for at that time there were no frontiers, and if this empire, too extensive for the genius of his successors, could no longer be governed by a single mind, it retained, under the name of Europe, the same laws, the same civilisation, though under the authority of different rulers. During nearly half a century that he sustained this great empire by his indefatigable perseverance, he devoted himself to establish order, justice, and humanity—such, at least, as they were then understood; for which purpose he sometimes employed the national assemblies which he summoned twice a year, sometimes the clergy, his great instrument of civilisation, and lastly, his direct representatives, his *missi dominici*, the celebrated agents of his indefatigable vigilance. Convinced of the necessity of good laws, but knowing that amongst an uneducated people the laws cannot be enforced, he founded schools, whence flowed

not the knowledge of modern times, but that of his own, for he could not supply to these receptacles any greater abundance than he possessed. He joined to these laborious virtues some weaknesses, which perhaps originated in the goodness of his heart. He established himself in his palaces, which were rich farms; and surrounded by his children, he lived there as a kind-hearted king, as amiable as he was wise and learned; doing more good than a conqueror or general, and was the model of a perfect sovereign, loving his people, deserving their affection, and by his undeviating exertions to do good, accomplishing more perhaps than any ruler that ever lived. After having contemplated these terrible Alexanders and Cæsars, who overturned the whole world rather to spread their fame than to serve mankind, what a pleasure it is to turn to this calm, majestic, and benevolent figure, ever employed in study, or in some work for the benefit of mankind, and whom we see subjected but to one annoyance—that of beholding towards the end of his life the skiffs of those terrible Normans, whose devastations he foresaw, though he had not time to repress them. How true it is that no career on earth is perfect, not even the most active, the most extensive; and that no life, not even that which deserves it best, is happy even to the end.

As we descend to modern times we no longer meet these colossal figures, either because proximity diminishes their prestige, or that the world, assuming a more regular form, leaves less space for extraordinary beings. Neither Charles V. with his wisdom and sadness, Henry IV. with his charming manner and refined policy, the Nassaus with their persevering firmness, Gustavus Adolphus, who conquered the German empire with a few soldiers, Cromwell, the assassin of his king and ruler of the English Revolution, nor Louis XIV. with his dignity and good sense, could equal the grandeur of those glorious figures we have attempted to depict. We now come to two men, Frederick and Napoleon, whom the twofold brilliancy of intellectual and military genius has placed, one near, the other quite on, an equality with the great men of antiquity. Frederick, the jesting sceptic, the crowned leader of the philosophers of the eighteenth century, the despiser of all that is respectable in mankind, who turned his very friends into ridicule; who was in some sort predestined to defy, insult, and humble the pride of Austria, and of the old system it represented; who dared, in the midst of that firmly seated Europe, in whose position it was so difficult to effect a change—dared, we repeat, to undertake the creation of a new power, and had the honour of succeeding, though opposed alone to the entire continent—his success is due, it is true, to the frivolity of the courts of France and Russia, and to the narrow policy of

the Austrian court ; and after having carried on a war of twenty years' duration, his profound policy kept Europe in peace, and succeeded in dividing Poland without firing a single shot. This Frederick is an original and striking character, who, though not deficient in great deeds, is deficient in greatness, either because he only changed the relative proportion of power in the interior of the Germanic Confederation, or because his mocking physiognomy is deficient in that dignity which impresses mankind.

Greatness ! there is no lack of that in him who succeeded Frederick, and surpassed him in the admiration he excited, and the destruction he caused ! It was reserved for the French Revolution, destined to change the aspect of European society, to produce a man who would fix the attention of the world as powerfully as Charlemagne, Cæsar, Hannibal, and Alexander. He possessed every qualification that could strike, attract, and fix the attention of mankind, whether we consider the greatness of the part he was destined to perform, the vastness of the political convulsions he caused, the splendour, extent, and profundity of his genius, or his majestic gravity of thought. This son of a Corsican gentleman, who received the gratuitous military education that ancient royalty bestowed on the sons of the poor nobility, had scarcely left school when in a sanguinary tumult he obtained the rank of commander-in-chief, then left the Parisian army for that in Italy, conquered that country in a month, successively destroyed all the forces of the European coalition, wrested from them the peace of Campo-Formio, and then becoming too formidable to stand beside the government of the republic, he went to seek a new destiny in the East, passed through the English fleet with five hundred ships, conquered Egypt at a stride, then thought of following Alexander's footsteps in the conquest of India ; but suddenly recalled to the West by the renewal of the European war, after having attempted to imitate Alexander, he imitated and equalled Hannibal in crossing the Alps, again overpowered the coalition, and compelled it to accept the peace of Lunéville ; and at thirty years of age this son of a poor Corsican nobleman had already run through a most extraordinary career. Become pacific for a while, he by his laws laid the basis of modern society ; but again yielding to the impulses of his restless genius, he once more attacked Europe, vanquished her in three battles, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, set up and threw down kingdoms, placed the crown of Charlemagne on his head, and when kings came to offer him their daughters, chose the descendant of the Cæsars, who presented him with a son that seemed destined to wear the most brilliant crown in the universe. He advanced from Cadiz to Moscow, where he was subjected to the greatest catastrophe on record, rose again, but was again defeated, and

confined in a small island, from which he emerged with a few hundred faithful soldiers, recovered the crown of France in twenty days, struggled again against exasperated Europe, sank for the last time at Waterloo, and having sustained greater wars than those of the Roman empire, went, he, the child of a Mediterranean isle, to die in an island of the ocean, bound, like Prometheus, by the fear and hatred of kings to a rock. This son of a poor Corsican nobleman has indeed played in the world the parts of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, and Charlemagne ! He possessed as much genius as the greatest amongst them ; acquired as much fame as the most celebrated, and unfortunately shed more blood than any of them. In a moral point of view, he is inferior to the best of these great men, but superior to the worst. His ambition was not as futile as that of Alexander, nor as depraved as that of Cæsar ; but it was not as respectable as Hannibal's, who sacrificed himself to save his country the misfortune of being conquered. His ambition was that usual with conquerors who seek to rule after having aggrandised their native land. Still he loved France and cherished her glory as dearly as his own. As a ruler he sought what was right, but sought it as a despot ; nor did he pursue it with the consistency or religious perseverance of Charlemagne. In variety of talents he was inferior to Cæsar, who, being compelled to win over his fellow-citizens before ruling them, had to learn how to persuade as well as how to fight, and could speak, write, and act with a certain simple majesty. Napoleon, on the other hand, having acquired power by warfare, had no need of oratory, nor possibly, though endowed with natural eloquence, could he ever have acquired it, since he never would have taken the trouble of patiently analysing his thoughts in presence of a deliberative assembly ; but he could write as he thought, with force and dignity, and even carefully, but he was sometimes a little declamatory like his mother, the French Revolution : he argued with more force than Cæsar, but could not narrate with his extreme simplicity or exquisite taste. He was inferior to the Roman dictator in the variety of his talents, but superior as a general, both by his peculiar military genius, and by the daring profundity and inexhaustible fertility of his plans, in which he had but one equal or superior (which we cannot decide)—Hannibal—for he was as daring, as prudent, as subtle, as inventive, as terrible, and as obstinate as the Carthaginian general, with one advantage, of living at a later period. Succeeding to Hannibal, Cæsar, the Nassaus, Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, Turenne, and Frederick, he brought military art to its ultimate perfection. God alone can estimate the respective merits of such men ; all we can do is to sketch some prominent traits of their wonderful characters.

Napoleon has claims on us Frenchmen, claims which we can neither disavow nor forget, to whatever party we may be attached by birth, conviction, or interest. Certainly in organising our social state by the Civil Code, and regulating our administration according to its conditions, he did not give us the political form in which French society was to repose definitely, and live peacefully, prosperously, and free; he did not give us liberty, which is still due to us from his heirs; but on the morrow of the French Revolution he could do no more than restore order, and we must thank him for having given us, with that, our civil position and administrative organisation. Unfortunately for him and us, he diminished our greatness; but he left us glory, which constitutes moral power, and which in time will restore material greatness. He was by his genius fitted for France, and France for him. What they have done together could not have been accomplished by the French army without him, nor by him without the French army. Author of our reverses, but companion of our exploits, we must judge him with severity; but at the same time we must entertain for him the sentiments of soldiers for the general who has long conducted them to victory. Let us study his great deeds, which are our own; let us learn from him, if we are soldiers, the art of guiding armies; if we are statesmen, how to govern empires; let us learn, above all, from his faults; let us avoid his example and learn to love moderate greatness, that which is attainable, and is durable because not insupportable to others; in a word, let us learn moderation from this most ambitious of men. Let us, as citizens, draw this last and memorable lesson from his life—that however great, wise, or boundless the genius of any man may be, the destiny of a country should never be entirely entrusted to his power. We most assuredly are not of the number of those who blame Napoleon for wresting France on the 18th Brumaire from the hands of the Directory, in which she might have perished; but it does not follow because it was well to wrest the country from weak and corrupt hands, that it should be delivered over unconditionally into the daring and powerful grasp of the conqueror of Rivoli and Marengo. If any nation ever had an excuse for placing itself in the power of one man, it was France when in 1800 she adopted Napoleon as her chief. It was no pretended anarchy that was raised as a bugbear to terrify the nation into chains. Alas, no! thousands of innocent lives had been sacrificed on the scaffold, in the prisons of the Abbey, or in the waters of the Loire. The horrors of barbarism had suddenly reappeared in the midst of a terrified civilisation, and even when these horrors had for some time subsided, the French Revolution continued to oscillate between the axe of the executioners, from whom it had been wrested, and the stultified

emigrants who wished to effect a retrograde movement over a bloodstained path towards an unattainable Past, and all this whilst the threatening swords of foreigners flashed above the chaos.

At this very time there returned from the East a young hero, full of genius, who had conquered nature and men wherever he had appeared, and who, wise, moderate, and religious, seemed formed to captivate the world. There never certainly was a better excuse for entrusting power to a single man, for never was terror more real than that which pervaded French society, never was genius greater than that to which Frenchmen turned for protection. After a few years this great wise man became mad, mad with a different but not less disastrous frenzy than that of '83, a frenzy that immolated a million lives on the battlefield, excited all Europe against France, which was left vanquished on the field, weltering in blood, and stripped of the fruits of twenty years of victory, and with no hope of regeneration but in the few seeds of modern civilisation deposited in her bosom. Who could have foreseen that the sage of 1800 would become the madman of 1812 and 1813? Yes, it might have been foreseen by any one who remembered that the possession of unlimited power is ever accompanied by an incurable frenzy—the ambition that aims at grasping everything because everything is within its reach—and that this frenzy often leads to the commission of evil him who had before wielded the same power to do good. The life of this great man, so instructive for soldiers, rulers, and politicians, contains a lesson also for citizens. It teaches them that they ought never to abandon their country to the power of one man, no matter who he may be, no matter under what circumstances! This is the cry that springs from my heart, the sincere wish I utter, as I conclude this long history of our triumphs and our reverses: a wish which I hope will penetrate the heart of every Frenchman, and persuade him never to sacrifice his liberty, nor run the risk of doing so, by abusing it.

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